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ABSTRACT 
 
 Much has been written about the nature of the United States Army in World War 
II and the topic of military effectiveness.  This dissertation examines how the United 
States responded to a combat environment, specifically, fighting in built-up areas, that it 
had not planned to fight within before World War II.  By following three infantry 
divisions, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions through their combat in World War II, 
this dissertation investigates how the Army of the United States fought within the urban 
setting to see whether the American Army improved and became more effective as the 
war continued. 
 It argues that the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions learned and became more 
proficient at urban combat over time. This dissertation asserts that as these divisions 
embraced combined-arms operations in general, that is, mastered the coordination of 
infantry weapons, armor, and artillery into battle, so they applied those lessons to the 
urban environment.  Whereas the American military had neither doctrine nor tradition of 
urban combat before World War II, combat units learned to develop methods of fighting 
within towns and cities.  Further, the United States Army processed and incorporated 
these battlefield lessons into military doctrine at a slower rate.  The infantry divisions’ 
combat experience had a greater impact on army doctrine than the doctrine had on the 
divisions’ warfighting practices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  WORLD WAR II, CITIES,  
AND AMERICAN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 
 Upon landing in North Africa on 8 November 1942, the 1st Infantry Division’s 
18th Infantry Regiment had orders to take the town of St. Cloud in Algeria.  A small 
French colonial town of approximately four thousand people, St. Cloud had a small 
garrison including French Foreign Legionnaires and French artillery.  The approaches to 
the town offered very little cover, exposing the Americans to French artillery and 
machine gun fire.  The 18th Infantry attacked this small town in the opening hours of 
America’s war against the German Third Reich.  Men of the 18th Infantry tried to 
infiltrate into and capture St. Cloud but the regiment struggled to take the town without 
any armor, air, or artillery support.  The 1st Infantry Division bypassed the town as the 
18th continued to wrestle within it.  The French surrender of Oran ended the fighting in 
St. Cloud as well.  Lack of support, the infantrymen’s hesitation to fight, and the well-
prepared positions of the defenders conspired to prevent the 18th Infantry Regiment 
from seizing it until French forces surrendered Oran.1
 One year later, in December 1943, and after fighting through northern Africa and 
Sicily, the 18th Infantry was in England training for the invasion of France.  Because the 
“memories of Saint Cloud, Algeria linger in our heads,” the regiment began developing 
techniques and procedures for fighting in towns and villages.  Using a bombed-out 
British neighborhood, riflemen from the 18th Infantry Regiment consciously prepared 
themselves for combat in the built-up areas of France and Germany.  By the end of the 
 
2 
 
month, the regiment was satisfied that “a definite operating procedure is gradually 
evolving.”2
 Two years after the invasion of North Africa, on 20 November 1944, the 18th 
Infantry was enduring a nightmarish experience in the Hürtgen Forest.  Fighting through 
this heavily wooded area included taking towns.  Along with a platoon of tanks, two 
companies from the 18th seized the small town of Heistern, Germany house by house.  
After the riflemen and tanks took the town, five battalions of American artillery blasted 
apart a German counterattack.  Taking Heistern helped prepare the infantry, tanks, and 
artillery to take the small city of Langerwehe days later.
  But this training included only infantrymen and not the regimental Cannon 
or Antitank Companies nor the attached armor. 
3
 In one sense, World War II was not unique because armies have fought for cities 
since people first built them.  The history of the city is linked with the history of war.  
Cities emerged from a combination of agricultural surplus, religious reasons, trade with 
other cities, as well as fulfilling defensive needs.
  These three short vignettes 
help show that fighting in World War II included the urban environment unlike ever 
before in American military history.  For the Allies to defeat the vaunted German 
Wehrmacht meant grappling with it through Europe’s villages, towns, and cities.  For an 
American army with little prewar urban combat doctrine, that meant learning “on the 
go” to master that environment effectively as soon as possible.  
4  Walls around even the earliest cities 
indicate that people took the threat of attack seriously and the “sight of an approaching 
army ranked almost on a par with such natural disasters as famine, pestilence, flood, or 
earthquake.”5  This was in part because conquering cities has historically brought out the 
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worst in attacking armies with wholesale slaughter, rape, pillage, and enslavement.  Yet 
organized combat inside a city has remained a rare phenomenon.6  Nineteenth-century 
military thinkers such as Antoine de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz had much to say 
about how to execute a siege but nothing on combat within that locale.  There is an 
effusion of thought on siege warfare but there is a shortage of theoretical writings “about 
military operations within or against the city . . . Thus there is no foundation from which 
to build.”7
 But in another sense, World War II remains unique from past wars.  Not only 
was the scale of violence and destruction exponentially greater, but the ends for which 
each side fought also differed: the Allies asserted that they fought to restore a balance of 
power in Europe by achieving the unconditional surrender of Germany, not merely by 
conquering land.  Because of this strategic objective, the Allies cared less about 
conquering and looting cities than defeating the German enemy wherever it was.  As 
mentioned, cities often reduced soldiers to their most depraved level but this was 
generally not the case in World War II because towns and cities were tactical and 
operational means to achieve strategic ends; they were never ends in themselves.  Seeing 
the urban setting as a hurdle to overcome affected how and why American infantry 
divisions fought for them.  For his part, commander of Allied forces in Europe, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, kept Americans away from the most important cities on the 
Western Front—Paris and Berlin.  The Germans withdrew from Paris and the Soviets 
took Berlin.  Like Paris, German forces also retreated from major cities such as Naples, 
Rome, and Luxembourg City.  This perspective is important as the Americans in 
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particular fought their way through France and Germany.  As the 10th Infantry Regiment 
prepared its late-autumn 1944 campaign along with its parent 5th Infantry Division in 
Patton’s Third Army against the strategically fortified city of Metz, the city itself 
“loomed as merely another objective.”8
 What is more, the road-bound nature of motorized World War II armies made 
urban combat more common than before.  The Americans and Germans were often 
restricted to the roads because of their heavy reliance on motorized transportation and 
armor, thus giving hundreds of smaller towns and cities immediate tactical and 
operational importance to the extent that they lay along the axes of advance and retreat.  
For example, the Americans and British wanted St. Lô and Caen respectively because 
both cities lay on key road networks in Normandy that would permit Allied forces to 
pour into the French countryside.  The Allies’ need for a deep-water port to sustain the 
drive into France gave Cherbourg, Brest, and Marseilles high value.  General George 
Patton took Metz after great difficulty because he did not want to bypass a major city 
containing so many German forces.  Bringing lessons learned from the Eastern Front to 
the Roer River Valley, the Germans “transform[ed] every village into a menacing 
fortress. . . . The villages and towns were so numerous that they readily formed in turn a 
great network of mutually supporting fortifications” against the advancing Allies in the 
autumn of 1944.
  In this sense, fighting for urban centers only had 
value insofar as they helped achieve the Allies’ strategic goal of defeating and 
annihilating the Wehrmacht. 
9  In addition to the psychological effect of capturing a major Nazi 
symbol of German culture and history, one key reason for taking the city of Aachen was 
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capturing its road network.10
 Because of these realities, the Second World War provided hundreds of instances 
of urban battles, ranging from company-level fights for villages and towns to entire 
armies grappling within large cities such as Stalingrad and Berlin.  While the United 
States never fought for a city as strategically valuable as Berlin, American forces 
experienced heavy urban fighting within Brest and Metz, France as well as Aachen and 
Nuremberg, Germany.
  The Allies considered any bridge over the Rhine River to 
be a target.   
11
 The United States had limited experience in urban operations between 1775 and 
1941.  The most prominent nineteenth-century examples were street fights in Monterrey, 
Mexico, in 1846 and Fredericksburg, Virginia, in 1862.  In 1914, American soldiers and 
marines invaded Veracruz, Mexico, under President Woodrow Wilson’s direction.  But 
these limited experiences never sparked serious study of the nature of urban combat in 
the army before 1941, in part because the army lacked institutional memory and 
regarded fighting inside a city as the rare exception more than the expected norm.  
Therefore, the American soldiers who liberated hundreds of European towns and cities 
had neither mature doctrine nor a tradition to guide them.  Faced with this unexpected 
reality, military leaders stateside and the soldiers fighting overseas had to adapt and 
learn on their own.  During World War II, the U.S. Army did just that as it fought the 
Germans.  The first doctrine on the topic came in January 1944 with Field Manual 31-
  The high number of instances of urban combat in World War II 
presents an opportunity to study how the American military responded to such a 
distinctive combat environment. 
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50:  Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns (FM 31-50).  This manual 
emphasized the tactics, techniques, and procedures for combat within a city.12  Soldiers’ 
stateside training also became more realistic by 1943 to include taking a village and 
those preparing for Operation Overlord received training for urban combat, but this 
training receives little more than cursory mention by historians.13
 The U.S. military generally has performed well at conventional tactics and in 
environments that it anticipates fighting in.  This dissertation examines how the World 
War II American military responded to the demands of operational and tactical situations 
for which it had little preparation in a conflict that witnessed urban combat as it never 
had in the past.  It argues that although the Americans had not planned for the demands 
of urban combat brought on by the war, the Army of the United States, as a wartime 
military organization, gradually learned and adapted over the course of a war. 
  By 1943, the army 
had already encountered urban combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.   
Objectives 
 The primary objective is to argue that learning took place within the U.S. Army 
based on experiences in urban combat.  Learning and adaptation become evident by 
closely tracking how three American infantry divisions in World War II fought within 
this specific combat environment.  Military adaptation and learning is not a new topic 
but this study uses urban combat as way to highlight that learning, adaptation, and 
flexibility by examining how three sample divisions fought numerous urban battles in 
World War II.  
7 
 
 This study does not assume that wartime adaptation and improvement necessarily 
occurs; failures can occur at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels of 
warfighting.  For example, Mark Grotelueschen shows that American high command in 
World War I never fully appreciated the tactical and operational changes wrought by 
trench warfare.  As General John Pershing retained his faith in the individual rifleman 
and “open warfare,” the soldiers fighting in the AEF’s divisions slowly adapted to the 
rigors of combat in the Western Front in 1917 and 1918 by incorporating other weapons 
systems as well.14  Writing about World War II, Allan Millett contends that the 
Americans never mastered the art of close air support and problems plagued the tank-
infantry relationship.15  By failing to adapt to larger strategic and political changes 
caused by the war that they started, the Germans consequently failed to convert their 
smashing battlefield successes into political victories.16  John Nagl argues that the U.S. 
Army failed to improve during the Vietnam War because army leaders failed to see the 
conflict’s unconventional nature and never considered fighting it any way other than 
conventional set-piece battles.  The army’s organizational culture, Nagl contends, did 
not possess a “learning mindset” to allow it to adapt and adjust to the unique demands of 
counterinsurgency operations.17
 Contending that the Army of the United States did learn to fight effectively in the 
urban environment, this dissertation examines the organizational mechanisms that 
facilitated or hindered learning.  It evaluates how the three divisions’ infantry 
regiments—alongside divisional units such as artillery battalions, engineer battalions, 
  Indeed, this dissertation also shows errors and mistakes 
made by veteran units in 1940s urban combat. 
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and reconnaissance units as well as with attached tank and tank destroyer battalions—
engaged in urban operations.  It also considers the direction of the learning: that learning 
and attempts to improve came from both the top-down as well as from the bottom-up.  
Along those lines, this dissertation reveals that while the U.S. Army learned 
institutionally during the war, the experiential lessons that the infantry divisions gleaned 
from their own combat had a greater significance to those units than institutional 
learning.  There was also a gap between the more quickly learning combat units and the 
more slowly developing formal institutional learning.  That is to say, in many ways, 
battle experiences taught combat units more than did institutionalized doctrine and that 
the army’s collective combat experiences had more influence on doctrine than doctrine 
influenced the individual divisions’ warfighting. 
 This study uses urban combat as a lens to gauge and explore wartime adaptation 
and flexibility in the American army ground forces within World War II Europe.  It 
defines urban areas broadly and looks at the whole spectrum of small villages to large 
cities.  Each selected division conducted at least one major urban operation, but not 
before engaging in other smaller ones.  This project contends that the sample divisions 
found challenges to the urban combat environment but their reactions over time and 
space reveal patterns and trends toward increased proficiency.  These improvements in 
urban operations also occurred as the Americans honed their combined-arms 
capabilities.  Historian Jonathan House defines combined-arms warfare as coordinating 
the different combat arms together “to maximize the survival and combat effectiveness 
of others,” thus affecting unit organization as well as tactics, techniques, and practices in 
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battle.18
 While this project uses urban combat as a way to understand how a military 
learns, it is worth noting that most scholars studying military learning focus on 
peacetime.
  As the Americans enhanced their combined-arms effectiveness against the 
Germans in general, so they applied those skills specifically within the urban 
environment. 
19  In contrast to peacetime learning, historian John Nagl asserts that 
“successful adaptations of military doctrine in the course of a war are interesting cases of 
organizational adaptation under extreme pressure.”20  A note on terminology is 
important here.  The terms “flexibility,” “adaptation,” and “effectiveness” are not new to 
military historians.  Indeed, each concept has received its own recent treatment by 
various scholars.21  Meir Finkel’s On Flexibility examines how militaries dealing with 
technological and doctrinal surprise by successfully or unsuccessfully changing their 
organizational structures to meet that surprise.  Williamson Murray’s essays on the topic 
in Military Adaptation in War look at very nearly the same phenomenon: militaries faced 
with unexpected wartime conditions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and 
deciding how best to meet those challenges.  Finkel determines the nature of 
organizational flexibility and establishes what characteristics facilitate wartime 
flexibility but Murray only “suggest[s] how military organizations and their leaders 
might think more coherently about adaptations at the various levels of war both before 
and during combat.”22  Murray makes the excellent point that “not only does 
technological change occur in peacetime but the very nature of conflict, where the enemy 
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gets a vote, inevitably increases the demand for change and adaptation.”23
 Unlike the previous two, Roger Reese does not attempt to expound upon military 
effectiveness per se as to study it within the specific Soviet context of World War II.  
His opening chapter on military effectiveness is a reminder that while most students of 
warfare understand military effectiveness within the cold rationality of organizational 
science, it is fundamentally a social activity by various human agents who act within a 
cultural context.
  This point on 
the enemy’s adaptation only highlights the complexity of war as a social activity.   
24  Indeed, he lists “morale, motivation, unit integrity, and discipline” as 
the “bedrocks of military effectiveness” before introducing measurable factors such as 
technology, doctrine, command structure, or training.25  Elsewhere, Allan Millett, 
Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman use more tangible markers to define military 
effectiveness and describe the political, strategic, operational, and tactical layers to 
military effectiveness.  At the operational level, one element is flexibility and whether a 
military can “move rapidly in both the intellectual and physical sense either in 
anticipated or unanticipated directions.”26
 Scholars studying militaries in the 1920s and 1930s often tend to focus on 
technological changes, such as the effect that the tank or airplane had on combat.  They 
have paid less attention to how soldiers have engaged their enemies within different 
environments.  This dissertation fills a gap by documenting how the Americans 
repeatedly interacted within a specific environment.  In light of its long history, urban 
  One way to assess operational effectiveness is 
to study a military’s ability to be flexible and adapt to unanticipated environments, such 
as towns and cities. 
11 
 
warfare has its own dynamic and does not exclusively rely on any certain technology.  
Indeed, historian Roger Spiller contends that urban operations are even more peculiar 
than any other operation precisely because they are set in a non-natural, man-made 
environment.27  Yet, as the U.S. Army pondered over the issues of air, armor, and 
amphibious warfare during the interwar period, it never considered that urban operations 
would become more common.  Indeed, the only urban combat doctrine before the war 
was a four-page section entitled “Combat in Woods and Towns” in the 1939 Field 
Service Regulations.28
 Ultimately, this dissertation uses urban combat to test prevailing interpretations 
of the Army of the United States and its World War II capabilities to see if, when, and 
how, learning and organizational improvement took place in wartime in order to reach 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the American army in World War II.  This 
dissertation asserts that the United States Army initially ignored the possibility of the 
urban environment as a potential battlefield.  But during World War II, American 
combat units learned from their battlefield experiences how to handle the challenge of 
  America was not alone in ignoring the implications of 
mechanized and armored warfare in urban areas; no other army in World War II had 
thought that combat in cities would become more prevalent largely because combat in 
urban areas heretofore had been relatively rare.  As mentioned, the leaders of the Army 
of the United States had not developed doctrine for military operations in urban terrain 
that it could do for strategic bombing or armored warfare.  This army had to learn how to 
engage its German enemy in villages, towns, and cities as it advanced through North 
Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, and Germany.   
12 
 
military operations in urban terrain, and adapted by developing the ability to fight 
effectively inside Europe’s villages, towns, and cities.  This dissertation argues that the 
United States Army flexibly and effectively adapted to the unexpected urban 
environment and reveals how that adaptation developed. 
Historiography 
American Combat Effectiveness  
 One debate that has continued since 1945 is the effectiveness of the American 
army.  One prevailing interpretation is critical of American soldiers.  Martin van 
Creveld’s Fighting Power argues that the Wehrmacht was a superior organization to the 
Army of the United States in World War II.29  Specifically, he asserts that its command 
structure, view of war, replacement system, and discipline were superior to the American 
system.  For instance, the Germans stressed the operational arts to all levels of officers 
and noncommissioned officers and encouraged independent thinking and initiative 
across the ranks.  In contrast, the U.S. Army, he contends, had a top-down management 
system that told a subordinate how to accomplish his mission.  Van Creveld’s argument 
certainly demonstrates that the American military from 1941 to 1942 would have fared 
poorly against the Germans but does little to explain how his argument worked through 
later World War II battlefields.30
 Van Creveld’s argument attacks the organizational structure of the American 
army while others criticize the Allies’ combat effectiveness.  In his work condemning 
the Allies’ strategy, John Ellis’s Brute Force argues that the Allied victory was 
inevitable because they had more airplanes, tanks, and bullets.  The Allies used this 
   
13 
 
material superiority and brute force to slog their way to victory.31  Ellis portrays 
American soldiers as timid, overly-dependent on artillery, too rigid in tactical thinking, 
and often failing to exploit any gains made.32  Max Hastings’s Overlord continues this 
school of thought when he asserts that the American soldier had inferior equipment, poor 
doctrine (especially in terms of tank-infantry cooperation), and were ineffective soldiers.  
Hastings portrays the majority of the Army of the United States as inexperienced and not 
as well armed when it reached Normandy’s shores in June 1944 to fight a better trained, 
better led, and better equipped German Wehrmacht.33
 In his assessment of American military effectiveness, Allan Millett echoes some 
of these sentiments.
 
34  While Millett praises American military effectiveness in the areas 
of politics, strategy, and operations and recognizes that “infantry-artillery integration had 
reached highly proficient levels” by April 1945, he also indicates that this close 
relationship had consequences.35  Most importantly, this infantry-artillery closeness led 
to a reluctance to close with the enemy and retarded tank-infantry teamwork.  American 
soldiers were less effective at assaulting fortified positions “because such attacks 
required precisely timed fire and maneuver” for which they were ill-trained.  This 
reliance on firepower, he writes, is evident in both the Pacific and Europe.36  Close air 
support struggled because of interservice miscommunication and the U.S. Air Force’s 
unwillingness to undertake such missions; American armor also struggled because the 
equipment was not as good as German tanks or anti-tank weapons.37
 Not everyone agrees with van Creveld’s, Ellis’s, and Hastings’s views of the 
American army.  One example is Williamson Murray’s and Allan Millett’s A War to Be 
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Won, which includes strategic and operational learning.38  In contrast to Ellis, Murray 
and Millett contend that Allied victory was not inevitable, victory had to be fought for, 
and material superiority alone was not as decisive as other scholars have argued.39  They 
are critical of some Allied generals, such as Omar Bradley and Mark Clark, and identify 
the operational deficiencies inherent in American, British, and Soviet doctrine but they 
also observe maturation from seeing battle for battle’s sake to using battle toward a 
strategic end.  Murray and Millett contend that the Allies largely overcame this 
shortcoming as the war progressed.40
 More focused monographs on the American military in World War II, by authors 
such as Michael Doubler and Peter Mansoor, generally assert that American soldiers 
adapted through the war and outfought their German opponent.
 
41  In Closing with the 
Enemy, Michael Doubler delineates how the Army of the United States improved as it 
engaged the German army in different environments, including battle within forests, 
across rivers, against fortifications, and inside cities.42  In his chapter on urban combat, 
for example, Doubler discusses the fight for the port city of Brest, France, by the 2nd 
Infantry Division and then the action in Aachen, Germany, by the 1st Infantry Division 
to argue that the Americans improved over the course of the war.  Because he does not 
focus on one division and because he cannot show change or continuity within that 
single division, he does not document what the “Big Red One” may have gleaned from 
the 2nd’s experience in Brest when entering Aachen one month later.  Further, Doubler’s 
study does not fully demonstrate whether learning took place from the bottom-up or the 
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top-down.  He also does not reveal what level of organization most quickly learned: the 
regiment, the division, the corps, army, or army group. 
 Just as van Creveld was critical of the American military organizational 
structure, so Peter Mansoor also examines how American infantry divisions, the most 
basic autonomous military organization in the army, engaged the Germans in North 
Africa, Italy, France, and Germany in The GI Offensive in Europe.43  Opposite of van 
Creveld, Ellis, and Hastings, Mansoor concludes that the “Army of the United States 
accomplished its mission in western Europe because it evolved over time into a more 
combat-effective force than Germany could sustain on the battlefield.”44  Divisions 
gained experience after their first taste of battle, officers took initiative, and the army 
improved in the field during the course of the war.  Mansoor censures American 
generals’ deficiencies in the operational arts, as other scholars do, but this did not 
prevent the army from improving enough to defeat the Germans.  A major reason for this 
success, he contends, was because American divisions “were on the whole better trained 
for their missions, were kept up at a higher state of readiness due to superior personnel 
and logistical systems and were more cohesive than their enemy counterparts” while also 
sustaining themselves better than the Germans could.45
 This dissertation uses urban combat to test these opposing interpretations.  
Studying urban combat in World War II shows the different ways in which American 
divisions, and by extension the U.S. Army, learned during wartime.  While the American 
  He emphasizes more the 
organizational realm than the personnel.  With this focus on the division, he does not 
include many small-unit actions nor how American soldiers improved at ground combat.   
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army had many deficiencies in the early part of the war and the Germans remained 
highly proficient throughout World War II, how did adaption occur in the American 
Army to allow it to defeat the Germans in the context of urban operations?  Following 
three infantry divisions allow a comparative analysis of when, where, and how different 
American units improved in urban operations over the course of the war.  While artillery 
was certainly used against Wehrmacht-held French and German cities, it could not take 
and hold a city.  Tactically, the infantry did most of the fighting in a city and these 
divisions engaged the Germans at close-quarters in many instances.  Given the organic 
structure of the U.S. infantry division with its various infantry, engineer, reconnaissance, 
armor, and artillery units, did American officers improve their use of combined-arms 
teams (that is, infantry-artillery-tank-tank destroyer integration) to achieve the objective 
of taking a town or a city?  Further, looking at a division allows one to also evaluate 
subordinate units.  The entire division was not always used to take every contested 
village, town, or city.  For example, the 1st Infantry Division used only two reinforced 
infantry battalions to take Aachen, the most famous instance of American urban combat 
in World War II Europe.  This study therefore includes not just divisional leadership but 
also regimental, battalion, and company officers as well as the frontline soldiers.  As 
such, it disputes the van Creveld’s, Hastings’s, and Ellis’s findings regarding the Army 
of the United States in World War II by showing a definite learning curve within these 
three infantry divisions as well as within the army as a whole. 
 But Doubler and Monsoor also have their methodological blind spots.  Doubler 
does not show intellectual connection between Brest and Aachen because these battles 
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involved two different combat organizations.  That is, Doubler does not examine 
whether the 2nd Infantry Division’s battle inside Brest may have influenced the 1st 
Infantry Division’s fight for Aachen.  Furthermore, whereas Doubler has a brief essay on 
the fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, combat in this theater had a 
more significant impact on the European Theater of Operations than he allows.  This 
dissertation follows specific units over space and time to analyze patterns and change.  
Mansoor focuses at the strategic and operational levels; as such, he rarely dips to the 
regimental level but many towns were taken by companies and battalions.  This 
dissertation reaches below the division to see how noncommissioned, junior, and field 
officers and the various subordinate units handled urban challenges at the operational 
and tactical levels.  By following three infantry divisions through France and Germany 
this project takes Doubler’s and Mansoor’s works further and into more detail. 
Urban Warfare 
 Few works are written with a broad historic scope on urban combat and urban 
operations.  The few exceptions include G. J. Ashworth’s War and the City, Roger 
Spiller’s Sharp Corners, and Louis DiMarco’s essay, “Attacking the Heart and Guts: 
Urban Operations Through the Ages.”46  As DiMarco’s title indicates, these three works 
offer a macrohistory of urban operations.  Michael DeWar’s War in the Streets briefly 
narrates urban combat in World War II, concluding only that urban combat “pervaded 
every theatre throughout World War II,” including Burma, but he concentrates on 
Canadians and Britons.47 
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 This is not to say there is little work on urban operations.  On the contrary, there 
is a mountain of work but most historical literature on urban operations in the twentieth 
century is usually an attempt to create a usable past for the U.S. military and is often 
episodic or selective.  For example, the U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory 
analyzed twenty-two instances, or episodes, of urban combat between 1941 and 1987 in 
order to “provide a series of findings on MOUT [military operations on urban terrain] 
which reflect the dominant factors influencing” victory and defeat.48  Although designed 
for two different audiences, the edited works City Fights and Block by Block are 
organized by major urban battles: a chapter each on Aachen, Berlin, Stalingrad, Seoul, 
Hue and so on.49  Many research organizations have published reports on different facets 
of urban combat by selectively using past examples.50  Likewise, the Army Command 
and General Staff College has many theses and monographs that selectively use past 
urban battles to argue one point or another.51
 No one has studied urban combat within one major war.  The primary objective 
of this dissertation uses urban operations as a way of investigating military effectiveness 
as well as wartime adaptability and organizational flexibility within one military:  the 
American Army.  Its purpose is not to be a transnational comparative study but to focus 
exclusively on the Americans.  Thus this project, evaluating U.S. forces’ urban 
operations in World War II Europe, also fills a gap in the literature of urban combat by 
analyzing urban operations within one conflict.  This work defines urban areas broadly 
and incorporates small villages with large cities to explain how the American soldier 
responded to the full spectrum of this environment.   
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 As will be shown, the methodology followed is similar to such works as Jeter 
Isely and Peter Crowl’s The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War and Mark 
Grotelueschen’s The AEF Way of War by studying selected organizations’ wartime 
responses to the stresses and strains of combat.52  Grotelueschen argues that the 
American Expeditionary Force learned to fight the Germans “from the bottom up.”53  
This dissertation concludes similarly for American forces World War II Europe while 
identifying what top-down institutional learning also occurred.  This project is also 
similar to Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, which investigates 
the evolution in British and American views and execution of strategic bombing.  Biddle 
studies how World War I affected interwar thought, which affected World War II 
strategic bombing as well as how the experience of World War II forced modifications 
in both countries.54
 Van Creveld, Ellis, and Hastings overstate their arguments and Doubler and 
Mansoor leave methodological gaps.  The Americans struggled early on, including in 
villages and towns of North Africa and Sicily.  The reason for many of these struggles 
was because, at the operational and tactical levels, the American military was only just 
beginning to understand the nature of modern combined arms warfare when it entered 
World War II in December 1941.  The 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions reveal that as 
the Americans began to embrace a combined-arms mentality in general, learning to bind 
  Likewise, this dissertation shows how the interwar debates and 
changes affected the ways in which the Americans could respond to urban combat but 
focuses on how the experience of the Second World War also forced fundamental 
changes. 
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its infantry, artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, engineers, and airpower together as a team, 
so they applied that mindset to towns and cities specifically, thereby improving their 
urban operations capabilities.  Indeed, the Americans came to realize that combined-
arms fighting was the best way to capture European towns and cities.   
 Further, by the time that the U.S. Army grappled with the problems and 
challenges of urban combat, soldiers in combat units had already made this realization 
and, in many cases, had developed their own approaches on the basis of their own 
experiences.  The Army of the United States identified doctrinal weaknesses and worked 
to correct them by issuing new doctrine that embraced cooperation amongst the combat 
arms.  At the same time, the army and army group commanders permitted combat 
soldiers to share their own successes and failures with others, indicating that learning 
also came from the bottom-up.  Throughout the war, the combat units adapted and 
learned more quickly than new doctrine that came from the army.  The way these 
divisions responded to urban operations points to the thesis that the Army of the United 
States capably learned and improved its combat effectiveness, thereby permitting the 
Army of the United States, along with its allies, to outfight the German Wehrmacht. 
Procedure 
 As indicated earlier, the methodology of this project is to follow three selected 
infantry divisions—the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions—and explore how they 
responded to urban operations over space and time.   
 These World War II divisions each fought in at least one major city but also 
advanced through France and Germany along three different axes through many smaller 
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towns, villages, and small cities.  The infantry regiments will receive the most attention 
but this study incorporates the impact of divisional units such as artillery and engineers 
as well as attached tank and tank destroyer battalions, especially as the Americans 
learned to incorporate and integrate all its weapons systems into effective, cohesive 
action.   
 The 1st Infantry Division included the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments.  
It entered combat in North Africa in November 1942.  When it landed in North Africa, 
to seize the port city of Oran, Algeria, the 18th attacked and failed to take the small town 
of St. Cloud on 8 November 1942.  During the campaign for Sicily, the division later 
engaged in operations for the city of Troina by focusing on the hills around the city itself 
as it pursued the withdrawing German Army in 1943.  When the Big Red One landed in 
Normandy on 6 June 1944 with the First U.S. Army, it was already a veteran unit 
fighting under Major General Clarence Huebner’s capable leadership.  In October 1944, 
the division surrounded, attacked, and took the city of Aachen, Germany, the division’s 
major urban operation.  In early 1945, the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments took the city 
of Bonn with speed in order to capture the bridges over the Rhine River.  A study of the 
1st Infantry Division will include the few instances of urban combat in North Africa and 
Sicily to understand how these cases, along with training in England prior to the 
Normandy landings, shaped and prepared the division for French and German urban 
areas. 
 Second is the 3rd Infantry Division and its 7th, 15th, and 30th Infantry 
Regiments.  It, too, engaged in limited urban operations in North Africa.  Like the Big 
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Red One, the 3rd also participated in the Sicily Campaign as well as the fighting in Italy.  
The 3rd Infantry Division fought its way through southern Italy and participated in the 
Anzio landings.  While surviving at that beachhead, the 3rd Infantry Division saw major 
fighting in and around the city of Cisterna di Littoria, a focal point for German counter-
attacks.  After helping to take Rome, the 3rd participated in Operation Dragoon and 
landed in southern France.  The 3rd fought through southern France to the Vosges 
Mountains into Germany.  As it advanced into Germany, the division took Nuremberg in 
April.   
 The last division is the 5th Infantry Division, which included the 2nd, 10th, and 
11th Infantry Regiments.  Importantly, it did not engage in any combat until it landed in 
Normandy on 9 July 1944.  Its first taste of urban combat was Vidouville and then 
Angers, France, as part of General George Patton’s Third U.S. Army in central France.  
During the division’s involvement in the Lorraine Campaign, it played a key role in 
taking the city of Metz, France, as well as its surrounding fortresses between September 
and November 1944.  Within Germany, it helped to take the city of Frankfurt in late 
March 1945, ultimately ending the war in Czechoslovakia.  Unlike the 1st and 3rd 
Divisions, the 5th Infantry Division had no practical experience with urban combat prior 
to landing in France in July 1944. 
 Chapter Two studies the state of infantry doctrine and training during the 
interwar years of 1919 to 1941.  It documents the lack of thought concerning urban 
operations amidst the debates and changes in other organizational and doctrinal areas 
that affected how the army responded to town fighting during World War II.  Chapter 
23 
 
Three covers the fighting in North Africa and Sicily from November 1942 to July 1943 
during which the 1st and 3rd Divisions received their baptisms of fire and experienced 
their first taste of urban combat.  After the capture of Sicily, the 1st Infantry Division left 
for England to prepare for the cross-Channel assault while the 3rd Infantry Division 
participated in the invasion of Italy, the focus of Chapter Four.  On the Italian peninsula, 
the 3rd Infantry Division began to hone its combined-arms fighting skills and saw its 
first stiff urban fight at the town of Cisterna in May 1944.  Chapter Five takes a step 
from these particular infantry divisions and looks at how the Army of the United States 
attempted to learn and process lessons during World War II.  It reveals learning from the 
top-down with modifications and revisions in doctrine as well as from the bottom-up 
through various military periodicals disseminated through the army designed to improve 
how the Americans fought.  Chapters Six and Seven examine the fighting on the 
European Continent from the invasion of Normandy in June 1944 to the Battle of the 
Bulge that next December.  Chapter Eight covers the fighting from the Battle of the 
Bulge to V-E Day in May 1945.  These three chapters include all three infantry divisions 
fighting a resilient German Wehrmacht through urbanized France and Germany.  
Chapter Nine concludes by analyzing the postwar dialogue on urban combat in the 
professional journals as well as analyzing the 1952 version of FM 31-50 to see how 
much of the army’s experience with urban combat in World War II planners considered 
after the war and applied in formal doctrine.  This latter part—applying its World War II 
experience in a newly revised manual—will be seen as the culmination of formal 
learning and adaptation for the U.S. Army for combat in urban areas. 
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 I argue that, despite having no prewar preparation, American G.I.s and their 
leaders in World War II learned to effectively fight in the urban environment while 
simultaneously fighting their German enemy.  Most fundamentally, this learning 
occurred as American soldiers discovered “on the go” that they had to combine all the 
combat arms to maximize their fighting power within Europe’s villages, towns, and 
cities.  Furthermore, America’s combat units improved their urban combat capabilities as 
they adopted a combined-arms mentality and also influenced both American infantry 
doctrine and institutional top-down learning. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“AUGMENTED BUT UNDER-FUNDED”:  
INTERWAR DOCTRINE AND TRAINING 
 By most accounts, the period after World War I was a time of intense intellectual 
activity as military leaders speculated how they might fight the next war.  Indeed, as 
historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millett put it: the 1920s and 1930s were a time 
of peace but military leaders “engaged . . . in intellectual and technical jockeying” for 
doctrinal and technological advantages before finally going to war.1
 With a few exceptions during the interwar period, United States Army officers 
largely ignored the possibility of fighting any enemies within an urban environment.  
Further, while the army established some doctrinal basics that it could use when entering 
the many small towns and villages through Europe in World War II, it was not, in 
practice, prepared to do so by 1941.  This chapter investigates prewar infantry doctrine 
as well as summarizing the state of the army’s training before World War II, with an 
emphasis of the training done by the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions before their 
overseas deployments. Doctrine established the army’s intellectual starting points.  
However, an examination of army training reveals the limited extent to which the army 
had internalized that starting point. 
  Most of this 
jockeying centered on the place of armor and air power; the potential of amphibious 
warfare and airborne doctrine; and how all of these changes affected military 
organization.  Few expended intellectual energy on the possibility of urban combat in 
future combat. 
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 In short, for all the discussion within the service during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
army did not appear concerned about urban combat.  This inattention was common in 
both American and European armies.  Journalist and military analyst S. L. A. Marshall 
describes “a curious void in the literature of warfare” when it comes to urban operations.  
Through the history of military thought to 1939, few addressed urban operations: not 
Frederick the Great, Karl von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini, nor modern thinkers 
such as Ferdinand Foch, J. F. C. Fuller, or B. H. Liddell Hart.  Marshall notes one 
exception: an 1806 work by Prussian General Gerhard von Scharnhorst entitled The 
Military Field Pocket Book that remarked on attacking and defending towns.  In his 
work, Scharnhorst instructs how to fortify and defend villages and towns including any 
houses, castles, and churches.2  Apart from Scharnhorst, Marshall observes, “there is no 
foundation from which to build” a body of thought on urban warfare.3  With few 
exceptions, this historic negligence has carried through the twentieth and into the 
twenty-first century.4
 The same pattern occurs through America’s military past.  In the 1800s, Dennis 
Hart Mahan, an influential early American military thinker, was the main engineering 
and military science professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.  Mahan used 
history to teach military science and taught cadets the most current trends in permanent 
and field fortifications, concentrating more on building fortifications for defensive 
purposes and less on siegecraft.
 
5 Although West Point emphasized military and civil 
engineering, and therefore permanent and field fortifications, fighting in cities was 
nowhere in the curriculum. Mahan’s thoughts on besieging permanent works were along 
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conventional lines and he, too, was silent on urban combat.6  West Point cadets learned a 
great deal about military engineering and fortifications, some on siege warfare, but 
nothing on fighting in cities. This intellectual foundation logically followed the 
nineteenth-century U.S. Army’s primary missions of policing the frontier and manning 
coastal defences.  Indeed, during the nineteenth century, American soldiers engaged in 
major urban combat in only two instances at the Battles of Monterey in 1846 and 
Fredericksburg in 1862.7
 Neglecting the urban environment continued through the interwar period of the 
1920s and 1930s.  None of the major professional military publications, including 
Infantry Journal, Field Artillery Journal, Military Engineer, Cavalry Journal, Military 
Review, and the Infantry School’s Mailing List, have discussions of urban operations.  
When America entered the war in 1941, there was no substantive body of thought 
directing the army or its subordinate units how to handle combat in cities.  Further, there 
was neither training within mock cities nor any preparation for fighting within villages, 
towns, or large cities.  While the 1939 and 1941 editions of the Field Service 
Regulations addressed the urban environment (for no more than two short pages in each 
edition), a real treatment of this sort of fighting went completely ignored.
  As the army struggled to become a modern army in the early 
twentieth century and tackled other, more fundamental changes, it continued to ignore 
urban operations. 
8  The army did 
not rectify the situation until it published Field Manual 31-50: Attack on a Fortified 
Position and Combat in Towns, in January 1944.  As we shall see later, there was a 
dialogue on combat in other environments but there was nothing on combat in towns and 
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cities.  Whereas European and American armies in the mid-1900s did not perceive 
combat in towns and cities to be a topic worth planning for or considering, it is because 
the comparatively few historical experiences did not render it a topic worth planning for 
or considering. 
 While the American and European oversight is reasonable in the scope of several 
centuries of warfare, World War II revealed that the urban environment was worthy of 
special planning and consideration.  As policy analyst Alice Hills notes, “the urban 
environment is distinctive” because of the spatial closeness within cities, the challenges 
that arise from fighting in and amongst a civilian population as well as the “magnifying 
effect” that a city can have an operation’s “complexity, rate, scale, and the range of 
military roles.”9  These characteristics make the urban setting different from any other 
combat environment.  Former General Don A. Starry describes the city as a living 
organism in which there are “interrelated systems in the organic infrastructure,” thus 
greatly influencing how belligerents conduct offensive and defensive operations within 
them.10  This interconnectedness means one thing affects another in the urban 
environment.  For instance, as an attacking army cuts a city’s power grid, so it must also 
find a way to run hospitals and supply clean water.  Indeed, S. L. A. Marshall argues that 
an attacking army should gain control of a city’s water and electrical systems even 
before taking its airstrip, so important is a city’s infrastructure.11
 Further, the presence of noncombatant civilians, along with their dangerously 
tenuous status and place, is almost exclusive to urban combat.  Another exclusive 
characteristic is the nature of the battlespace.  As with the jungle, desert, or forest 
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environments, an army fights within and through the urban environment, not around it.  
Unlike those other environments, the urban battlespace is three-dimensional.  
Belligerents can use several floors or the roof of a building as well as subway tunnels 
and sewers to their advantage.  Historian Gregory John Ashworth observes elements 
common to fighting within cities when he argues that urban operations require smaller 
operational units, close-range weaponry, include the presence of civilians and 
noncombatants, are biased toward the defensive, and are manpower intensive.12
 Although American military leaders overlooked the urban environment during 
the interwar decades of the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Army considered many other 
facets of ilitary science that affected how it fought World War II.  These decades were 
charged with intense discussion about military theory and organization as well as how 
World War I had altered the nature of warfare.  This next section discusses the main 
doctrinal and organizational elements and what effects it had on the army in European 
urban combat.  The doctrinal and organizational changes made during this period 
directly affected how the U.S. Army fought within towns and cities in World War II. 
 
 Military theorists also debated the place and use of air power.  The Americans 
eventually concluded that they should emphasize strategic bombing over tactical air 
support or even escort fighters.13  Arguably, the decision to rely on heavy, four-engine 
bombers helped advancing American infantry and armored divisions by bombing French 
and German towns and cities days before they encountered those urban locales.  As 
tactical air support improved in World War II, one of its missions became the 
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preliminary attack of military targets inside towns and cities in World War II by fighter-
bombers with machine guns, rockets, and bombs.14
 Another doctrinal and organizational discussion was the place of armor in the 
army.  In the pages of Cavalry Journal, officers such as Major Bradley Cheynoweth had 
argued for the increased use of tanks at the expense of horse cavalry.
 
15  On the other 
hand, Colonel George Grunert observed in 1933 that “Horse cavalry can be organized 
and trained more quickly than can mechanized cavalry.”  Further, Grunert reported, “I 
am unable to visualize wholly mechanized or motorized armies on any future 
battlefields.”16  Another major debate for armor was whether to perceive it as an 
infantry-support weapon or as a fundamental replacement to cavalry and its traditional 
missions of reconnaissance, screening, and shock action.  In the end, the army decided 
that tanks served best as infantry support while tank destroyers targeted enemy tanks.17
 Pulling from their World War I experience, American officers disputed various 
aspects of military organization.  One issue was the question of how to configure the 
right number of support weapons within infantry regiments as military leaders realized 
that they could not rely wholly upon the rifleman.  Within the infantry regiment, leaders 
deliberated how to best integrate new weapons such as automatic rifles, machine guns, 
and mortars.  To bolster regimental firepower, planners coupled artillery batteries with 
  
The successful use of tanks as a rapidly moving, mobile weapon remained to be seen on 
the field of battle.  World War II revealed that one consequence of making these armies 
motorized and mechanized gave road networks special significance and the towns and 
cities on those networks operational value. 
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an infantry regiment to enhance infantry-artillery cooperation, thus creating a combined-
arms unit organic to the division: the regimental combat team (RCT).18  The United 
States had a long way to go in achieving effective combined-arms fighting abilities, but 
its infantry-artillery cooperation was superb by December 1941.19
 Military planners also reevaluated the best size, shape, and composition for an 
infantry division.  The choice here was a square division (one composed of four infantry 
regiments) or a triangular division (one composed of three infantry regiments).  The 
fundamental issue was whether the U.S. Army preferred firepower and staying power 
with the square division or the mobility of the smaller triangular division.   
 
 The above issues—armor, air power, regimental and divisional organization—
dealt with force structure and organization.  Americans also attended to combat in 
specific environments.  How an army engages its enemy in a jungle, for instance, is 
different than how it would do so in a desert or even a city.  Not all environments, 
however, were ignored.  The field manuals discussed jungle and desert warfare.  In a 
1937 Army Extension Course, special operations included raids, small wars and 
expeditions, river crossings, defense against river crossings, beach defense, mountain 
warfare, jungle combat, and winter combat.20  A similar 1937 Command and General 
Staff School document likewise characterized special operations as being night 
operations, attack of river lines, defense against river crossings, and mountain warfare.21  
What is instructive is that these documents cover how to fight in these environments but 
did not consider the urban environment.  The Infantry School’s publication, Mailing List, 
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published articles on combat in different environments, but its first discussion of the 
urban environment, however, did not appear until 1944.22
 Amidst this intense internal examination during the interwar period, the army 
also had to determine how it would fight.  Inasmuch as there remained disagreement 
through the 1930s about the specifics of infantry doctrine there was consensus about its 
essence: maintaining a strong offensive spirit.  This preference toward the offense in 
American infantry doctrine surely affected urban operations despite the absence of any 
specific urban doctrine.   
   
 The place to begin is the first post-World War I doctrinal manual, the 1923 Field 
Service Regulations (FSR), and compare it with the 1939 and 1941 versions, or the last 
two manuals before World War II.  One attitude prevalent in all three manuals is an 
offensive spirit in combat.  The 1923 FSR states that “the ultimate objective of all 
military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces by battle. Decisive 
defeat in battle breaks the enemy’s will to war and forces him to sue for peace.”  The 
manual takes the promise of offensive action further when it states that “decisive results 
are obtained only by the offensive. Only through offensive action can a commander 
exercise his initiative and impose his will on the enemy.”23
 The 1923 manual put into practice observations gleaned from World War I.  One 
of its chief lessons was the integration of more weapons than just the rifle and bayonet.  
Before World War I, American military leaders accepted the centuries-old assumption 
that the infantryman and his rifle were the centerpiece of doctrine.  The Great War 
forced Americans to understand that the modern battlefield now called for a combined-
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arms approach to waging war.24  For example, the tank appeared ready to provide 
necessary infantry support but not to necessarily effect breakthroughs themselves.  The 
FSR stipulated that “the tank constitutes an armored infantry element possessing 
protective properties that enable it to close with entrenched defensive groups protected 
against the effects of ordinary infantry fire.  Its essential mission is to assist in the 
progression of the infantry by overcoming or neutralizing resistances or breaking down 
obstacles that check the infantry advance.”25
 Doctrinally, however, the 1923 Field Service Regulations extolled the idea of 
maneuver, especially through the “holding attack.”  The holding attack worked like this:  
a secondary force would fix the enemy into their position, hopefully forcing them to 
commit their reserves.  In the meantime, the main attack would either envelop, or turn, 
the enemy’s flank or assault their front.  Doctrine preferred turning the enemy’s flank 
because it “enable[d] a superior force to bring into play all its means of action.”
 
26  In the 
attack of a fortified position, which is the closest the 1923 regulations come to 
discussing urban combat, doctrine extolled planning, thorough reconnaissance, and 
firepower through tanks and artillery.  During the actual assault, “resistances are as far as 
practicable either outflanked or reduced by envelopment.”27
 When Colonel George C. Marshall arrived at Fort Benning’s Infantry School in 
1927 as the assistant commandant, he took charge of the school’s curriculum and 
training.  Under Marshall’s direction, the holding attack remained doctrine.  While at the 
Infantry School from 1927 to 1932, Marshall emphasized the chaos and confusion of 
battle, striving to prepare the army’s junior officers to anticipate and prepare for battle’s 
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chaotic madness.  In field exercises, it was not rare for the future Chief of Staff to 
suddenly redirect a maneuver and upset students’ carefully prepared battle plans; 
introduce a surprise enemy force during an exercise; elevate subordinate officers to 
command positions without warning; or dispense outdated, poor, or no maps during 
exercises.28  At Fort Benning, he taught one tactic: the holding attack.  According to 
historian Geoffrey Perret, the holding attack was consistent with Marshall’s belief in 
tactical simplicity and flexibility because it “could be taught in less than five minutes 
[and it] didn’t matter what the terrain was like, what the weather was like, or what size 
force was involved—it was always the same.”29  As biographer Forrest C. Pogue counts, 
as many as one hundred and fifty World War II generals studied at Marshall’s Infantry 
School as junior officers while another fifty were instructors with Marshall’s emphasis 
on the holding attack.30
 Marshall also attempted to influence a wider audience with the publication of 
Infantry in Battle.  This work provided peacetime officers with a book replete with case 
studies of the chaos of war.  Marshall wanted to correct the American service schools’ 
false assumption “that organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that 
subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications 
work, that orders are carried out.”
 
31  In this work, Marshall stressed the pandemonium 
and confusion of battle as well as the complexities of leadership under fire.  Because, 
Infantry in Battle points out, each engagement is infinitely varied, officers “who seek to 
fight by rote, who memorize an assortment of standard solutions with the idea of 
applying the most appropriate when confronted by actual combat, walk with disaster.”  
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As such, the book states, noncommissioned officers and officers alike must “familiarize 
themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking.”32
 As these questions on force structure and organization reached resolution and as 
technology changed, so there was a new need for an improved doctrinal manual.  The 
army re-evaluated its Field Service Regulations, to modernize and revise it in 1939 but it 
would remain the tentative manual until fully revised and accepted in 1941.  As with its 
1923 predecessor, the 1939 revisions possessed an offensive spirit, recognized the 
importance of combined arms, and saw the tank as an infantry support weapon.  Like its 
1923 predecessor, it pushed the “holding attack” as the ideal.   
 
 Unlike the 1923 regulations, there was instruction in 1939 regarding the concept 
of “combined arms.”  These instructions emphasized the infantry-artillery relationship 
over the place of tanks and engineers and did not include other elements, such as close 
air support.33  Also unlike the 1923 manual, the 1939 manual did discuss combat in 
woods and towns under the rubric “Special Operations.”34  Officers refined the succinct 
1939 discussion in the 1941 edition.35
 In these grouped urban and wooded environments, the manual stated, the 
defender had the advantage and could make combat very difficult for the attacker.  When 
the attacker could not bypass or cut off a town, then the attacker should attack on one 
  However brief the instruction, it constituted the 
army’s only interwar instruction on urban combat.  Whereas there is no discernible 
dialogue among officers anywhere in the pages of the professional military journals 
between the world wars, the army nominally mentioned the urban environment in its 
doctrinal manuals just before World War II. 
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side, fight his way through, and capture the exits on the far side.36
 On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, the army published the 1941 
Field Service Regulations.  As with the previous two editions, this manual stressed the 
importance of offensive action: “Through offensive action a commander exercises his 
initiative, preserves his freedom of action, and imposes his will on the enemy.”
  Within this 
discussion of combat in towns, the manual stressed the infantry and artillery, giving very 
little room for armor’s participation.  Also neglected were all the major aspects of tactics 
of how to move and fight within a city, town, or village.  It was to be, basically, an 
infantry and artillery fight. 
37  
Whereas the 1941 manual reminded its readers of the importance of valid objectives, it, 
too, relied upon the “holding attack” as the prime method of achieving its objectives.  
The main force, as was discussed in 1923, was to either envelop its objective or to 
penetrate straight through the enemy’s position toward the objective.  But taking the 
1939 tentative manual further, the 1941 version devoted more attention to combat in 
towns.38  It highlighted the importance of sealing off a town by a flank attack whenever 
practical.  If a flanking maneuver was not practical, then a frontal attack must seize hold 
of the near side of the town and a methodical advance through the town must seal off the 
exits on the far side.  The FSR offered no tactical instruction on how to methodically 
advance through an urban location but it recognized that “the outcome depends largely 
upon the initiative and aggressive leadership of subordinate commanders.”39
 The 1941 FSR correctly foresaw that “the action within the town necessarily is 
decentralized to subordinate infantry leaders since lack of observation of the action 
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precludes satisfactory centralized control.”40  It also accurately predicted that aerial and 
artillery bombardment were important tools to reduce a town’s defenses.41  However, it 
discouraged using mechanized troops as inadequate for urban combat because “their use 
for such combat will probably result in excessive casualties, both in personnel and 
vehicles” later proved inaccurate on the field of battle.42
 In sum, junior and field officers in the late-1930s and early-1940s had only 
limited ideas on how to handle towns or villages.  They did not have tactics specific to 
that task, thus forcing them to modify tactics from other tasks.  How to operate against 
enemies in a large city, though, with its interconnected infrastructure, prepared enemy 
defenses, and larger civilian population was a different matter.  By virtue of untested 
doctrine, Americans thought they knew to bypass urban areas—villages, towns, and 
cities—whenever possible.  The army also thought that when forced to take a town or 
city it was best to use maneuver and flank the city in an envelopment attack.  If that first 
option was not possible, then a traditional frontal attack should first gain a foothold 
followed by a methodical advance that would push through to capture the exits on the far 
side of the locale.  The envelopment and frontal attack are consistent with both the 
offensive spirit and tactical options of all three Field Service Regulations.  Importantly, 
American doctrine specifically discouraged an effective combined-arms approach that 
included air, artillery, infantry, and the critical support of armor.  Further, this doctrine 
proffered little direction on how to advance through a town or city.  Important elements 
were left out but there was some instruction given.  During the war, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th 
  Soldiers would learn through 
the war how to use armor to their advantage in the urban environment. 
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Infantry Divisions would learn to move against villages and towns like they would 
against a fixed, fortified position: using a mixture of fire and maneuver and a combined-
arms approach of infantry, artillery, and armor. 
 While FM 100-5 in 1939 and 1941 gave scant help in how to deal specifically 
with villages and towns, other places in the manual offered direction, albeit after some 
tailoring.  The 1941 edition of FM 100-5, gave instruction on how to engage a fortified 
locality, which “may comprise a single, strongly organized position” or a “series of 
strongly organized positions disposed in great depth and breadth in such manner as to be 
mutually supporting.”43
 This view of a “fortified locality” fits more closely a description of the German 
Siegfried Line, or Western Wall, but a hastily defended town or village fits if one 
stretches the definition.  Indeed, cities such as Sauerlautern, where the city incorporated 
portions of the Siegfried Line, literally became a fortified locality.  Assaulting a fortified 
locality involved special planning and breakthroughs, which the Americans would not 
have to do when moving through French villages in late-1944 or German hamlets in 
early 1945.  However, similar to what these U.S. infantry divisions would discover at the 
Siegfried Line, attacking Europe’s villages and towns also involved reconnaissance, 
attacking during hours of darkness, preparatory aerial and artillery bombardments, and 
bringing in tanks.
  By seeing a town or a village as a “fortified locality” then 
American officers had a way to perceive and fight against these places.    
44  Related to how the infantry could handle a town, the manual also 
stipulated that “whenever possible, fortified localities are reduced by siege or by an 
attack from the rear following an enveloping maneuver to accomplish their complete 
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isolation.”45
 Alongside doctrine that offered limited assistance for conducting urban 
operations, it is worth examining what sort of training the army emphasized and then 
examine what the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions were doing before entry into 
World War II. 
  Despite giving little assistance in how to take a city, town, or village, an 
officer could modify American infantry doctrine from other tactical situations, in this 
case, planning to assault and breakthrough fortified localities, to use in the urban 
environment. 
 As a point of context, the limited budgets of the Great Depression and the New 
Deal restricted army training in the 1930s.  For instance, when estimating Fiscal Year 
1934, the army submitted a budget of $319 million as the minimum “which would 
provide a coordinated and well balanced military program.”46  Congress gave it $270 
million but after Franklin Roosevelt took office, his administration threatened to slash 
the Fiscal Year 1934 budget to $196 million.  These deep cuts led to friction between 
Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur and President Roosevelt; they compromised at $225 
million.47  Consequently, the different combat arms endured “severe cuts in ammunition 
allowances for training”; one infantry unit even rationed its toilet paper to three sheets 
per man.48  Indeed, those training to drive the new light tanks could rarely drive them for 
want of fuel.49  One enlisted man in the 5th Infantry Division remembered throwing beer 
cans loaded with sand (makeshift hand grenades) at quarter-ton trucks carrying the sign, 
“I AM A TANK.”50  Even if street-fighting training had been a priority, building a mock 
town would almost certainly have been out of the question for financial reasons. 
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 The other aspect was the army’s involvement in organizing and directing the 
Civilian Conservation Corps.  Politicians intended for the CCC to hire young, unmarried 
men to work in national parks and on other beautification or conservation projects.  The 
army was the only federal agency with the manpower and ability to organize the tens of 
thousands of young men who came through the program.  Army leadership saw the CCC 
as an unnecessary distraction and worked hard to extricate itself from CCC leadership at 
the earliest possible moment.51  For instance, the 1st Infantry Division’s 18th Infantry 
Regiment loaned 20 officers and 132 enlisted men to the CCC.52  It was not without its 
positive consequences: Brigadier General George C. Marshall described his assignment 
to the CCC as “the most instructive service I have ever had and the most interesting.”53
 The army had to make do with what it had during the 1930s.  However, as 
historian Russell Weigley describes it, the army in 1940 was one of “cavalry horses, 
artillery horses, and infantry pack mules.”
 
54  Indeed, as the war embroiled the world in 
1940, a lieutenant in the 3rd Infantry Division remembered that in America “peacetime 
training was slightly augmented, but the Armed Forces still suffered from under-funding 
and inattention.”55  When not struggling for money or competing for training time, the 
army performed a series of peacetime maneuvers to test its organizational and tactical 
changes in the field, namely the new triangular division, as well as the state of the 
army’s combined-arms’ abilities.56  In the fall of 1941, two large-scale, army-level 
maneuvers in Louisiana and North Carolina were “a critical testing ground” for the 
newly organized units as well as new weapons and equipment, thereby giving many 
Regular and National Guard soldiers their first chance to field test them.57  These two 
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peacetime maneuvers were indeed massive, involving a total of 740,000 officers and 
enlisted men, twenty-seven National Guard and Regular Army divisions, three armies, 
and nine air force groups.58  The opposing army commanders received strategic 
objectives but the means of accomplishing those goals were left up to army 
commanders.  Earlier maneuvers held in 1940 had been, in the words of historian 
Christopher Gabel, “playacting” but the 1941 maneuvers had been “serious business.”59  
Chief of Staff George C. Marshall intended these maneuvers to be the “Combat College 
for troop leading” for both the army and the National Guard.60
 Meeting days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, army planners and civilian 
leaders gleaned several lessons from these maneuvers.  One of the key deficiencies was 
small-unit fighting capability. Indeed, during the Louisiana Maneuvers, biographer 
Stephen Ambrose reports that a young Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower “was 
distressed to discover that company and platoon leadership was inadequate.”  Colonel 
Eisenhower, who was chief of staff of one of the competing armies, spent time moving 
from unit to unit directing, leading, exhorting, and pushing units to do their job.  
Soldiers’ “neglect of proper camouflage, their poor traffic-handling abilities” frustrated 
the future general.
 
61  Part of this problem stemmed from soldiers who did not take the 
peacetime maneuvers seriously and, therefore, failed to use cover, maneuvered in the 
open, or stood up to watch air attacks.62
 Leaders realized that they needed to return to the basics.  That is, they needed to 
redress deficiencies from the platoon to the regimental level.  The army devised a plan to 
offer remedial training in increasingly larger units.  Ultimately, the planners expected an 
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infantry battalion to coordinate a series of different assaults under battlefield conditions 
with artillery support.  This training benefitted small infantry-artillery forces, but did not 
include the other combat arms, namely tank, tank destroyer, and air units, thus limiting 
combined-arms training and experience.63  Between maneuvers, General George S. 
Patton pointed out these combined-arms limitations and deficiencies when he 
complained to his 2d Armored Division that “We still fail to use every weapon every 
time . . . Each time we fight with only one weapon when we could use several weapons, 
we are not winning a battle; we are making fools of ourselves.”64
 Inasmuch as these maneuvers revealed many problems in the combat readiness of 
the army just before the United States entered the war December 1941, they also gave 
commanders much needed experience in leading, supplying, and commanding large 
units.  However, it would take the pressures of combat for these units to iron out the 
organizational, doctrinal, and cooperative problems in order to defeat the German Army.  
While the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers were important and gives important 
context for what the army was doing before it entered World War II, we lastly turn to 
what the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions were doing before entering combat. 
 
 Between 1940 and 1941, the 1st Infantry Division went through the maneuvers 
that the rest of the army experienced as well engaged in a relatively high degree of 
amphibious training.  In 1940, the 1st Division participated in corps-level maneuvers in 
Louisiana.  These maneuvers were designed to further test the new triangular infantry 
divisions as well as to test the holding attack on which the Field Service Regulations and 
doctrine relied from 1923 to 1939.65  In 1941, with the peacetime draft in force, many 
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divisions lost valuable and experienced officers and noncommissioned officers to be 
cadres for the newly forming divisions.  The 1st Division did not experience these 
losses.  Instead, its strength increased in mid-1940 as it absorbed 5,500 conscripts.66  In 
December 1940, as Hitler’s power was near its height in Europe, two infantry battalions 
of the 1st Division reported to Maryland to help learn, test, and develop amphibious 
warfare doctrine.  These early tests involved rowboats in the ship-to-shore movement 
and oftentimes could not even land an entire 904-man battalion.67  These experiments 
were the starting point upon which the army would build upon through the war for its 
many amphibious operations in both Europe and the Pacific.  By August 1941, however, 
the entire division partook of amphibious exercises with improved equipment, including 
motorized launches, and more sophisticated doctrine.68
 In November 1941, the 1st Division participated in the army-level war games in 
North Carolina.  By February 1942, two months after the United States entered World 
War II, the 1st Division reported to Florida for jungle training exercises and later moved 
to Fort Benning, Georgia.  While there, training stressed “air-ground liaison and close 
artillery support.”
 
69  Next, in August 1942, the division left for Great Britain.  Originally 
this move was to initiate the Allied buildup for the eventual invasion of the Continent 
but the plan changed to prepare for the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa with 
Operation TORCH.  Overseas, the division’s infantry regiments rotated through the 
Combined Operations Training Center in Scotland in September 1942.  The training in 
Scotland emphasized amphibious warfare training.  Each regimental combat team, that 
is, an infantry regiment with its attached artillery, engineer, and armor units, practiced 
 
 
49 
 
disembarking and landings.70  The final exercise, according to one veteran, incorporated 
a night beach landing and movement up a “steep hillside.”71
 The 3rd Infantry Division, whose home base was in the Pacific Northwest, had 
similar prewar experiences to those of the 1st.  In August 1939, the War Department 
assigned the division to the Amphibious Corps Pacific Fleet with the Navy and Marine 
Corps to work out amphibious warfare doctrine as well as the specifics of landing 
operations.
  On 26 October 1942, the 
division left Great Britain and set sail for the port of Oran, Algeria. 
72  With five large-scale wartime amphibious landings, the 3rd became quite 
adept at amphibious operations but after this early training, “the feeling of many junior 
officers and noncoms . . . was that once a soldier had learned to clamber down a cargo 
net while carrying full kit, he was a trained artist in amphibious warfare.”73
 When the 3rd Division was not making practice landings, it also conducted 
division-level training at Camp Ord near Monterey, California.  In that training, the 3rd 
focused on soldiers’ fundamentals, maneuvers, and physical conditioning.  Sherman 
Pratt, an enlisted man at the time, remembered that Camp Ord was also where they 
turned in their bolt-action M-1903 Springfield rifles for new semi-automatic M-1 Garand 
rifles.
   
74  As Pratt recalled the days prior to America’s entry into World War II, basic 
training, field maneuvers, and physical conditioning governed much of the soldiers’ lives 
in the 3rd.  Aside from the amphibious warfare training received in Washington state and 
California, Pratt does not record a sense of urgency within the army.  Even into 1942, the 
division continued to train for an uncertain future.  As Pratt recalled, “the ‘Summer of 
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‘42’ at Camp Ord passed somewhat routinely. . . . Training continued.  Soldiers passed 
their evenings at the nearest post theatre, the gym, or the PX snack bar.”75
 This field and amphibious training on the West Coast made many believe that 
they were destined for the Pacific and because army leadership had distributed “a great 
deal of material in the way of maps and literature on the Pacific theater and Japanese 
army.”
   
76  However, this belief changed when the 3rd Division deployed to Camp 
Pickett, Virginia, in September 1942.  The locals warmly received the soldiers, Pratt 
recalled.  Although the soldiers replaced unserviceable equipment, they engaged in “no 
training programs of any significance.”77
 Unlike the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions, the 5th did not see combat until July 
1944 when it landed on Normandy after the initial invasion.  Life for the average 5th 
Infantry Division soldier was the usual routine in barracks, which contained “chicken s--
t inspections [sic], close order drill and monotonous classes and field marches.”
 In late October, the 3rd Infantry Division left 
with its attached units to join the 1st Infantry Division in the invasion of North Africa. 
78  The 
5th Division, however, did participate in two large-scale maneuvers.  On 20 May 1941, 
the division marched from its station in Fort Custer, Michigan to army maneuvers in 
Tennessee.  During one of these exercises in Tennessee, General George Patton’s 2nd 
Armored Division broke through the 5th’s lines at night and captured its headquarters.79  
Some of the more important critiques related to a “failure to carry out principles and 
methods laid down in the field manuals and training literature.”80  Further, historian 
Benjamin Franklin Cooling asserts, “nearly every critique following a particular problem 
pointed to inadequate reconnaissance, weak and nonaggressive leadership, and the fact 
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that the troops were roadbound.”81  After these maneuvers, the 5th returned to Michigan 
where it prepared for the Louisiana Maneuvers in September.  Heinz Werle, a conscript 
in the 5th, remembered that his fellow soldiers “halfheartedly went through the motion 
of simulated warfare and did everything possible to confound the higher command.  
Feigned illnesses and injuries ran rife.”82
 After these maneuvers in Tennessee and Louisiana, despite having reasons to 
continue training, the 5th Infantry Division deployed overseas to Iceland, the first 
elements arriving in September 1941, before the United States entered the war.  Soldiers 
of the 5th replaced British soldiers who then transferred to a more active front.  Iceland, 
according to the divisional history, was an “ordeal”; serving there was an “arduous 
task.”
 
83  Soldiers recalled that because the Icelanders were culturally German, they 
received their American occupiers coolly.84  Duties primarily included guarding military 
installations, manning observation posts, unloading ships, watching for German 
submarines, and cleaning up the flotsam and jetsam from submarine attacks during the 
Battle of the Atlantic.  It was inglorious and boring for most soldiers.  Veteran Michael 
Bilder remembered being detailed for an “elite” ski outfit within the 5th Infantry 
Division, but little came of this.85  Ultimately, because of their garrison responsibilities, 
training on Iceland was limited.86
 When the U.S. Army went to war in 1941, its doctrine pushed an aggressive 
offensive approach to combat.  This approach pushed maneuver with the holding attack 
and encouraged combined-arms battle, although military leaders typically defined 
  The division began to deploy in mid-1943 for 
England and Ireland to prepare for the invasion of France. 
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“combined arms” to denote infantry-artillery cooperation. Inasmuch as the 1939 and 
1941 Field Service Regulations paid scant attention to urban operations, the army 
offered little instruction as to how the army should move against a town or a city.  
However, by seeing these places as fortified places, the U.S. Army had an intellectual 
basis from which to operate.  An intellectual starting point only goes so far; the army had 
much to learn and many practical adjustments to make after they engaged in real battle 
with the Germans. 
 In many ways, the U.S. Army clearly had to grow and develop before it could 
effectively engage the German Army in combat.  As soldiers’ memoirs indicate, most 
enlisted personnel did not take their prewar training seriously.  The lessons learned from 
the major field maneuvers did not incorporate anything relating to urban operations 
doctrine.  The army was more concerned with instilling a more aggressive attitude in its 
junior officers than how to take a city.  Because of these more fundamental concerns, the 
army did not go in with a well-defined, well-integrated, or well-understood policy 
toward the urban environment.  The army would have to learn when it went to war.  As 
this study will show, it would learn effectively enough. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
“THAT TOWN IS FULL OF TROOPS”:  
 
TOWN FIGHTING IN OPERATIONS TORCH AND HUSKY  
 
 The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions first saw combat with the invasions of North 
Africa and Sicily in 1942 and 1943.  These two campaigns taught the American military 
that it had much to learn about modern warfare as well as fighting its German enemy.  
Actually fighting the Germans would force the U. S. Army to become more proficient 
and effective at combined-arms warfare as well as urban combat than when it entered 
war in 1941.  
 Northern Africa and Sicily are not heavily urbanized places.  Indeed, most of the 
heavy fighting in North Africa took place in the Tunisian desert.  Nevertheless, Allied 
military leaders deemed the port cities of Oran, Algiers and Casablanca, Morocco as 
vital to their campaign in North Africa.  Taking the hill-city of Troina in northeastern 
Sicily was critical to cracking the German defenses around Mt. Etna.  Further, the 
landings in North Africa and capturing Sicily taught both infantry divisions that 
advancing would necessarily require moving through many villages and towns in this 
war of maneuver.  There was simply no escaping the reality that modern armies were 
roadbound with their myriad of tanks, jeeps, trucks, tank destroyers, and self-propelled 
artillery.  Allied strategic goals placed a higher priority on the destruction of the German 
Wehrmacht than on capturing any urban center of gravity.  But Allied soldiers needed to 
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take towns and cities if they wanted to defeat the German military, especially as 
Germany defended those urban centers. 
 The role that cities played in World War II fighting showed itself after the British 
and Americans invaded a more urbanized France in 1944, although officers could read 
how Russian cities were affecting combat in the Eastern Front.1
 Fighting for North Africa’s and Sicily’s towns taught the Americans that urban 
combat hinged on two elements.  The first element would be the Americans’ own ability 
to master combined-arms warfare, that is, their ability bring all the various weapons into 
organized coordination against the enemy by coordinating their infantry, armor, artillery, 
and air forces together.  Fighting in the field also helped to teach the Americans the 
importance of mastering combined-arms warfare.  The second element would be how 
determined the enemy might be to defend these urban locations.  North Africa and Sicily 
would show that when the enemy chose to fight and defend a city, it could make it 
painful and costly for the Americans, especially as the Americans struggled to 
coordinate all their weapons into one concerted effort against the Axis defenders.  The 
3rd Infantry Division drew upon experiences gained in Sicily later on the Italian 
  The question facing the 
Allies remained only to what degree the enemy would defend these urban centers.  By 
the time the Allies landed divisions in France in June and August, 1944, they would have 
a much better grasp of how to deal with enemy-occupied villages, towns, and cities 
partly because the fighting in North Africa and Sicily furnished these divisions a starting 
point from which to act. 
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mainland while the 1st would later use these lessons when it invaded northern France in 
June 1944. 
Operation TORCH  
1st Infantry Division  
 The United States finally entered the land war against the European Axis powers 
on 8 November 1942 with the amphibious landings into North Africa.  This campaign 
provoked controversy in its own right.  Key strategic disagreements strained the Anglo-
American alliance because the Americans, headed by Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, 
strenuously endorsed an invasion of Europe at its earliest date.  In contrast, the British, 
led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, pushed a peripheral strategy emphasizing 
operations in the Mediterranean Sea, Italy, and the Balkans.  To appease the American 
public and his Soviet allies, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that it was better 
for America to enter the fight in North Africa sooner rather than wait for the cross-
Channel invasion later.2
 Allied military leaders planned a three-pronged assault on North Africa.  A major 
question on everyone’s minds from commanding general to the privates on the ground 
was whether French forces would fight.  The location of the landing beaches were in 
French-controlled North Africa and the subservient status of the Vichy government 
made it unclear how the French military in North Africa would respond to an Anglo-
American invasion.  As such, the British and American invaders hoped for the best—that 
the French would not fight the Allies and might even join their ranks—but planned for 
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the worst—a protracted resistance from the French and their colonial troops against the 
British and the Americans.3
 Both the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions benefitted from prior amphibious training 
to prepare for this invasion.  Targeting Casablanca, Morocco, the Western Task Force 
was under the command of General George S. Patton and included the 3rd Infantry 
Division.  The Center Task Force came under General Terry de la Mesa Allen’s 
command, who led his own 1st Division, against the port city of Oran, Algeria.  The 
Eastern Task Force, involving American and British components, looked to the city of 
Algiers.  Although all three task forces engaged the enemy in a city, their experiences 
were quite different, highlighted by contrasting the 1st’s 18th Infantry Regiment in St. 
Cloud and the 3rd’s 7th Infantry Regiment in Fedala. 
 
 The Center Task Force took the port city of Oran, which in 1942 had a 
population of 200,000.  In terms of its urban geography, the most farms, villages, and 
small towns were made of brick.4  General Allen planned a double envelopment of Oran.  
Battalion landing teams from the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments landed northeast of 
Oran at the small fishing village of Arzew while the 26th Regimental Combat Team (26 
RCT) landed west of Oran at the beaches outside Les Andalouses.  Elements of the 18th 
Infantry, reinforced with the 1st Ranger Battalion, received orders to take the village of 
Arzew.  Figure 3.1 below shows the seizure of Oran.5
 French defenses, under the Oran Division, included 100 airplanes, coastal guns 
manned by 4,000 troops as well as 10,000 infantrymen that could be augmented by an 
additional 12,000 men within five days of an invasion.
 
6  The military leadership was a 
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Figure 3.1:  Seizure of Oran 
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mix of anti-Vichy and anti-British officers.7
 Early on Sunday, 8 December, combat units of the 1st Infantry Division boarded 
amphibious craft to invade North Africa.  Toward the west, the 26th RCT landed near 
Les Andalouses.  In these landings, smaller villages were immediate targets.  Third 
Battalion, 26th Infantry (3/26) moved to the east while Second Battalion, 26th Infantry 
(2/26), without G Company nor its anti-tank platoon, set out to capture Ain-el-Turk.
  The unanswered question of French 
resistance concerned Allied commanders. 
8  
This move was to protect the regiment’s western flank.9  At the same time, G Company 
and its anti-tank platoon captured El Ancor, a small town populated by 2,000 
individuals.  Before landing, G Company’s commanding officer, Captain V. L. Ruwet, 
remembered that they had no idea whether there would be opposition to the landings nor 
to El Ancor’s capture.  Further, Ruwet planned his operation without the anti-tank 
platoon commanding officer because he was on a different ship.  The plan called for 2nd 
Platoon to move on the town from the east.  Second Platoon would signal little to no 
opposition by firing a red flare; a white flare meant stiff resistance.  At that point, Ruwet 
and 1st Platoon would attack from the north.  The simple plan called for maneuver and 
reinforcements from different axes of advance but no armor, artillery, nor even the anti-
tank platoon supplemented the attack.  The landing occurred without incident and 2nd 
Platoon sent up a red flare by 0400.  By 0430, Ruwet was in El Ancor talking to the 
mayor and chief of police.  G Company set up a roadblock and the anti-tank platoon 
reinforced them by 0800.  Despite the lack of thorough preparation, the small mission 
went remarkably well.     
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 Ruwet was relieved to see the anti-tank platoon because at 0830 three French 
armored cars weakly tested the roadblock.  This engagement constituted the bulk of the 
action that day for G Company.  Ruwet commented that he wished that his planning had 
been smoother.  He could make no personal reconnaissance and depended solely upon 
aerial photographs.  Further, the anti-tank platoon’s 37-mm gun crews only knew where 
G Company was because the beachmaster informed them after landing.  This situation, 
Ruwet believed, “only proves the necessity for detailed planning at an early stage.”10  
From generals to privates, Americans expressed relief that the French did not oppose the 
TORCH landings.  By 10 November, the 26th Infantry and the attached 33rd Field 
Artillery Battalion were in place to assault Oran from the west.11
 As 16th Infantry landed to the left of the 18th in the Golfe d’Arzew, both 
regiments advanced toward Oran from the east.  The 16th Infantry had the task of 
securing the division’s left, or southern, flank.  Like the 26th Infantry, the 16th targeted 
smaller villages and towns.  The regiment’s First Battalion (1/16) took Damesme, St. 
Leu, and Port aux Poules without incident or resistance.  The regiment confronted strong 
resistance as it approached La Macta.
 
12  In La Macta, the 2nd Algerian Infantry 
Regiment ambushed the first Americans from 1/16 who entered the town.  Because A, C, 
and D Companies were posted elsewhere, B Company and the regimental headquarters, 
with the aid of Battery A, 7th Field Artillery and naval guns from the HMS Farndale, 
took La Macta.13  By the evening, La Macta was in American hands.  By 10 November, 
these forces left La Macta and its nearby towns for the assault on Oran. 
 
 
67 
 
 The 26th and 16th Infantry Regiments experienced a small taste of urban combat 
with these minor fights in El Ancor and La Macta.  However, it was the 18th Infantry’s 
attempts to take the town of St. Cloud that the 1st Infantry Division engaged in its first 
sustained urban combat.  The 18th Infantry landed to the right of the 16th Infantry in the 
Golfe d’Arzew.  By 0120, Ranger elements were ashore and had taken most of Arzew 
already.  By 0430, over 1,000 men from the 18th Infantry were already ashore.14
 A town of approximately 4,000 people, St. Cloud lay on the 1st Division’s route 
to Oran.
  The 
regiment had begun its movement inland by the early morning hours of 8 December with 
little resistance from French forces.  The calm did not last long as 1/18 advanced toward 
St. Cloud. 
15  Its defenders included the 16th Tunisian Infantry Regiment, a battalion of the 
French Foreign Legion, and paramilitary fascists of the Service d’Ordre Légionnaire.  
Aside from these riflemen, there were troops with machine guns and mortars as well as 
37-mm antitank guns and 75-mm and 155-mm artillery from the 68th African Artillery 
Regiment.16  According to American military intelligence, the defenders were “second- 
or third-class military troops.”17
 The Americans may have rated the defenders low but the town’s architecture of 
stout stone buildings with brick and concrete walls augmented their ability to defend the 
town.
 
18  The division postwar history records that the streets were at right angles to each 
other thus “offer[ing] unbeatable cover for a small arms fight.”19  A low wall that 
encircled the town cemetery to the south was also ideal for defense.20 St. Cloud, 
according to one veteran of the battle, “rested in a shallow shaped piece [sic] of terrain 
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completely surrounded by vineyards.”  Because it was November, the recently planted 
grapevines were “stubby root sparcely [sic] planted and affording neither cover nor 
concealment.”  The defenders enjoyed the advantages of “at least a thousand yards of 
clear field of fire in all directions, good cover for themselves, a small amount of artillery 
support and the capability of inflicting severe losses on an attacking infantry unit.”21
 The 18th Infantry marched westward with C Company leading the regiment’s 
advance.  Three miles outside Renan, five French armored cars approached C Company 
but the Americans promptly destroyed four of them.  One escaped and returned to St. 
Cloud to make that small garrison aware of the approaching Americans.
  
Clearly, St. Cloud’s defenders had no intention to surrender, their first shots answered 
whether the French would contest the invasion.   
22  A few miles 
from St. Cloud, C Company lengthened its lines as it moved from route column to an 
approach formation and A Company deployed to C Company’s left.23  The Americans 
did not expect resistance but remained wary and alert.  Around noon, C Company moved 
into St. Cloud but took artillery as well as heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the 
French.  A Company tried to skirt to the south of town but heavy fire from the cemetery 
stopped the company cold.24  A few Americans penetrated into the town during this first 
advance but at a disorienting cost:  both A and C Company commanders, as well as two 
more A Company officers, were killed or wounded during this early action.25  In the 
meantime, B Company had to regroup itself after French artillery rounds had landed in 
its midst.  Platoon leader Lieutenant Edward McGregor watched mortified as “literally 
dozens of our men began running to the rear discarding their packs, gas masks, 
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impedimenta.  It was almost a rout.”  It was not until late afternoon that the company 
“got some semblance of organization” and recovered itself.26
 B Company was not the only company to struggle with its green soldiers, 
unfamiliar with war.  One officer remembered that “non-battle experienced troops tend 
to converge on whatever is firing on them, and in this situation [regimental commander 
Colonel Frank] Greer soon found all three of his battalions pinned down by effective fire 
from the town.”
   
27
 By late afternoon of 8 November, Colonel Greer directed his Second and Third 
Battalions to help with the assault.  The Third Battalion went into position by dusk north 
of and to the east of St. Cloud but did not participate much in the fight.
  As the gunfire from the cemetery and within the town stalled these 
two companies, 1/18 withdrew in order to coordinate a new attack.  After regrouping, B 
Company rejoined the battalion and posted itself within the cemetery along the town’s 
southern side.  So far, it had been purely an infantry fight with little artillery and no tank 
support to aid the Americans. 
28  Second 
Battalion moved quickly to the scene of the fighting and deployed south of St. Cloud 
near First Battalion’s A Company.  As elements of 2/18 moved into position, men from 
A Company cautioned that “that town is full of troops.  Our company is all shot up. . . . 
You better watch out.  These snipers will get you.”29  One forward observer for the 
attached 32nd Field Artillery Battalion remembered how he struggled to help his battery 
register its guns on St. Cloud in these combat conditions.  Upon asking if artillery would 
shell the French positions, someone informed him that, in order to avoid civilian 
casualties, no artillery would fire on St. Cloud.30 
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 At approximately 1600 hours, the Second Battalion as well as A and B 
Companies assaulted St. Cloud for one last attempt at the town, “using neither mortars 
nor artillery preparation so as to spare the civilians, if we could.”31  B Company’s 
McGregor ordered his men to follow him over the low cemetery wall and push into the 
town.  When he jumped the wall and ran forward, he noted that “it seemed awful quiet 
for so many men running.”  Indeed, only three men followed him; the other 40 remained 
hunkered behind the safety of the wall.  The lieutenant angrily returned to his old 
position, reiterated his plan again to his squad leaders, and threatened that “any son of a 
gun that doesn’t go, I’m going to shoot him in the back!”  With that, McGregor’s men 
entered the town itself.  As B Company pushed forward, the men moved carefully within 
the streets but a burst of machine gunfire killed the company commander.32
 This final attack rendered the First Battalion completely disorganized.  McGregor 
remembered that most units rarely used their radio.  The regiment’s operations officer 
mounted a bicycle in order to transmit information and intelligence; other officers relied 
on runners.
   
33  Command and control disintegrated within this Algerian town.  By the 
evening, soldiers from A and B Companies were isolated within St. Cloud but the 
battalion had lost all three company commanders killed alongside thirteen men killed 
and thirty-six wounded.  St. Cloud remained in French hands.  Upon reflection, 
McGregor was thankful he faced French soldiers during that first battle, for “if they had 
been Germans out there, we’d have been in bad trouble.”34  The night passed without 
either side trying to drive the other out of the town, although many trigger-happy 
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Americans shot at anything that moved, including those who gave the correct challenge 
to the password.35
 On the morning of 9 November, the 1st Division was determined to take this 
stubborn town in order to advance toward its objectives of Oran and its port.  Daybreak 
found the 18th Infantry strung out to the east and south of St. Cloud with various 
elements in and out of the town.  So jumbled was the First Battalion by the morning of 9 
November that Lieutenant McGregor received orders to lead a patrol to locate the men 
of the battalion, “never mind finding the enemy.”
   
36  It is not clear what Colonel Greer 
and his battalion commanders planned or discussed during the previous night.  Targeting 
French artillery positions at 0636, the 32nd Field Artillery fired a few rounds into St. 
Cloud.37  The 18th then renewed the assault reinforced by K/16.  Two platoons of K 
Company assaulted with the rest of the 18th and encountered “enemy rifle fire which 
pinned the two assault platoons to the ground.”  Third Platoon attempted to help by 
entering the fray but “further enemy fire, including small arms, automatic weapons and 
mortar fire, prevented the company from making further advancement.”  Some soldiers 
managed to enter buildings within the town and used hand grenades to flush out or kill 
snipers in the various rooms.38
 The 18th Infantry fared little better.  The assault companies renewed the attack 
but only small groups of infantrymen penetrated into the town.
  Altogether the company failed to move as an organized 
force into the town. 
39  C Company reached 
the village square.  Lieutenant Clement van Wagoner, a platoon leader in C Company, 
related his platoon’s role in that early fighting on the 9th.  Wagoner recalled that his 
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platoon discreetly avoided an enemy machine gun post as they darted toward the town’s 
post office, which doubled as a French observation point.  This position allowed the 
French to “control the main four corners of the town.”  A corporal fired rifle grenades 
into the post office, thus inducing the French defenders to surrender.  To stop a nearby 
enemy machine gun nest, Wagoner “lined the prisoners up shoulder to shoulder to use 
them as a shield so my platoon could move up.”  This method worked until the French 
fired on their own men to stop the Americans.  During this time, one soldier attempted to 
silence single-handedly the French machine gun position but received a gunshot wound 
to the stomach, applied his own sulfa powder, and received help to the rear.  Wagoner’s 
platoon was still “gathering up prisoners when we received word to cease firing and 
leave town.”40
 The regiment’s Cannon Company, consisting of self-propelled 105-mm 
howitzers as well as half-tracks with 75-mm guns, drove its half-tracks into the town, 
engaging a French 75-mm artillery battalion.  The men fought their way out when they 
realized they could not drive their half-tracks out of the town, losing one in the process.  
The company commander confessed, “we didn’t know what we were looking for, really.  
Luckily, we got out.  And, maybe, with more experience, we could have kept going on 
past them and caused real trouble to their rear.”
 
41
 By 0930, the regiment acknowledged that “progress in St. Cloud slow.”
   
42  By 
1100, the regiment succeeded only in sustaining more casualties.  The town firmly 
remained in French hands and Colonel Greer ordered the units to withdraw from the 
town again.  For Greer, the fight became a matter of will.43  This time Greer decided to 
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do what he had heretofore not done—use his attached artillery to shell St. Cloud before 
the next infantry assault.  Early on, the division approved the plan, telling the regiment 
to “concentrate [their artillery] and push through.”44  Greer’s plan had First Battalion 
renew the attack after a 30-minute artillery bombardment at 1400.  This idea, as recorded 
by an embedded journalist, meant “a creeping barrage through that town, starting at this 
end and working right over it!”45  Second and Third Battalions were to re-assemble, 
bypass St. Cloud, and continue the advance on Oran.  First Battalion would capture St. 
Cloud and then march toward Oran.46
 According to Lieutenant Colonel Stanhope Mason, 1st Infantry Division G-3, 
Greer had been “clamoring for a full scale Division artillery concentration on the town” 
since the previous evening.
  With this new plan, the regiment regained its 
focus on the division’s objective, joined the 16th Infantry westward, and kept an infantry 
battalion and a supporting battery of artillery to contain the French forces if not defeated 
by the Americans.   
47  In contrast, the division staff opposed the idea because it 
would surely kill many civilians.  Mason noted that here General Allen faced a dilemma 
that only he, as commanding general, could resolve.48 As the division G-3 journal 
indicates, by 1140 hours, the division had approved of an idea to shell St. Cloud.  As 
1400 approached, Allen decided that shelling the town was too risky.  Allen ordered 
Greer to keep one battalion in St. Cloud and have his other two battalions break contact 
and join the advance on Oran, rejecting the regimental commander’s plan for an artillery 
bombardment preceding an all-out assault.  The commanding general would not allow 
the artillery to shell St. Cloud for several reasons.49  Allen admitted that the first was “if 
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we bombard the town and then fail to take it by attack, it would be disastrous.”  Second, 
they could just as easily bypass St. Cloud.50  Third, Allen was convinced that shelling a 
town like that complicate the Allies’ diplomatic attempts to woo the French.51  Last was 
the civilian issue.  Allen said to Guy Ramsey, an embedded British correspondent, “‘I 
just couldn’t do it, Ramsey,’ he said to me. ‘Just couldn’t.  There were civilians in that 
god-damned place.  I couldn’t blast them all to hell.’”  Ramsey reported that Allen 
himself went to his artillerists to order them to stand down and not shell the town.52  
Determined to take Oran quickly, Allen spurred his division on by telling them that 
“nothing in Hell must delay or stop” this attack.53
 With that, the Second and Third Battalions of the 18th Infantry began to 
disengage from the fight and move to the west to help take Oran.  The First Battalion 
remained to contain the defenders in place and perhaps capture the town.  Having 
withdrawn at 1100 hours and the preparatory bombardment at 1400 cancelled, there was 
no further fighting in St. Cloud that day.  On the 10th, as the balance of the 1st Division 
took Oran, 1/18 continued its attack on the town.  K Company of the 16th Infantry, C 
Company of the 1st Ranger Battalion and A Battery, 32nd Field Artillery Battalion all 
reinforced the battalion.  These units renewed the assault on the third day in St. Cloud by 
0815.  This reinforced infantry battalion made significant progress and captured 75 
percent of the town.  By 1400 hours, Oran had surrendered and word had gotten to St. 
Cloud’s French defenders to surrender.
  
54  In the early afternoon of 10 November, after 
three days of urban combat, the 1st Infantry Division had taken its first town without 
major loss of life. 
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 One unofficial regimental historian, Frank Parr, put it best when he observed that 
St. Cloud was where the regiment made “the first full-scale platoon and company 
assaults launched” and that the French Army credited itself for “put[ting] up a 
determined and gallant defense, finally surrendering only upon orders of higher 
command.”55  General Allen stated that the French defenders “fought viciously, and used 
their combined fire power with telling effect.  All three battalions had been sucked into a 
converging attack, maneuverability had been lost,” and the French had repulsed the 
Americans.56  The regiment also revealed how inexperienced it was and how reluctant 
many of the soldiers were to close with the enemy.  McGregor pointed out that, “after 
the battle, I found the Battalion was completely disorganized.”57  Communications 
depended on runners because officers had not used their radios properly, thus hindering 
officers’ command and control.58  As the war lengthened and military planners assigned 
new operations, the division would have to make its soldiers more aggressive while 
maintaining organization within towns and cities defended like St. Cloud.  Leadership 
changes followed this fight.  The commanding officers of the First and Second 
Battalions were relieved.59
 The 1st Infantry Division also learned what happened when an enemy chose to 
defend a village, town, or city: it could make the Americans pay dearly.  St. Cloud might 
have held up the division from its objective of Oran longer had Allen not decided that it 
  Indeed, no accounts describe what Major Richard Parker, 
commander of 1/18, did, nor where he was during this fight.  Men of the Big Red One 
had fought hard but they would have to improve their effectiveness at future urban 
encounters, especially by utilizing armor and artillery. 
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was far wiser to simply bypass the town, and move towards Oran.  This operational 
decision to go around St. Cloud is why the action there remains a relatively insignificant 
battle.  Investing more resources into taking St. Cloud likely would have shown how 
well-defended urban areas tend to draw in personnel and material.  Allen’s choice 
prevented that line of events and, no doubt, saved many noncombatants’ lives.  All the 
same, as mentioned by Parr, the Americans only took the town when French high 
command ordered its men to surrender.  By 10 November, the 1st Infantry Division 
began to understand the difficulties in capturing a defended locale.  While the 3rd 
Division’s experience was different, they, too, suffered from similar organizational 
weaknesses. 
3rd Infantry Division  
 General Patton landed with the Western Task Force and received the mission of 
taking Casablanca, a city so fortified where a direct frontal assault was not an option.60  
Patton assigned the 3rd Infantry Division to capture Casablanca and its port while other 
units landed further north and south to secure air fields and land armor.  The division 
landed northeast of Casablanca, targeting the small fishing city of Fedala as a temporary 
base of operations.  It fell to the 3rd’s 7th Infantry Regiment to accomplish that mission.  
Fedala was home to approximately 2,500 Europeans and 13,000 Arab Moroccans.  A 
few coastal guns defended the city at Batterie du Pont Blondin.  North of Fedala was 
Cape Fedala that, according to the division’s postwar history, “provid[ed] some 
protection for the harbor and serv[ed] as a base for one of the two jetties which enclose 
the harbor.”61  Figure 3.2 shows the Fedala region.62  According to the divisional history, 
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the land between Fedala and Casablanca was “gently rolling, largely cultivated, and 
ideal for motor and mechanized operations, since there is a good network of roads and 
trails.”  Similar to Oran, military intelligence could not discern if the French planned to 
resist.63  Military intelligence had learned that Fedala housed approximately a battalion 
and a half of infantry, a few antiaircraft batteries and a coastal battery at Cape Fedala as 
well as two companies of Moroccan cavalry.  Intelligence also estimated three or four 
infantry battalions in Casablanca along with four companies of cavalry (including one 
mechanized company) and four battalions of field artillery.64
 First Battalion, 7th Infantry advanced into Fedala.  Unlike St. Cloud with the 
18th Infantry Regiment, there was an entire plan for taking the city.  L Company was to 
land west of Fedala to secure road crossings over the Wadi Mellah while the 3rd 
Reconnaissance Troop followed nearby to take enemy positions in western Fedala.  First 
Battalion landed further east.  A Company was to move into the city and capture a 
German officer contingent that intelligence believed was in the Miramar Hotel and then 
assist C Company in taking the town’s and Cape Fedala’s artillery batteries.  B Company 
received instructions to take the city’s market place and protect the battalion’s rear.  
Similar to St. Cloud, these plans did not include tanks; it was to be an all-infantry fight.  
All three companies received orders to avoid the Kasbah, or the Arab sector of Fedala.  
Because Western Task Force intended that Fedala to be a temporary base of operations, 
1/7 had to capture the city without destroying the city’s public utilities.  The battalion 
received instructions to avoid an urban firefight.  The men would land under the cover of 
darkness.  Orders dictated that no one was to fire on the enemy; instead, they were to  
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Figure 3.2:  Road Net Sketch—Fedhala Area 
 
 
 
 
“take advantage of the darkness and the enemy fire to work around his flanks, and to 
move toward their objectives.”65
 This first wartime landing, however, was difficult.  There were complications 
getting the naval vessels in line, forcing leaders to postpone H-hour by a few hours.  
After they launched, the landing vessels lost their way; some landed on the wrong 
beaches while others overturned in the surf or upon hitting hidden sandbars.
 
66  L 
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Company’s and Third Reconnaissance Troop’s western landings failed to materialize 
due to rough seas.  The 7th’s regimental history records that during these landings, some 
men were injured and others drowned.67
 A Company moved first into the city but met Senegalese soldiers armed with 60-
mm pack mortars and machine guns.  When Lieutenant William Tolbert asked these 
soldiers to surrender, they promptly dropped their weapons.
   
68  A Company continued 
into Fedala, passing armed, albeit cooperative, Senegalese along the way.  At the 
intersection of Moulay Youssef and Moulay Ismael, this mixed group rendered 
ineffective several machine guns, a 20-mm cannon, and 60-mm pack mortars that the 
defenders could not use because too many Senegalese were among the Americans.69  A 
Company secured the Miramar Hotel by 0730 but the German Armistice Commission 
was gone; C Company captured them as they tried to escape.70  As A Company finished 
its job at the Miramar Hotel, the Navy began to shell the Miramar.  The company pushed 
forward but it took nearly an hour before the Navy stopped the friendly fire.  A 
Company pushed forward to a casino and nearby park where they remained in a series of 
trenches to take cover from the friendly naval shelling.71
 Around 1100 hours, the company moved toward Cape Fedala, to attack a coastal 
artillery battery shelling the American landing beaches.  A Company’s Captain Albert 
Brown noted that portions of his company maneuvered towards the Cape “under cover 
of buildings,” trying to expose themselves as little as possible to enemy fire.
 
72  At that 
point, Colonel William H. Wilbur approached with a platoon of light tanks from the 
756th Tank Battalion.  Wilbur had just returned from Casablanca on a diplomatic 
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mission to encourage the French to surrender.  He had observed the threat posed by the 
French artillery to the landing beaches and the 7th’s slowness in taking them.  As a 
platoon of light tanks from the 756th Tank Battalion came near, he commandeered them 
to speed up the attack on the guns on Cape Fedala.73  Despite the lack of armor in any 
early operational plans, the 7th Infantry had tanks on hand to assist in their fight because 
of Wilbur’s foresight and initiative.  Despite the presence of armor, the tanks and 
infantry did not work in close concert.  Lieutenant John Rutledge wrote that the infantry 
advanced along the waterfront toward the Cape while his tank platoon moved to the 
infantry’s left, toward the Wadi Mellah to the west of the city, advancing fully 
independent of the infantry and exposed to any enemy anti-tank weapons.74
 The Americans employed 60-mm mortars, tanks, and infantrymen to focus on the 
fire control station and its surrounding barbed wire.  The regimental history recorded 
that “automatic riflemen protected men with wire cutters who made holes in the barbed 
wire for the riflemen to dash through . . . As the enemy fired from the upstairs windows 
of the fire control station, Company ‘A’ closed in from all sides in the final assault.”
   
75  
The tanks also pushed through the barbed wire, except one that tipped over in a ditch.  
Rutledge recalled that he and Wilbur maneuvered his tanks through the streets of Fedala 
but only saw action after they observed French pillboxes firing on American infantry.  
Inasmuch as Rutledge indicates little real infantry-armor cooperation, the tanks’ fire 
materially aided the attack.76  This early infantry-armor assault claimed five French 
killed, twenty-two prisoners, and captured three coastal artillery pieces. Later that day, 
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elements of A and C Companies took the surrender of French guns on the very tip of 
Cape Fedala.77
 The friendly naval shelling that disrupted A Company’s formation at the 
Miramar Hotel also disrupted C Company as it moved through the southern part of the 
city toward a racetrack and an anti-aircraft battery.  The company advanced through 
Fedala’s streets to neutralize the battery.  As they approached the objective, the 
company’s executive officer and acting commander, 1st Lieutenant Virgil Smith, posted 
machine guns and mortars to fire on the French.  Smith recorded that “the men seemed 
very anxious to get a crack at the enemy.”
  
78
 In contrast to later battles in Europe, Fedala was a small action.  Two infantry 
companies and a platoon of tanks captured the city with relative ease and minimal loss.  
By the afternoon, it was firmly within American hands.  One more small action on 10 
November also revealed the stress on infantry in the Americans’ doctrine.   
  During the fight, a false surrender resulted 
in one lieutenant and sergeant wounded by the French.  As Smith gave the signal for his 
machine guns and mortars to fire, the French surrendered for real, thus ending the fight 
for the anti-aircraft battery. 
 By 9 November, the men were quite tired from their march from the landing 
beaches.  According to Captain L. J. Hruska, “loads which should have been carried by 
six men had to be carried by five and in some cases by four men.”79   Late on 10 
November, the men of 2/7 were moving toward Casablanca without its self-propelled 
artillery or armor.80  Hruska noted that they proceeded with a little daylight remaining, 
the advanced guard reported enemy activity to their front: the French had constructed a 
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roadblock “of overturned ore cars, defended by riflemen with automatic weapons” at 
Beaulieu-ain-Saba, at the outskirts of Casablanca.81  H Company’s Captain Gilbert St. 
Clair recalled that his company brought up the rear of the tired column.  When the men 
“reached Ain Sebah, and it was still at least one hour before daylight; we were in the 
midst of houses, walled gardens, factories, and toward the front as well as on all sides, a 
few yards away, complete darkness.”82  Figure 3.3 shows regimental movements on 10 
and 11 November 1942.83
 Artillery also began to fall on the Americans’ position on apparently prearranged 
lines giving that the impression to Company F’s Captain Curtis Tigard that “we had 
made contact with an enemy in well prepared positions, with ample artillery support.”
 
84  
It became evident to Second Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Rafael L. 
Salzmann that “the enemy had posted patrols and snipers in buildings and behind walls 
in advance of their [main line of resistance],” thus bringing fire from all directions.85  
The battalion remained stalled until morning came a few hours later but they did not wait 
to prepare an attack.  Salzmann ordered the battalion’s other companies to move to E’s 
left and south to flank the French position.  As morning dawned, E Company riflemen 
were able to silence some of the artillery that had been firing on their position.86
 With morning’s light, the battalion launched a holding attack: E Company pinned 
the French to their position as the rest of the battalion attacked from E’s left but there 
was confusion within the company.  The death of F Company’s commanding officer 
  Early 
in this small action, the company commanders of E and F Companies were wounded and 
killed, respectively. 
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 Figure 3.3:  7th Infantry Assaults and Enters Casablanca, 10-11 November 
1942 
 
 
 
 
caused confusion and the lack of adequate communications did not help because the 
attacking units did not move in concert with one another due to confusion among the 
officers and malfunctioning radios.87  Indeed, G Company reported that the company 
commander momentarily lost three-fourths of his company because he did not receive 
word of the leftward envelopment under the direction of the battalion commander.88  
Nevertheless, Salzmann’s holding attack was sufficient to silence the roadblock in 
Beaulieu-Ain-Saba.  One regimental history described that “small groups of American 
assault troops made their way forward as best they could.  These men, primarily from F 
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and G Companies, were carrying out Salzman’s [sic] flanking order.  They covered one 
another and advanced in small bursts, killing enemy riflemen and machine gunners or 
forcing them to flee.”89
 As 2/7 assaulted its suburb of Casablanca, Beaulieu-ain-Saba, so First Battalion 
assaulted Camp de la Jonquiere.  The battalion’s focus was on a barracks in Jonquiere, 
not the town itself.  The attack did not include tanks only because they had not enough 
fuel.  Despite the use of the supporting arms, the attack bogged down; by morning of 11 
November, the battalion had not taken the barracks.  On the evening of 10-11 November, 
the assistant division commander, Brigadier General William W. Eagles, ordered the 7th 
to continue the assault into Casablanca.  The 15th Infantry and 67th Armored Infantry 
Regiments were to come alongside and join the 7th into Casablanca.  The regiment’s 
cannon company was to offer “general support” but the 756th Tank Battalion would “be 
initially in reserve, prepared to attack in the left of the Regimental zone.”  Artillery 
gunfire and dive bombers were to precede the infantry attack at 0700.  What marked 
these plans was the low-level of infantry-tank cooperation for this attack into 
Casablanca.  Before the attack could begin, the French in Casablanca surrendered the 
city.
  
90
 After taking their objectives, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions settled down for 
an uncertain future.  Fate had different roles for them.  The 1st moved rapidly eastward 
to fight the Germans in Tunisia’s hilly terrain, gaining combat experience at Longstop 
Hill, Kasserine Pass, and El Guettar.  The 3rd remained in Casablanca and endured what 
they called the “North African Interlude.”  After the collapse of the vaunted German 
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Afrika Korps in early 1943, the Allies turned their attention toward the Mediterranean 
island of Sicily.  
Operation HUSKY  
 The decision to invade Sicily in July 1943 was much less controversial than that 
to invade North Africa in November 1942.  Despite the concern of American military 
leaders that it would lead to an invasion of Italy, something they wanted to avoid, 
American and British leaders understood that it was necessary to gain control of the 
Mediterranean’s shipping lanes while also diverting German forces from the Eastern 
Front before launching a legitimate Second Front in 1944.91
 Topographically and geographically, Sicily was more urban than North Africa.  
As the 3rd Infantry Division’s new commanding general, Lucian K. Truscott, observed: 
  In mid-July, a second 
Anglo-American invasion force planned and executed another amphibious landing in 
Sicily.   
“The country seems to be predominantly agricultural, but at least 95% of the 
population lives in the towns and villages.  These towns nearly all date from 
medieval days, houses are usually of stone, close packed beside narrow streets, 
and filled with unwashed women, children, and men living and playing in the 
filth of the barnyards which are the streets . . . Most of the towns and villages are 
built upon hill tops accessible by steep rocky roads.”92
 Both infantry divisions formed part of the Seventh U.S. Army and received pre-
landing training in North Africa at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center.  The 30th 
Infantry’s postwar history lists the training as including “night attacks, infiltration, 
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demolitions, destruction of armored vehicles and obstacles, air-ground communications, 
support fire and smoke, and supply.”  The center included realistic exercises such as 
attacks on pillboxes, attacking enemy tanks, street fighting, and assaulting enemy 
defenses.93  These divisions received street fighting training but there is little description 
of what it included.  Don Whitehead, correspondent for the Associated Press, recorded 
that the center “schooled the troops in street fighting and house-to-house fighting in a 
little shantytown build for the purpose.”94  The 30th Infantry held exercises that included 
“Dummy houses [that] were constructed to provide training in street fighting, and the 
activities of teams were timed so closely that soldiers advanced through the covering fire 
of their own supporting elements in perfect confidence.”95
 The center also taught teams of twelve soldiers to assault isolated buildings.  
Doctrine here harkened to Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall’s holding attack 
whereby support and flanking forces kept a strong fire on the building or house, allowing 
the entry and assault teams to approach as well as gun down anyone who tried to escape.  
The entry team of two riflemen forced entry into the building through a window or door 
and the assault team of three men assaulted immediately afterwards.
 
96  The army was 
improving its training methods and showed that it understood that combat would 
encompass a wider array of environments.  Indeed, as it planned the next campaign, the 
3rd Division created a special “street fighting unit,” but its postwar history did not 
specify details of that unit.97
 An important element of learning how to conduct street fighting included how 
much these three infantry divisions combined its combat arms, that is, its organic 
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infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, and engineers with attached tanks, tank destroyers, 
and any supporting airpower, to capture Europe’s towns and cities.  According to the 
description from the Invasion Training Center, there were few infantry-tank-artillery 
exercises.  Inasmuch as the 1st Infantry Division landed on its beaches with the light 
tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, it is uncertain whether they trained together before 
landing in Sicily.  The 3rd Infantry Division had little to no training with armor.   
 Therefore, combined-arms warfare was not high on these divisions’ list of 
priorities.  In fact, the 3rd Infantry Division landed on Sicily without any armor support 
whatsoever.  Their records show that tanks were not used by the 3rd until quite late in 
the campaign.  Nor is there any indication that division leaders asked for armor but never 
received it.  Truscott’s memoir, for example, devotes more pages relating how he 
convinced his naval counterpart to load transport mules aboard his naval vessel than any 
struggle to get a tank battalion to accompany his division.98  A close look at the 7th 
Infantry’s training shows that, quite possibly, no one considered the need for armor-
infantry-artillery cooperation within this division.  By the last week of May 1943, the 
regiment endured close-order drill, rigorous physical conditioning, exercises in 
assaulting pillboxes, and several night attack problems.  None of these involved tanks.99  
The rigorous physical conditioning likely included what the men dubbed the “Truscott 
Trot”:  covering five miles an hour for the first hour, four miles an hour for the next two 
hours, and three and one-half miles an hour until they had marched 30 miles.100  
Inasmuch as the army was beginning to provide its men with more realistic training, it 
still had room for improvement. 
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 On 10 July 1943, Patton’s Seventh U.S. Army landed the 3rd, 1st, and 45th 
Infantry Divisions on the southern side of Sicily.  Figure 3.4 shows the Allies’ invasion 
of Sicily.101
1st Infantry Division  
  3rd Division units disembarked astride the small port city of Licata on the 
Seventh Army’s left flank.  The 1st came ashore in the middle, just east of the small port 
at Gela, and the 45th landed near Scoglitti further to the east.  Patton commanded the 
American contingent but British Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander commanded the 
combined Anglo-American invasion.  It would soon become clear that Alexander only 
intended to use the Americans to guard the British left flank while Field Marshal 
Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army made the principal drive up the island’s eastern 
side to capture Messina.  This decision affected Patton’s command and leadership during 
the campaign. 
 The Big Red One captured many towns along its line of advance through Sicily.  
However, it encountered little resistance inside most of them as German units 
continually withdrew toward Messina in the island’s northeastern corner and the Italian 
Army simply collapsed and surrendered.  There was no action similar to St. Cloud and 
there was no combat in these towns of the sort they would face on mainland Europe 
from 1944 to 1945.  However, the division could not have known that and had to plan as 
if they would fight for each town.  Consequently, it is worthwhile to examine how the 
1st Infantry Division maneuvered within this environment, assuming that unsure reality.  
Its largest urban operation to date would be the division’s costliest engagement in the 
Sicily campaign: the battle for Troina from 31 July to 6 August.  That battle showed   
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Figure 3.4:  The Final Landing Plan 
 
 
 
 
important shifts in attitudes since the small fight for St. Cloud the previous November.  
 The 1st Division landed east of Gela on 10 July and spent the first three days 
fending off intense Axis armored counterattacks.  Once the division secured the 
beachhead, it moved northward into the hilly terrain that marks most of Sicily.  By 13 
July, a wartime history reported, the Italians and Germans “were in general retreat, and 
from that time on Italian troops fought indifferently and deserted in large numbers when 
the opportunity was present.  However, Germans fought desperate rear-guard actions 
with definite orders to hold to the last man.”102
 By 16 July, the town of Barrafranca became a target for the 26th Infantry.  
Important in capturing Barrafranca was the presence of supporting American tanks.  
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Unlike the 3rd Infantry Division, elements of the 1st had tanks alongside them 
throughout much of this campaign.  The Germans took a Barrafranca that was 
geographically built for fortification and added to it by guarding the approaches.103  The 
topography was such that the 26th Infantry used its rifle battalions and the light tanks of 
the 70th Tank Battalion to take the hills and maneuver the Germans out of Barrafranca.  
Late on 15 July, the 26th Infantry encountered stiff armored resistance for these hilltop 
positions around the town as German tanks nearly overran American infantry 
positions.104  During the fighting on 16 July, withdrawing American positions drew the 
Germans into a pursuit and allowed the American artillery to pound the German advance 
while “tanks were used with reckless abandon as they plunged down the hills and 
attempted a major breakthrough.”105
 The battalions reorganized themselves on the afternoon of the 16th and pushed 
toward Barrafranca but the Germans had withdrawn.  The 70th Tank Battalion entered 
Barrafranca in the early evening while the 26th redirected its efforts to the west.
   
106
 These tanks remained with the 26th Infantry as the infantry pushed toward 
Alimena and Bompietro days later.  On 19 July, the regiment targeted Alimena, making 
the city early on Wednesday, 21 July.  Second and Third Battalions took the hills 
adjacent to the town; 2/26 then moved on the town itself.  When the battalion noticed 
  
Inasmuch as there was no urban combat proper in this small battle, it helped the 1st 
Division push towards Caltanissetta, a more important divisional goal.  Further, this 
action against Barrafranca showed infantry working alongside armor, helping realize 
armor’s necessity in these fights.   
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German armor, it called for the 70th Tank Battalion but advanced without them when the 
German tanks withdrew.  Tanks were more instrumental as First and Third Battalions 
occupied adjacent hills.  The division’s operational diary recorded that by 0524 hours, 
2/26 “was in the outskirts of Alimena and receiving small arms and mortar fire.”107  By 
0830, the regiment had been fighting for approximately five hours in Alimena and a 
considerable amount of sniping remained in the town by 1530.108  The 26th Infantry 
daily report stated that 2/26 handled this sniper opposition by proceeding “street by 
street, almost house by house, to eliminate the points of opposition . . . it was a slow 
process.”  Tanks eventually entered Alimena to help clean out the snipers as the 
regiment shifted its focus to Bompietro.109  Most prisoners were Italians as the Germans 
withdrew the day before on the 20th.110  Figure 3.5 shows the area of Sicily in which this 
fighting occurred.111
 The Germans had blown the bridges across rivers toward Bompietro, stalling the 
American advance.  Nevertheless, on 21 to 22 July, soldiers from the 26th Infantry 
closely worked with tanks in a battle that also included air support and the division’s 
artillery.  Men from 1/26 and tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion moved north toward 
Bompietro.  Armor moved ahead of the infantry toward Bompietro until German anti-
tank fire stalled the advance.  By 0800, the battalion commander reported that “we are 
having one hell of a fight around Bompietro and need all support we can get.”
 
112  By 
0900, the infantry called for a bombing mission on Bompietro but higher commands 
initially denied their requests because “Gen Bradley says there will be no bombing of 
cities.”113  Bombers dropped ordnance by 0940, tragically including some  
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Figure 3.5:  II Corps Advance, 24-31 July 1943 
 
 
 
 
that fell on American soldiers and tanks.114  The 70th Tank Battalion suffered another 
friendly-fire incident from American bombers at 1300.115  These accidents, along with 
the heavy German resistance, stalled the advance until 1800 when infantry, tank, and 
artillery officers conceived a new plan.  At 1800, division and corps artillery laid an 
intense barrage on and around Bompietro.  The tanks and infantry followed the barrage 
with the tanks moving into the town and the infantry to the high ground north of the 
town.  The 26th Infantry’s Third Battalion accompanied the tanks into Bompietro to 
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clear the town of snipers.116  When the new attack began, the 26th Infantry took its 
objectives and the tanks successfully moved into the town.  The 70th Tank Battalion 
recorded that it faced “very heavy resistance was . . . in the town during the attack.”117
 The fighting during the last week of July revealed how the enemy’s defense 
influenced urban operations.  Contextually, after the 26th Infantry took Bompietro and 
Alimena, the 18th Infantry and 70th Tank Battalion occupied Petralia.  The division then 
turned toward the east as the 45th Infantry Division, and later the 3rd Infantry Division, 
drove eastward along the northern coastal highway near the 1st Division’s left flank.  
Following the 16th Infantry for the last week of July 1943 showed a quickly moving 
American force pursuing an equally quickly withdrawing German defense to Messina in 
the northeast corner of the island as they evacuated from the island.   
  
As 3/26 cleared Bompietro of snipers, the 18th Infantry moved north to take Petralia.  
The push for Bompietro began at 0100 hours and the Americans occupied it by 1900 that 
evening.   
 On Friday, 23 July, combat patrols from the 16th entered Villadora after 
receiving word from civilians of a German presence there.  The regiment recorded that 
the patrol reached the outskirts by mid-afternoon, captured nine Germans, and “engaged 
in a fire fight with other enemy in the town.  At dusk the patrol returned after clearing 
the town of enemy.”118  By nightfall, the patrol occupied Villadora.  In the last days of 
July, the regiment spearheaded the move east on Highway 120.  Most of the fighting on 
24 and 25 July focused on the hills around Sperlinga but it was bitter as the Germans 
reluctantly lost their grip on those terrain features and German artillery took a heavy toll 
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on the Americans.  As the 1st Division moved eastward, fighting from hill to hill, 
Germans in Sperlinga and Nicosia were in danger of being trapped and withdrew.  The 
division fought throughout 27 July but elements of the 16th Infantry entered both towns 
on the morning of 28 July with no opposition.  The Germans, known for their fearsome 
rear guard fighting, were gone.119
 The fight for the hilltop town of Troina became the 1st Infantry Division’s most 
important and costliest victory during the Sicily Campaign.  The Americans targeted 
Troina as a key point in the German “Etna Line,” a defensive line anchored on Mt. Etna, 
the island’s most prominent terrain feature.  The Etna Line was significant to the 
Germans as part of their staged withdrawal plans to Italy; Mason recorded that Troina 
was vital to that Etna position, because it “sat astride the main roads to Messina.”
  When the 9th Infantry Division’s 39th Infantry 
Regiment walked into Cerami unopposed on 31 July, the new divisional target became 
Troina. 
120
 Regardless of its strategic location, the division initially expected the main fight 
would come further east at Randazzo and that Troina would not require much effort.  At 
a regimental meeting on 1 August, 26th Infantry officers learned that the Germans in 
Troina were “a delaying force—a force  that is not too large.  They have a small 
[amount] of [artillery]—few 81 mm’s.”
     
121  The mistaken belief that a few demoralized 
German soldiers garrisoned Troina and that it would fall easily emanated from divisional 
and corps intelligence officers, not the 26th Infantry.122  Indeed, the 70th Tank Battalion 
received orders to detach from the 1st Division, thus removing any armor support during 
this battle.123  Instead, the Germans fortified themselves on the hills north, south, and 
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west of Troina.  The enemy used the town to observe the Americans’ movements as well 
as for communication and supply.124  According to one division staff officer, the general 
withdrawal “had welded [the Germans] into a compact defense perimeter; they had an 
excellent field of fire on any approaching soldiers; they had the added advantage of 
protective stone buildings in the town.”125
 What became a costly and bitter battle focused primarily on the hills around and 
the approaches to the town.
  As a hilltop city, Troina had a commanding 
view of the immediate area.  The Germans may have marched away from Sperlinga and 
Nicosia but they refused to surrender Troina without a fight. 
126  Given Troina’s dominating elevation and Wehrmacht 
defenses, the Germans successfully prevented the 16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry 
Regiments along with the attached 39th Infantry Regiment and North African Goums 
from coming near the town for a week.127  A World War II infantry division like the Big 
Red One included four artillery battalions, each with four batteries, that worked 
alongside the division’s infantry regiments.  By the end of the battle, according to one 
staff officer, seventeen batteries eventually supported the infantry attacks on Troina and 
its surrounding heights.  Moreover, waves of American bombers bombed Troina from 
the air throughout this battle.  In North Africa, General Allen had refused to bomb 
French citizens during the attacks on St. Cloud the previous November, but now he 
unleashed American artillery and air power on Troina, regardless of the noncombatants 
in the town.  The Americans were learning to put prewar ethical concerns aside to 
accomplish their urban objectives with fewer casualties among their soldiers. 
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 If St. Cloud developed into a grudge match for the 18th Infantry commander 
Colonel Greer, then Troina certainly became one for General Allen.  Operations for 
Troina began in earnest on 31 July.  Fighting for the surrounding hills raged until 5 
August between German and American infantry and artillery.  On the evening of 5-6 
August, the Germans, having their positions threatened from the encroaching American 
units, withdrew from Troina.  A patrol from the 16th Infantry entered Troina unopposed 
on the morning of 6 August to see a destroyed town.  Although it was never the 
objective of the artillerists to destroy the town itself, they nearly did so.128  Combat 
reporter Don Whitehead accompanied an American patrol into Troina and saw firsthand 
what the Sicilians endured for seven long days as the Germans would not permit them to 
leave once the battle opened.  One room in the city’s cathedral contained “the stench of 
human excrement and hundreds of sweating bodies[, which] was sickening.”129  One 
battalion commander was quoted as saying: “‘I never wanted to capture a town more 
than this in my life.  But now . . . .’ [sic] He made a helpless gesture.”130
3rd Infantry Division  
  No doubt, the 
condition of towns like Troina and civilians’ miseries would become the norm 
throughout World War II.  For its part, the exhausted 1st Infantry Division had fought 
for nearly five weeks straight.  The 9th Infantry Division took its place as the Big Red 
One enjoyed a long-deserved rest a few days later. 
 The 3rd Infantry Division landing at Licata went more smoothly than the 1st 
Division’s at Gela, namely because the 3rd Division did not face the strong 
counterattacks that the Big Red One endured.  The 7th Infantry Regiment landed west of 
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Licata, the 15th Infantry disembarked with the 3rd Ranger Battalion astride the small 
port city, and the 30th Infantry landed to the east.  Elements of the 15th Infantry along 
with the Rangers captured Licata with relative ease by 1130.131  Because there was no 
Axis counterthrust, the division moved quickly from the beachhead “under the influence 
of the personalities of two hell-for-leather personalities, one the ex-cavalryman [division 
commanding general Lucian] Truscott, the other the ex-tanker [Seventh Army 
commanding general George] Patton.”132  Figure 3.6 shows the Licata-Agrigento region 
of Sicily, where the division fought for the first several days.133
 In the early hours of D+1, 11 July, the 7th Infantry moved west to capture Palma 
di Montechiaro.  These early days of the invasion also witnessed probably the heaviest 
resistance from Italian soldiers.  According to Third Battalions’ commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel John Heintges, Palma “sat up on a hill and looked right down our lines.”
 
134  
Heintges remembered that the Italians had good positions east and south of Palma but 
used deception to kill soldiers of the 7th Infantry.  One defensive position would 
“surrender,” allowing Axis machine guns to fire on Americans who went to take the 
surrender.  Heintges recalled having “a hell of a lot of casualties because of these ruses 
that they pulled on us.”135  The mayor of Palma di Montechiaro approached the 7th 
Infantry and surrendered the town to Colonel Heintges; at that point, Heintges recalled 
seeing white flags appearing in the town’s houses.  Heintges accepted the surrender, 
sending young Lieutenant Frank Petrozell and a sergeant to arrange the surrender terms 
in the town itself.  As the two men entered the town, the white flags disappeared and 
Heintges heard “a lot of machine gun fire and some explosions that sounded possibly 
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Figure 3.6:  Licata-Agrigento, Sicily 
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like hand grenades or bazooka type sounds.”136  The Italians had ambushed Petrozell and 
his sergeant.  Angry and feeling responsible for the likely death of his two men, Heintges 
grabbed ten or twelve soldiers, leading the patrol into the town from a different 
direction.137  The patrol hunted down the ambushers, unintentionally killing a few 
civilians who happened to be in the same area as the Italian soldiers firing on the 
Americans.138
 By now, 3/7 entered the town, engaged the Italians in street fighting, and pushed 
them out of Palma.  Approximately two hours later, the Americans forces the last of the 
Italians out of the town.
  The patrol found the sergeant and the mayor dead in the street but the 
lieutenant escaped unhurt.  The mayor had tried to surrender the town but the Italian 
soldiers in the town did not agree with his initiative. 
139  Palma di Montechiaro was in American hands by 1100 but 
Heintges positioned his battalion in prepared defensive positions to the west and south of 
Palma.140  Heintges described the enemy as fanatical Italian fascists, men dedicated to 
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and to repulsing the American invasion.141  Aside from 
these fanatical soldiers, that the Italians also reinforced the Palma garrison and showed a 
rare Italian fighting spirit to deny the town from American occupation.142
 In many ways, and on several levels, the campaign in Sicily revealed the stresses 
and strains typical in coalition warfare.  In this case, the British ground commander, 
Field Marshal Alexander, relegated the Americans to merely support the glacially 
advancing British Eighth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Montgomery, along the 
eastern coast of the island.  Patton, ever the aggressive army commander, found a way 
around this support role when he received permission from Alexander to perform a 
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“reconnaissance in force” against Agrigento, approximately twenty miles west of Palma 
di Montechiaro.  As one historian put it: “Like a pushy salesman who only needs a 
slightly opened door to force his way inside, Patton seized on Alexander’s 
‘reconnaissance in force’ order as an excuse to bag all of western Sicily.”143  Taking 
Agrigento, a hilltop city of 34,000 people, would also give Patton the port at Porto 
Empedocle as well as an important road junction, which would be critical in capturing 
western Sicily, thus permitting him to set his sights on the all-important city of Palermo 
on the northern coast.144
 The 3rd Division’s 7th Infantry Regiment received permission on 14 July to 
capture Agrigento.  One division staff officer remembered that General Truscott gave 
Colonel Harry B. Sherman “a company of tanks, tank destroyers, and other supporting 
troops” but the record does not indicate that any armored units accompanied the 7th 
Infantry to Agrigento.
  After taking Palermo, Patton could drive eastward to Messina 
along the northern coastal highway. 
145  From a previous reconnaissance of Agrigento, the 7th Infantry 
knew it was unwise to attack the city frontally.146  Two battalions fell upon Agrigento 
from two different directions: 2/7 captured the town of Favara and moved from the 
northeast while 1/7 approached from the southeast.  On 15 to 16 July, the regiment 
advanced slowly against stubborn Italian infantry and heavy artillery.  The Americans, 
however, enjoyed their plentiful artillery support as well as naval guns firing from 
offshore.  For example, an Italian attempt to reinforce the Agrigento garrison resulted in 
148 American guns destroying the convoy.  First Battalion moved on Agrigento by 
evening of the 16th.  The regimental history recorded that the battalion stormed the city 
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despite stubborn Italian resistance and soon engaged in “vigorous street fighting 
wherever the advances of its troops were challenged.”147  And those men faced 
resistance: when an 81-mm mortar crew called back for more ammunition, the driver of 
a jeep carrying the ammunition went missing.  An aidman left his place of “comparative 
safety . . . and drove the ammunition vehicle up the street to the mortar position in the 
midst of heavy sniper fire.”148
 The regiment got what little rest it could that night.  The next morning, it began a 
northward movement to take the city of Palermo.  For the next five days, the division 
marched over one hundred miles toward Palermo in a military feat of arms (and feet) 
comparable to General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Confederate “Foot Cavalry” of 
the American Civil War.  The “Truscott Trot” finally came to use.  The regiments 
advanced on foot over tough mountainous terrain and captured several towns along the 
way, overcoming stout German and crumbling Italian resistance along the way.  Thirst 
and heat became as much the enemy as the Axis.  The 15th Infantry had a small clash for 
Serradifalco and the 30th a brisk fight for San Stefano di Quisquina, both occurring 
without any armor support.  While the 1st Infantry Division employed tanks outside 
Barrafranca, the 3rd maintained its distinct infantry nature. 
  Ultimately, nearly 3,000 Italian soldiers surrendered that 
night and Agrigento was declared in American hands by 0030 on the morning of 17 July.  
Seven days into the invasion and elements of the 7th Infantry had already fought two 
small urban fights. 
 Devoid of Germans, division patrols entered Palermo ahead of General Patton’s 
prized 2nd Armored Division on 22 July.  For the next week, the division policed the 
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city, leaving it by 31 July.  The division relieved the 45th Infantry Division along the 
northern coastal highway and became the left flank of the Seventh Army’s II Corps.  As 
the division fought and moved along this road, the Germans fell back toward Messina 
where they were evacuating from the island.  The Germans planted thousands of anti-
personnel mines in their wake.  The 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions discovered together 
that German soldiers were as good at rear-guard, delaying actions as they were at 
offensive operations.  During this time, fighting occurred around towns such as San 
Fratello, Sant Agata, and Brolo but rarely for those towns.  However, when 3/15 entered 
San Fratello on 8 August, there was “house-to-house fighting, [as the Americans] fought 
through the town to contact elements of Co. L, 30th Infantry.”149  For the most part, the 
Germans found the mountainous terrain more to their advantage for defense so these 
Sicilian towns were not defended so heavily.  During this eastward movement to 
Messina, the 3rd Infantry Division effected two “end-runs,” whereby 2/30 made 
amphibious landings behind German lines to cut off their retreat.  These end-runs were 
never as effective as division command hoped and, in the second one attempted, almost 
led to the destruction of the entire battalion.  However, during these end-runs in early 
August, the division finally began to attach tanks to its infantry units.150
 As this fighting attested, the closer the Americans came to Messina, the harder 
the Germans fought to give themselves a chance to leave Sicily.  The 7th Infantry 
experienced one last small urban battle as they reached Spadafora on 15 August.  First 
Battalion marched along Highway 113, the northern coastal road, and C Company had 
nearly entered Spadafora when they fell under observed German artillery fire.  This 
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shelling devastated the company and killed the company commander as he directed his 
men to cover from the enemy fire.  As darkness approached, the company waited and 
then entered the town at night.  An advance guard apprehensively filed into the town.  
Upon entering, a German tank and four machine guns opened fire, obliterating one man.  
The others jumped inside nearby buildings for cover.  This strongly defended German 
roadblock was “supported thus by automatic weapons, tank, mortar and artillery fire 
[that] exacted heavy casualties on the company.”  As C Company became engaged in a 
seemingly one-sided fight within the town, A and B Companies took positions on higher 
ground south of Spadafora, and attempted to envelop the Germans from the south.  This 
envelopment sufficiently encouraged the Germans to withdraw from the town altogether. 
By 0035 of 16 August, Spadafora was in American hands.  Despite this unexpectedly 
violent, albeit brief, fire fight, the battalion moved eastward, capturing Rometta Station 
by 0430 and stayed there for the night.151  In assessing the last weeks of fighting, a 
regimental report commended 1/7 for “determination and aggressiveness in advancing at 
night against stubborn enemy resistance” in Spadafora as well as for successfully 
“confront[ing] the problems of movement through a defended urban area.”152
 The 7th Infantry took the honor of winning the Patton-Montgomery “race” to 
Messina.  During the early hours of 17 August, the regiment marched into an empty 
Messina, thus signaling the end of the six-week long Sicily campaign.  All that remained 
now was for the Allies to make the next move: either build up for the invasion of the 
Continent or pursue the Axis into Italy.  Until then, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions 
rested, rehabilitated, and trained for the next operation. 
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Conclusion  
 The 16th Infantry’s history effectively summed up the Sicilian campaign as 
“strictly an infantry war.”  “Up and down mountains,” the history continues, “across 
ravines, rivers, and draws, over terrain which could be negotiated only on foot, the 
infantry had borne out the brunt of the burden.”153  According to another 16th Infantry 
account: “the fighting was sporadic, but bitter, and consisted mostly of skirmishes for 
road centers.”154
 St. Cloud reflected this dependence on infantry; the only combat support 
available was artillery.  However, General Allen decided not to let divisional artillery 
loose upon the town.  While his reasons were both noble and pragmatic, he had few 
qualms unleashing artillery and airpower on Troina.  Nevertheless, the 18th Infantry 
used no armor, neither tank destroyers nor tanks, in St. Cloud.   
  As a pattern, this early urban fighting in North Africa and Sicily turned 
out to be largely infantry-based and without the aid of armor, tank destroyers, or close 
air support.  It also involved small-unit actions, being primarily rifle companies and 
battalions.  Troina was the only urban operation that involved an entire division.   
 This same pattern emerged as well for the 7th Infantry in Fedala.  Armor had a 
role in the capture of Fedala mostly because it happened to appear.  However, pre-
landing plans and orders did not include armor.  Tanks made an appearance because 
Colonel William Wilbur, who had no connection to the 7th Infantry but seeing their need 
for armored help, gathered a platoon of light tanks for the attack into Fedala.  As 
Lieutenant Rutledge of the 756th Tank Battalion indicated, he maneuvered his tank 
platoon through Fedala without the aid or cooperation of any infantrymen.155  Rutledge 
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was fortunate not to have faced a more effective enemy who understood the 
vulnerabilities of armor in a city.  The Americans would learn that infantry and armor 
must work in close concert in an urban environment; tanks and tank destroyers remained 
easy targets to any number of anti-tank weapons, rockets, or mines if not protected by 
infantry.  Early in the war, the infantry had a tendency to use tanks like they might a 
crew-served weapon such as the bazooka or towed anti-tank gun, but, as Fedala showed, 
not always in close support.  Sometimes tanks and tank destroyers were not included in 
operations orders.156
 As the fighting around Barrafranca attested, the 1st Infantry Division saw the 
value of armored support in Sicily.  Records indicate that tanks accompanied the 1st 
more frequently in Sicily than they did the 3rd.  Still, it fell mostly upon the infantry 
rather than upon armor to take these towns.  The probable reason for this difference is 
because men of the 1st Infantry Division worked with tanks during the fighting in 
Tunisia whereas the men of the 3rd garrisoned Casablanca and, therefore, could not 
observe firsthand the need for tank-infantry cooperation.  Later combat up the Italian 
boot forced the 3rd Division to change its views regarding armor. 
  Just because the Americans had armor available did not mean that 
they used them well or effectively.  Facing more defended cities, American soldiers 
grew to understand and appreciate the role of armor in the urban environment. 
 Both North Africa and Sicily also showed the influence defenders have on urban 
combat.  There was not as much fighting in Sicily as there might have been because the 
Germans, in part, kept breaking contact and the Italians preferred to surrender.  For 
example, the 1st Division’s G-2 operations report recorded that when Italian soldiers 
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retreated before the attacking American Rangers in Butera, they fled toward Mazzarino.  
Their fear “panicked the garrison at Mazzarino and the garrison there withdrew to 
Piazza-Armerina [sic], leaving Mazzarino undefended.  As a result, the 26th Infantry 
occupied Mazzarino without incident.”157
 Lastly, both campaigns showed how important villages, towns, and cities figured 
in Allied strategy.  Inasmuch as General Eisenhower preferred to destroy the German 
Army, he needed to capture urban locations, because many of these locations were “road 
centers.”
  The Italians did not have their heart in these 
battles and responded accordingly, thus facilitating in the Americans taking these hilltop 
cities and towns with deceptive ease. In stark contrast, the spirited defense of St. Cloud 
and Troina showed how difficult it could be to capture a town, even if intelligence rated 
the defenders as less than effective. 
158  While he could later afford to bypass places like Paris (despite its political 
and moral influence on the Free French forces), capturing Casablanca and Oran meant 
seizing Fedala and St. Cloud.  Oran, Casablanca, and Algiers in Operation TORCH as 
well as Licata, Gela, and Scoglitti in Operation HUSKY were important preliminary 
targets for Allied strategy because these were ports.  These ports were vital for the Allies 
to supply their armed forces and sustain their offensive drives against the Germans.  The 
failure of the Allies to secure a significant port in the invasion of Europe in mid-1944 
directly affected the Allied drive through the Continent.  As the Allies drove inland after 
securing the beachheads, towns and cities continued to remain significant.  Breaking the 
Etna Line meant taking Troina first.  There simply was no other way.  There was no 
combat in Troina but its German defense and strategic location necessitated its capture, 
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requiring a reinforced infantry division as well as massed artillery and aerial 
bombardment to capture it after a week of intense combat.  Consequently, the Allies 
should have anticipated capturing many more villages, towns, and cities, and should 
have been more concerned about Axis troops defending those places.   
 To this end, the town fighting in Operations TORCH and HUSKY served as a 
warning for the fighting to come.  Germans did not resist every town, especially through 
mid- to late-1944 as the Allies drove the Germans from France to Germany.  As St. 
Cloud and Troina showed when the enemy decided to defend an urban locale, the 
Americans should have realized that the Axis could make urban operations and urban 
combat costly and painful.  It was to the Americans’ advantage to learn both how to do 
just that as well as how best to combine their arms to maximize that effort. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“THE STREETS WERE LITTERED WITH CORPSES”: 
 
FIGHTING FOR ITALY’S TOWNS,  
 
SEPTEMBER 1943 TO JUNE 1944 
 
 As fighting for the dusty island of Sicily ended in August 1943, Allied leaders 
planned their next move.  The British and Americans had choices in mid-1943.  After 
capturing Sicily, the initiative was theirs to do as they wished.  As they built up for the 
cross-Channel invasion, the Allies could launch smaller operations of lesser importance 
to keep the pressure on Germany.  They could invade Sardinia, Corsica, or both; they 
could choose to aid the Russians by invading the Balkans; or they could invade Italy.  
Each option had its advantages and disadvantages, but the planners also had to balance 
an auxiliary campaign with the massive buildup of men and material in England.  The 
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff chose Italy while also preparing for the 
eventual cross-Channel assault.1
 As with the decision to invade North Africa, the decision to land substantial 
forces in mainland Italy strained the Anglo-American alliance because the British and 
Americans placed different strategic importance upon Italy.  The Americans approved 
launching limited, secondary operations in the Mediterranean region but did not want 
such a campaign to overshadow the build-up for the cross-Channel invasion.  Pursuant to 
their peripheral strategy, the British wanted to keep major forces in the region, even if it 
meant taking all of Italy.  In landing forces in Italy, the British and Americans managed 
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to agree that an invasion should force an Italian surrender, establish major air bases from 
which the British and Americans could bomb Mediterranean France and southern 
Europe, and, finally, to draw German forces from Russia and France into Italy.2
 Of the three selected infantry divisions for this study, the 1st Infantry Division 
left Sicily for England in September 1943.  The 5th Infantry Division remained in 
Iceland until early 1944 when they, too, shipped to England to prepare for the grand 
assault across the Channel.  The 3rd Infantry Division was the only division that fought 
in the Italian campaign, where it remained from September 1943 until the capture of 
Rome on 4 June 1944.   
 
 Fighting the Italian Campaign revealed the 3rd Division improving its combat 
effectiveness, especially its urban combat capabilities, as it captured important 
crossroads and hilltop towns to slowly and painfully plod toward Rome.  The division’s 
experience in Italy fell into two parts: slogging up the Italian boot from 18 September to 
17 November 1943 and then holding the beachhead at Anzio from 22 January 1944 until 
the capture of Rome on 4 June.  Figure 4.1 shows the first month below.3  During those 
first fifty-nine days, the division failed to coordinate its combat arms; the infantry 
regiments’ fights for Italy’s towns and villages were generally without armored 
assistance.  The division began developing a combined-arms mindset during the Anzio 
Campaign as the infantry and armored units realized the importance of improved 
teamwork between the infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, and artillery.  When the division 
broke out of Anzio and fought for the town of Cisterna di Littoria in May 1944, tanks, 
tank destroyers, and infantry effectively worked together.  The 3rd Division in the 1943- 
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Figure 4.1:  Advance to the Volturno, 15 September-6 October 1943  
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1944 Italian Campaign shows the American infantry division shifting from a reliance on 
its infantry regiments toward increased teamwork between all the combat arms.  Further, 
as the Americans honed their combined-arms effectiveness against the Germans in 
general, so they applied those new lessons and capabilities specifically to the urban 
environment. 
 The combat experience was worsened by Italy’s daunting topography and poor 
weather.  Even more mountainous than Sicily, Italy’s geography significantly affected 
the nature of the fighting.  Third Division commander Major General Lucian Truscott 
vividly remembered the country: “Narrow valleys were broken by intensely cultivated 
plots.  Rugged mountains rose to elevations of more than 5,000 feet. . . . Off these roads 
and tracks, the country was passable only for men on foot and for mules.  We were to 
find many places that pack mules could not climb where supplies had to be carried on 
the backs of men.”4  The Wehrmacht proved to be as deadly effective in defensive 
operations as in offensive operations.5
 The mountains affected the structure of Italian towns.  A wartime report 
described these towns as “generally consist[ing] of closely packed houses and narrow, 
twisting streets.”  Buildings were quite sturdy, “with thick stone walls generally immune 
even to artillery fire except for direct hits.”  These towns’ confusing and compact sizes 
made it easy for defending German soldiers to cover the approaches and flanks.
  The Germans’ slow, grinding, fighting 
withdrawal up the peninsula made it a war more for the heights that covered the axes of 
advance than a dash across flat plains.  Armor counted for little within this treacherous 
terrain.   
6  The 
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roads tended to proceed through the towns but not always around, making it difficult for 
armor to bypass these places and sometimes funneling them into small, confined urban 
spaces, where hidden German antitank weapons and soldiers could destroy them.7
 Italy’s wet fall and winter climates affected troop movement as well as the men’s 
health.  Truscott observed that fall rains became a problem as the “mud rendered all 
movements difficult and frequently made movements of vehicles off roads impossible.”
 
8  
One sergeant recalled that “the already bad road conditions worsened as heavy military 
vehicles turned the thin asphalt or dirt road ways into soupy and deep quagmires of 
bottomless mud.”9  Many men also became ill from the rain, the mud, and the generally 
wet weather, thus affecting the division’s fighting effectiveness.  By November, the 
worsening climate caused more casualties than German bullets did.10  Dry clothes and 
hygiene were a luxury on the Italian front.11
Up the Italian Boot: 18 September to 17 November 1943 
 
 In mid-September, with the plans finished, British and American naval forces 
steamed into Salerno Bay and landed ground forces.  From the beginning the Germans 
made everything extraordinarily difficult.  There were no perfect places to land forces in 
Italy; Salerno was one of the best options available despite drawbacks that the Germans 
quickly used in their favor.  Writer Rick Atkinson has written that, for the Allied navies, 
Salerno offered a great place to park warships and for amphibious vessels to dump 
combat personnel with its “few sandbars, a negligible tide, a small port in a sheltered 
bay, and twenty-two miles of gorgeous beaches.”12  But for those disgorged combat 
personnel, fighting at Salerno was like being “inside of a cup” with Germans looking 
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down from the dominating heights that completely surrounded the area and exploiting 
the Sele River, which split the Allied positions.13
 And that is what happened: the Germans expertly defended the higher ground 
from 9 to 13 September with a fury that the Allies had not experienced in either the 
landings on North Africa nor Sicily.  American General Mark Clark commanded the 
Fifth U.S. Army and several times rushed rear echelon, support elements to the front to 
stop German counterattacks.  More than once, Allied leadership considered evacuating 
the beaches.  When it became clear the Germans were withdrawing, the British and 
Americans congratulated themselves for a job well done.  One American officer told his 
men that “we are more than a match for all that can meet us.”
 
14  In contrast, the German 
ground commander proclaimed that, despite supply and logistical limitations, “once 
again German soldiers have proved their superiority over the enemy.”15
 Germany’s failure to throw the Anglo-American force back into the sea came not 
from lack of effort but from the Allied soldiers’ stubbornness, well-laid artillery fires, 
and overwhelming naval gunfire support that gave Clark time to rush in 
reinforcements.
  The Germans 
may have retreated but they were far from defeated.  They had stalled the Allied advance 
inland; the fight at Salerno foreshadowed what the Americans could expect in Italy.  By 
14 September, the Germans began a phased retreat up the Italian boot that kept the 
combined Anglo-American force away from Rome for many months, building pressure 
on the democratic Allies by prolonging both the war and human losses. 
16    One of those divisions that Clark landed to reinforce his embattled 
Fifth Army was the 3rd Infantry Division.  Clark requested the 3rd during the worst of 
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the fighting at Salerno but the lead regiment, the 30th Infantry, did not land until the 
18th, after the Germans had withdrawn.   
 Within days of the 3rd Division’s arrival on the Italian mainland, the Americans 
were fighting to capture urban areas.  The division had missed the fight for the 
beachhead but the fresh reinforcements helped to maintain the Allies’ initiative.  General 
Clark sent the American VI Corps, including the 3rd Division, to make a wider flanking 
movement on the right through the mountains while sending the British 10 Corps along 
the coast toward Naples.17
 As the 30th Infantry Regiment left its assembly area in Battipaglia, it advanced 
toward the small mountain town of Acerno on 20 September.  Control of Highway 7 
toward Naples meant taking Acerno.  Upon landing, the division had replaced the 36th 
Infantry Division on the line but received the 36th’s attached 751st Tank and 601st Tank 
Destroyer battalions.  As the 30th Infantry moved toward Acerno, it had support from A 
Company, 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion as well as B/751st Tank Battalion. The 
regimental history bemoaned its circumstances: “It would be almost impossible to find 
terrain more unsuited to offensive warfare. . . . There are wind-swept passes, cliffs that 
fall away hundreds of feet to narrow valleys below and canyons where the sun penetrates 
only a brief time during the day.  All these rugged terrain features make rapid advances 
impossible.”
 
18
 Because of the mountainous landscape, it took from 20 to 22 September for the 
30th Infantry to wrangle the Germans out of Acerno.  There is little that indicates what 
  It also became obvious that the Germans intended to defend Acerno and 
the roads that led toward Naples.   
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the attached armor did during the battle or even if tanks supported the infantry.  Figure 
4.2 shows the maneuvers toward and the terrain around Acerno.19  Third Battalion, 30th 
Infantry (3/30) led the way and reported minor skirmishes from advanced patrols on 20 
September.  By the end of the twentieth, the regiment established an observation post 
overlooking Acerno.20  On the twenty-first, 3/30 moved along the main road toward the 
town.  By 1800 hours, 2/30 pushed northward but to the west of the town in an attempt 
to cut off any escaping Germans.  F Company marched to the east so that it could fall on 
the town from the south.  This move divided the battalion while permitting the 
Americans to advance on Acerno from three different directions: Second Battalion from 
the north, Third Battalion from the west, and F Company from the south.  Artillery and 
bombs from A-36 fighter-bombers provided support as the battalion traversed the 
difficult land.21
 Given the rough ground, the various units took nearly all night to move into 
position.  The Third Battalion had to cross a deep gorge, the Iscadella Serra, and it was 
almost dark when 3/30 marched over the western mountains, crossed the Iscadella Serra 
gorge, and shoved the enemy off the eastern bank.
 
22  Around 0800 on 22 September, 
3/30 attacked the Germans in a chestnut grove on the edge of town as 2/30 moved to its 
positions to take Highway 7, the north-south road out of Acerno.  Amongst the trees, the 
regimental history recorded that 3/30 overcame chattering machine-gun fire “in a bitter 
hand-grenade and bayonet fight.”23  The battalion reorganized and moved to a church on 
the edge of Acerno, destroying a nearby light artillery battery.  At 1200, the town was 
still not in American hands as German mortars had stalled their attack.  Between 1252  
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Figure 4.2:  Capture of Acerno, 20-22 September 1943 
 
 
 
 
and 1325, division artillery pounded Acerno with over 1,000 rounds.  German artillery 
on the hills north of Acerno slowed Third Battalion as Second Battalion struggled to 
isolate the town from the north.  Through efforts described as “herculean” and with 
tremendous difficulty, 3/30’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Edgar C. Doleman, 
pushed his battalion into Acerno at approximately 1500.24  A patrol inspected the houses 
and captured a few Germans.  By early evening of the twenty-second, U.S. infantrymen 
controlled both the town of Acerno and the only reliable highway toward Naples.25  
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Mainly due to the difficult ground, the Americans operated against and seized the town 
of Acerno just as they had taken towns in Sicily: by relying on the infantry.  Yet despite 
the difficult ground, the Americans captured the town by maneuver rather than by a 
simple frontal attack.  In part because of that maneuvering, there was less need for an 
actual fight within the town itself. 
 Within these dispositions, there is little to no mention of the presence of 
American armor, although the terrain certainly would have limited their use.  In the slow 
push up the Italian peninsula, Truscott recalled that the division relied mostly on 
infantry-artillery cooperation and far less on its armor.  When the Germans stopped a 
regiment’s advance, one battalion remained in reserve “while other battalions took to the 
mountains on either side to outflank the enemy positions, the whole operation being 
supported by Division artillery emplaced as far forward as positions could be found.”  
After the American infantrymen controlled the area, engineers would clear roadblocks, 
repair or rebuild damaged and destroyed bridges, and another regiment would maintain 
the momentum.  This wearying process became the division’s standard operating 
procedure for the next two months.26
 As Fifth Army pressed forward to Naples, Highway 7 remained the axis of 
advance to that city.  Because of this, Avellino became the next notable city although the 
7th did capture smaller villages en route, including Le Croci de Acerno, Volturrara, and 
Montemarano.
  The division continued its northward advance, 
slowed by the mountainous land, rainy weather, and a determined and crafty German 
foe.   
27  Taking Avellino was not just a division target but became a Fifth Army 
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objective when General Clark told VI Corps commander General John P. Lucas that the 
crossroads town was vital to capturing Naples.  Lucas carefully funneled the 34th 
Infantry Division into position, intending to use the 3rd Division in support.  As these 
divisions approached the town, the Allied Army Group commander, Field Marshal Sir 
Harold Alexander, shifted the corps attention to Benevento, fifteen miles north of 
Avellino.  Responsibility for the capture of Avellino fell to the 3rd Division.28
 Late on 27 September, General Truscott ordered the 15th Infantry to support the 
7th Regiment as it trudged over the Italian mountains northward toward Volturara.
 
29  
The regiment’s First Battalion captured Volturara after overcoming stiff German 
resistance.  Taking the town entailed smaller 75-mm pack howitzers shelling the church, 
thus injuring civilians, because the Germans had placed an observation post there.30  The 
7th Infantry’s history described the land as “the most rugged mountains yet 
encountered,” preventing some men from receiving food for nearly twenty-four hours 
while fighting the wet and the cold.31  Poor road conditions notwithstanding, the 7th 
Infantry did not move fast enough for Truscott, who demanded to know if 3/7 had taken 
Avellino on 29 September.32  Figure 4.3 below shows the 7th’s cross-country route in 
taking Avellino.  For their part, the Americans made many of these marches at night, no 
mean feat given the topography.  Night marches allowed the Americans to bypass enemy 
resistance and take Avellino before the Germans could destroy it.33
 Finally, on 30 September, patrols from the 7th Infantry entered an empty  
Avellino after crawling over the Italian mountains and taking other towns en route.  For 
all that cross-mountain movement, the Germans evacuated Avellino and retreated north. 
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Figure 4.3:  7th Infantry Captures Volturara, San Stefano, and Avellino, 28-30 
September 1943 
 
 
 
 
From there, an intelligence summary stated, the Germans continued their habit of “road 
blocks and demolitions, booby-trapping the road blocks.  [Their] artillery went into 
defiladed positions along the terrain.”34  The advance on Avellino only showed the 
frustrating nature of combat in Italy: the Americans traversing arduous terrain but unable 
to come to grips with the Germans as they retreated from Avellino.  Most certainly, the 
infantrymen did not object if these night marches postponed combat.  Yet taking 
Avellino by way of these wearying overland night marches showed the efficacy of the 
Americans’ speed and maneuver that forced the Germans to retreat.  Despite the 
enemy’s withdrawal, Truscott remembered that Avellino looked destroyed: “All about 
were damaged buildings, bomb craters, shell holes, and other marks of devastation, and 
the whole town reeked of putrefying bodies buried in the debris.”35  An enlisted man in 
the 15th Infantry wrote that “the Air Corps and our artillery had practically pulverized 
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the place.  There were Civilians and Germans laying all over the streets.  What a 
smell.”36
 While Avellino helped the Allies advance toward Naples, the American infantry 
operated, like at Acerno, without the aid of much armor.  Few accounts mention the 
presence of tanks or tank destroyers.  The Germans continued this delaying action as 
they retreated to and defended Italy’s first major natural obstacle:  the Volturno River. 
 Much of the story of the 3rd Infantry Division’s experience in Italy for the first 
month is the slow movement toward the Volturno River with comparatively little 
German resistance.  Although it lacked the panache of the later Allied pursuit across 
France in the summer of 1944, this advance included a German retreat as the Germans 
fell back onto a more defensible body of water.  Third Division soldiers continued to 
trudge northwestward along the Italian boot, taking several small towns along the way.  
If the G.I.s did not fight German defenders, then they faced booby-traps.  Italian towns 
are not known for their wide boulevards and Truscott accused the Germans of 
“demolish[ing] the fronts of whole blocks of old stone buildings, completely blocking 
the narrow streets,” thus forcing the infantry to stop while the 10th Engineer Battalion 
cleared the way.
 
37  The Germans were not the only ones to be crafty.  Vert Enis, a 
wireman in the 15th Infantry, recorded a group of desperate Italian civilians who came to 
the Americans with tales that the Germans were shooting civilians and destroying their 
town.  When the Americans arrived, the civilians welcomed the soldiers with a parade, 
streamers, and confetti.  There were no Germans.  The civilians “just wanted us to move 
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into town so we could protect it” from a German counterattack.  The Americans did not 
remain long.38
 By 7 October, the division occupied positions with the rest of the Allied front 
between the Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas.  Most of the Fifth Army had reached the 
Volturno and found the other side fortified by the Germans.  As one might expect in 
Italy, the “narrow winding roads, steep hills, and swift streams” did not lend themselves 
to easy river-crossing operations.
 
39
 Within these strategic circumstances, the 3rd Division played a critical role in the 
river-crossing operation of 13 to 14 October.  The detailed planning included intense 
patrolling to identify various German positions as well as to test the waters.  The plans 
laid out, the Americans assaulted across the Volturno.  The 7th Infantry made the first 
beachhead with ample amounts of division artillery in support.  As the 7th staked its 
claim across the Volturno, its sister regiments crossed as well.  The Germans opposed 
the Allies with full complements of machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire.  To the 
Americans’ credit, armor tried to accompany the lead troops but enemy fire prevented 
their crossing until later.  General Truscott understood the stiff resistance but urged 
Colonel Harry B. Sherman of the 7th Infantry to “keep pushing [tank destroyers] and 
[tanks] and push on up the valley.”
  Still, the American and British forces composing the 
Fifth U.S. Army needed to cross the river if they wanted to keep pushing toward Rome.  
The Germans, for their part, were equally determined to stop that crossing along with the 
overall Allied advance.   
40 
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 As the 7th Infantry moved northward, Sherman received orders that his first two 
objectives, respectively, were the towns of Liberi and Dragoni and that the infantry 
should bypass any resistance in order to capture those two towns.41  As the regiment 
moved north, it encountered resisting Germans within the small town of Cisterna.  The 
short urban fight there was part of a rapidly developing situation that the American did 
not expect because the Germans had resumed their orderly retreat to more defensible 
positions.  Figure 4.4 below shows the movement from the Volturno to Dragoni in mid-
October.42  The regimental history described Cisterna as “a little stone village . . . on the 
forward slopes of Mount Fallano” that prevented an entire battalion from advancing, 
showing the defensive power of even small villages.  For the first time, however, the 
Americans had armor supporting them.43
 By 2250 on the evening of the fourteenth, it became clear that the defenders of 
Cisterna would not go without a fight.  As the men of 3/7 tried to enter the town, 
Germany artillery and mortars began to rain on them as the hidden defenders’ small 
arms and machine guns fired from the village itself.  A nighttime attempt by K Company 
to outflank the village failed as the men became scattered over the steep, broken land.
 
44  
Three American tanks entered Cisterna to destroy a German machine gun position but 
German mortars disabled two of the tanks, with one blocking the road.45  The Third 
Battalion promised to go around the town if resistance continued but, by 0500 on the 
fifteenth, they had not accomplished that.46  By now, the Second Battalion had moved 
around the town and had destroyed German armor north of Cisterna at a village called 
Prea.  The darkness became a major problem for Third Battalion as it reported being   
134 
 
Figure 4.4:  7th Infantry Drives on to Hills South of Dragoni, 14-18 October 1943 
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“spread all over the hills around Cistern[a].”47
 As morning turned to day on 15 October, 2/7 was in Prea and 1/7 had also moved 
around the village; the defenders in Cisterna were now cut off but continued to resist.  
Further, the battalion had not used its attached artillery much except for its own mortars, 
although it understood that batteries of 105-mm guns stood by to assist.  Division 
command pressured the battalion to take Cisterna quickly lest the Germans were “going 
to build up resistance in front of you.”
 
48  To that end, Truscott, eager to capture Liberi 
and Dragoni, moved the 15th Infantry into the area.49  It did not help the battalion when, 
while conducting a personal reconnaissance, a German shell had wounded 3/7’s 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Heintges.  By 1130, the battalion reported that it 
was still in a firefight.50  The battle finally ended after the wounded colonel called for 
artillery to fire smoke rounds on the town and the Germans withdrew, influenced by the 
flanking positions of the 7th Regiment’s First and Second Battalions.51
 Cisterna had much in common with the 1st Infantry Division’s fight at St. Cloud.  
Even into mid-1943, the Americans still depended heavily upon their infantrymen to 
perform the bulk of the fighting.  In the case of Cisterna, the terrain was certainly a 
factor because the 7th had armor attached to it and there were indications that the Third 
Battalion lost cohesion from the broken topography.  Inasmuch as the Americans had no 
qualms with bombarding Acerno and Avellino, it is not clear why they did not use any 
artillery on Cisterna until firing smoke rounds on the afternoon of the fifteenth aside 
from their own mortars.
 
52  Similar to St. Cloud, Cisterna was an obstacle but the 
respective division commanders would not permit the town to stop an entire infantry 
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regiment; thus, the other battalions went around the town.  This bypass certainly affected 
the outcome as the Germans withdrew rather than allow the Americans to trap or capture 
them.  The skirmish at Cisterna also shows Americans’ continuing need to sharpen their 
combined-arms capabilities. 
 The division took Liberi and Dragoni, continuing its northward advance.  At this 
point in mid-October, the men had slogged over the Apennines toward the Volturno, 
made a riverine assault, and now were approaching the German Winter Line, a series of 
heavily defended positions anchored around Cassino.  Soldiers endured freezing and 
rainy weather without adequate clothing.  The ground was so challenging that sometimes 
even the pack mules could not get supplies, food, and equipment to the front line units.  
Truscott wrote that this only made the men more susceptible to disease, “imposing 
burdens on the Division medical service and filling the Corps and Army hospitals.”53  
Soldiers were so exhausted that “it is safe to say the men were running on sheer 
fortitude” alone.54
 The 7th Infantry took a series of hills and a small village called Baja e Latina in 
the latter part of October.  On the 7th’s left, the other side of those hills, was the 15th 
also moving northward.  The 15th fought Germans at a small town called Roccaromana 
between 18 and 24 October.  Truscott described the 15th’s main road around 
Roccaromana as “a trail which Division engineers gradually widened to make passable 
for jeeps, and the incessant rains often made even their passage impossible.”
 
55  Again, 
whereas the division was beginning to employ armor more often with the infantry (the 
7th Infantry had tank destroyers during this period), Roccaromana was a costly infantry 
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fight won with the aid of artillery.  Armor remained largely absent from this 
engagement. 
 Roccaromana is nestled on the western slope of some Italian hills.  Figure 4.5 
shows the area of operations.56  As the 15th pushed against Roccaromana, the 7th 
captured Latina and then   Baja e Latina as the 751st Tank and 601st Tank Destroyer 
Battalions cleared the area between the hills and the Volturno River.  Roccaromana was 
operationally significant because it lay on an important road that would allow the 
Americans to maintain contact with nearby units and supply itself.  Regimental leaders 
had the sense to attack from those hills down toward the town, entering an empty 
Statigliano at 2340 on 17 October, cutting off the road to Latina by the early morning 
hours the next day.57  On the eighteenth, 1/15 took the heights just to the northeast of 
Roccaromana, called Castle Hill.  American artillery blasted the valley before them and 
aircraft dropped bombs onto Roccaromana while German artillery bombarded American 
observation posts.  At 1300, C Company tenuously claimed control of Roccaromana, 
despite a brief withdrawal in order to resupply.  By 1520, it reported the town as secure.  
At the same time, Second Battalion sent a strong force to take Mount Della Costa to the 
north.  By the end of the day, the regiment struggled to maintain its gains.58
 Pursuant to their infantry doctrine, the Germans counterattacked to retake the lost 
ground.  The 3rd Infantry Division experienced its first vicious counterattack since 
advancing along the northern coastal highway in Sicily.  At around midnight, 19 
October, a German counterattack slammed into 1/15 in Roccaromana.  The 15th’s 
regimental history recorded that German artillery shelled the Americans and then  
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Figure 4.5: 7th Infantry Outposts to the Front, 19-21 October; Reconnoiters in 
Force, 22-25 October 1943 
 
 
 
 
“enemy infantry poured into the town from the surrounding fields, and down the main 
street.”59
tanks in support.  One tank came down the main street and the other came from the First 
Battalion’s left flank, from the south.  After the tanks shot up Americans with bazookas, 
the only antitank weapons, the Americans retreated to Castle Hill behind the town.  The 
Germans regrouped and reorganized, counterattacked in the morning on the nineteenth, 
  C Company broke up the attack but the Germans launched another with two 
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and shoved the First Battalion off Castle Hill altogether.  After repulsing a fourth 
counterattack, 1/15 retook and kept Castle Hill outside of Roccaromana while 2/15 
retained its hold on Mount Della Costa.60  By now, reports described 1/15’s position as 
“one of disorganization.”61
 Division command released the 15th’s Third Battalion from division reserve.  
Third and Second Battalions fought for Mount Della Costa northwest of Roccaromana 
while the town remained the domain of 1/15.  First Battalion spent the remainder of the 
day trying to hold onto Castle Hill and prevent the Germans from overrunning them.  
American armor was largely absent from this fight but American artillery made its 
supporting presence clear.  Around 0900, Second Battalion requested “constant 
[artillery] interdiction on road, Roccaromana to Pietramelara [sic]” to the west.  By 
1100, Truscott told his assistant division commander and acting commander of the 15th, 
Brigadier General William Eagles to send up artillery observer planes to spot the 
German artillery so the Americans could knock them out.
 
62  Eager to take the town on 
the 19th, Eagles told Truscott that he planned to launch another assault on Roccaromana 
but this attack apparently failed.63
 On the twentieth, the regiment recommended “getting tanks in readiness” but the 
751st Tank Battalion remained parked in an assembly area.
 
64  Armored support would 
have been useful when a C Company patrol entering Roccaromana ran into German 
tanks that fired directly into the Americans.  The patrol, no doubt, pulled back but asked 
for artillery support against the tanks.  After estimating a company of enemy infantry 
and tanks in Roccaromana, 1/15 received word of an artillery concentration planned for 
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the entire town.65  Despite the artillery support, the 15th Infantry’s communications 
made clear that “we are not going to do anything about the enemy in Roccaromana until 
we receive some [antitank] assistance.  Will maintain observation from our position on 
the hill. . . . We will use [artillery] as much as we can.”66
 On the twenty-first, fighting swirled on Mount Della Costa and around 
Roccaromana.  The Americans made three more attempts to enter Roccaromana but 
could not keep a presence there.
  Between the suspected 
German artillery in Pietramelara and American artillery firing on Roccaromana 
throughout 19 and 20 October, life in Roccaromana was a veritable hell.   
67  The regimental history indicated that by the twenty-
first, the regiment’s organic artillery, their Antitank and Cannon Companies, were still 
not yet in position.68  From Italian civilians, the Americans learned that approximately 
150 Germans were not only entrenched inside the buildings but also had a 150-mm gun 
as well as a 100-mm gun in support.69  Germans and American artillery traded shots on 
various positions but the Germans continued to control Roccaromana by noon, 22 
October.70
 Further intelligence indicated how the Germans held the town.  The 601st Tank 
Destroyer Battalion, operating in the area but not in support of the 15th Infantry, 
reported on the twenty-second that four Wehrmacht detachments and three tanks 
garrisoned Roccaromana, the men used the buildings as cover, and “everything else 
[had] pulled back in small groups last night.”
 
71  Also on the twenty-second, an 
observation post sighted six 88-mm multi-purpose guns, three armored vehicles, as well 
as machine guns within the houses covering the approaches to the town and near the 
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church.72  On the twenty-third, a 30th Infantry patrol observed five to six Germans in 
each of Roccaromana’s outlying homes.  A captain stated that he “saw 10 or 12 peeking 
out of the windows and housetops, estimated to be at least a platoon.”  Artillery fired on 
the town again after this report.  By 22 and 23 October, patrols from 1/15 might infiltrate 
the town but it remained firmly within German hands.73
 The Germans had tanks in Roccaromana but it appears that 1/15 had no armor 
support until 24 October, after the Germans had withdrawn.
  If the 15th had tried to seize 
Roccaromana, the German defenders would have made it very difficult and very costly. 
74  American patrols into 
Roccaromana reconnoitered the German positions and shelled the town but from 19 to 
24 October, the Germans controlled the town.  Early on 24 October, the Nazis simply 
withdrew from the town and left it for the Americans.  Like Cisterna, Roccaromana 
remained a place that the Americans did not take until the Germans pulled out.  Despite 
the lack of combined-arms fighting, the artillery bombardments of Roccaromana 
rendered the town devastated after eight days of fighting.  Fifteenth Infantry enlisted 
man Vert Enis wrote in his diary that “the whole town was strewed with dead, German 
and American alike.  The stink was worse than Avellino.”75
 In addition to lacking armored assistance, because the attached armor units were 
operating between the Volturno and the mountains, there was limited air support, too.  
Whereas the Italian geography often negated tank assistance, the lack of close air 
support was primarily organizational: there remained too little coordination between the 
air and ground at lower levels.  Truscott explained that the divisions would submit a list 
of preferred targets for air support to Fifth Army.  Within twelve hours, a committee 
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would decide amongst all the divisions’ requests which targets to bomb.  The XII Air 
Support Command then assigned the planes, usually fighter-bombers, to each target.  
Division commanders like Truscott might never know whether the committee granted or 
rejected their requests.76  In late-1943, the Air Force had yet to place forward air 
controllers within divisions to call more efficiently for immediate close air support.  
Until then, XII Air Support Command focused on targets further away from the 
immediate frontlines.77
Operation SHINGLE: 18 November 1943 to 4 June 1944 
  Until American units like the 3rd Infantry Division developed 
their tank-infantry cooperation as well as air-ground coordination, combat largely 
centered around the infantry-artillery relationship. 
 The fight around Roccaromana was merely part of the Allies’ laborious drive 
north.  After the 7th Infantry took Baja e Latina and the 15th finally secured an empty 
Roccaromana, the division took Pietravairano and Presenzano.  After exhausting 
mountainous warfare, the division took Monte La Difensa, Monte Cesima, Monte 
Lungo, and Monte Rotondo near the German Winter Line in early November.  On 17 
November, after nearly two months of intense and constant combat against trench foot 
and sickness as well as German bullets, mines, and artillery, the men of the 3rd Infantry 
Division finally moved to the rear.  By the 18th, the division was behind the lines to rest, 
refit, replace equipment and men, and begin preparations for their next campaign. 
 Frustrated with the slow progress of the Italian Campaign, British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill revived a rejected plan of landing forces behind German lines to help 
the stalemated Allies in front of the Winter, or Gustav, Line to regain the momentum and 
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effect a quicker capture of Rome.  This “end-run” had its opponents and clear drawbacks 
but Churchill, who many blamed for the fiasco that was the amphibious operation at 
Gallipoli in World War I, won the day and military leaders began planning Operation 
SHINGLE by December 1943.78  VI Corps, including the 3rd Division, spearheaded the 
amphibious landings at Anzio in January 1944.  It was their fourth amphibious 
operation. Operational success hinged on accomplishing two victories: quickly 
advancing to the Alban Hills to threaten Rome and the rear of the German Winter Line 
as well as a rapid hook-up between the Allies confronting the Winter Line with the VI 
Corps at Anzio.  The Allies landed at Nettuno and Anzio on 22 January but were unable 
to break out toward Rome until May.  The quick victory that Churchill foresaw for the 
landings at Anzio vanished and he became discouraged: “I had hoped we were hurling a 
wildcat onto the shore but all we got was a stranded whale.”79  Figure 4.6 shows the area 
of operations around Rome by spring 1944; the 3rd Division remained deployed 
opposite the city of Cisterna di Littoria.80
 For veterans of the 3rd Infantry Division, Anzio evokes powerful memories, few 
of them positive.  After the landings, the 30th Infantry’s history described what 
happened next as “four months of the worst hell on earth.”
 
81  But Anzio was also a 
formative experience for the division that helped produce several innovations.  The 
division also began to understand that its tank- infantry cooperation needed urgent 
refinement.  The months spent on the Anzio beachhead was an unenviable nightmare but 
as the divisions’ various weapons systems began to merge, so the division enhanced its 
combined-arms capabilities and applied those lessons to urban combat.
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Figure 4.6:  Stalemate, Spring 1944 
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From November 1943 to January 1944, the division trained for the landing operation.  
One battalion-level exercise included the “utilization of all the fire power of all the 
Infantry [sic] weapons before requesting assistance.”  Another emphasized the 
“employment of tanks.”82
  On 22 January, the VI Corps went ashore on the beaches north and south of the 
coastal villages of Anzio and Nettuno.  The landing occurred with total surprise and 
there was little resistance, although the division suffered a few casualties.  Although the 
Allies achieved surprise, the Wehrmacht had suspected the Allies might try an 
amphibious end-run like this and began to hurry units toward Anzio.  VI Corps 
commander General Lucas was caught in the quandary between military prudence—that 
is, build up the beachhead with enough men and supplies before advancing—and 
aggressiveness—push toward the Alban Hills, threaten Germany’s main lines of supply 
and communication between the Winter Line and Rome but risk weakening his force as 
he did so.  By fatefully choosing the former, Lucas allowed the Germans to amass 
enough force to stop the Allies when Lucas began his own offensive.  On the evening of 
29-30 January, a week after the landings, Lucas ordered his units forward.  Elements of 
the 3rd Infantry Division supported two U.S. Army Ranger battalions as they took the 
city of Cisterna di Littoria.  Superior German numbers and firepower caught the two 
Ranger battalions, which lacked heavy weapons, in a powerful vise from which nearly 
  There is no indication that of the 3rd Division’s infantry 
regiments had any urban combat training; likely because division planners did not make 
it a high priority aside from the landing operation itself. 
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no one escaped.  These two battalions suffered so many losses, mostly from prisoners, 
that the War Department disbanded this Ranger unit altogether.83
 What followed for the next three and a half months was the tragedy of an 
existence that defined Anzio.  The Germans were largely on higher ground and their 
artillery, including monstrous 210-mm and 280-mm railroad guns, dubbed the “Anzio 
Express,” that could shell anywhere on the Anzio beachhead with ease.  Because of this 
reality, nowhere was “behind” the lines; even the medical tents were not immune to the 
occasional, albeit unintentional, German shell.  Some American soldiers preferred to 
suffer in their foxholes rather than in hospitals or aid stations.  Life for frontline 
American and British soldiers was reminiscent of World War I.  They had to perform 
most work at night: bringing up supplies, replacements, and food; maintaining 
communications and fighting positions; removing the dead and wounded; transferring 
men from one position to another; and aggressive, constant patrolling.  One 3rd Infantry 
Division replacement described his Anzio experience: “It was just plain hell all through 
the day, and the nights were worse. . . . The [fox]hole got about six inches of water, and 
you couldn’t do anything but try to bail it out with your helmet. . . . If you got [hit] at 
night, you were lucky, because they could get you out right away.  God help you if you 
got hit in daytime, because you might have to lay there all day before somebody could 
get to you.”  His regimental commander greeted him and his fellow replacements with: 
“You’re going to suffer.  You came here to suffer.  You’re going to suffer in everything 
the Boche can throw at you and you’re going to suffer everything that goes with this 
miserable damn climate.  But you’re going to take it like men.”
 
84 
147 
 
 Frustration with the failure to capture Rome more quickly fell on General 
Lucas’s shoulders.  While Lucas certainly bears some responsibility for the failure at 
Anzio, he became an unwitting victim of the politics of war and lost command of VI 
Corps.  On 17 February 1944, General Lucian Truscott, commanding general of the 3rd 
Infantry Division, became Lucas’s deputy commander.  Moving to division command 
was Brigadier General John W. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, a bulldog of a man who 
commanded the division for the rest of the war.  Six days later, Truscott replaced Lucas 
and inherited the debacle that was the Anzio beachhead.  Under Truscott’s leadership, 
the Allied position at Anzio bent under the weight of determined German counterattacks 
through February and March but never broke.   
 Anzio rightly looms large in the history of the 3rd Division because of the trials 
and miseries that the men endured.  But Anzio is also important because the 3rd Infantry 
Division worked to improve its combat effectiveness.  One example was the “Battle 
Patrol.”  During a stalemate in mid-March, the three regiments and the division itself 
created special Battle Patrols to help the division continually reconnoiter the German 
positions through hazardous patrols. In an example of bottom-up lesson learning, the 
Battle Patrol first appears in the 15th Infantry Regiment’s monthly report for February 
1944, when it suggested “that battle patrols of specifically trained men be developed to 
fulfill the more important patrol missions.”85  The other regiments soon followed suit 
with their own versions.  The men in the Battle Patrols remained in the rear with hot 
food and shelter in order to maintain their mental edge because their nightly missions 
were often, according to one division staff officer, suicidal.86  Each night Battle Patrols 
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went beyond the wire to accomplish intelligence-gathering missions.87
 The second way in which the division sharpened its combat effectiveness at 
Anzio was by honing its combined-arms capabilities.  This improvement may have 
occurred because the flat terrain around Anzio and Nettuno contrasted so much with the 
Apennine Mountains or perhaps because of the confines of the small beachhead 
converted tanks and tank destroyers into an auxiliary to artillery.  While most of the 
751st Tank Battalion was in an assembly area during the Roccaromana fight, the 7th and 
15th Infantry had clearly integrated these tanks prior to the first breakout attempt on 29 
January.  Those not attached to an infantry regiment were ready to exploit a 
breakthrough or confront a counterattack.
  These regimental 
Battle Patrols survived Anzio and remained in service reconnoitering and patrolling 
throughout the rest of the war, including towns and cities. 
88
 The fighting at Anzio forced the 3rd Infantry Division to fight with and alongside 
its attached tanks and tank destroyers.  Indeed, the 30th Infantry observed in January that 
“tanks are capable of giving Infantry closer support than they have been.  If men are 
expendable, so are tanks.  There must be closer coordination between tanks and 
Infantry.”  The 30th Infantry was critical that “tanks fail to use their fire power against 
enemy infantry to full extent.  Failure to engage even targets of opportunity on basis of 
exposing themselves is a fallacy, for in present terrain, they are exposed regardless of 
stealth or distance.”
 
89  These comments only underlie how much the infantry did not 
work with tanks before Anzio.  A learning curve appeared at Anzio.  As the positions 
stalemated, there were many houses used by both sides as outposts and strongpoints that 
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became the scenes of nasty, bitter fights.  Tanks and tank destroyers helped to support 
American-held houses, destroy German-held houses, or, depending on location, use 
them as cover.  For example, the 30th Infantry put L Company men in houses designated 
Houses 5 and 6.  One squad and a machine gun were in House 6; half a squad and a 
machine gun were in House 5.  Beyond the houses were fifty-two soldiers, antitank and 
anti-personnel mines, barbed wire, and a supporting tank.90
 The armored units first advocated enhancing tank-infantry cooperation.  In 
February, the 751st Tank Battalion asserted that “tanks should not be employed in 
defensive positions solely as anti-tank guns.”  Further, it contended that “tanks must 
have infantry protection at all times when occupying defensive positions.”
 
91  Not 
surprisingly each party, tanks and infantry, saw the other as the problem.  The next 
month, the 751st Tank Battalion presented more ideas for improving tank-infantry 
cooperation within the division.  The first suggestion was most important:  the need for 
tank and infantry commanders to plan together ahead of time and communicate clearly.  
That is, because “the tank commander must know [the infantry’s] plans, give him all the 
information you have about the enemy as well as your own troops.  Ask the tank 
commander for his ideas before issuing orders.”  Because the infantry was to protect 
tanks from antitank fire, company, battalion, and regimental officers should “give [tanks 
and tank destroyers] all the support you can with your mortars and assault guns by firing 
on known and suspected anti-tank guns. . . . Use prearrange[d] visual signals, during the 
attack, so the tank commander will know where you want his fire.  Work together as a 
team.”  The report also argued that fighting effectiveness was more than just tanks 
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working with infantry but also involved successful tank-artillery relations as well as 
tank-engineer teamwork, especially in antitank minefields.92  When the division made a 
series of limited attacks in April and fought with the 191st Tank Battalion, the 191st 
echoed many of these same sentiments: the importance of prior planning and clear 
communication between the infantry and armored elements.  The 191st even 
recommended rehearsals of an operation to enhance tank-infantry cooperation.93
 The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion also chafed under poor tank-infantry 
relations.  Bothered that posting tank destroyers on the front lines nullified their mobility 
and long guns, the 601st recommended, instead, that infantry commanders take 
advantage of tank destroyers’ long-range guns by posting them further behind the front 
lines.
 
94
 The tanks’ and tank destroyers’ ideas were applied by May when the division 
marched off the front lines.  During that period, the division underwent intense training 
for a major Allied offensive out of Anzio and the Winter Line to capture Rome.  The 
training and preparation indicate how the 3rd Infantry Division resolved its teamwork 
problems.  For instance, the 7th Infantry’s immediate objective included the town of 
Cisterna di Littoria.  As such, regimental training included “street fighting,” the wartime 
term for urban combat.  This preparation was critical since Cisterna had remained in 
  Aside from the comments made by the 30th Infantry in January, the other 
infantry regiments did not see any need to improve their combined-arms capabilities.  
Until infantry officers understood their deficiencies in the area of combined-arms battle, 
there remained room for the 3rd Infantry Division to resolve its tank-tank destroyer-
infantry-artillery challenges.   
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German hands from the beginning of the campaign and the shelled ruins of the city had 
become a strongly defensible fortress that could delay any Allied attempt to break out of 
the Anzio beachhead.95  Although not an impressive urban center (it had an estimated 
seven thousand people in it), one battalion commander saw Cisterna as “the principal 
communication center in the entire Anzio area” because one of the main roads to Rome 
ran through it.96  Therefore, any breakthrough necessarily meant taking Cisterna.  
Indeed, although Cisterna had been thoroughly bombed over the previous four months, 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Izenhour remembered that its defenses included “a series of 
trenches, gun pits, and fortified houses completely wired and avenues of approach 
mined.”  The Americans estimated the enemy strength to consist of elements of the 
362th Infantry Division, its artillery, and well over one hundred tanks.97  An intelligence 
summary admiringly regarded the enemy’s position around Cisterna to be “an expert 
piece of workmanship.”98  Quite reasonably, Truscott regarded Cisterna to be the “key 
locality in the German plan for containing the beachhead” as he planned the VI Corps’ 
offensive.99
 Accordingly, the 7th’s training included urban combat training nearly every day 
from 3 to 19 May as well as four days of tank-infantry training and lessons in what the 
regimental operations’ officer called “dirty fighting.”
 
100  Unfortunately for anyone 
seeking to better understand urban combat, there is little information on what that 
training included but the regiment did take advantage of an urban combat course on the 
coast at Nettuno where soldiers could conduct live-fire exercises with demolitions.101  
Division leaders also realized that an urban operation required more specialized 
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equipment and an unnamed “street fighting battalion” requested a higher number of 
Thompson sub-machine guns, rifle-grenade launchers as well as 50-round drum and 30-
round clip pouches to hold additional hand grenades, ostensibly for the attack on 
Cisterna di Littoria.102
 The division also specifically trained in tank-infantry cooperation, marking a 
significant change from past practice.  Whilst the division emphasized tank-infantry 
teamwork for all the infantry regiments, including the 7th, the desire to improve its 
combined-arms effectiveness also led to some novel innovations.  Former battalion 
commander John Heintges described General O’Daniel as “a doer . . . a gadgeteer.  He’s 
always had some idea for new weapons.”
 
103  One of those new gadgets were the “Battle 
Sleds” that were “narrow steel tubes mounted on flat runners and were wide enough to 
carry one armed infantryman lying down.”  An individual M4 Sherman could tow 
twelve sleds at one time, so a platoon of five tanks could tow sixty soldiers at once.  The 
idea was to rapidly move soldiers to the battle safe from shrapnel and bullets.104
 Consequently, infantry-tank training time increased.  For example, the 15th 
Infantry trained with tanks from 7 to 18 May on the battle sleds as well as conducting 
mock assaults on fortified houses, which regimental and division operations officers 
expected to encounter after the breakout.
  
Undoubtedly, the battle sled concept took tank-infantry cooperation to new directions 
and clearly shows that the 3rd Infantry Division had begun to understand the importance 
of combined-arms warfare. 
105  Likewise, the 30th Infantry reported that 
training during the month of May “was directed at [the] correction of deficiencies noted 
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during the previous combat period. . . . Stress was placed on coordinated tank-Infantry 
training and Tank-TD [tank destroyer]-Infantry control was developed.”  This training 
also included combined-arms assaults and attacks with the battle sleds.106
 The plan called for a corps-wide breakout from the Anzio positions to hook up 
with the Fifth Army behind the Winter Line and then capture Rome.  Figure 4.7 shows 
the attack on Cisterna in the early stages of the breakout.
 
107  The first priority was the 
capture of Cisterna by the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division.  From 
there, the Americans could drive towards Cori and accomplish the operation’s first 
phase.  The second phase was the movement towards Artena and then to Highway 6 and 
Valmontone.  Once the Americans took Highway 6, they could cut off the Germans at 
the Winter Line.108
 The final Allied push out of the Winter Line opened on 11 May under a 
tremendous artillery barrage in the Cassino sector.  The attack itself out of Anzio began 
at 0545 on 23 May.  After a massive Allied artillery barrage pounded the German 
positions, including those posted in the rubble around Cisterna di Littoria, the 3rd 
Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions lurched forth to break the four-month long 
stalemate.  The Americans knew the Germans had used the previous four months to 
mine, fortify, conceal mortars and machine guns in houses and outbuildings, and 
otherwise prepare for this eventuality.  Due to the number of mines and fortified 
positions, the going was initially quite rough, especially for tanks and tank destroyers.  
Inasmuch as the fighting devolved into the ferocious chaos of “a disorganized, bloody  
  The VI Corps had contingency plans to change their axis of advance 
if conditions called for it. 
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Figure 4.7: Capture of Cisterna, 23-25 May 1944 
 
 
 
 
brawl,” there remained a desperation to the American advance.109  Soon after the attack 
started, the two advanced companies from the 7th Infantry claimed they were “pinned 
down.”  O’Daniel growled that “we have no such words in our vocabulary now.”  
O’Daniel reminded the 7th’s Colonel Wiley O’Mohundro that he had to make his 
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objective by noon on the 23rd: “you’ll get a bonus if you do, something else if you 
don’t.”110
 The 7th advanced toward Cisterna from both its southwestern and northwestern 
sides.  The 30th and 15th Infantry Regiments bypassed the town on both sides, focusing 
on their own regimental objectives.  The division’s postwar history recorded that aerial 
and artillery bombardments had largely destroyed the town itself, thus allowing the 
Germans to use the rubble and wreckage to conceal “strongpoints, supply distributing 
points or tank-assembly areas.”  American tankers were grateful that for the first time 
since landing in Italy the ground was flat and ideal for tank-infantry cooperation.
  Despite this aggressiveness, the 3rd Division failed to approach Cisterna by 
the end of the first day.  
111
 By 0900 on 24 May, division command wanted the 7th Infantry to extend patrols 
into Cisterna but the regiment would not be in a position to enter the town until that 
evening.  German machine guns, small arms, and mines stalled the American advance.  
As the division’s intelligence officer put it: “enemy opposition to our attack on Cisterna 
consisted mainly of fiercely holding his well-protected and camouflaged positions in 
front of and along the railroad.”  Further, the division staff detected “little or no traffic 
from Cisterna, indicating the enemy did not intend to evacuate the town.”
 
112
 At 1600, 3/7 received orders to take Cisterna.  The regiment sent in the 
regimental Battle Patrol to reconnoiter the place, ceasing the bombardment while the 
patrol gathered intelligence.  By 1750, a platoon of tanks reached Third Battalion to 
support the assault.  Third Battalion requested a thirty-minute artillery concentration 
before it entered at 2000.  By 2100, 3/7was attacking but Second Battalion did not enter 
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the fight until 2200 when it received enough tank destroyer support.113  By now, both 
battalions had edged inside Cisterna, it was past sunset, and there was no sign that the 
combat would subside with the onset of night.  After this second day of the offensive, 
losses mounted: the 15th Infantry commander reported that his L Company was 
“practically non-existent.”114
 At 2230, Third Battalion urgently reported that American artillery was shelling 
them and it took thirty minutes to find out what artillery it was.  Until midnight, 3/7 
encountered little resistance yet within Cisterna.  At 0020 on 25 May, Second Battalion 
radioed that it was “working from house to house—all houses occupied and mined.”  
O’Daniel ordered them to move the tanks from the 751st into Cisterna but poor 
communications prevented this move.
 
115  By 0435, German snipers and machine guns 
had kept 3/7 from advancing deeper inside Cisterna but the battalion slowly ground its 
way past this fire.  By 0500, the Second Battalion had finally gotten through the antitank 
and anti-personnel mines but found it impossible to bypass fortified houses since each 
house was a small fort unto itself.  Further, 2/7 relied more on its tank destroyers 
because it had lost contact with its attached tanks.116
 Fighting in an urban environment is challenging enough but these two battalions 
were attacking in the dead of night as well.  Russ Cloer, a replacement reconnaissance 
officer, described the scene within Cisterna that night:  “Fires were everywhere from 
artillery and white phosphorous mortar fire. We choked on smoke, cordite, and cement 
dust from the shattered concrete buildings. . . . The streets were littered with corpses 
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lying where they fell, abandoned weapons, destroyed vehicles and collapsed buildings. 
This was what Hell must be like.”117
 Cloer also wrote that he led a reconnaissance patrol from the 7th Infantry 
Headquarters Company to find a new command post within the town.   The fires within 
Cisterna gave him all the light he needed to see at night.  A self-propelled 75-mm gun 
accompanied his patrol.  Together, his jeep’s machine gun and the self-propelled gun 
fired at upper-story windows and blasted into buildings wherever they found enemy 
resistance.  The streets were nearly impassable for vehicles; the self-propelled gun could 
not help but drive over the bodies of dead men.
 
118
 By 0600, the men could see better and the fighting continued within Cisterna as 
the two American battalions fought from house to house and street to street toward each 
other; the Third from the north and the Second from the south.
 
119  By early morning, 3/7 
was advancing with two assault companies and one in reserve, informing regimental 
headquarters that it was “moving into town and firing TDs [tank destroyers] extensively” 
with tanks contributing to the heavy fire fight.120  None of this was easy: Colonel 
O’Mohundro radioed that “I may need some help.  [Third Battalion] is held up NW of 
town. . . . They are suffering heavy casualties.”  By the afternoon, the Third Battalion 
must have lost its tanks or needed more, stating first that the situation was under control 
“if we can get tanks” but later that “we are still holding but need tanks badly.”  Third 
Battalion received those additional tanks by 1300.121
 Individual acts of bravery dotted the intense combat.  Sergeant Samuel W. 
Pollard, a mortar section leader in F Company organized his own patrol to eliminate the 
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snipers in Cisterna.  His men covering him with fire, Pollard assaulted his first house by 
himself, taking four prisoners.  Having success there, he searched every house on the 
street, constantly exposing himself to heavy German small arms and automatic fire.  The 
last house on the street had an especially heavy volume of fire but he charged it anyhow, 
entered through a large hole in the house, wounded three German soldiers downstairs, 
and took twenty prisoners upstairs.  He turned over these men to guards and, upon re-
examining the last house, noticed a large tunnel.  Pollard fired into the tunnel and called 
on everyone there to surrender.  One hundred seven men filed out and gave themselves 
up.  Pollard took one hundred thirty-four Germans prisoner and later received the 
Distinguished Service Cross.122
 By late morning, the two battalions were slowly advancing toward each other.  
They finally encountered the last main obstacle in the center of Cisterna: reports said it 
was a tower or castle that looked “like it was well held by pillboxes” with an antitank 
gun guarding the only entrance.
 
123  Fighting became reminiscent of a “street brawl” 
when 2/7 began to fire on the tower by 1530; they reported it captured by 1542.124  The 
Americans set up a machine gun across the street from the antitank gun, keeping the gun 
crew away so an M4 Sherman tank from the 751st Tank Battalion could enter the castle 
and destroy the gun.  The Americans stormed the castle, tossed grenades into every 
opening and caused two hundred Germans under the castle to surrender, including the 
commander of the city’s defense.125  With the commander’s surrender, all that remained 
was to clear out isolated pockets of resistance.  The two battalions received help from 
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1/7 around noon when it joined the urban fight but it was not until 2000 that the 7th 
Infantry had finally secured the town and claimed it captured.126
 Unlike previous battles like Acerno and Roccaromana, where there were no 
tanks, or Fedala in November 1942 where tanks worked independent of the infantry, the 
3rd Infantry Division had undertaken its first major urban assault by means of a 
combined-arms attack.  It was slow, grinding, violent work but the division was 
successful.  Cisterna was gutted.  But taking the small community was costly: 3/7 lost its 
commander, three company commanders, and 80 percent of the G.I.s who began the 
attack.
 
127
 As the 7th Infantry fought for Cisterna, its sister regiments moved around the 
town and pursued the Germans northeastward around the southern edge of the Alban 
Hills.  After cracking the initial defenses, the going turned from a slow attack into a 
more rapid pursuit as the Germans retreated from both the Anzio beachhead and the 
Winter Line.  There was some resistance in the town of Artena as the division fought to 
cut the Germans from their line of retreat to Rome.  With armored and artillery 
assistance, the 15th Infantry took Artena and then defended it against a German 
counterattack in late May.  On 4 June, elated Romans greeted the triumphant Allies as 
they entered an undefended capital.  The Germans moved to better positions further 
north.  What the Allies had established as the main objective the previous September—
the capture of Rome—they finally accomplished nine months later.  Two days later, 
American, British, and Canadian forces landed in France, effectively turning Italy into a 
secondary theater.  The men of the 3rd Infantry Division enjoyed a long-deserved break 
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in Rome and, by July, began preparing for their fifth and final amphibious operation: 
Operation DRAGOON and the invasion of southern France.  By August, the 1st, 3rd, 
and 5th Infantry Divisions would all be inside France fighting the German Wehrmacht 
and capturing many villages, towns, and cities. 
 Most of the combat the 3rd Infantry Division faced in Sicily and Italy was 
against a retreating German Army.  Still, the Germans’ defense slowed the Allied 
advance to a costly crawl.  Their use of Sicily’s and Italy’s rough mountainous terrain as 
well as their prolific use of anti-personnel and antitank mines, all contributed toward that 
effectiveness.  These series of withdrawals affected the Americans’ experience of urban 
combat in that the Nazis saw few urban locales as more valuable than their own men and 
not worth sacrificing valuable German soldiers in extended defense.  Thus, they 
abandoned large urban areas like Palermo, Messina, and Rome without a fight.  In 
Russia and France, it was Adolf Hitler who regarded places like Stalingrad and Brest 
more valuable than the defenders and ordered that each German soldier fight to the 
death.  Nevertheless, when the Germans did choose to make a stand, however brief, like 
in Cisterna and Roccaromana in October 1943 and Cisterna di Littoria in May 1944, they 
could certainly force the Americans to pay for those places. 
 By June 1944, 3rd Division operations showed that the Americans clearly 
understood the value of maneuver as evidenced at Acerno, Avellino, and Cisterna di 
Littoria as well as the value of bypassing a place when necessary.  They had shown there 
appeared to be value in dedicating an entire division to just one place, although most of 
these defended towns were generally small.  What the Americans would do if the Nazis 
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mounted a strong defense of a large city remained to be seen.  For now, the Americans 
were wise to keep in mind that their first priority was to destroy the German Wehrmacht 
and the Americans captured towns only insofar as it helped them defeat the enemy.  
Terrain and cities were not ends in themselves but only means to an end of defeating the 
Germans. 
 The Americans did not fight the Germans as effectively as they might have but 
the 3rd Infantry Division in Italy showed that they were making improvement.  The 
division did not list any armor attached to it in Sicily until the very end.  When it went to 
Italy, it had a battalion of tanks and of tank destroyers that often remained in rear areas.  
The rough topography was a key reason for this rear placement and the 3rd Division 
occasionally relied heavily on its armored units during operations such as the riverine 
assault across the Volturno River in mid-October.  In general, the division did not fight 
its German opponents as a combined-arms division for the first part of its Italian 
Campaign. 
 By February and March 1944, there was a clear change in thinking and behavior 
when the division began to adopt more of a combined-arms mindset.  It is instructive 
that the catalyst to increase tank-infantry capabilities came from the tankers within the 
open confines of the Anzio beachhead.  Armor officers perceived that they offered more 
to the division and pressed for a more effective role.  By the planning stages of the 
Anzio breakout, the 3rd Division’s commanding general, John O’Daniel, certainly had 
heard what they said, even to the point of innovating new levels of cooperation with his 
battle sleds.  Inasmuch as post-battle reviews of the battle sleds were generally negative, 
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it did not hinder the development of the tank-tank destroyer-infantry dynamic.128  
Further, it is noteworthy that in their June reports, the infantry regiments also recognized 
a need for better infantry-tank teamwork and the 751st Tank Battalion continued 
preaching it.129
 These new combined-arms changes are apparent in the fight for Cisterna di 
Littoria from 24 to 25 May.  It truly was a tank-infantry fight as contemporary records 
indicate.  The tank-infantry cooperation in Cisterna di Littoria was not an accident: the 
street fighting course at Nettuno and the intense tank-infantry training prepared the 
infantrymen and tankers.  In this way, Anzio—and, by extension, Cisterna di Littoria—
was a turning point for the 3rd Division in World War II: as the division learned to 
sharpen its ability to coordinate the different combat arms in general so it improved its 
effectiveness in the urban environment in particular. 
  For all of the pain and death of the Anzio Campaign, it had taught these 
Americans the importance and the efficacy of combined-arms battle; something they 
continued to develop and improve through France and Germany. 
 While the 3rd Infantry Division demonstrated that it had learned that tanks and 
infantry could work together in towns and village, it is important to note there were two 
other large urban battles during this campaign for Rome, the battles for Ortona and 
Cassino.  It is noteworthy that the Allies fought for these cities similar to how the 3rd 
Division engaged the Germans in Cisterna di Littoria.  The Allies’ behavior in these 
battles showed that the improvements made in the 3rd Infantry Division were neither 
isolated nor in an organizational vacuum.   
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 From 20 to 27 December on Italy’s east coast, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
fought to remove veteran German paratroopers who had time to prepare an effective 
defense of Ortona.  The Canadians, like the Americans, learned to use all their weapons 
at hand: tanks, antitank cannon and rockets, engineers blowing holes inside buildings to 
permit movement, and small teams moving under cover to take building after building.  
Because the Canadians were new to this style of fighting, the rubble and destruction, the 
narrow, winding streets, and the Germans’ habit of infiltrating behind the Canadians, all 
conspired to turn Ortona into “some kind of evil maze.”130  In fighting from house to 
house, the Canadians dealt with the familiar problem of advancing under cover.  Their 
solution was to modify a technique called “mouseholing,” developed in their battle-drill 
schools whereby soldiers used tools to create holes in walls.  To speed the process, 
engineers used explosives to blow holes in walls, soldiers then charged through and 
violently cleared rooms and buildings without exposing themselves to German fire on 
the streets.131  Breaching buildings by the mouseholing technique became the accepted 
practice among the Allies by war’s end.132  The 1st Canadian Division forced the 
Germans out of Ortona but, during the course of the entire month, lost over 2,300 dead 
and wounded.  In contrast, the German 1st Parachute Division only suffered 455 men 
killed and wounded.  Sadly, an estimated 1,300 Italian citizens died in the crossfire.133
 In January, the American 34th Infantry Division attempted to pierce the Gustav 
Line.  By early February, the division had fought to Cassino but failed to capture the 
place because the town is below the formidable Monte Cassino and near defended rivers.  
However, American riflemen used tanks alongside them as they methodically worked to 
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extricate German soldiers from the sturdy two-story buildings.  Historian Martin 
Blumenson summed up the fighting for Cassino best when he observed that it became 
“street fighting of the most vicious sort.”134
 The Canadians’ battle for Ortona and the 34th Division’s battle for Cassino does 
not appear to have affected what the 7th Infantry Regiment did in Cisterna.  While the 
practice of moving from building to building through blown interior walls, also known 
as mouseholing, became a standard practice, it is not clear whether the Canadians 
influenced that lesson learning.  What is significant about Ortona and Cassino is that the 
Allies, like at Cisterna, relied upon a combined-arms solution.  The 3rd Infantry 
Division’s artillery-tank-tank destroyer-infantry battle for Cisterna is part of a larger 
pattern of the Allies mastering combined-arms warfare.  The stalemate at Cassino later 
influenced how the Americans attacked the city of Aachen later in 1944.  From their 
Italian experience, American intelligence analysts, commanders, and soldiers took note 
that more intense urban warfare awaited them in the months to come and accordingly 
began adapting a combined-arms mindset. 
  The Allies would not control the destroyed 
town until the offensive to capture Rome. 
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CHAPTER V 
“WHAT IS TAUGHT AT BENNING . . . IS ALL WRONG”:  
DEVELOPING NEW APPROACHES TO  
URBAN COMBAT IN THE WARTIME ARMY 
 
 In October 1944, Colonel Francis H. Boucher admitted what the United States 
Army failed to foresee during the interwar period: that “an increasingly noticeable 
feature of this war is the difficulty of capturing villages and cities.”  Boucher observed 
one distinctive aspect of urban combat: “when stubbornly held, a town is captured only 
after many successive attacks, each netting small gains and heavy losses.” While 
bypassing a village or city is usually best, “it is certain that there are cases when it is 
necessary to attack enemy-held towns and villages.”1
 As the Americans recognized a rise in “street fighting,” the contemporary term 
for urban combat, so the army began to write doctrine and train its men for when they 
inevitably encountered that environment.  By 1943, doctrine and training remained 
imperfect.  One officer in the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, speaking to the urban 
combat in the hills and mountains of Italy, reported that “what is taught at [Fort] 
Benning about taking small towns or villages is all wrong.”
  While individual units such as the 
1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions refined their urban combat capabilities, America’s 
army also realized that not only was it necessary to attack many villages and cities but 
that this combat environment also required a different approach than battle in other 
environments.   
2  By late 1944, Americans 
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soldiers were using more sophisticated methods to capture French towns and cities.  
Further, Americans’ improvement in urban combat paralleled their simultaneous 
appreciation, understanding, and implementation of combined-arms warfare.  The U.S. 
Army worked to distill lessons from the battlefield and labored to convert those lessons 
into improved doctrine and training.  As American G.I.s adapted toward combined-arms 
urban combat, the stateside army more slowly grasped the potentialities for that sort of 
urban fighting.  As such, the American army developed different methods for handling 
urban combat during World War II. 
 This chapter has three parts.  First, it is worth beginning with what lessons the 
various field units learned as they fought the Germans.  The army processed lessons 
learned on the battlefield through a number of methods.  Individual units compiled and 
analyzed their own combat experiences.  During the fight in Europe, Battle Experiences, 
an unofficial, army-sanction publication, allowed soldiers from privates to generals to 
give hints and tips on a variety of issues in combat: from ammunition resupply to urban 
combat.  Here, the army could report on and learn from its successes and failures.  Battle 
Experiences displayed how fighting men from below regarded infantry doctrine and 
urban combat.  Additionally, it is valuable to see what observations the U.S. Army made 
of other armies as they wrestled with the urban environment.  The branches’ professional 
journals discussed fighting in a variety of different environments and considered what 
America’s allies and enemies were doing along with what they could learn from these 
other militaries.  In these publications and lessons learned from the bottom up, officers 
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and enlisted men showed a growing appreciation for combined-arms warfare, including 
in towns and cities. 
 Second, the lessons learned from battle must be processed and converted into 
doctrine, usually in the form of field manuals and official publications designed to 
educate field officers, such as Fort Benning’s Infantry School Mailing List.  
Understanding that the Americans had not considered urban combat before the war, it is 
natural to discover that the war seriously changed military doctrine.  To observe these 
changes requires examining not only the 1944 field manual on fighting in towns but 
other manuals dealing with infantry combat.  Although slower than the lessons learned 
from fighting units or observations made by stateside professional journals, these 
wartime manuals reveal that the army, from the top downwards, slowly grasped the 
nature of urban combat.  Indeed, as the army took a more sophisticated attitude towards 
combined-arms fighting, it codified those applications in towns and cities into its official 
army doctrine.  
 Lastly, doctrinal changes in the military affected how the army trained soldiers 
for the battlefield, thus justifying an investigation of wartime training in light of top-
down modifications in wartime doctrine and bottom-up learning.  Through much of the 
war in Europe, the battlefield helped mold American infantry doctrine and also affected 
army officers’ operational and tactical decisions.  As America learned and understood 
combined-arms battle better as well as how to handle the ubiquitous presence of towns 
and cities in Europe, so the U.S. Army adjusted how it prepared its soldiers for the urban 
battlefield. 
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Wartime Learning  
 The army made specific attempts to process lessons while in the field.  These 
processed lessons were to develop soldiers’ fighting effectiveness at different levels.  
During the war, combat units dissected their own combat experience while the army 
employed official observers.  Additionally, army publications gave soldiers an avenue to 
explain and share what they had learned through an in-theater periodical, Battle 
Experiences.  Through the professional journals and other official periodicals, the 
Americans also studied and shared what they might glean from their allies’ combat 
experience.  It is difficult to track these periodicals’ influence but investigating what the 
soldiers themselves concluded helps to demonstrate what lessons the army emphasized 
as it worked to improve its fighting capabilities.  By the end of the war, army doctrine 
had begun to embrace a combined-arms mentality but the men on the ground were well 
ahead of official doctrine especially regarding combat in the urban environment. 
 Specific units made in-theater attempts to process ways to develop their fighting 
abilities.  In November 1944, the 1st Armored Group of the Mediterranean Theater of 
Operation (MTO) wrote what it had learned by publishing the thoughts of various 
armored units.  In assaults on towns, the 756th Tank Battalion noticed that “infantry 
protection is essential for tanks.” When approaching towns, the 191st Tank Battalion 
gave support by “shooting up the highest building,” especially church steeples, because 
that eliminated the enemy’s artillery and mortar observers.  The 601st Tank Destroyer 
Battalion suggested that tank destroyers offer support from outside a town because their 
open turrets made them susceptible to snipers.3   
180 
 
 MTO officers tallied their lessons for 1943 and 1944.  In 1943, an 82nd Airborne 
Division officer complained that “what is taught at Benning about taking small towns or 
villages is impracticable out here.”  He learned that the best way to capture towns was to 
“work the whole outfit around the town or village under cover, seize the high ground in 
rear of it, and firmly establish ourselves on that dominating ground.”4  Usually, that was 
sufficient to persuade the Germans to retreat.  If bypassing or moving behind was 
impossible because of the mountainous terrain, carefully planned night attacks or 
infiltration sometimes proved successful.5
 MTO staff officers in 1945 observed that Americans needed to improve their 
combined-arms proficiencies and gave direction on how to achieve that.
 
6  That 
discussion included urban combat, namely, that the Americans should bypass towns 
whenever possible.  This was especially true in the case of Italy, where “the crooked, 
narrow streets and thick-walled buildings provide the enemy with excellent opportunity 
for tank traps and antitank gun positions.”  But when the Americans must capture a 
town, the report maintained that urban operations constituted a combined-arms 
operation.  In these cases, armor’s “employment must be closely supported and 
combined with close infantry action.”7  In general, the report also stated that phase-lines 
were essential for maintaining communication and control of units and that soldiers and 
tanks must fight with a certain violence of speed and action to control the engagement 
and keep the Germans off-balance.8
 The 3rd Infantry Division compiled a list of lessons from the first three months 
of campaigning in southern France.  The document advocated using bazookas and rifle 
 
181 
 
grenades to allow riflemen to approach semi-fortified houses.  The lessons observed that 
semi-fortified houses fell fastest when small arms and machine gun fire supported the 
attack.  This publication argued that, in order to maintain command and control within 
towns and villages, “forward movement must be slow and thorough with frequent checks 
at phase lines.”9  The artillery staff discerned that enemy armor oftentimes hid in these 
towns, thus requiring artillery to expend considerable ammunition trying to knock out 
German tanks.10  The compilation advised tankers to work closely with infantry inside 
towns and villages because German antitank weapons remained a prevalent threat.11
 The 1st Infantry Division likewise reviewed its past operations from which to 
learn and improve.  In a report examining infantry-tank cooperation, the division 
understood the importance of communication and mutual support.  In towns, however, 
the memorandum argued that tanks would not normally participate in an assault upon a 
village or town but would support the infantry from the outside and in enveloping the 
town to prevent the defenders from escaping.
  
The division document modified earlier doctrinal statements proposing a speedy capture 
of towns and villages.  As army thinkers slowly realized that fighting in towns was a 
combined operation, the 3rd Infantry Division’s already grasped that. 
12
 After the invasion of northern France in June 1944, the army compiled observer 
reports on different elements of fighting in Europe.  Report 55 addressed improper 
security issues in villages after Americans had captured them.
   
13  Documents posted in 
November 1944 gave details of the 1st Infantry Division’s fight in Aachen, Germany.  In 
December 1944, “Attack of Towns” described German defensive tactics that expanded 
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from a town’s approaches to the town itself, including the presence of enemy tanks 
within the town, giving recommendations for an assault on these German-held places.  
Further, the reconnaissance should be from multiple directions and the assault, which 
should also converge from different directions, ought to cut off the town as soon as 
possible.   The assault units should arm themselves liberally with rifle grenades and 
bazookas to destroy the tanks likely to be within the town.  After taking the town, the 
author instructed Americans to consolidate their positions and prepare for a German 
counterattack.14
 Aside from official observer reports, the 12th Army Group disseminated units’ 
experiences and lessons learned through brief two-page compilations known as Battle 
Experiences.  Battle Experiences was a prime example of inter-army communication.
 
15  
The tips and observations recorded within Battle Experiences focused on matters 
concerning supporting weapons with riflemen, matters concerning tactics, techniques, 
and procedures, and furthering their combined-arms proficiency.  Each issue stated that 
“the items published will be those based on practical experience and are recommended 
for careful consideration by units which may encounter similar problems.”16  These 
lessons ranged from using manure piles as camouflage to fighting with immobilized but 
still operable tanks to maximizing communication equipment to fighting inside towns.17
 One concept that Battle Experiences related was the use of regimental weapons.  
The 5th Infantry Division’s 11th Infantry Regiment described how its Cannon Company 
  
As will be discussed, army leaders worked to improve urban combat doctrine; but 
soldiers in-theater also sharpened their urban combat abilities.   
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aided in the attack on Angers, Chartres, and Fontainebleau in August 1944.  At Angers, 
Cannon Company acted as a “separate battery with its own fire direction center” 
targeting German antiaircraft, antitank, and command post positions.  At Chartres, 
Cannon Company fired on the city’s church steeple, destroyed a key German 
observation post, “neutraliz[ing] enemy counter fires.”  A barrage from the company 
also ensured the surrender of nearly one thousand German soldiers.18  The 38th Infantry 
Regiment suggested putting machine guns into second-story windows because their 
experience showed that German tanks could not fire into the second story.  In the same 
piece, another unit stated that white phosphorus grenades were better for assaulting and 
clearing houses than fragmentation grenades.19  Soldiers saw explosives and bazookas as 
invaluable ways to cover advancing assault squads or for mouseholing in order to help 
soldiers advance under cover.20
 Lessons from the 2nd Infantry Division in Brest, France and the 1st Infantry 
Division in Aachen, Germany prominently appeared in several Battle Experiences.  A 
battalion commander in the 1st Infantry Division’s 26th Infantry remembered that “I 
learned to use the fire power of every available weapon in the Aachen fighting,” 
including mortars, artillery, and hand grenades at one strongly-held position.
 
21  Of his 
division’s experience within Brest, the 2nd’s commanding general, Major General 
Walter Robertson believed “that the division came out of the Brest operation far better 
trained than when it went in, particularly because of the house-to-house fighting, which 
was essentially a squad leader’s battle.”22  Reflecting on the battle for Brest, Robertson 
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was “surprised” at the “extensive use of direct fire guns including [self-propelled] 155 
mm guns fired at ranges as close as 500 to 600 yards.”23
 More than anything else, Battle Experiences instructed on the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures of organizing assault squads as well as support and reserve units.  The 
periodical also advised on the methods of assaulting towns in general and buildings in 
particular.  Improvement was imperative because, Robertson wrote, “the term ‘street 
fighting’ is a misnomer, for the street was one place we could not go. . . . Our procedure 
was to go from house to house blasting holes through the walls with satchel charges.”
 
24  
A Sergeant Floyd of the 357th Infantry insisted that success depended on “knowledge of 
the plan of attack, intensive personal reconnaissance, following the supporting artillery 
as closely as possible, speed of movement, and keeping the platoon leader informed” of 
his squads’ positions.  On 15 July, Twelfth Army Group Battle Experiences, pulling from 
a British report, asserted that it was better to assault a house from the roof downwards, 
citing an experience where a British patrol cleared a house but, in failing to check the 
upstairs, undetected Germans killed two men when the patrol left.25
 One company commander in the 377th Infantry Regiment said that his platoons 
fell into two seven-men assault squads and a third support squad, presumably carrying 
mostly automatic weapons and bazookas, in clearing houses.  Each assault squad 
advanced “down opposite sides of the street under covering fire from the support and 
other [assault] squad.”  In maneuvering toward the first house, the support squad fired on 
the house, including with bazookas.  As the support squad lifted its fire, one assault 
squad rushed the house; two men cleared the first floor, two cleared the upper floors, two 
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cleared the cellar, and one guarded the entrance.  When this first squad had secured the 
house, it covered the house across the street for the second assault squad.  When these 
two houses were captured, the support squad took the third house under fire.  This 
method “provide[d] ample fire support for the squad moving forward without exposing 
too many men at one time.”26
 One element of tactics, techniques, and procedures was infantry-tank 
cooperation.  Although doctrine downplayed their combined-arms effect, American 
soldiers discovered the opposite: armor was a vital tool in this environment.  Most 
battlefield lessons acknowledged the necessity of infantry-tank teamwork.  As the 70th 
Tank Battalion found, tanks could not approach a town or village ahead of the infantry, 
for this made them susceptible to German antitank weapons.  Within the village itself, 
infantry “should remain abreast of or close behind [tanks] to provide antitank 
protection.”  Tank commanders might even toss grenades into buildings without 
expending the main gun’s ammunition.  Tanks’ main strength remained the ability to 
destroy stubbornly defended enemy positions.
 
27  In September, elements of the 1st 
Infantry Division depended on infantry and tanks to capture Liège: “the leading tanks 
followed with infantry marching on the sidewalks.  The tanks covered the infantry by 
firing machine guns into the windows.”28  In Aachen, one officer conceded that “we kept 
the tanks and tank destroyers well forward, usually one to a street.  Four infantrymen 
were assigned to protect each vehicle from bazookas and other antitank weapons.”29  In 
this case, the soldiers’ experiences had moved ahead of established doctrine.  Urban 
doctrine that frowned upon tanks in cities did not stop commanding officers and generals 
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from arranging tanks and infantry together as they fought through France’s and 
Germany’s villages, towns, and cities. 
 Alongside Battle Experiences, the U.S. Army had its professional journals. 
Whereas Chapter 2 showed that there were no articles on urban combat in the 1920s and 
1930s, such writings began to appear during the war.  Many articles were reprints of 
foreign articles detailing how best to fight within the urban environment.  These journal 
articles—printed in Infantry Journal, Military Review, Cavalry Journal, Field Artillery 
Journal, Tactical and Technical Trends, and Intelligence Bulletin—show both a growing 
awareness of the urban environment and its distinctiveness as well as a realization that 
the urban fight was not fought by infantry weapons alone as official doctrine prescribed. 
 Early on, the message was just that: the urban fight was an infantry fight that 
tanks entered at their own risk.  In September 1942, Infantry Journal published the 
advice of Bert Levy, a Spanish Civil War veteran from Britain, on fighting in the urban 
environment.  Levy argued that “street fighting is not a negligible part of modern war: it 
is a very important part.”  Pointing to Soviet Russia, Levy reminded his readers that “we 
have seen how towns and villages, stoutly and skillfully defended by regular or guerrilla 
forces, can be quite literally thorns in the flesh of an advancing enemy.”30  The veteran 
described ways to defend and attack a built-up area.  Given time, a defender could make 
a town virtually impregnable by razing the right buildings as well as through the use of 
fire, booby traps, and barbed wire to funnel the enemy into prearranged kill zones.  Levy 
advocated movement through buildings by way of mouseholing.  But in “making a rapid 
search of a house, [soldiers should] make as little noise as possible.”31  He strongly 
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opposed tanks’ deployment in town fighting because “tanks can do very little in street 
fighting.”  He agreed that Germans in 1940 successfully used tanks in French towns but 
only because the French failed to put up a solid defense.  For the most part, Levy 
asserted that “tanks have generally failed to penetrate streets.”  Writing from experience, 
Levy concluded that urban combat was an infantry fight through and within buildings.32
 However, as the Americans digested its Allies’ lessons, they learned a 
contradictory viewpoint from Levy’s thesis, namely that a combined armor-infantry-
artillery arrangement was requisite to effectively waging urban combat.  Indeed, in the 
same issue as Levy’s piece, the Infantry Journal printed an article by Soviet Colonel A. 
Kononenko.  Given how the Germans had fortified populated areas for their lines of 
supply and communications, the Soviets had learned how to attack these towns and 
disrupt the German supply system.  Such attacks necessarily required “careful air 
reconnaissance” and had three echelons.  First was a shock group of sappers and 
flamethrowers that violently gained a foothold on the town and “disrupt[ed] the fire 
system of the defense.”  The second echelon included a reinforced company or battalion 
that would “disrupt by bombardment and fire, the tactical coordination of the different 
garrisons that make up the enemy’s system of defense.”  The third echelon fed from the 
success of the first two echelons to get into the town and destroy the rest of the enemy, 
assisted by the second echelon.  Kononenko asserted that tanks could be quite effective 
when working in cooperation with infantry.  Tanks, for example, accompanied the first 
echelon in the Soviet attack on the fortified town of Zhurovka.  The Soviets had shown 
that knowing their enemy’s defense system through reconnaissance allowed them to 
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bring many weapons to bear, including armor and artillery, to retake these fortified 
towns.  Key to Soviet success was often the “close cooperation of infantry with tanks 
and artillery.”  Levy’s article showed how a stout urban defense could cause problems to 
the attacker; Kononenko wrote that a well-planned combined attack, carried out with 
speed and violence, could be successful.33
 As the Americans read more about what Soviet urban combat included, they 
learned that it entailed careful reconnaissance and planning followed by explosive 
attacks.  In contrast to Levy’s advice that units should move quietly while taking a house 
or building, the Soviets assaulted far more aggressively.  The victor of Stalingrad, 
Lieutenant General Vasily Chuykov, described how Russian soldiers fought inside 
houses: by creating special shock troops composed of an assault group, reinforcements, 
and reserves.
 
34  The six- to eight-man assault group’s most important weapons were 
“speed and surprise.”  The assault group was lightly armed but their only objective was 
to enter the building or house.  When signaled by the assault group, the more heavily-
armed reinforcement group “rushes into the building, occupies the firing points already 
gained by the storm [assault] groups, and establishes new ones, [and] creates a fire 
system of its own” prepare for a German counterattack.  The reserves then entered the 
structure to replace any casualties and help repulse any counterattacks.35
 Chuykov strongly emphasized careful scouting of target buildings, arguing that 
“however bold the group may be, the leader will look in vain if he has not planned the 
whole thing thoroughly.  The assault especially must be carefully prepared and 
accurately calculated.”
 
36  Once fighting for control of the house began in earnest, 
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Chuykov advised violence of action.  To do this, the assault groups carried liberal 
quantities of hand grenades and Thompson submachine guns: “There must be two of you 
to rush a house: you and a grenade . . . In rushing a house let the grenade go in first; then 
you follow.  Go through the whole house the same way: first the grenade and then you 
yourself.”  Before entering a room, toss in a grenade.  Submachine gun fire can quickly 
clear ceilings.  In essence, Chuykov wrote, “fighting inside a house is savage fighting.  
Blind your enemy by every means and then hit him from the darkness.”37  After 
achieving control, the reinforcements and reserves entered, prepared for the 
counterattack, and looked to the next building.  As for the different arms’ coordination, 
Chuykov said that Soviet soldiers were “working hard to solve the tactical problems” 
involved in coordinating infantry, armor, and artillery most effectively.  Supporting fire 
from both artillery and tanks “considerably increases the force of the attack” within 
built-up areas.38  Ultimately, Chuykov agreed with Levy that street fighting “means 
fighting for a house, for a building, for a block.  Operations develop along alleyways, 
inside houses, in ruins, underground.  But the streets are empty.”39
 In short, many of the reprinted Soviet articles in Infantry Journal and Military 
Review recommended careful reconnaissance and planning.  Careful planning allowed 
the consequent urban attack to be explosive, fast, and hard-hitting and prevent it from 
bogging down within the rubble of a town.  In contrast with FM 31-50 and Bert Levy’s 
1942 article, the Russians fully endorsed combined infantry-armor-artillery fighting 
  But Chuykov clearly 
disagreed with how soldiers accomplished any of that. 
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against their German enemy.  By 1944, American soldiers learned many of these same 
lessons.40
 Not only did the Americans report Soviet lessons but also British experiences.  
For American consideration and reflection, Intelligence Bulletin printed a discussion in 
1944 between British infantry, artillery, antitank, and tank officers to plan how they 
together would take a hypothetical town “about the same size as Ortona.”
 
41  The 
composition of officers assured a combined-arms approach but the discussion also made 
clear that the British Army’s view of urban combat had gone beyond Briton Bert Levy’s 
claim that the urban fight was the infantry’s domain.  The give-and-take discussion 
identified issues that a regimental commander would have to resolve when planning an 
urban fight and how these British officers came to a decision.  These matters included 
command and control concerns such as phase lines, potential German antitank positions, 
communication between buttoned-up tankers and soldiers, duties of engineers, supply 
issues, and aid station positions.  Aside from the combined-arms component, the article 
also showed the myriad challenges that officers must expect and plan for in a bitter 
urban fight.42
 The other service journals, Cavalry Journal and Field Artillery Journal, focused 
less on this environment but did not ignore it entirely.  Cavalry Journal printed a copy of 
Bert Levy’s early-war piece on street fighting that argued for the irrelevance of tanks.  
But in 1943, the journal published an essay by General Chuykov on Stalingrad, 
including the presence and role of tanks.
 
43  Similar to Cavalry Journal’s Chuykov piece 
on Stalingrad, Field Artillery Journal focused on the role of artillery in specific urban 
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battles, such Stalingrad, Kaltenhouse, and Arnhem.44  Only one Field Artillery article, 
Colonel Francis Boucher’s “Artillery Attacks on Stone Villages” and quoted at the 
opening of this chapter, goes beyond a specific urban engagement.  Instead, Boucher 
looked specifically at how artillerists would have to adjust and adapt their skills for a 
very different environment.  Boucher dissects German urban defensive techniques, 
evaluates the abilities and limitations of light, medium, and heavy artillery and 
establishes the role that artillery can play both before and during the attack on a town.45
 Tactical and Technical Trends detailed how a British platoon trained for street 
fighting in 1943.  In clearing a street, the platoon divided into three squads.  Two squads 
moved through and cleared the buildings lining the street while the third remained 
behind to offer support.  The squads on either side of the street also supported each other 
from within the houses and buildings.  The third, supporting squad advanced by bounds 
between a rifle group and an automatic rifle group.  If resistance forced a delay in 
momentum, a two-inch mortar fired high-explosive or smoke rounds to help the advance 
resume.
 
46
Wartime Doctrine  
  This drill was for a rifle platoon and the article did not stipulate what training 
there was for larger units or for infantry-tank training.  This article also remains one of a 
few clear descriptions of what World War II urban combat training looked like. 
 Changes in wartime doctrine gauge how army leadership applied battlefield 
lessons from the top down.  The army continued to write new field manuals into 1942, 
the first year that American forces battled Axis forces, but it took time for fighting in 
towns and cities to warrant its own publication.  There is, however, no trail of archival 
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breadcrumbs that maps the interactions between combat experiences, field lessons, and 
official doctrine.  It is not possible to determine authorship of these field manuals and it 
is even more difficult to speculate how the manuals were written.  The researcher only 
has the lessons that field units learned—divisions, armies, and army groups—and the 
end doctrine produced.  It is as though the researcher can observe a river flow into and 
then flow out of a mountain but is blind to the twists, turns, or deviations within the 
mountain.47  Officers creating new doctrine may have relied upon reprints of Soviet 
articles, observer reports, after-action reports, Battle Experiences, or the combat 
interviews conducted by combat historians such as Lieutenant Colonel William 
Goddard, Major Kenneth Hechler, Technical Sergeant Monroe Ludden, and Staff 
Sergeant Forrest Pogue but it is not clear if they did nor the extent.48  Part of the reason 
for this mystery was organizational: the U.S. Army capably culled and gathered many 
lessons from the field but had no central organization to process, evaluate, and apply 
those lessons.49
 Inasmuch as the intermediate steps remain obscure, it is plain that the doctrine 
produced by the United States Army during World War II follows the pattern seen in the 
lessons learned in the field, albeit more slowly.  Initially, army doctrine did not 
completely embrace a combined-arms mentality, even in its first urban combat manual.  
Later wartime manuals reflect the transition toward combined-arms warfighting, 
including within urban locations. 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1941 edition of Field Manual [FM] 100-5:  
Operations said very little about urban combat.  Armor had little relevance and relied 
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mostly upon artillery and aerial bombardment for infantry support.  In the space of two 
pages, it also offered little instruction on whether to attack or bypass a built-up area and 
was vague on the tactics of assaulting within a town.50  However, officers might have 
gleaned from earlier instruction on how to attack a “fortified locality” if they tailored 
that doctrine to suit immediate needs.51
 In February 1942, soon after America entered the war, the army published a 
manual on the rifle regiment.  The manual said nothing about urban combat, except to 
point the reader to the 1941 edition of Field Manual [FM] 100-5:  Operations.
 
52  
Manuals on lower levels of regimental organization, the company and battalion, had 
more to say on the topic.  The 1942 field manuals for a rifle company and heavy 
weapons company emphasized incorporating all an infantry regiment’s organic weapons: 
attached artillery as well as 81-mm mortars, heavy machine guns, and 57-mm towed 
antitank guns.53
 The 1942 edition of FM 7-20:  Rifle Battalion also remained limited in scope on 
the topic of urban combat.  The manual compared fighting through a defended town as 
similar to fighting through woods in that both environments affected unit organization as 
well as command and control, even though direction was easier to maintain in a town.
  At the company level, however, there was no consideration of 
combined infantry-artillery-armor action in the attack in general nor in the urban 
environment in particular. 
54  
In moving through a defended town, FM 7-20 presented options: rifle companies might 
“advance by bounds from street to street or from house to house.”  Both methods had 
their advantages as well as drawbacks: advancing down streets helped to maintain 
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control but presented targets for snipers while moving through houses offered riflemen 
more cover but hampered control.55  Because the objective in capturing a defended town 
was to control the exits on the opposite side of the attack, assaulting units ought to 
bypass hostile resistance knowing that reserves and supporting units took responsibility 
for mopping up any bypassed enemy later.56
 In this 1942 discussion, the army never included the possibility of tank and tank 
destroyer support.  This was not unusual because many believed early in the war that 
tanks had no place in street fighting, due to tanks’ vulnerabilities in the confines of a 
town or city.  Instead of tank support within villages, towns, and cities, a battalion was to 
rely on its supporting weapons such as machine guns, mortars, regimental Cannon 
Company and Antitank Company detachments, and division artillery.
 
57
 Doctrinally, a 1942 infantry battalion captured a town by incorporating and 
exploiting all its organic weapons, but it does not necessarily follow that, at the tactical 
levels of command, the army had adopted a combined-arms way of fighting.  Failing to 
appreciate a combined-arms arrangement in the 1942 manual on rifle battalions was not 
limited to street fighting.  Indeed, sections discussing the attack offered instructions for 
when tanks were present and when they were not present.  As such, the manual gave 
room for tank-infantry attacks but never emphasized a close armor-infantry-artillery 
partnership.   
   
 This lack of armor-infantry-artillery cooperation reflected larger organizational 
debates within the United States Army.  By 1942, military thought supported pooling 
tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft units into their own units to be used when and 
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where the situation required.  After combat in North Africa, there were those who argued 
that attaching these units to infantry divisions would give constant exposure to different 
weapons that would facilitate teamwork and a combined-arms mentality.  But by 1943, 
there remained separate armor and antiaircraft units pooled at the corps and army level—
per doctrine—as infantry divisions had independent tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft 
battalions assigned to them.58  Due to this top-level debate and emphasis on pooling, the 
1942 manual stressed that battalions should employ all accessible organic and supporting 
weapons, including close-air support, which did not always include tanks.59
 By 1944, the army responded to its combat experiences with changes in doctrine.  
Three publications of that year showed the army slowly grasping the nature of urban 
combat and that fighting it effectively required a combined-arms approach. Those 
manuals included a new edition of FM 100-5:  Operations; new doctrine on urban 
combat itself, FM 31-50:  Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns; and, 
lastly, an updated FM 7-20:  Infantry Battalion.   
   
 The 1944 manual on operations, FM 100-5, devoted a little more space to combat 
in towns—nearly three pages—than the earlier 1941 edition, which covered the issue in 
two.60  The 1944 edition emphasized a holding attack as the best way to capture a 
defended town or city, the enveloping force being the main attack that also isolated the 
town’s enemy garrison from reinforcement and resupply.  If a frontal attack was the only 
option, the revised doctrine broke the capture into two phases: the assault to the near 
edge of the town to gain a foothold onto the place; followed by reorganization and the 
advance through the town itself.61  While speed was the key in order “to capture quickly 
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the exits on the far side,” hastiness was not.  The army stressed that attacking units must 
have sufficient reconnaissance of the town as well as a plan to capture the town.62
 FM 100-5 (1944) also emphasized speed in capturing a defended town rather 
more a more methodical advance; the capture and advance occurs prior to a thorough 
mopping up process.  In this way, capturing the exits from the town’s far side had first 
priority and “assault units are freed from the responsibility of mopping up the town.”
  
63  
As units attacked the near side of the town, artillery, air support, and a unit’s organic 
weapons assisted the assault.  Assault units were to “[push] through the defensive area in 
a series of bounds,” presumably through the streets themselves.  Behind, reserves and 
supporting units would remove stubborn enemy defenders from their positions.64  The 
army, even in mid-1944, generally minimized any contribution armor might have in this 
environment: “Strongly defended towns rarely present opportunities for tanks to exploit 
their mobility due to the restrictions of barricades, debris, streets, cellars, and short range 
antitank methods.”  The manual never ruled out the use of armor and it conceded that 
tanks might play a role in street fighting but neither did it speculate nor specify under 
what conditions tanks might be gainfully employed.65
 The operations doctrine appeared to officers in June 1944, after the 3rd Infantry 
Division had captured Cisterna di Littoria and before the Anglo-American offensive in 
northern France had broken out of the hedgerows into open country.  Previous manuals 
gave officers some instruction on conducting an urban operation but this combat 
environment received its own detailed attention in January 1944 with FM 31-50: Attack 
on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns.  This work argued that the urban 
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environment was distinct unto itself for several reasons: its three-dimensional nature; the 
difficulty in locating hostile fire; the urban geography hampered movement, maneuver, 
and communications; the presence of civilians; urban fighting was inherently 
decentralized, impeding command and control; and enhanced the critical importance of 
using organic, supporting weapons such as a regiment’s Cannon Company, Antitank 
Companies, and mortars.  In light of these considerations, street fighting was distinct 
from combat in the desert, wooded areas, or the jungle.66
 From the beginning, FM 31-50 asserted that fighting in towns was not an entirely 
infantry affair and that supporting weapons were critical to the capture of a town.  But 
still, armor was not a “supporting weapon” and it was not as useful in this environment.  
Because the urban geography “subject[ed armor] to close range attack by various 
weapons” and because tanks could not “elevate or depress their main weapons to fire 
into the upper floors or basements of nearby buildings,” tanks simply were not a good 
asset in the streets.
   
67  The manual conceded that individual tanks and tank destroyers 
might fire on strongly defended positions but infantry support was absolutely essential to 
protect tanks in streets and were best placed in reserve.68
 Intelligence and reconnaissance remained essential before a battalion, regiment, 
or division could decide to fight within a town or city.  It was best if a unit could by-pass 
a defended area.  When a unit attacked, the Americans employed two phases: Phase I 
was getting a foothold on the area and Phase II was the systematic elimination of the 
  In general, American urban 
operations doctrine by early 1944 did not rely entirely on riflemen but it still did not 
fully endorse a combined-arms approach either.  
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opposition.69
 Once they had achieved a foothold, the first phase, soldiers moved to Phase II:  
fighting for and capturing the place.  In instructions to regiments and battalions, the FM 
31-50 emphasized using all units and organic weapons: namely, engineers as well as 
machine guns, Cannon Company, Antitank Company, mortars, and observed artillery 
fire.  The task for commanding officers was preserving command, control, and 
communication: knowing where their units were vis à vis the enemy in order to maintain 
the momentum.  In this second phase, FM 31-50 differed from FM 100-5’s exhortations 
that officers ought to push through a town quickly and have supporting and reserve units 
mop up opposition from behind the assault echelon.  Early on, FM 31-50 cautioned that 
soldiers should expect an increased possibility of close-quarters action and, therefore, 
should have a large supply of grenades and explosives.
  Getting a hold on a town was similar to an attack on an organized position, 
for which the army had doctrine.   
70
 Combat in Towns provided instruction on how to organize rifle companies and 
rifle squads inside towns and cities.  The instruction dealt far more with tactics, 
techniques, and procedures.  Here, also, were signs of learning and improvement.  The 
1942 battalion officer’s field manual had advised that soldiers could advance through a 
town two different ways: either moving carefully on the streets or through backyards and 
alleyways.
 
71  Combat in Towns does not present a choice for rifle squads and riflemen—
they should advance “house-to-house through side yards; over rooftops; by breaching 
walls; or through backyards, streets, or alleys.”  Doctrine implied that assault units were 
to avoid the streets in street fighting.72  By 1944, the army learned that it was unsafe to 
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advance, even by bounds, along the streets.  Moving along the streets might preserve 
command, control, and communication but was too dangerous because the enemy 
usually had the streets targeted. 
 Lastly, FM 31-50 described the techniques of planning, organizing, and 
executing assaults on and the clearing of houses and buildings.  It advised inconspicuous 
and discreet movement within the urban environment.  Assaulting and clearing buildings 
were jobs for riflemen cooperating together, whether individuals supporting each other 
or as squads offering mutual support.  Supporting weapons such as machine guns and 
mortars helped the overall advance.  But it was vague in squad formation.  According to 
the manual, “covering teams” supported “searching teams” assaulting buildings and 
homes but neglected to describe those teams’ compositions.  It was up to the soldiers 
themselves to learn by trial and error how to formulate the best combination of weapons 
for support and assault squads.73
 The manual assumed a certain violence of action in that all levels of command 
were encouraged to use all weapons at their disposal to extricate the enemy from 
defended positions.  Therefore, these instructions fully assumed the destruction of 
private property.  For example, soldiers were encouraged to bore through a roof 
downwards, to shoot through walls and floors, to toss hand grenades down flights of 
stairs and into rooms; and to move into adjacent buildings and rooms by blowing holes 
in interior walls, called “mouseholing.”
  
74  The close-quarters nature of the fight helps to 
explain why attacking units would require a large supply of hand grenades and 
explosives.  American soldiers were careful not to kill innocent civilians but American 
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urban combat doctrine in a conventional conflict had few qualms with destroying a town 
in order to save it.   
 The army’s urban combat doctrine received further elaboration in Fort Benning’s 
publication for officers, The Infantry School Mailing List.  The purpose of the Mailing 
List was to instruct officers going through the army’s Infantry School.  In July 1944, the 
Mailing List published its one wartime article on street fighting, “Principles of Town and 
Village Fighting.”  
 The Mailing List explained reasons for investing Allied strength in a city or 
town: usually “when to by-pass [the place] will endanger the advancing troops or imperil 
the plan of the higher commanders.”75  Because of this situation, American officers 
could expect the enemy to defend more thoroughly those urban locales critical to the 
Allied advance.  Pursuant to this line of thought, the 3rd Infantry Division, for example, 
ordered the 7th Infantry Regiment to capture Cisterna.  Fear of what the enemy would do 
if he simply went around partly explains why General George S. Patton invested an army 
corps in the capture of Metz, France.  The article asserted that the Russians had proven 
the “soundness” of the principles explicated.76  These principles included the need for 
accurate intelligence; fighting in urban locations was inherently decentralized, making 
control by higher commanders “practically nonexistent;” the fighting should be 
systematic, meaning that plans ought to be simple and clear with definite and limited 
objectives; assault troops were to avoid the streets; “every movement has covering fire;” 
support squads and reserves closely followed assault units; soldiers should execute plans 
with speed and aggression.77   
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 As “Town and Village Fighting” expounded upon these principles, it largely fell 
in line with FM 31-50’s prescriptions.  Although acknowledging difficulties in 
command, control, and communication, fighting aggressively for limited objectives with 
clearly communicated simple plans helped to ease that problem.78  The article also 
advised on how best to use grenades and small arms such as light machine guns, rifles, 
submachine guns.  At the squad-level, the article’s authors instructed how squads should 
cover each other as they advanced through buildings, captured houses, and crossed 
streets, working together, purposefully, and methodically.  As with FM 31-50, the article 
encouraged the use of all supporting weapons such as artillery, towed antitank guns, 
mortars, and machine guns.  The publication saw tanks’ vulnerability as a serious 
liability and argued that tanks and tank destroyers “are seldom employed in close 
support of an attack on a village or town.”  Similar to FM 31-50, it did not write off the 
presence of tanks but was unenthusiastic to their usage.79
 FM 100-5, FM 31-50, and the Mailing List piece were published between 
January and July 1944, before the Americans fought on the European continent in 
earnest.  The October 1944 edition of FM 7-20: Infantry Battalion, revealed a more 
sophisticated attitude regarding urban combat.  Like FM 31-50, the 1944 version 
removed any option for soldiers’ inner-city movement: “leading troops avoid streets as 
much as possible. . . . The advance will ordinarily be from house-to-house through side 
  Writers of FM 31-50 and 
“Principles of Town and Village Fighting” doubtless would have accepted using tanks to 
help envelop and isolate an urban location but remained unenthusiastic toward their 
close support of infantry within and inside these places.   
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yards; over rooftops; by breaching walls; of through back yards, or alleys.”  If an 
advance must take place along a street, it was through “two or more parties, each 
covering the opposite side of the street.”80
 FM 7-20 (1944) offered clearer and more specific advice for fighting in the urban 
environment than the 1942 edition.  In 1942, one sentence explained the duties for the 
regimental Cannon Company: “elements of the regimental cannon company, attached or 
in close support may be employed for direct fire against buildings and barricades held by 
hostile elements.”
  The 1942 manual encouraged speed in 
capturing a town but the 1944 revisions emphasized thoroughness, specifying the areas 
where reserve units should look for by-passed resistance such as cellars and tunnels.   
81
 The 1944 edition expanded the role for Antitank Company as well.  In 1942, 
Antitank Company advised only giving “close protection to the front and flanks of the 
attacking echelon.”
  The 1944 revisions described how Cannon Company detachments 
helped in the assault on the first phase of an urban operation—that of capturing the near 
side of a town—as well as how the company’s self-propelled howitzers could operate as 
direct support weapons against defended buildings behind the advancing riflemen.   
82  Two years later, Antitank Company was to fire on enemy 
positions not destroyed by Cannon Company or artillery.  Within the town itself, 
Antitank Company must continue to provide “all-around antimechanized protection,” 
thus assuming that German tanks would be involved in combat for these towns.83  In 
sum, the 1944 edition offered necessary and more detailed descriptions of what each 
supporting weapon’s role was when fighting inside urban places. 
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 Most important, the revised edition specified clear roles for tanks, something that 
did not even appear in FM 31-50.  By October 1944, the army had processed that 
“within a town, tanks may advance with infantry squads.”  The doctrine asserted that 
“tanks fire against hostile street barricades and against hostile snipers or machine guns in 
buildings . . . In advancing on a street, tanks should be ready to move into a side street to 
avoid antitank gun fire.”84
 These lessons inconsistently appeared in other branches’ doctrine as well.  The 
field artillery manual for 1944 did not devote much space to urban combat but it did 
acknowledge that artillery’s flat trajectory and limited observation limited artillery’s 
usefulness in combat in built-up areas.  Therefore, many infantry-supporting missions 
might be “best performed by tanks, tank destroyers, or infantry cannon weapons.”  It saw 
its chief purpose being “mass employment against critical areas and against the 
defender’s artillery.”
  By late-1944, the Americans had pushed through France and 
were approaching Germany and had encountered many towns and cities of varying sizes.  
American soldiers had seen the importance of integrating supporting weapons such as 
mortars and heavy machine guns as well as Cannon and Antitank Companies with 
riflemen but also realized that tanks and tank destroyers were necessary contributions.   
85  Armored doctrine did not change much during the war.  
Following early war thought, the 1942 FM 17-10: Armored Force, Tactics and 
Techniques stated that tanks had little business fighting inside towns and cities.  Tanks 
should encircle and flank to isolate towns and cut off reinforcements.  Attacking into a 
town was “only as a last resort or when the locality can be surprised.”  Even then, tanks 
and tank destroyers should provide direct support of the infantry from outside the town.  
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In defense, armor should support the infantry by helping to envelope attacking forces.86  
The November 1944 edition of FM 17-42: Armored Infantry Battalion said nothing of 
combat in towns and pointed the reader to FM 31-50.87  The field manual for tank 
destroyers covered how these weapons cooperate within a combat team but said nothing 
about battle inside towns and cities.88
Wartime Training  
  While artillery justly acknowledges its 
deficiencies in urban combat, armored doctrine was slow to recognize how important 
tanks could be in urban combat.  As army planners gradually learned these combined-
arms lessons, so it affected the soldiers’ training. 
 The U.S. Army in 1941 and 1942 endorsed the incorporation and integration of 
regimental and battalion supporting weapons, including heavy machine guns, mortars, 
bazookas as well as combat engineers, Cannon Company, Antitank Company, and field 
artillery.  But it did not stress combined-arms operations that brought infantry weapons 
and the riflemen alongside tanks or tank destroyers.  As the 1942 field manuals 
indicated, pooling tanks and tank destroyers rather than assigning them permanently to 
infantry divisions reflected the United States Army’s lack of combined-arms outlook.  
Training was little different.  With different training centers for infantry, tanks, artillery, 
antiaircraft units, and tank destroyers, training new soldiers for the European Theater of 
Operations reflected the lack of organizational amalgamation.89  As the war influenced 
American infantry doctrine so it also influenced army training, including how the army 
addressed the urban environment. 
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 Wartime training occurred in two different general areas:  stateside and in-
theater.  Stateside training pertained to preparing former civilians for the rigors of 
modern combat.  Separating the combat arms stateside, and therefore training, did not 
facilitate an attitude of coordination and cooperation.  To be fair, creating an effective 
and efficient training system was anything but easy: army planners had to provide for a 
multitude of training for occupations from pilots to artillerists to riflemen to mechanics 
to cooks to communications specialists to tank drivers.  The army also had to prepare 
men for combat from the deserts of North Africa and the jungles of the southwest Pacific 
to the woods and villages of continental Europe.  Training newly created divisions 
composed solely of draftees dramatically differed from peacetime Regular Army 
training, in part because peacetime training had did not have the urgency to make its 
soldiers immediately prepare for combat, whereas combat zones needed these draftee 
divisions as soon as a training program could prepare them and ship them to active 
fronts.90
 Stateside training had two elements.  The first was the creation of preparing 
combat divisions.  Early in the war, draftees were brought together and they trained as 
one unit.  Usually, veteran divisions provided experienced officers and NCOs to help 
prepare these raw recruits for battle.  The 9th Infantry Division, for example, transferred 
men to the 82nd Airborne Division as it formed in January 1942.  The 101st Airborne 
Division’s cadre came from the 82nd Airborne.  Having trained together as a unit for 
nearly a year, these divisions were to proceed intact to a combat theater.  As the war 
progressed, there was no need for new divisions, only the individual men to replace 
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fighting units’ losses.  In 1944, stateside training emphasized the individual replacement, 
who joined a division after arriving in Europe.91
 Prewar planning created a program that trained millions of young American men 
but the war greatly modified it.  With no peacetime urban combat doctrine, there was 
likewise no peacetime urban combat training.  By 1943, as more American forces 
experienced combat, planners adjusted the training better to fit the grim realities of 
modern warfare.  One modification injected more realism in training, including, among 
others, urban combat tactics.  Former civilians, now conscripted soldiers, learned how to 
assault buildings within a mock village.  This village fighting course had three purposes: 
to teach draftees for the chaos, confusion, and mayhem of urban fighting; the proper 
tactics, techniques, and procedures of urban combat, such as assaulting and capturing 
buildings and houses, moving from roof to roof as well as avoiding and setting booby 
traps; and, lastly, to do all of this as a team—whether squad or platoon.  Eventually, in a 
mock village battle draftees demonstrated their proficiency at cover, mutual support, and 
teamwork to clear streets, assault houses, and fire on surprise, moving targets under 
simulated fire and explosions.  It remarkably included tank support at the end of, but not 
during, the exercise.
 
92
 One replacement soldier to the 3rd Infantry Division wrote home in July 1943 
that his stateside training included an attack on a mock village.  The “enemy” fired live 
ammunition well over their heads.  The first man tossed a hand grenade (a small sack of 
flour) through a window and got on all fours after the grenade’s “explosion,” to allow 
the next man to jump on his back and spring through the window.  After a thorough 
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search of the building and capturing the men inside, they would take up firing positions 
to support the assault on the next building.  While the grenades were fake, the draftees 
did fire on dummy targets inside the buildings.  Facing two-story buildings, the men 
moved through the second-story first and assaulted downwards.  Despite this training, 
this combat veteran could not “recall this attack and conquer concept being used in 
actual combat.”93  In contrast, a replacement in the 1st Division recalled using his 
stateside training when nervously assaulting rooms in Soller, Germany in 1945.94
 While the mock village fight might have included tank support at the end of the 
exercise, combined-arms training generally did not include armor.  Especially as the 
army created new divisions, “combined-arms training” remained the realm of infantry-
artillery cooperation that rarely included tanks, tank destroyers, or airplanes.  After 
eleven months of fighting in urbanized France and Germany, that urban combat 
effectiveness required strong combined-arms teamwork was not lost on American 
military leadership.  As some soldiers in Germany prepared to redeploy and fight the 
Japanese, renewed training included a village-fighting course that emphasized infantry-
tank cooperation.
 
95  By 1945, American high command finally understood how to 
capture urban areas; training reflected that understanding.  But even this improvement 
must be qualified.  One veteran recalled that his stateside training in 1944 prepared him 
for a towed 57-mm antitank cannon crew but that training never included house-to-house 
or village fighting training whatsoever.96  The army was too selective as to who should 
receive this training. 
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 To be sure, the effectiveness of stateside training remained limited if only 
because no one was trying to kill these draftees, a basic and fundamental difference.  
Leroy Stewart, a scout in the 26th Infantry Regiment, remembered receiving 
replacements during the fight in Aachen, sometimes at night, and feeling sorry for them.  
He wrote that “all the Inf[antry] training you could get would never have you ready 
when it came time to go into combat.”97
 The realization that urban combat training was necessary did not escape those 
units already serving overseas.  The Americans stationed in England before the invasion 
of Normandy trained intensely from hardening marches and physical training to 
attending various schools and facilities for amphibious assault, attacking fortified 
positions, to participating in large-unit exercises.  The 1st Infantry Division arrived in 
November 1943 from Sicily to begin preparing in earnest for the invasion.  By 
December, the division’s 18th Infantry Regiment was doing “street fighting training.”  It 
is noteworthy, though, that only rifle and weapons companies underwent this training, 
excluding both Cannon and Antitank Companies from this training.
  As such, it is important to note that the army 
understood the value of giving draftees some experience and understanding—albeit a 
very limited one—of combat in built-up areas.   
98  Of the three 
infantry regiments, the 18th most eagerly trained for this contingency.  First Battalion 
felt compelled to develop “an effective standard operating procedure” for towns and 
villages because the “memories of Saint Cloud, Algeria linger in our heads.”99  
Apparently, the difficulties it regiment experienced in capturing a small North African 
town in November 1942 still stung.  Using an abandoned, bombed out British 
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neighborhood in Weymouth, the regiment worked out how to capture the village as well 
as its houses with as few casualties as possible.  Platoons advanced through defended 
blocks, endured booby traps, and worked with its squads as well as teams within the 
squads as they assaulted and cleared houses.  By the end of December 1943, the 
regiment was satisfied that “a definite operating procedure is gradually evolving.”100  In 
January, 3/18 did two full exercises at Weymouth while individual platoons and squads 
did more.101  The next month, 1/18 incorporated smoke and hand grenades at 
Weymouth.102
 The 16th and 26th Infantry Regiments also trained at Weymouth but the 16th 
Infantry, the regiment that landed at Omaha Beach in June 1944, focused its training on 
the amphibious assault as well as establishing and securing the beachhead.  The 26th 
Infantry inquired about the Weymouth facility but was less enthusiastic about training 
there since the soldiers could not use live ammunition.  Some regimental planners 
opposed going to Weymouth “unless we are definitely ordered to do this type of training 
because we can do it all here” and because live firing was prohibited.  A week later, the 
regiment prepared to train at Weymouth.
 
103
 It is worth mentioning that the way in which assault divisions prepared for the 
invasion of France in 1943 and 1944 reveal an increased awareness of combined-arms 
fighting by broadening the “regimental combat team” concept.  Created in the 1930s, the 
  The 26th Regiment’s communications 
indicate that the regiments had a certain degree of control over their training.  It was not 
the 1st Division that forced the 18th to train at Weymouth but the regiment itself to 
prevent another fiasco as happened at St. Cloud. 
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combat team originally paired an infantry regiment with an artillery battalion as the 
infantry division organization changed.104  Regiments landing in North Africa trained 
within this framework.105  Combat Team (CT) 18 included the 18th Infantry Regiment, 
32nd Field Artillery Battalion, B/1st Engineer Battalion, 1/531st Engineer Shore 
Regiment, and batteries from the 431st Separate Battalion Coastal Artillery 
(Antiaircraft).  Armor did not land with CT 18 in North Africa.106
 As the army embraced a more combined-arms awareness, the regimental combat 
team went beyond just infantry-artillery teamwork.  By March 1944, when CT 16 
participated in an amphibious exercise, the combat team included the 16th Infantry 
Regiment, 7th Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Engineer Battalion, 741st Tank  Battalion, 
62nd Field Artillery Battalion, A and C Companies, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, 
20th Engineer Battalion,  an air support party, elements of the 5th Engineer Special 
Brigade, 103rd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and the 15th Ordnance Bomb Disposal 
Squad.
 
107  By mid-1944, most regimental combat teams were built around an infantry 
regiment as well as artillery, tank, and tank destroyer battalions.  Indeed, 5th Infantry 
Division wartime records consistently used the language of the regimental combat team.  
Instead of reporting the activities of the 2nd, 10th, and 11th Infantry Regiments, division 
records detailed the actions of Combat Teams 2, 10, and 11.108  Prolonged exposure 
sustained working relationships, thus developing these combined-arms teams and 
directly affected how American soldiers engaged in urban operations through 1944 and 
1945. 
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 Even in-theater, the American divisions continued their training.  As the 3rd 
Infantry Division showed prior to the breakout from Anzio in May 1944, American 
infantry divisions were occasionally pulled off the frontlines to undergo training.  The 
division’s 7th Infantry Regiment underwent specialized training in urban combat.  At 
Nettuno, as far away from German guns as a unit could be on that beachhead, the 7th 
Infantry used the small town to learn the tactics and techniques of urban combat, which 
the regiment used when it assaulted Cisterna di Littoria.  Unlike the 1st Infantry Division 
at Weymouth, the 7th Infantry had live-fire exercises at Nettuno prior to the breakout 
from Anzio, although it is unclear if tanks were involved in this training.109
 By the time that the 3rd Infantry Division landed in southern France in August 
1944, the division had as mature a combined-arms mentality as any division in the 
European Theater of Operations.
  
110  This attitude of cooperating with their attached 
armor battalions certainly helped them as they passed through, fought in, and captured 
French and German towns and is evident in how the 7th Infantry Regiment trained as 
late as March 1945.  By late-February 1945, the division came off the frontlines and 
prepared for the push into Germany.  The division rested in the Lorraine region of 
France.  In a significant step, the 7th Infantry Regiment converted Pournoy la Chetive, a 
city that the 5th Infantry Division had fought for and defended against strong German 
counterattacks, into an urban combat training facility.  The regiment tried to make the 
training as realistic as possible at Pournoy, including the use of live ammunition, 
explosives, flame throwers, bazookas, and two tank destroyers that represented 
supporting tanks.111  By the time the 3rd Division fought its major urban operation in 
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Nuremberg the next April, the division was well-prepared to use all available weapons 
effectively, including armor.   
 While there is no indication that 5th Infantry Division units trained for urban 
combat as enthusiastically as the 18th Infantry Regiment or the 3rd Division, elements 
did attempt to train for this environment nonetheless.  When in division reserve in mid-
December 1944, the 5th Division’s 10th Infantry Regiment asked to use nearby 
abandoned houses for training purposes, including the use of live ammunition, bazookas, 
rifle grenades, and explosives within these houses.  This request shows foresight, 
especially since the division would soon replace the 95th Infantry Division fighting in 
the streets of Saarlautern, but division staff denied it.  The Civil Affairs detachment 
informed the 10th Infantry that “we weren’t supposed to destroy private property and if 
we did we would certainly have to pay [for] all the damage we did.”  Because the houses 
remained in good order, the 10th Infantry’s request was simply not possible.  If the 
regiment’s companies destroyed those houses, the 5th Division “will be publicized the 
world over for destroying good homes.”  The 10th Infantry’s desire for realistic training 
facilities was prescient but it died in the name of public relations.112
 Even at the corps level, some found ways to process these lessons.  On 13 and 14 
December 1944, the XIX Army Corps hosted a lecture and demonstration of how the 
30th Infantry Division captured “a succession of small villages within mutually 
supporting distance of one another, the intervening terrain being generally open with 
excellent fields of fire.”
 
113  The division took visiting officers on an impromptu staff ride 
through towns it had taken the previous November to show how division units 
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accomplished the towns’ capture.  Like the Soviet experience, the intent was to use 
surprise and speed against the Germans.  The presentation explained that the 30th 
Division’s basic method was to lay down an intense barrage “by all type of weapons on 
the village to be attacked and on adjacent enemy localities” while assaulting troops 
moved behind the barrage from the safest route and quickly attacked from one or more 
directions when it lifted.114
 By FM 31-50’s doctrine, assaulting troops completed the first phase—getting a 
toehold on the village—when the barrage lifted.  Assaulting soldiers relied on rifle 
grenades and rifle fire to “neutralize enemy fire during the remaining distance to the 
village” and tanks fired their main guns and machine guns.  Upon entering a village, 
soldiers moved quickly to prevent a German response.  Prior planning made use of aerial 
photographs and visual reconnaissance so that infantry squads and platoons attacked 
specifically assigned houses and sections of the town as their “immediate objective.”
 
115
 At this point, tanks, which had only offered fire support assaulted quickly in 
order to join the infantry at the objective.  Operating off the roads hindered the tanks and 
caused losses among the armored units but their presence in the towns multiplied the 
infantry’s power, so division leaders accepted those tank losses.  American antitank 
assault teams destroyed any German tanks inside the village while “some antitank or 
tank destroyer guns and have machine guns move into the town as soon as practicable 
behind the assault infantry.”  If the villages lay abreast each other, the division 
recommended assaulting a “flank village” en route to capturing all three.  Upon capture 
of the village, the division prepared for counterattack, rearranged artillery and mortar 
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support for successive villages and towns, and lay mines to the approaches of the 
locales.116
 The division staff stated that the assault itself could take less than an hour but 
preparation took several hours more because officers had to coordinate artillery, mortar, 
tank, tank destroyer, and antitank firing plans as well as to brief and inform the assault 
troops.  If the division mission included subsequent villages, the 30th Infantry Division 
tried to save time and retain the initiative by having one infantry battalion prepare and 
plan while another attacked its objective.  The division was confident that “these 
coordinated attacks have gained more objectives in a given time and eliminated more of 
the enemy with minimum loss to our own troops than when the attacking units are under 
pressure to inch forward, showing some progress hourly.”
   
117
 Much of this in-theater training was at each division’s own discretion.  No corps 
or army-level orders demanded that these infantry divisions have any urban combat 
training.  Because of its difficulties and failures at St. Cloud, the 18th Infantry Regiment 
was motivated to prepare for its next urban battle.  The 7th Infantry Regiment had 
known that it would encounter more urban combat and so trained for it.  Although 
limited, there is evidence that the 5th Infantry Division conducted wartime urban combat 
training:  division headquarters rejected the 10th Infantry Regiment’s request to do 
house-to-house fighting drills.  In October 1944, and as a result of costly failures against 
Lorraine towns, the 2nd Infantry trained to assault villages until it became, its postwar 
history said, “second nature.”
 
118  This suggests that the divisions could choose for 
themselves how they would train their men.   
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 This movement from incorporating all of a unit’s organic weapons to a more 
robust view combined-arms warfare is part of a long process dating back to World War 
I.  As the military rethought its organizational paradigm after World War I, one 
fundamental lesson was realizing that a modern army could no longer solely rely on the 
rifleman and his bayonet.  That is, at the tactical and operational levels, modern warfare 
dictated that the rifleman work with the mortarman, automatic rifleman, and machine 
gunner.  Incorporating all regimental or battalion weapons was a lesson slowly 
integrated during the interwar period; embracing a combined-arms way of fighting took 
longer. 
 Integrating company, battalion, regimental, and divisional weapons before 
combining the combat arms follows what happened within the U.S. Army during the 
interwar period.  Through the 1920s and 1930s, army thinkers questioned military 
organization from the company to the division.  At the divisional level, “combined-
arms” meant infantry-artillery cooperation and the “regimental combat team” was an 
infantry regiment paired with an accompanying artillery battalion for more effective 
teamwork.  Armored units, in contrast, remained distinct and separate from infantry 
units.119
 By 1942, infantry doctrine clearly accepted that doctrine of units utilizing all 
organic weapons within their organizations, from the M1 Garand rifle to machine guns 
to mortars to towed antitank guns to Cannon Company’s self-propelled howitzers.  Thus, 
  This segregation influenced the wartime “pooling” concept at the division and 
corps levels while doctrine began to encourage the company through the division to use 
all the weapons within their organization. 
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early wartime doctrine showed that Americans had imbibed and applied the World War I 
lesson of incorporating a unit’s weapons at all levels of military organization while not 
fully incorporating armor.  The early “pooling” concept exposes a military hesitant to 
embrace a combined-arms mentality.  Only after the infantry division achieved 
integration could it take the next step of combining with the different combat arms, 
namely, tanks and tank destroyers.  Later wartime doctrine reveals the process of 
Americans slowly broadening what they incorporated as they included tanks, tank 
destroyers, and, eventually, airpower into their battle plans.   
 The regimental combat team concept by 1944 also helps to show that 
augmentation process.  The armored units not included in November 1942 had become 
essential team players eighteen months later with the invasion of France.  
Simultaneously, America’s combat experiences in the urban environment further pushed 
army thinkers and planners to integrate and include more weapons, thus continuing the 
expansion of how the U.S. Army understood combined-arms warfare.  As the army 
learned the art of combined-arms warfare in general, soldiers quickly saw how they 
could apply it within cities, towns, and villages in particular. 
 It becomes difficult to say that Americans never achieved proficiency at 
combined-arms operations when divisions like the 3rd Infantry Division worked quite 
hard to achieve a high level of effectiveness.  Indeed, whereas the Americans did not 
have enough of an appreciation for combined-arms operations at the onset, the war 
persuaded many of them that modern combat hinged on cooperation between all combat 
arms.  In terms of urban combat, early wartime journal articles and doctrine indicated 
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this lack of appreciation to bring all weapons to bear on the enemy.  Changes in wartime 
attitudes toward combined-arms cooperation are evident in both official doctrine as well 
as professional journal articles.  Lessons applied came from two different directions.  
From below, soldiers and officers processed their experiences, giving ideas and thoughts 
on how to fight against the Germans.  Although recorded inter-division communication 
seems to be limited, periodicals such as Battle Experiences were ways for army field 
units to assist and advise each other.  Army leaders encouraged soldiers’ ideas and 
disseminated them throughout the army.  From the top, the army stateside slowly but 
steadily followed the lead and experiences of the combat units by providing new 
doctrine that increasingly merged the combat arms together.  The learning process 
converged from both directions in the U.S. Army during World War II as the Americans 
developed new ways to fight urban combat. 
 As these divisions prepared and trained during the war itself, they understood the 
realities of urban combat and prepared for it.  How they prepared for it and with what 
fervor varied amongst the divisions: the 3rd Infantry Division devoting more time and 
effort than the 5th Infantry Division.  This points to a reality of the American war effort 
in World War II:  that given the autonomy of the infantry divisions, it is difficult to 
generalize to what extent every division achieved combined-arms proficiency but it is 
clear that American divisions tried to learn during the war in order to become more 
effective.  In reality, the divisions were unequal in their eventual performance in that 
some reached combined-arms effectiveness to different degrees than others.  Left to 
themselves, however, American infantry divisions were generally successful in adapting 
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to the rigors of modern war, including urban combat.120
 
  The battles through France and 
Germany from 1944 to 1945 help to show this adaptation in the 1st, 3rd, and 5th 
Divisions.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
“KNOCK ‘EM ALL DOWN”:  URBAN COMBAT WITH THE  
 
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, JUNE TO DECEMBER 1944 
 
 In mid-1944, Anglo-American forces began what the Americans had wanted 
since entering the global conflict in December 1941: the invasion of continental Europe.  
On 6 June, the Americans, British, and Canadians assaulted the beaches of Normandy in 
northern France.  Ten weeks later, on 15 August, American and Free French troops 
landed in southern France.  Finally, American, British, Canadian, Free French, and 
Soviet military forces were arrayed against their German enemy throughout the 
continent of Europe.  After breaking out of their beachheads, the American advances 
across northern, central, and southern France shared similar experiences in fighting 
against weakened German forces through the summer but bogged down before 
strengthened German defenses within restrictive terrain in the fall and winter.   
 As the German army retreated, it established defenses anywhere it could: along 
rivers or the static Siegfried and Maginot Lines as well as within thick forests and 
French, Dutch, and German towns.  Allied operations occurred amidst a degree of urban 
settlement that did not exist in northern Africa, Sicily, or Italy.  French farmers typically 
lived in a town and farmed the ground around it, in contrast with American farming 
families that often live in a farmhouse surrounded by their acreage.1  As such, French 
towns usually lay a short distance from others.  Usually road-bound, Germans and Allies 
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gave significant operational value to otherwise unimportant French towns and cities at 
important road junctions and at crucial river-crossing sites.   
 Through June, July, and August, the 1st, 5th, and 3rd Infantry Divisions fought 
for and through more villages, towns, and cities than in previous campaigns.  These 
American divisions experienced combat through the entire urban spectrum: from L/15th 
Infantry’s attack on the village of Allan in August to 2/10’s assault and defense of the 
town of Pournoy-la-Chétive in September to the 1st Infantry Division’s operations 
against the city of Aachen in October to XX Corps’ investment of the city of Metz in 
November.  As the Americans continued to develop a maneuver-based, combined-arms 
mentality, they applied this mindset to seizing French towns and cities.  A combined-
arms approach to urban combat became especially important when each division had to 
defend an urban location rather than attack it.  These three divisions’ various urban 
battles demonstrate that the American military had learned how to use the combat arms 
in concert by the time the Germans launched their Ardennes Forest counter-offensive in 
December 1944. 
 Complicating the combined-arms approach to urban warfare, each division also 
found it necessary to conduct training for inexperienced replacements as they integrated 
into their veteran organizations.  The American replacement system served as a reminder 
that while an infantry division, as a combat organization, could become efficient in 
battle, many soldiers fresh to combat were assigned to the veteran units.  A second 
complication was the nature of the defender.  Fighting in a town against an enemy 
desperate to retreat seemed relatively straightforward, but when the German Wehrmacht 
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dug in its heels to stubbornly defend the towns and cities behind the Siegfried Line urban 
combat became much more costly and complex.  A third complication was geography.  
Fighting for towns in heavily forested regions especially strained the Americans’ 
infantry-armor-artillery teamwork.  These challenges notwithstanding, the Americans 
had learned by December 1944 that modern war required the coordination of all the 
combat arms.  While this learning continued during the campaign for France, the 
Americans consistently demonstrated improved combined-arms capabilities in urban 
combat.  
 The 1st Infantry Division landed elements on Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944 and 
fought through the Normandy Campaign and participated in the breakout from the 
bocage, or the hedgerow country, with Operation COBRA.  After pursuing the Germans 
through northern France, the division fought costly urban battles in the Siegfried Line, 
within the city of Aachen, and through the Hurtgen Forest. 
 To prepare for the invasion of Europe, the 1st Infantry Division’s rifle companies 
had performed street fighting drills in the streets of Weymouth in southern England.  
Invading northern France, British and Canadian forces attacked beaches code-named 
“Sword,” “Juno,” and “Gold.”  The Americans assaulted beaches code-named “Omaha” 
and “Utah.”  The 1st Infantry Division led the amphibious assault on “Omaha.”  Map I 
below shows the final plans for Operation OVERLORD as well as the villages and 
coastal roads just behind the beaches.2
 The 1st Division (reinforced by the 29th Infantry Division’s 116th Infantry 
Regiment) landed the 116th, 16th, and 18th Infantry Regiments on “Omaha” early on 6 
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Figure 6.1:  Final Overlord Plan  
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June.  Its objective on the first day was to establish a beachhead by seizing the coastal 
road and to also control the high ground over the important Paris-Cherbourg highway.  
The 16th Infantry’s mission included seizing Colleville-sur-Mer behind the assault 
beaches.3
 The 16th Infantry arranged itself into “Battalion Landing Teams,” or BLTs, 
where a company each of engineers, 4.1-inch mortars, tanks, and a naval shore fire 
control party would support an infantry battalion.  The rifle companies likewise broke 
down into sections, rather than platoons, for this amphibious assault.  The 16th 
Infantry’s 2nd BLT was to land on Beach Easy Red, capture Colleville-sur-Mer behind 
the beach, and establish defensive positions and to prepare to improve those defenses 
with tanks.  The regiment’s 3rd BLT was to capture the towns of Le Grande Hameau, La 
Vailee, and Ste Honorine-des-Pertes as well as make contact with the British 50th 
Division on the regimental and divisional left.  The 1st BLT, initially held in reserve, 
was to seize the towns of Formigny and Surrain and maintain contact with the 116th  
Combat Team on the regiment’s right.
 
4
 By 0630 on 6 June, the 16th’s G Company crowded aboard the small assault craft 
two thousand yards from the beach.  In the next five hours, the troops reached the 
beaches, assaulted through a murderous hail of gunfire, and captured the bluffs above the 
shoreline.  The assault on Normandy was chaotic: few tanks made it ashore, G Company 
landed on top of the previous two waves and successive waves landed on top of it.  
Assisted by disorganized elements of other companies and regiments, the survivors of G 
Company slowly and painfully wound their way to the high bluffs.
 
5  By noon, much of 
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the company had seized the crest of the bluffs and cleared its positions of any Germans.  
Now the company could attack Colleville-sur-Mer.  (Figure 6.2 shows the area around 
Colleville.)6
 Around 1300, G Company, reinforced by machine guns, approached the town.  
The Germans awaited them.  First Section infiltrated into the western edge, seizing a 
church and nearby houses.  Captain Joseph T. Dawson, the company commander, 
stormed the church with a sergeant and a private.  Three Germans killed the private but 
Dawson and his sergeant took the church and steeple.  The ensuing firefight that led to 
three Americans killed and another two wounded.  When Dawson left the church, a 
sniper’s bullet wounded him lightly in the knee.  
  
 Dawson doubted his ability to capture the town with troops he had on hand, 
especially after learning from French civilians that 150 Germans were in Colleville and 
knowing his company had taken severe losses from the landing.  Around 1425, 2/16’s 
commander requested tanks and reinforcements to strike inland.  Remaining on the 
western edge, 2nd Section deployed north of town while the 3rd and 5th Sections 
deployed on the south.  Soon after the Americans appeared, the Germans 
counterattacked but lost eighteen killed and eight taken prisoner as the Americans 
repulsed their attack.  Because of the chaos of the landings, the lack of a clear front, and 
sketchy communications, G Company grasped onto the western outskirts of Colleville 
and waited for the 18th Infantry to relieve them. 
 At 1530, U.S. naval vessels suddenly began shelling Colleville and caused eight 
American casualties.  After 90 minutes, the shelling stopped when naval gunners learned 
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Figure 6.2:  Colleville-sur-Mer 
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who was there.  Dawson remembered later that this shelling “absolutely leveled” 
Colleville and it “angered me beyond all measure because I thought it was totally 
disgraceful.”  The navy had orders to shell Colleville an hour after the landings or 
whenever its gunners had proper visibility.  At 0800 on 7 June, a large patrol entered 
Colleveille and, according to a post-battle report, “moved carefully from house to house, 
shot a few enemy riflemen, and captured eight prisoners.”7
 Although a small engagement relying solely on the infantry, the fight in 
Colleville after making a major amphibious assault signifies not only the many village 
and town fights that Americans could expect as they advanced through France but also 
that they were part of a larger operation or strategy.  That is, urban actions occurred as a 
part of an amphibious assault, a river crossing, while fighting through a heavily wooded 
area, or while operating against a larger city.  These urban fights did not happen within 
an operational or strategic vacuum.   
   
 On 7 June, the Allies attempted to achieve the objectives they failed to get on the 
sixth.  The days after the landings were uncertain ones as the Allies awaited a massive 
German counterattack and consolidated their positions as rapidly as possible to link the 
Utah-Omaha-Gold beaches.  The 1st Infantry Division struggled to seize key roads, 
bridges, and the high ground, all goals that required controlling the area’s towns and 
villages.  The Americans soon confronted the hedgerows, or the centuries-old property 
markers throughout the region that were impenetrable walls of vines and trees and gave 
the Germans superior concealment but made observation difficult.  The division’s rifle 
companies and battalions, assisted by the 741st and 745th Tank Battalions, took several 
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villages in the area.  The 18th and 26th Infantry Regiments captured their original D-Day 
objectives of Trévières and Port en Bessin on the seventh.  Later the same day, 1/18 
attacked Engranville against some opposition while 3/18 took Surrain, and 1/26 seized 
Russy.  Early on 8 June, B/18 and tanks fought for and gained control of the town of 
Formigny.8
 On 12 June, the 26th Infantry received orders to attack south toward Caumont.  
The 18th Infantry was in support.  Both regiments operated as combat teams, each 
incorporating a battalion of tanks, a company of tank destroyers, and a platoon of 
engineers.
  The 26th took Tour en Bessin on the eighth and the 16th secured Mosles, 
thus helping to secure the important Isigny-Bayeaux coastal highway.  After capturing 
Tour-en-Bessin, the Americans pressed forward to link with the British 50th Division 
around Caumont, an important crossroads town. 
9
 The next day, 2/26 assaulted Caumont.  By 0730, the 26th radioed to division 
headquarters that the “going [was] pretty tough in the town,” in part because the 
American had underestimated the number of enemy soldiers.  Five minutes later, it 
became a house-by-house fight as tanks and infantry had “to blast” the Germans inside 
the houses.  At 0800, F Company reported being shoved out of the town but the battalion 
was moving three companies abreast with tanks in front of them.  The 26th described the 
  On the twelfth, the 18th made it to the St. Lô-Caumont road; 2/26 
approached Caumont and encountered enemy tanks and artillery.  Unable to take 
Caumont on the twelfth, the 26th pulled back to allow division artillery to pound the 
town and surrounding areas.  The Americans still relied on heavy firepower when the 
infantry were not initially successful. 
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fighting as “hard” and that there were seven or eight enemy tanks in the town moving 
west toward the 18th Infantry’s position.  By 0900, the 26th declared Caumont to be in 
their hands, established antitank defenses, and rooted out the few snipers left behind.  
After withdrawing, the Germans began shelling the town.  Artillery from both armies left 
the town in ruins.  The 1st Engineer Battalion cleared the streets of the rubble and put 
out fires.  The Americans set up a defensive line outside Caumont and began patrolling 
to their front.10
 The Big Red One remained along the Caumont-St. Lô road until mid-July.  The 
Americans and Germans conducted patrols and exchanged artillery barrages.  On 14 
July, the 5th Infantry Division came ashore and replaced the 1st Infantry Division on the 
frontlines; the Big Red One redeployed to the rear.  To the west during this time, XIX 
Corps’s 29th, 30th, and 35th Infantry Divisions, as well as V Corps’s 2nd Division, 
fought for St. Lô among the marshes, rivers, hedgerows, and outlying villages but a 
fierce German defense stymied them until late July.  St. Lô fell when American forces 
entered on 18 July for the first time.  Most of the fighting was in a semi-circle north of 
the city.  What little street fighting there was came as American patrols entered the city 
on 18 July.  By the nineteenth, the city was under American control.  With XIX Corps’s 
capture, the Americans took a vital highway away from the Germans, which they used 
  On 13 June, the 1st Infantry Division established a new defensive line 
along the Caumont-St. Lô road, linking the American beachhead with the British.  As the 
most exposed Allied position, the division endured German artillery and patrolled along 
that line until the Allies came up with a new plan to break out of the frustrating 
hedgerow country. 
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when they broke out of the hedgerows.  To the east, the British experienced incredible 
difficulties taking Caen from an equally stalwart defense.  To the northwest, VII Corps’s 
4th, 9th, 79th, and 90th Divisions pushed toward the port of Cherbourg.  These divisions 
advanced up the Cherbourg Peninsula in the days after the invasion and fought against 
its many defenses.  The port finally surrendered on 27 June before an intense urban 
battle could develop.  Since these important urban actions did not involve the 1st, 3rd, or 
5th Divisions, they are not analyzed in this dissertation.   
 In the stalemating hedgerows, First U.S. Army commander Lieutenant General 
Omar Bradley planned Operation COBRA: the breakout from the hedgerows to the open 
plains of central France.  In this campaign, the 1st Infantry Division transitioned to the 
American right.  Following saturation bombing of the German frontline positions near 
St. Lô, three VII Corps divisions, the 9th, 4th, and 30th, would pour through the massive 
gap in the line.  The 1st Division had instructions to closely follow the lead units.   
 On 25 July, two thousand bombers dropped five thousand tons of bombs on 
Germans near St. Lô.11  Despite friendly casualties from bombs falling short of their 
target, VII Corps pushed across the St. Lô-Périers road.  On the twenty-sixth, the 3rd 
Armored Division’s Combat Command B (CCB) led the 1st Infantry Division’s attack 
south, followed by the 18th Infantry Regiment as the infantry advanced toward 
Marigny.12  The 18th Infantry were surprised to discover Germans defenders there on the 
morning of 27 July.  As the Americans passed into the town, the Germans opened fire.  
Fighting became house by house as the Germans defended from the narrow streets, tight 
alleyways, and buildings to slow the American advance.  To support their advances, I 
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and L Companies brought up machine guns and mortars to Marigny’s main street.  
Despite the tough urban battle, 3/18 reported the town secure on the twenty-seventh as 
the regiment turned its attention to antitank weapons south of Marigny.13
 COBRA broke the German defensive line in Normandy and soon the 
breakthrough turned into a pursuit.  The commander of 1/26, Lieutenant Colonel Francis 
Murdoch, remembered that “it was push, push, push, with fighting from time to time.”  
Murdoch credited much of the division’s success to its organic artillery but, while the 
Americans encountered many small towns and villages along the way, he “did not 
believe in shooting artillery into every little town we came across.”  His battalion often 
attacked on foot at night, “mov[ing] silently into the town, then bring[ing] in our 
tanks.”
   
14
 Combat Team 26 made effective use of August.  On 21 August, battalion and 
artillery commanders met with the tank and tank destroyer commanders to “thrash out” 
the appropriate use of armor with assault infantry.  Each battalion had developed its own 
method of integrating tanks and tank destroyers. For example, First Battalion preferred 
to place tanks behind the lead company and tank destroyers behind the tanks but before 
the second company.  Second Battalion put its tanks out front by fifty yards, followed by 
infantry walking alongside the tank destroyers.  Third Battalion mounted half a company 
onto its platoon of tanks and the other half-company mounted on its platoon of tank 
destroyers.  Colonel John Seitz permitted his battalion commanders to decide how best 
to employ tanks and tank destroyers.  Although maintenance issues cut short the 
discussion, the combat team actively acted to improve its combined-arms capabilities.
  Typically, the Germans withdrew or, more rarely, they surrendered. 
15  
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Indeed, the combat team went further by creating three “battle groups” of a battalion of 
infantry, a platoon of tanks, a platoon of tank destroyers, and artillery.16
 The division also reevaluated its tank-infantry coordination.  The 1st Division’s 
own monthly report of operations for August advocated permanently including tank, 
towed tank destroyer, and self-propelled tank destroyer battalions into the divisional 
organization.  The report advocated tanks working together, preferably as a platoon of 
five tanks.  It encouraged the infantry’s active cooperation and support of tanks in 
combat.  In well-defended areas, tanks became assault guns that knocked out enemy 
positions and moved forward alongside the infantry.  Infantry-mounted tanks, assisted by 
artillery and reconnaissance, could roll ahead of the main body of infantry.  Against a 
fortified town or village, it was best for tanks to support the infantry’s attack by firing 
from outside or to control the town’s rear and prevent the defenders’ escape.
   
17
 Meanwhile, the British and Americans failed to close their pincers at Falaise and 
Argentan and allowed approximately twenty German divisions to escape.  Even so, 
between D-Day and mid-September, the Germans had lost nearly 300,000 men as well 
as another 200,000 trapped in coastal ports on the Brittany Peninsula.  By September, the 
1st Division—along with the First U.S. Army—progressed across northern France, 
through southern Belgium, and approached the German border.  The 1st Infantry 
Division, now in VII Corps, again occupied the left flank of the First U.S. Army.  At the 
same time, George S. Patton’s Third U.S. Army, including the 5th Infantry Division, 
  By the 
end of August, the 1st Infantry Division clearly understood that to win in urban combat 
it was imperative to incorporate its weapons together. 
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aggressively raced across central France, moving just south of Paris.  Alexander Patch’s 
Seventh Army, with the 3rd Infantry Division, lurched ahead from the beaches of 
southern France.   
 As the Americans neared the West Wall, also called the Siegfried Line, by early-
September, many believed that the Wehrmacht teetered on the brink of collapse and that 
one more major battle would result in an Allied victory.  The Allies had options but also 
serious limitations.  Chief among them was logistics: the supply dumps located several 
hundred miles behind the frontlines failed to keep the Allies adequately supplied.  
Another limitation was geography:  the terrain along the German border channeled the 
Allies’ advance into narrow, eminently defensible corridors.18  Both situations helped 
the hard-pressed Wehrmacht defenders to reconstitute themselves behind the Siegfried 
Line fortifications and prevent the Allies from winning the war by Christmas 1944.  To 
inspire his soldiers to dig in their heels, Adolf Hitler gave the order to “Stand your 
ground or die! . . . Every bunker, every block of houses in a German city, every German 
village must become a fortress.”19
 As the Big Red One and other VII Corps units faced the Siegfried Line near the 
Belgian-German border, they encountered not one line of fortifications but two: the 
Scharnhorst Line to the west and the Schill Line to the east.  Map III shows the VII 
Corps situation by mid-September as well as the 1st Infantry Division’s area of 
operations around Aachen.
 
20  First Army did not have the strategic priority but VII 
Corps commander General Joseph Collins attempted to plow his way through the West 
Wall anyhow.  Collins ordered a “reconnaissance in force” of the Siegfried Line for 12 
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Figure 6.3:  Breaching the West Wall South of Aachen, VII Corps, 12-29 September 1944 
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September but this failed because the Germans managed to cobble together a defense to 
prevent a breakthrough.21
 When the “reconnaissance-in-force” failed, Collins planned a corps-level 
operation that relied on the 3rd Armored Division to pierce the Scharnhorst and Schill 
Lines while the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions covered the northern and southern flanks 
respectively.  The 1st Division, on the corps’s left/northern flank, was to take the high 
ground east of Aachen.
  As the Germans expertly incorporated villages, towns, and 
cities into their defensive schemes, as per their Führer’s order, they challenged 
everything the Americans thought they knew about urban warfare. 
22  Initially, Collins ordered Huebner to capture Aachen on 13 
September but Huebner persuaded his boss to let the 1st Division settle for the high 
ground east of Aachen, link up with the 30th Infantry Division on the right flank of XIX 
Corps, and cut off the city.  After all, Huebner reasoned, if the goal was to break through 
the enemy defenses, then bogging down in a costly, ponderous urban battle was 
counterproductive.  Unbeknownst to the Americans, the city was lightly defended and its 
commandant, General Gerhard von Schwerin, was ready to disobey Hitler’s orders and 
surrender the city.23  As historian Harry Yeide observes, the fog of war was such “that a 
German division commander who wanted to prevent unnecessary deaths among his 
compatriots was thwarted by an American division commander who wanted the same for 
his men.”24
 With 1/26 attached to the 3rd Armored Division, CTs 16 and 18 moved through 
the Scharnhorst Line from 13 to 18 September.  Encountering heavy German resistance, 
the 26th Infantry Regiment attacked south of Aachen, confusing von Schwerin:  why did 
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the Americans not attack his relatively undefended city?25  Combat Teams 16 and 18 
penetrated deeper into the Scharnhorst Line defenses, encountering its pillboxes and tank 
traps.  The German soldiers in the Scharnhorst Line were not Germany’s finest frontline 
soldiers, but the defensive scheme magnified the combat power of the defenders, stalling 
the Americans and making the attacks into the West Wall costly.26  For their part, the 
Americans learned that destroying or capturing each pillbox required teams of riflemen, 
machine gunners, rifle grenadiers, engineers, bazookas, tanks, tank destroyers, 
explosives, and plenty of nerve.27  Ammunition and fuel shortages, along with German 
counterattacks and bad weather, conspired to prevent an American penetration of the 
West Wall.28  Nevertheless, by the fifteenth, the 1st Infantry Division had a semi-circle 
position around Aachen, covering it from the south, southeast, and east although it had 
yet to penetrate the eastern Schill Line.29  On the seventeenth, the 15,000-man 12th 
Infantry Division, a fresh and fully equipped unit redeployed from Russia, reinforced the 
weakened German defenses materially and psychologically.  The ability of the Germans 
to bring up reinforcements vis á vis the Americans’ lack of sorely-needed reserves 
helped halt the VII Corps by the eighteenth.30
 Before the showdown inside Aachen, division units fought in several urban 
battles within the Siegfried Line defenses.  On 17 September, 1/16 and tanks from the 
745th Tank Battalion assisted elements of the 3rd Armored Division in taking 
Munsterbusch.  The wooded, hilly terrain amplified the combat power of German 
machine guns, antitank guns, tanks, and small arms in and around the many pillboxes 
and house cellars.
   
31  Despite an artillery preparatory bombardment, the fighting in 
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Munsterbusch became house to house and room to room and devolved into a savage 
hand-to-hand battle.32  By the nineteenth, the 16th Infantry Regiment had many 
casualties plus sixteen cases of battle fatigue.33
 Located in a valley astride the Vicht River, Stolberg was ringed by pillboxes that 
formed the city’s first defensive barrier.
  The soldiers needed a rest but already 
had their next objective. 
34
 On the eighteenth, a platoon from the 745th Tank Battalion and C/634th Tank 
Destroyer Battalion got into Stolberg’s outer edge “shooting up” and “reducing 
buildings” defended by German snipers, antitank guns, and machine guns.
  The fight for Stolberg also constituted the 1st 
Infantry Division’s first significant urban action in the European Theater of Operations.  
The battle from 19 to 22 September foreshadowed the kind of intense urban combat the 
Americans could expect as they entered Germany.  Germans defenses necessitated more 
house-by-house, room-by-room, cellar-by-cellar assaults.  Rainy weather made a 
difficult operation more miserable.   
35  Tank 
destroyers fired around 100 rounds of high-explosive rounds into buildings outside 
Stolberg at the cost of one tank destroyer.36  When 1/16 attempted to get inside the city 
on the nineteenth, A and C Companies remained pinned down due to heavy resistance 
and B Company’s gain was minimal.37
 On the nineteenth, 1/16’s target was a factory in northern Stolberg.  D Company 
reported that the fight into the city’s edge was “extremely difficult” because of German 
small-arms, mortar, and artillery fire; the 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion described their 
defenses “well organized.”
   
38  Indeed, enemy fire was enough to force the tanks to 
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withdraw.39  The number of fortified houses inside Stolberg revealed the Germans’ 
determination.  A tanker remembered that the Germans used “every house as a gun 
emplacement and each street as a line of fire.”40  Several German tanks helped defend 
against that American attack: around 2000, a bazooka team stalked a German tank 
around a church but the problem of enemy tanks continued into the next day.  Tiring of 
the Germans in the cellars and the German tanks inside the city, 1/16 impatiently cried 
out for Molotov cocktails of a concussion grenade and a bottle of gasoline.41
 The 16th Regiment’s fight for Stolberg revealed many of the frustrating problems 
of urban combat.  The Americans fought well-motivated, veteran German soldiers in the 
cellars and houses.  On the twentieth, the 16th Regiment’s commander, Colonel 
Frederick Gibb, complained that “this thing in town is going very slow” even though 
Stolberg “is practically knocked level.”
 
42  American counterattacks restored any lost 
ground but the veteran 12th Infantry Division was not the demoralized Wehrmacht from 
the previous July and August.43  German attacks, well supported by their own mortar 
and artillery, sometimes shoved the Americans out of their positions.44  A second 
problem the Americans struggled to overcome was a lack of infantry-tank teamwork 
with the 3rd Armored Division.  The First Battalion commander, Major Edmund 
Driscoll, grumbled early on the twenty-first that “there is no cooperation between the 
armored and myself and I would like to get away from them as soon as possible.”45  
Despite Driscoll’s protest, radio traffic indicated that 3rd Armored Division tanks 
elsewhere worked “practically in line with our companies.”46  A third challenge was the 
battle’s exasperating three-dimensional nature.  Alongside forcing the Americans into a 
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house-to-house fight and destroying American tanks operating with the infantry, the 
Germans also used underground tunnels to get behind the Americans after they cleared a 
house and tanks had passed.47  The 16th complained to division headquarters that “you 
clean out one house and they come through a tunnel and come out behind you.”48  B 
Company sent a patrol that simply vanished, presumably ambushed by Germans hiding 
in the tunnels.49
 The 16th Infantry Regiment limited its involvement in Stolberg to the 
northwestern part of the town.  On the twentieth, 1/26, attached to CCA, 3rd Armored 
Division, fought into Stolberg from the southeast.  However, getting to that point 
required rigorous fighting:  while CTs 16 and 18 attacked the Siegfried Line from 13 to 
18 September, 1/26 helped the 3rd Armored Division seize Nutheim and Busbach 
between 13 and 15 September.  After hard and costly combined-arms fighting from 16 to 
20 September, the battalion took Dieppenlichen and Weissenberg.  When 1/26 received 
orders to move northwest into Stolberg, the battalion fielded less than half its strength 
and fought alongside an understrength tank battalion of 16 medium and light tanks.
   
50
 As the Americans approached from the east in the open, German artillery opened 
up on the attackers.  Most of the infantry made it safely into the city but the tanks 
suffered heavily.
   
51  While 1/16 had fought the two previous days in Stolberg, now 1/26 
was entering from the south and east but encountering the same veteran 12th Infantry 
Division.  A post-battle interview described the battle as “a matter of cleaning out the 
area, house by house, of kicking in doors, lobbing grenades, and fighting at close 
range.”52  It was slow and grinding work.  By the end of the twenty-first, elements of A 
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Company were approximately one-third into the city.  The next day, A Company fought 
down the main street, Adolf Hitler Strasse, and B Company advanced down a parallel 
street but the Americans were stopped at a cross street from German tank, machine gun, 
and small-arms fire.  C Company had tried to enter the northern part of Stolberg but 
returned to support the other rifle companies.53  Outside the city, 3rd Armored Division 
units became embroiled in a larger fight against the German defensive line.  Although 
Stolberg was partially in American hands, the depleted and beleaguered 1/26 returned to 
its parent unit.54
 VII Corps’s attempt to pierce the Siegfried Line failed.  The Americans had to 
reconsider their operational approach.   
  For its part, 1/26 received a Presidential Unit Citation for the heavy 
fighting and losses incurred from assaulting several pillboxes and bunkers, capturing 
five towns, and its combat in Stolberg.  Amidst the chaos of war, the 1st Division and its 
regiments failed to coordinate 1/16’s and 1/26’s fight in Stolberg.  Neither regiment’s 
records mention the other so that these two units fought independent battles within the 
same city.  By the twenty-second, coordination was a moot point: ten days of intense 
combat had exhausted the Germans and Americans.   
 By October, the Ninth U.S. Army came onto the front, thus allowing First Army 
to shorten its frontage.  Despite the addition of this small army, September’s battles 
forced First Army to replenish its stocks and manpower before renewing the campaign.  
Even then, First Army commander General Courtney Hodges perceived that he had to 
accomplish four tasks before reaching the Rhine.  First, the Americans had to clear the 
Germans out of the thick woods composing the Hürtgen Forest—a difficult assignment, 
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to say the least.  Secondly, First Army leaders now believed that they must capture 
Aachen.  Thirdly, and to accomplish the second task, XIX Corps north of Aachen needed 
to break through the Scharnhorst Line and help encircle Aachen.  Fourthly, the Peel 
Marshes, located along the border between the American 12th Army Group and the 
British 21 Army Group, needed to be captured.55
 The 1st Infantry Division, on the left (northern) flank of VII Corps, received the 
mission to capture Aachen.  Geographically, Aachen lies within the Dutch-Belgian-
German border region and the city sits in a bowl surrounded by hills.  Of the 165,000 
Germans who called the place home before World War II, less than 20,000 remained by 
October 1944.
  The 1st Division became intimately 
involved in the first two tasks.   
56  Historically, Charlemagne had made the city his home as well as the 
capital of his Holy Roman Empire and was also where his body was buried.  Because the 
Nazis venerated it for its prominent place in German history, Aachen loomed large in the 
Nazi Party’s psyche.  Due to its relative safety over the centuries, the city never 
constructed strong fortifications like other cities, such as Metz.57  Similar to many 
European cities, Aachen was, according to General Collins, “a jumble of solid stone 
houses, through which meandered narrow cobbled streets.”58  If the Americans bypassed 
and ignored Aachen, the large metropolis could separate and wedge XIX Corps from the 
rest of First Army and threaten the lines of communication as First Army fought toward 
Düsseldorf, Bonn, and Cologne on the Rhine.59  The city’s industries produced clothing, 
electric motors, machine parts, radio parts, and railroad cars for the German war effort.60  
Hitler ordered the German Army to defend Aachen to the last man as General Hodges 
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ordered its capture, thus resulting in one of the largest urban battles on the Western 
Front.  
 The five to six thousand German defenders belonged to Colonel Gerhard Wilck’s 
246th Infantry Division.61  In truth, the defense was a jumble of different units—
including reclassified Air Force and naval personnel, a battalion of men in their fifties 
and sixties, a 150-man SS battalion, and 125 Aachen policemen—with the 246th at the 
core.62  These ad hoc units did not have the sort of organizational cohesion enjoyed by 
the Americans.  Augmenting the defenses were five Mark IV tanks, six 150-mm guns, 
nineteen 105-mm howitzers, and eight 75-mm pieces.63  The Germans estimated that the 
Americans would attack from the south or west and planned accordingly.  Their 
objectives were to defend Lousberg and Salvatorberg, the two hills in northern Aachen 
that commanded the high ground and was the main outside supply link.  The Germans 
planned to control the main intersections and use the sewers for covered movement.64
 The American plan to seize Aachen had two parts.  The first step was to isolate 
the city, requiring XIX Corps’s 30th Infantry Division to encircle the northern and 
northeastern half of the city as the 1st Division took the southern and eastern half.  The 
second step was the 1st Division’s attack from the east, which did much to unhinge the 
German defense plan.
   
65  During the September battles, the 1st Division managed to 
generally cut off Aachen from the south and southeast.  On 2 October, the 30th Division 
began a slow, costly penetration through the Scharnhorst Line north of Aachen, to help 
the 1st Division seal off the city.  When the “Old Hickory” Division was far enough into 
the West Wall by 8 October, the 16th and 18th Regiments attacked and secured the area 
 
 
251 
 
east of Aachen.  The 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments withstood savage and brutal 
counterattacks from the Germans while the struggle for Aachen raged inside the city.  
Holding the line east of Aachen was as unenviable as the task of capturing the city itself.   
 With these two regiments waiting to link with the 30th Infantry Division, Colonel 
John Seitz’s 26th Infantry received the responsibility of capturing Aachen.  But because 
1/26 was still recuperating from its Siegfried Line attacks, Seitz could only use his 
Second and Third Battalions, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Derrill M. 
Daniel and Lieutenant Colonel John T. Corley.  General Huebner warned Seitz not to 
become too invested in Aachen because the 26th Infantry might have to help the 18th 
and 16th Infantry Regiments.  Figure 6.4 shows the city of Aachen in 1944.66
 The area of operations for Corley’s 3/26 was the northern part of Aachen, 
including the apartments and factories in the northeast and especially the Lousberg and 
Salvatorberg hills.  This axis meant seizing a spa-bath-hotel-park complex at Farwick 
Park as well as the observation tower on Observatory Hill.  Because these positions 
formed the heart of the German defensive arrangement, Third Battalion had a stiffer 
battle, including confronting an SS battalion.
 
67
 In planning the attack, Daniel wrote that he and his staff expressed the most 
concern about avoiding what the Allies had experienced in Cassino the year before.
  Daniel’s Second Battalion assaulted into 
the city’s center on Corley’s left (southern) flank. 
68  
To prevent another Cassino, battalion leadership relied on the application of massive 
firepower.  Mortars and artillery could isolate an area in Aachen; tanks, tank destroyers, 
and machine guns could pin down the defenders; and infantrymen armed with small 
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Figure 6.4: The Assault on Aachen, October 1944 
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arms, bayonets, and grenades would kill or capture the defenders.  The Second Battalion 
coined the slogan “Knock ‘em all down!” to remind the soldiers “the necessity for 
keeping up a continuous stream of fire with all available weapons.”  Each rifle company 
therefore became a small combined-arms task force that included three tanks or tank 
destroyers, two 57-mm antitank guns, two additional bazooka teams, and two heavy 
machine guns.  Each company headquarters also retained demolitions and flamethrower 
teams that went forward to assist in breaching a building.  In contrast with the division’s 
desire to prevent collateral damage at St. Cloud in November 1942, the previous 
restraints on violence had loosened because there were no such qualms in methodically 
leveling Aachen two years later.  No doubt this lack of concern for collateral damage 
might also be because they were now assaulting a German town.  This lack of concern 
was obvious for the many urban encounters in the months to come.  Daniel also put all 
three rifle companies on the line, trusting that higher headquarters would provide 
reserves if needed.69
 The battalion staff acknowledged three drawbacks with its plan.  First, 
emphasizing firepower meant having enough ammunition.  To resolve this issue, Daniel 
made sure that a supply dump was “kept practically in back of the troops.”
 
70  The second 
challenge was the matter of movement:  the different company task forces had to 
coordinate their advance within the streets and minimize German antitank fire.  To 
maintain command and control, the battalion developed and distributed “measles 
sheets.”  There were maps that numbered every important building and intersection in 
red to make communication easy and accurate—there were so many red marks that it 
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looked like the map had measles.  Similarly, Daniel assumed that the infantry would 
naturally “avoid the streets as they would the plague,” thus leaving the armor vulnerable.  
He planned for tanks and tank destroyers to remain on side streets, firing from around 
corners, and moving when it was clear.  Riflemen also guarded and helped physically 
protect the armor from enemy antitank weapons.71
 The presence of 20,000 civilians created the third challenge.  The presence of 
civilians was tricky because the Americans believed that the German soldiers might 
dress in civilian clothes to enter the fight.  Daniel ordered Second Battalion “to search 
every building, every room, every closet, every cellar, even the manholes in the street, to 
be absolutely certain that no German was behind our front lines.”  The battalion 
understood how much that would slow things down but the colonel was determined not 
to have the enemy attack from the rear.
 
72
 While infantry and armor skirmished on the city’s outskirts on 10 October, the 
30th Infantry Division was still trying to link with the 18th Infantry.
  While Corley never recorded his plan nor any 
task organization, it is clear that he also created combined-arms teams and acted similar 
to 2/26. 
73  At the same time, 
the Americans gave the city an ultimatum:  unconditionally surrender within 24 hours or 
“the American Army Ground and Air Forces will proceed ruthlessly with air and 
artillery bombardment to reduce it to submission.”74  When the Germans rejected the 
offer, the Americans began preliminary assaults as 3/26 cleared the factory district in 
northeast Aachen.75  I Company led the assault by sending a platoon down each street, 
one squad on each side and the third in reserve.  The squads entered each building 
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warily, supported by armor.76
 Early on Friday the thirteenth, Huebner officially ordered the 26th Infantry to 
capture Aachen.
  At the same time, Daniel’s 2/26 began house-to-house 
fighting on the southeast side of Aachen.  During this time, division and corps artillery 
shelled the city itself.   
77  The Second and Third Battalions proceeded along planned phase 
lines, achieving limited objectives.  Second Battalion confronted the immediate problem 
of moving past a well-defended railroad embankment without losing too many of their 
tanks and tank destroyers.78
 Once inside Aachen, the soldiers avoided the streets.  Discovering that a common 
wall and door connected most basements on a block kept the Americans off the 
machine-gun swept streets.  To continue the advance under cover, the men liberally used 
explosives and concussion grenades to “mousehole”:  they blew holes in walls to move 
from house to house.  Not surprisingly, this consumed much of their high explosives and 
bazooka ammunition.
  With the help of bombers, artillery support, mortars, and 
grenades, Daniel’s rifle companies were fighting inside the city by the afternoon.   
79  But the infantrymen were able to clear some blocks without 
ever appearing on the streets.80  One soldier remembered he and his comrades 
discovering one basement that did not have a door, so they used explosives to make their 
own hole.  When engineers applied too many explosives and nearly brought the entire 
house down, the G.I.s learned to combine discernment with “Knock ‘em all down!”81
 By now, the Americans understood that successful urban combat required many 
weapons working in concert.  Artillery dropped rounds two or three blocks in front of 
the Americans to isolate pockets of Germans.  Because the artillery fired from south of 
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Aachen rather than from behind the assault troops, there was less concern of friendly fire 
from rounds falling “short.”  Tanks or tank destroyers, usually two to a street, used their 
machine guns and cannon to fire two or three buildings ahead and on all corners of 
intersections.82  Both American armor and artillery found success firing high-explosive 
rounds with a delayed fuse to explode inside a building and kill more defenders.83  
Tanks fired armor-piercing ammunition to punch holes through buildings followed by 
high-explosive rounds.  By forcing the enemy down to buildings’ cellars, the armor 
assisted infantrymen assaulting buildings.  The Americans employed their machine guns 
to fire at possible sniper positions ahead of the infantry.  Gunners chose their positions 
carefully lest the muzzle blast cause dust to rise from the rubble and betray their 
position.84  Similar to the Soviets, the G.I.s entered buildings with hand grenades first 
but also used bazookas and rifle grenades.85  The infantrymen would clear a house and 
signal that they were finished and away from the tanks’ muzzle blast.  Consistent with 
their “Knock ‘em all down!” motto, Daniel’s Second Battalion “made a habit of opening 
up fire without waiting for actual targets to appear hoping to scare them out or pin them 
down.”86  The Germans did likewise as they were just as eager to fire on suspected or 
exposed Americans.87
 The regiment controlled the air assets overhead and likewise took advantage of 
another powerful weapon: close air support.
   
88  Artillery and rifle companies marked 
targets with red smoke for fighter-bombers to attack.89  By the evening of the first day, 
the attached air support party informed the regiment when fighter-bombers were 
available and requested more targets.90  For the rest of the battle, the 33rd Field Artillery 
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Battalion continued to fire red smoke shells for close air support missions into Aachen.  
For all the many difficulties in air-ground cooperation throughout World War II, a result 
of various technological and organizational challenges, the Americans used Aachen to 
improve their close air support capabilities and become a better combined-arms 
military.91
 But progress on the thirteenth remained slow as infantrymen assaulted every 
building and cleared every room.  F Company bogged down against a stubborn defense 
in the Friedhof Cemetery.  Daniel’s fear of German soldiers masquarading as civilians 
proved valid when his battalion discovered civilians in “ill fitting clothes,” who the 
Americans believed were German soldiers.
   
92  By 1700, Third Battalion struggled to take 
some apartment buildings and move past the German artillery raining down on its 
position.93  The Germans dug in around the northeastern factory district and showed the 
vulnerability of armor in a city when a German rocket disabled a tank accompanying K 
Company.  L Company attempted to press along Julicher and Tal Streets but the fire was 
so heavy down Julicher that soldiers attacked buildings from the rear and by climbing 
over walls or through holes in order to keep off the streets.94  As historian Charles 
MacDonald describes the first day, 3/26 marked its progress in “buildings, floors, and 
even rooms” rather than blocks.95
 Despite their combined-arms capabilities, things had not gone well for the 
Americans by the end of the first day.  The two battalions were not in contact and Third 
Battalion failed to make its objectives as it also struggled with Germans using the sewers 
to get behind the Americans.
   
96  Colonel Daniel complained that this separation allowed 
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Germans to infiltrate behind the Americans and undermine their forward progress.  The 
fighting was already tearing apart the city.  A New York Times correspondent observed 
that “everywhere there are marks of the recent battle: Pink marks of bullets on the red 
brick of the houses, tangled twisting wire festooned from lampposts, dirty brown water 
in shell holes, the side of a house torn away.”  Further, he wrote, “the streets are strewn 
with the debris of war, empty cartridge cases, torn papers, broken glass and bits of 
furniture.”97
 The Americans also discovered that many apartment buildings could withstand 
tanks’ 75-mm guns and tank destroyers’ 90-mm guns.  Huebner loaned a 155-mm self-
propelled howitzer to each battalion.
  Despite the pre-assault planning including the “measles system” and the 
combined-arms fighting, the chaos of the urban combat along with the rubble, debris, 
and meandering streets made it difficult for the officers to maintain command and 
control over the battle. 
98  Third Battalion staff officers reported that “the 
155 did the trick—2 shots and the building disappeared.”99  The muzzle blast alone of 
the 155-mm howitzer could make sections of houses collapse.100  Despite heavy artillery 
support, progress remained slow.  Third Battalion’s I Company, depleted from its losses, 
only just barely took the Observatory Hill near Farwick Park on the fourteenth.101
 On the fifteenth, the Germans outside Aachen launched a vicious attack on the 
16th Infantry Regiment that concerned many on the division staff; a pouring rain made 
everyone miserable.
  
102  Inside Aachen, Wilck assaulted Corley’s Third Battalion from 
the south, southwest, and northwest that nearly unhinged 3/26 from its positions on 
Farwick Park.  Officers cried out that “everything seems to be coming out of town” but 
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likely included a battalion of infantry and six tanks or assault guns.103  German tanks, 
which may have included a behemoth Tiger tank, rolled down Manheims Allee firing on 
American positions, briefly retook Observatory Hill, and tore a hole in Third Battalion’s 
lines.104  American tank destroyers moved quickly to counter the German armored 
threat.  Third Battalion begged for Second Battalion to ease the pressure as it desperately 
rushed the battalion’s Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon—men usually not accustomed to 
combat—on the line.105  After two hours of frantic fighting—described by a 
correspondent as “fantastically hopeless savagery”—the Americans restored their 
position on Observatory Hill and Corley counterattacked against the tired Germans.106  
In these few hours, I Company fired over 500 mortar rounds directed by a forward 
observer who remained in his perch in the Observation Tower despite being under heavy 
fire from the Germans.107  Second Battalion lost a tank destroyer, an antitank gun, and a 
heavy machine gun but cost the Germans a tank and a platoon of infantry.108  The 
German attacks outside the city were to complement Wilck’s counterattack.  The SS 
soldiers continued to challenge Corley’s gains, even to the point of hand-to-hand combat 
in the halls of the Quellenhof Hotel, but the failure of both attacks contributed to falling 
German morale.109
 By now, the Americans had stopped receiving hot chow from behind the lines 
and survived on C-rations, though downtime in cleared buildings allowed soldiers to 
heat their rations and make coffee.  The heavy fighting also restricted the use of wheeled 
vehicles because the rubble and debris caused too many flat tires.  The men relied on the 
tracked M-29 Weasel to supply them and evacuate the wounded.
   
110  During the battle, 
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the battalions neared an organizational crisis from the casualties.  For example, losses 
forced one company to leave skeleton crews for its 60-mm mortars and commit the rest 
as riflemen.111  In part, this was because when the units received an infusion of 
replacements during the battle, these raw men seemed to die at a frightful rate.  The units 
suffered doubly when veteran soldiers and officers became casualties.112
 Fighting on 16 October revealed the chaotic nature of urban combat.  German 
tanks and infantry attacked down Hindenburgstrasse toward Second Battalion but the 
tanks soon retreated.  American and German infantry fought it out at the Hindenburg-
Wilhelm intersection before the German soldiers also retreated.  A few blocks north, two 
tanks with F Company destroyed a German 75-mm antitank gun.
   
113  Daniel made use of 
his attached 155-mm self-propelled howitzer but his artillery was unable to furnish close 
support.114  Daniel’s attached armor operated alongside the infantry but the nature of the 
streets prevented them from knocking out several German tanks.  A German soldier 
managed to disable one tank destroyer and some of its crew.  A pillbox at the State 
Theater on Hindenburgstrasse prevented Second Battalion from advancing until Daniel’s 
155-mm self-propelled howitzer destroyed several buildings and the pillbox, which 
turned out to be a camouflaged German tank.115  At the same time, Third Battalion 
withstood another German counterattack to retake lost high ground.  Before noon, 3/26 
lost approximately fifty men killed, wounded, and missing, including a veteran company 
commander.116  Corley held his ground but begged for more men.  Consequently, Daniel 
sent his F Company to assist 3/26. 
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 One veteran remembered that during the drive across France, they counted their 
progress in miles.  In Aachen, the Americans counted their progress in yards and 
sometimes it took all day to move one block.117  Corley reported to Seitz the familiar 
refrain: assaulting each building to clear each room, and move to the next.118  The New 
York Times correspondent Drew Middleton reported how “doughboys poke their rifles 
through holes blown in walls by bombs and shells during the bombardment and play a 
nightmarish game of hide-and-seek in the ruins with German sniper and machine-gun 
nests.”119  On the seventeenth, most of 3/26 rested, accepted new replacements to bolster 
the weakened rifle companies, and prepared to fight through Farwick Park to the 
Salvatorberg and Lousberg heights.  To the best of their abilities, the companies tried to 
inoculate the inexperienced men to the rigors of urban combat but these replacements 
were completely new to this environment, despite whatever stateside training they had.  
One replacement was a green lieutenant tasked with leading a rifle platoon, although he 
had experienced, veteran noncommissioned officers to support him.120  One soldier from 
K Company remembered feeling sorry for replacements because their training was never 
sufficient to prepare them for the life and death struggle of combat.121  This inoculation 
was critical because the next day 3/26 assaulted a large building called the Kurhaus, the 
Palace Hotel (or Palast Hotel Quellenhof), the gardens, walks, and tennis courts that had 
made the place a popular tourist destination in peacetime.122
 On the eighteenth, Third Battalion, its tanks, and tank destroyers pressed toward 
Farwick Park.  The ability to collapse buildings with the 155-mm self-propelled howitzer 
as well as to mark targets for fighter-bombers gave the Americans an edge in 
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firepower.123  There was intense close-quarters fighting as American G.I.s stormed the 
Palace Hotel.  German artillery and self-propelled guns remained potent weapons.  
German armor “rumbled around corners to fire at buildings in which Americans are 
firing on them.”124
 The 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion staff report observed that “enemy opposition 
is apparently disintegrating” by 19 October.
   By 1130, the battalion controlled Farwick Park along with large 
quantities of food and ammunition as well as 20-mm antiaircraft gun posted in a second-
floor window of the hotel.  By the early evening, the battalion prepared to attack 
Salvatorberg and Lousberg.   
125  Yet the fighting raged on as Third 
Battalion captured Salvatorberg and Lousberg by noon.  In Second Battalion, F 
Company pushed through cellars and backyards because pressing down the open streets 
remained unwise.126  By now, the fighting had stretched the division thin.  Its only 
reserve was 1/26 but that battalion was assisting the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments to 
defend against the Germans’ many attacks.  A battalion from the 28th Infantry Division 
deployed within Aachen to hold what the Americans took.  Task Force Hogan, 
composed of a battalion each of armored infantry and tanks from the 3rd Armored 
Division, assisted Corley’s northern (right) flank as 3/26 drove on the hills.127  The 
miserable weather accompanied them:  Drew Middleton reported that the “rain fell in 
sheets on already sodden ground . . . [and the] mud is thick and clinging.”128  The 
Germans still held western Aachen south of Lousberg and were determinedly ensconced 
in buildings as their perimeter dwindled. 
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 On the twentieth and twenty-first, 2/26 fought against German soldiers defending 
the Technical High School on the western edge of Aachen.  German machine gun, 
sniper, and mortar fire slowed the American advance.129  The walls of the Technical 
High School were thick enough to justify employing the 155-mm self-propelled 
howitzer, the surprise weapon of the Battle for Aachen.  Staff officers planned to 
bombard the school as F and E Company deployed around it.130  At the same time, 
Corley’s Third Battalion became entangled in fierce street to street and house to house 
fighting south of Lousberg.  Three of Corley’s four company commanders were 
wounded and a direct hit from a German mortar had wiped out an entire machine gun 
squad.131
 By the twenty-first, elements of 2/26 were several hundred yards beyond the 
city’s western railroad tracks and a 155-mm howitzer was pounding the Technical High 
School.
     
132  German automatic, antitank, and small arms fire pinned down two platoons 
of F Company.  A squad wormed its way inside after five hours of fighting, relying 
mainly on organic weapons, rifle grenades, bazookas, nerve, and guts.133
 Although the end was all but inevitable, the urban environment and determined 
defenders made the American victory costly.  Colonel Daniel’s battalion alone 
consumed 5,000 mortar rounds, 40,000 .30-caliber machine gun rounds, 4,300 grenades, 
nearly 27,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and 50 gallons of flamethrower fuel.
  With his last 
defensible position breached by midday, Colonel Gerhard Wilck finally surrendered the 
destroyed city and a quiet descended for the first time in ten days.   
134  The 
cost in human life was high: the two battalions lost the equivalent of two rifle companies 
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with 75 killed and 414 wounded.135  Grizzled veterans noticed new replacements staring 
at them.  When asked why the stares, a replacement simply said, “You look like hell.”136  
The city itself looked like giants had trampled it: after a four-hour long tour of the city, 
an intelligence officer wrote that “burst sewers, broken gas mains and dead animals have 
raised an almost overpowering smell in many parts of the city.  The streets are paved 
with shattered glass; telephone, electric light and trolley cables are dangling and netted 
together everywhere, and in many places wrecked cars, trucks, armored vehicles and 
guns litter the streets.”137
 The fighting in Aachen taught the Americans many tactical lessons about urban 
combat.  Colonel Seitz was especially impressed with the 155-mm self-propelled 
howitzer as well as soldiers’ copious use of explosives and grenades.  Seitz praised the 
infantry-artillery-air teamwork.  The infantry requested air, artillery marked targets with 
smoke shells, and fighter-bombers strafed and bombed the designated target.  Seitz did 
not believe that the fighter-bombers destroyed anything important but he was pleased 
with the coordination.  The colonel also echoed Daniel’s belief that command and 
control was vital inside Aachen, especially at night when adjacent units should “keep 
close physical contact.”
  Aachen was knocked down. 
138  At the same time, the supporting 33rd Field Artillery 
Battalion was confident that their artillery fires helped cover the infantry’s advance and 
destroyed German tanks.  Oftentimes, observed artillery fire forced Germans to flee 
from their antitank positions and mortar positions and permitted American direct-fire 
weapons to destroy them.  Overall, observation and wire communications were critical 
to the artillery’s effective support of the infantry and armor within the city.139 
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 Lieutenant Colonel Derrill Daniel also recorded what lessons Aachen taught him.  
In a post-battle interview, Daniel identified two elements vital to successful urban 
fighting: thorough searches of buildings as well as command and control.  The first, 
thoroughness, meant searching every building from the cellar to the attic to ensure that 
no one was inside, soldier nor civilian, that could attack from the rear.  The battle’s 
three-dimensional nature complicated this meticulousness: after forcing their way into a 
building, G.I.s had to clear each room on each floor as well as the subterranean cellars, 
catacombs, and the sewers that linked everything.140  The second element required 
maintaining a definite front so that no one raced too far ahead, no one lagged too far 
behind, and the flanks remained secured.  The “measles sheets” maps that pinpointed 
prominent intersections and buildings helped maintained command, control, and 
communications between advancing units.  Daniel assigned each company its area and a 
platoon most often had its own street.  At cross streets, each platoon would meet in the 
middle in order to clear every hiding place.141  Further, in postwar retrospect, Daniel 
credited part of their success to the direction of their attack: coming from the east rather 
than the west or the south, where the Germans expected.  He also believed that “the 
ruthless application of all available fire power” and thoroughness allowed his men to 
advance successfully.  He confirmed that assaulting troops must avoid the streets at all 
costs, depending on explosives to move from building to building.142
 It is also noteworthy that Daniel’s plan was influenced more by the fighting 
against Cassino, Italy in 1943 than the fighting against Brest the month before Aachen.  
Daniel had surely read about the fighting in Cassino while he and the rest of the 1st 
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Division trained in England.  The struggles at Cassino had made news but when active 
campaigning began, Daniel gives no indication that he had had time to process the 
success at Brest just a few weeks before his men attacked into the heart of Aachen.  
While Daniel apparently mulled over the events in Cassino, he may have had far less 
time to do the same for Brest while leading his battalion against the Germans. 
 The Americans also gained valuable insights into improving a combined-arms 
approach to large-scale urban combat.  Contrary to previous views that the vulnerability 
of tanks rendered them useless in cities, the armor was fundamental to the American 
victory in Aachen.  One company report stated that “the tanks with their cannon were 
invaluable in reducing strongpoints.”143  According to another soldier’s observation, 
tanks and tank destroyers “present such a mobile base of fire [by] spraying streets with 
machine gun fire or blasting buildings with direct cannon fire greatly assists the 
attacking infantry.”144
 Although necessary, armor did have vulnerabilities within a large city.  Towed 
and self-propelled antitank weapons lay concealed within the city.  German soldiers 
could drop grenades onto the open tops of tank destroyers or suddenly fire a rocket from 
amongst the rubble, atop buildings, within a cemetery, or after hiding in a cellar or 
sewer.  Therefore, as one tanker put it, “the infantrymen had to protect their 
protectors.”
  Tank-tank destroyer-infantry-artillery teamwork was essential to 
American success in this major urban battle. 
145  One method was to assign several infantrymen to protect each armored 
vehicle in order to knock out hidden antitank positions.  Aside from security, these 
soldiers also acted as runners and informed tank commanders of friendly infantry hidden 
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from the tanks’ view.  However, increasing casualties within the assault squads forced 
officers to return these riflemen to their squads.146  Another method of protection was 
soldiers tossing grenades into ruins and windows or armored units firing their cannon 
into suspected antitank positions.  While this method occasionally flushed Germans into 
the open, the enemy usually withdrew under the cover of the interconnected cellars.147  
A third method put infantry in front of armored vehicles, sometimes as far as one 
hundred yards in advance, wherein the G.I.s identified targets for tanks and tank 
destroyers and helped them fire more effectively on enemy positions.148
 The fighting inside and outside Aachen exhausted the 1st Division.  After Wilck 
surrendered the city, VII Corps allowed the division to rest, refit, and replenish its ranks 
with new replacements.  This was necessary because the Hürtgen Forest loomed ahead.  
By late-1944, the division was a completely different organization from the unit that 
sailed to England in 1942 to train for Operation TORCH.  Before entering the Hürtgen 
Forest in mid-November, G/16th Infantry had six officers and 165 enlisted men; only 
fifteen were with the company in 1942.
  As the 
American military oriented itself around a combined-arms mindset, so it applied that 
mindset to an environment that many had thought would be a purely infantryman’s fight.  
Aachen showed the successful integration of those weapons. 
149  An incoming stream of green men replacing 
the outgoing stream of veteran casualties created a constant need to prepare those 
inexperienced enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers for the horrors and 
rigors of battle.  Despite the perpetual personnel turnover, the battle-wise Major General 
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Clarence Huebner along with combat-hardened officers, sergeants, and corporals led at 
the division, regimental, battalion, company and platoon levels.   
 From VII Corps’s attempt to break through the Siegfried Line in September until 
January, thousands of Americans had fought and died in the forests simply known as the 
Hürtgen.  The months-long fight in these forests has remained a point of deep criticism 
against the operational and strategic abilities of the American corps, army, and army 
group commanders.  One of the chief critiques is that American generals and their staffs 
failed to understand that the key to the region were not the towns and crossroads in the 
forest but the Roer River dams south of the area.150
 Another criticism is that the Hürtgen was not a place to fight.  On one level, the 
terrain helped the relatively weaker Germans to make the Americans pay for even the 
slightest advances.  One artillerist complained that “maps did not show . . . the deadly 
ravines and elevated observation posts the Germans held above them.”  The maps also 
failed to reveal “the fir trees whose branches, down to the ground, hid machine gun 
nests, dug-outs, self-propelled guns, mortars, artillery.”
   
151  German artillery also 
weaponized the thousands of trees by setting their shells to explode within the treetops in 
order to rain wooden and metallic shrapnel on American infantry.  On another level, the 
terrain hurt the Americans.  The few roads and trails that wound through the thick forests 
were useless because they were mined, inadequate, washed out by the fall rains, or all 
three.  Infantry officers often found themselves lost.  American units stumbled upon 
German kill zones with frightening regularity.152  The forests and insufficient road 
networks also conspired to minimize the effectiveness of American armor, artillery, and 
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airpower and severely tested the Americans’ growing dependence on combined-arms 
mobility and firepower.153  Dropping temperatures, snow, freezing rain, and long nights 
in November and December turned the campaign into a nightmare.154
 Previous attempts to advance through the forest in September and October 
succeeded only in depleting American ranks with little to show for their efforts.  V and 
VII Corps, including the 1st Division, crashed into the forests again in November.  The 
objective then of VII Corps’s three infantry divisions and one armored division was to 
fight northeasterly and seize the Roer River crossings near Jülich and Düren.  The 1st 
Division’s ultimate goal—in the corps center and along the northern parts of the Hürtgen 
Forest—was to take the towns of Jungersdorf and Langerwehe.  Once through the forest, 
the corps could begin looking toward Düren on the Roer River.
  Personnel losses 
from trench foot as well as battle casualties quickly drained fighting units of combat 
veterans.  First Infantry Division veterans regularly portrayed the fighting in the Hürtgen 
Forest as some of the worst combat they saw since assaulting the beaches of Normandy.   
155  The division’s first 
objective was the forest town of Hamich and the nearby high ground at Hill 232.  Figure 
6.5 shows the corps operations in the area, including the 1st Division and its principal 
towns.156
 Having reconstituted itself by November, the renewed division was in line west 
of the Hürtgen waiting for orders.  The planners intended for an aerial bombardment to 
precede the corps offensive but rain, fog, clouds, and overcast skies forced the 
postponement of the bombardment until the sixteenth.  When the bombers dropped their 
payload, 1/16 stepped off against Hamich and its determined German defenders.
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Figure 6.5:  The Hürtgen Forest, 16 November-9 December 1944  
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 The terrain around the village of Hamich was ominously well suited for defense.  
The regiment needed to take Hill 232 beyond the village because it commanded the 
entire area.  Hill 232’s capture was necessary but, as the new regimental operations 
officer noted, “not only was [the area] wooded, but it was hilly.  [It was a] terrible place 
to make an attack.”157  Another account renders it “very thick pine woods.”158  As the 
16th Infantry planned the advance, it used “measles sheets,” similar to what 2/26 used in 
Aachen, to plan the fight for Hamich.159
 Following the aerial bombardment and under artillery support, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ed Driscoll’s 1/16 attacked into Hamich but met with a hail of gunfire.  
Although the attacking companies—A and C—each had two platoons of tanks and a 
platoon of tank destroyers, the defending Germans of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division 
kept First Battalion at bay with mounting losses from well-constructed dugouts that 
covered the approaches to the village with machine guns and mortars, supported by 
enemy artillery and tank fire.
 
160  Colonel Driscoll remembered Germans posted in 
second-story windows to “deliver grazing machine gun fire across the ground 
approaching the town.”161  As B Company arrived in the evening for another attempt at 
Hamich, the Germans counterattacked.  The counterattack failed but it was sufficient to 
keep 1/16 out of the town.  Tanks ran into many difficulties supporting the infantry due 
to the poor road conditions.  Until other American units took the nearby town of 
Gressenich, the main road to Hamich remained unusable, forcing the attackers to use 
narrow, unpaved secondary routes.  Several tank destroyers managed to briefly enter 
Hamich but, without infantry support, were vulnerable when they met fire from all sides.  
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Artillery damaged one M-10 and a bazooka destroyed another.  The damaged M-10, 
however, still knocked out two German tanks.162  Notwithstanding this brief penetration, 
the American attack stalled.163
 Through the seventeenth, Driscoll tried to drive into Hamich but succeeded only 
in losing more riflemen, despite strong artillery support.
 
164  Although the 9th Infantry 
Division captured Gressenich that day, control of the Gressenich-Hamich road did not 
turn the tide: an American tank-infantry attack had some success until mud, German 
tanks, and German artillery stopped it.165  German artillery observers on Hill 232 helped 
the 100 Germans in Hamich keep the Americans out of the village.166  By evening of the 
seventeenth, First Battalion reported that it had suffered heavy losses from constant 
German artillery fire, earlier infantry-tank assaults had failed, C Company’s commander 
had been killed and the company needed replacements or they would not be able to hold 
their position.  Simply put, 1/16 lacked the strength to complete the mission.167
 Third Battalion received orders to take Hamich on the eighteenth instead of Hill 
232.  The attack followed a fighter-bomber and artillery bombardment that pounded 
Hamich and Hill 232.  Third Battalion attacked Hamich as Second Battalion took Hill 
232.  Finally, the Americans saw progress:  before 1000 hours, Third Battalion infantry, 
tanks, and tank destroyers fought its way inside Hamich to begin cleaning the Germans 
out of the village while, with surprising ease, 2/16 took Hill 232.  Yet, Third Battalion 
took the rest of the day in fighting from house to house and capturing Hamich.  By the 
afternoon, the battalion was still fighting for Hamich’s destroyed buildings and houses.  
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Having lost one tank destroyer and two tanks, Second Battalion lamented that “the 
casualties are more than they should be.”168
 But the Germans were desperate to control Hamich.  At 2100, two hundred 
German infantry and five or more tanks counterattacked and a furious firefight 
erupted.
   
169  The Americans repelled the infantry but wrestled with the German tanks.  
One Sherman tank put a round into a Mark V Panther tank eight yards away.  American 
armor claimed three tanks and two self-propelled guns but lost three tanks and two tank 
destroyers.170  During the night, as German tanks roamed the streets, “people [were] 
screaming for bazooka ammunition and bazookas.”171  Private Carmen Turchiarelli of K 
Company fired a bazooka from a second-story window into the fuel tank of a German 
Tiger tank, causing it to explode.  During the night, K Company’s executive officer 
successfully brought artillery onto his own positions to prevent the Germans from 
overrunning them.172  There were as many as four separate counterattacks that night.  At 
0600 on the nineteenth, the Germans launched another tank-infantry sortie but were 
unsuccessful.  By noon, First and Third Battalions operated inside the burning town, 
trying to dig out the last remaining Germans holed up in cellars and buildings.173  
However, the 16th’s rifle companies were heavily depleted from these three days of 
fighting: C and B Companies were each the size of a platoon while I and A Companies 
each had 90 men.  A typical rifle company typically contained 150 enlisted men.174
 As the 16th fought elsewhere in the green nightmare of the Hürtgen, the 18th 
Infantry tackled the challenge of Heistern on 20-21 November.  A study of the area 
showed that the Germans prepared Heistern as they had Hamich:  “hasty field 
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fortifications along the edge of the built-up area, backed by individual strongpoints in 
the houses and the whole forward area covered by as heavy an artillery concentration as 
[the Germans] could muster.”175  It seemed the German artillery fell even more intensely 
on the twentieth.  The 18th endured fanatical house-to-house fighting.  Despite poor 
roads, supporting tanks from B/745 Tank Battalion fired on houses containing the enemy 
and helped to take 75 to 100 prisoners.176  By evening, 3/18 held southern Heistern 
although it had left several snipers in their rear.177  The Third Battalion defeated several 
counterattacks with artillery support.178
 As the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments fought eastward, the 26th Infantry 
deployed on the division’s right.  During this period the 26th’s battalions plodded slowly 
against aggressive German resistance.  As the corps commander pressured Huebner, so 
Huebner pressured the 26th’s Colonel John Seitz to make progress that was longer than 
hundreds of yards.
  When the Americans took Heistern and the 
surrounding hills, the 1st Division could anticipate taking their objectives of Langerwehe 
and Jungersdorf on the eastern side of the forests.  By now, dramatic personnel losses 
had weakened the infantry battalions but injecting them with inexperienced replacements 
was unavoidable in order to maintain the drive.   
179  Because the 26th fought mostly within the forest with slick ground 
and few roads, its armored support was largely unhelpful.  By 27 November, the 16th 
Infantry prepared to attack Luchem and the 18th eyed Langerwehe.  The 26th Infantry’s 
Third Battalion attacked Jungersdorf with supporting armor.  Many of the men in this 
attack had replaced the losses incurred in Aachen, making the Hürtgen Forest their first 
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battle and Jungersdorf their first urban fight.  Seven hours and a bitter close-quarters 
battle later, 3/26 controlled the city of Jungersdorf.180
 The next day at 1000 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Derrill Daniel’s 2/26 attacked 
the nearby town of Merode, with a promise of artillery support from the division.
 
181  One 
replacement tanker remembered that Merode was in the open down a gentle slope 600 
yards from the woods from which the Americans would emerge.182  Combat interviews 
described Merode as “a strongly fortified village blocking several eastern exits from the 
forest leading to the Roer River and the [strategic] approaches to the Cologne plain 
[sic].”  The Germans could easily defend the town because it was in the open: 
approaches to it lacked cover and their artillery had long since “zeroed in” on the woods 
outside the town.183  One, possibly two, battalions of German soldiers defended the 
town.184
 When 2/26 and their armor stepped out of the woods on a frontage of three to 
four hundred yards, a storm of German shells nearly stopped the attack as it began.
   
185  
One American tanker recalled the bombardment: “The assaulting company is taking a 
beating. . . . A sergeant in front of us gets hit in the leg, and I see him drag himself to the 
ditch.  Then a shell lands in that exact spot where he was laying . . . It is like that all 
over, men getting hit just enough to stop them and then getting torn apart by that 
unmerciful shrapnel.”186  Though drained by losses and stunned from the enemy 
bombardment, 2/26 pressed toward Merode.  As the Americans methodically captured 
the area’s bunkers, pillboxes, and castle, the Germans pulled out of Merode, abandoning 
defenses that had concealed machine gun and panzerfaust positions.187  At 1500, the 
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Americans were inside Merode.  American fighter-bombers that strafed the area may 
have killed some Americans.188  By 1700, 2/26 had E and F Companies, tanks, and tank 
destroyers controlled the town but the two tanks withdrew after fighting in the town 
ended.189
 German artillery opened up on the Americans in Merode around 1900 hours but 
regimental and division leaders did not seem concerned about it.  This curtain of artillery 
blocked the western approaches to Merode and kept reinforcements from assisting the 
defending Americans.  Following this artillery barrage, several tanks and a battalion 
from the German 5th Parachute Regiment counterattacked.
  Most fatefully, communications into Merode were poor and three inoperable 
tanks blocked the sole road into the town. 
190  By 2000 hours, American 
staff officers became more concerned about Second Battalion’s unsupportable positions 
inside Merode.  Neither towed nor self-propelled antitank weapons could enter the fray, 
so the battalion rushed in bazooka ammunition to balance the odds.191  The battalion 
desperately tried to remove the tanks or create a path around the tanks.  The well-laid 
defenses prevented the Americans from getting armored support into Merode.  The poor 
communications made it difficult for artillery to support the American infantry for lack 
of observation but the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion fired missions in support anyhow.192  
Colonel Seitz told division that the presence of enemy tanks and Daniel’s inaccessibly 
precarious position meant that the infantry were “going to take a beating.”193  The 1st 
Division was forced to wait for daylight but, throughout the twenty-ninth and thirtieth, E 
and F Companies were effectively isolated. 
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 On the afternoon of 30 November, the 26th Infantry could only account for two 
men from E Company and fourteen from F Company.  The Germans captured those not 
killed in the fighting.  Lieutenant Sidney Miller, an F Company platoon leader, 
remembered thinking that “surely as long as we had occupied a part of the village of 
Merode that additional support would be sent.”  Although the lack of communications 
prevented Second Battalion from receiving that information, a German prisoner of war 
reported that portions of F Company were in the southwestern portion of Merode.194  
German tanks hunted the American infantrymen by firing into every building.195  
Desperate but hopeful, Daniel remained convinced by early evening that knots of 
survivors were still fighting since German artillery continued to shell the area.196  
Although not clear when, the last radio contact from Merode was a series of messages:  
“There’s a Tiger tank coming down the street now, firing his gun into every house . . . 
He’s three houses away, now, and still firing into every house . . . Here he comes . . .”197
 On 1 December, 26th Infantry patrols tried to learn the fate of their fellow G.I.s 
in Merode but intense German fire kept them at bay.  The division gave up these two 
companies and the attached heavy weapons from H Company as lost.
  
The Germans retook the town. 
198  To the 
defenders’ credit, later German prisoners attested that most Americans were captured on 
1 December only as they ran out of ammunition.199  Although Merode confirmed the 
necessity of combined-arms fighting in an urban defense, the reason why the infantry 
fought alone were because the circumstances prevented the Americans from rushing 
armor to support the beleaguered defenders.   
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 With the failure to take Merode but Jungersdorf and Langerwehe in hand, the 1st 
Division attacked Luchem, the last town outside of the hated Hürtgen Forest.  It fell on 3 
December when 1/16 employed speed, surprise, and creativity over the usual methodical 
assault.  Rather than follow the artillery barrage that routinely signaled the beginning of 
an attack, the infantry set off before dawn in a foggy drizzle after the artillery 
concentrated on specific locations.  The battalion’s information placed several 
roadblocks and defense positions on the perimeter of Luchem; patrols prior to the assault 
destroyed several of these outposts to allow the G.I.s to maintain surprise.  A platoon 
from B Company infiltrated from the northwest as A Company attacked from the 
southwest at 0600.  Infantrymen dropped grenades into cellar windows by 0700.  When 
the Americans gained the town, they pulled a page from German tactics at Merode by 
shelling the far side of Luchem to prevent the Germans from counterattacking.  As 
expected, riflemen fought house to house, tanks and tank destroyers fired directly into 
buildings.  By noon, the battalion and its attached armor had cleaned out and secured 
most of the city and its nearby environs and then prepared an all-around defense.  The 
German counterattack the next day quickly failed.200
 One reason for these new tactics was the battalion’s leadership.  After the losses 
suffered from Hamich, hundreds of replacements filled 1/16 but there was not enough 
time to prepare them for battle. Further, just as Jungersdorf and Merode were many 
replacements’ first urban battle in the 26th Infantry, so Luchem was the first street fight 
for the replacements in 1/16.  Naturally, they depended on capable combat leaders.  A 
postwar account stated that any night attack was very risky but works “when well 
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planned, competently led, and with good communication.”  In many ways, the success at 
Luchem was possible not because of the men but because of their leaders.201  Still, some 
inexperienced men rose to the occasion: one replacement in his first battle was killed 
singlehandedly taking out a machine gun nest.  His action shook the Germans out of 
their position and allowed other G.I.s to press the attack.  Private Robert T. Henry 
posthumously received the Medal of Honor for his efforts.202
 Having been in combat since 16 November, the division finally pulled off the 
line for a well-deserved rest on 4 December.  By 7 December, the division was in 
Belgium, where the men found tents, showers, new and warm clothing, real food, 
entertainment, and new soldiers to replace the thousands lost.  The rest also brought the 
men a reprieve from tree bursts, shrapnel, bullets, mines, trench foot, seeing buddies torn 
to pieces, and the despair that accompanied units fighting for too long.  Indeed, this rest 
was necessary: the 1st Medical Battalion had treated over 6,000 wounded soldiers in 
November and another 500 in the first four days of December.  Together, the three 
infantry regiments lost 500 men killed and 345 men missing.
  The battalion maintained 
the surprise and initiative and employed the violence of action necessary to take Luchem 
with a minimal loss against a determined enemy.   
203  In Belgium, the division 
expected to train the many new replacements before its next battle.  There was also a 
command change.  General Clarence Huebner became deputy commander of V Corps 
and the commanding general of division artillery, Clift Andrus, became the commanding 
general of the 1st Infantry Division.   
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 Despite the division’s intent to rest, rehabilitate, and retrain, Adolf Hitler had 
other plans.  On 16 December, the Germans launched a massive counteroffensive 
designed to punch a hole in the Allied line and retake the port of Antwerp.  As Germans 
smashed through Allied units, the Big Red One found itself fighting on the northern 
shoulder of a giant “Bulge” in their lines.   
 Meanwhile, we can turn to the 5th and 3rd Infantry Divisions and their urban 
actions in France. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
“A SEEMINGLY ENDLESS NUMBER OF BRUTAL, TOE-TO-TOE  
 
SLUGFESTS”:  URBAN COMBAT FOR THE 5TH AND 3RD  
 
INFANTRY DIVISIONS, JUNE TO DECEMBER 1944 
 
5th Infantry Division  
 Having spent the war training in Iceland, England, and Ireland, the Major 
General Leroy Irwin’s Red Diamond Division eagerly anticipated its first combat 
assignment.  Unlike the 1st and 3rd Divisions, the 5th had no combat experience when it 
entered the ETO.  As it tangled with the veteran German forces, the green 5th Division 
learned that the war against the Germans required more than the infantryman’s rifle and 
that it was far better to combine the combat arms together against the enemy.  As it 
learned combined-arms fighting in general, the division learned to apply those tactical 
and operational lessons specifically to the urban environment.  Like other divisions, 5th 
Division soldiers also had to learn how to incorporate green replacements who filled in 
for veteran casualties.  Between June and December 1944, the 5th Division fought 
within General George S. Patton’s Third Army to participate in Operation Cobra, the 
Lorraine Campaign and the attack on Metz.  The division was fighting within 
Saarlautern when it joined Patton’s ninety-degree turn to slam into the Wehrmacht’s 
southern advance at the Battle of the Bulge. 
 The 5th Division began arriving through Utah Beach on 10 July.  By the 
fifteenth, the division had relieved the 1st Infantry Division in the Caumont area.  In this 
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sector, the 5th Division acclimated itself to the weather, the terrain, and to their enemy’s 
various weapons.  In these initial days, most action was between dueling artillery and 
combat patrols.  Operation COBRA called upon the 5th Infantry Division’s 2nd Infantry 
Regiment to wrest the town of Vidouville from elements of the German 3rd Parachute 
Division.  To one veteran, Vidouville was the “first in a seemingly endless number of 
brutal toe-to-toe slugfests with the Germans for control of a city or town.”1
 The 2nd Infantry attacked at 0630 on 26 July.  The veteran Germans grudgingly 
retreated.  First Battalion slogged through Le Militiere Woods; artillery and armor 
support helped dislodge the Germans.  The American advance through the forested area 
faltered against well-sited German strongpoints and concealed heavy weapons:  an 88-
mm gun knocked out two American tanks.
 
2
 The new frontline division had to learn its own lessons in fighting the Germans.  
As Captain Tommy Gilliam’s B Company deployed around Vidouville, it failed to clear 
all the buildings and a sniper killed a platoon leader when he stood up to get better 
reception for his radio.
  As A and C Companies approached 
Vidouville, Second Battalion’s F Company entered the town itself.  By 1600, Vidouville 
and the highway south of town were in the 5th Division’s hands but constant German 
counterattacks made the Americans’ hold tenuous. 
3  In another instance, one veteran recalled how soldiers 
“casually” walked across Highway 3 unaware of a nearby German tank until its machine 
gun fired on the green riflemen.  The Americans quickly took cover after losing several 
dead and wounded.4  These deaths confirmed the veteran’s reflection that “experienced 
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combat soldiers acquire their experience by being lucky enough to see, and yet survive, 
someone else’s mistake.”5
 After Vidouville, 10th Infantry’s A Company had an opportunity to put into 
effect room-clearing drills they had practiced before landing in Normandy.  First 
Battalion pressed forward to the small village of Vieux Calais.  Soldiers wielding the 
Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) fired on the unit’s flanks as well as at the building’s 
front doors and windows.  One squad approached the first building, threw grenades, then 
stepped in to find it empty.  As each squad entered each house, the automatic riflemen 
kept firing on the hedgerows behind them to discourage any would-be German 
reinforcements.
   
6
 By early August, the 5th Infantry Division transferred from First Army to 
General George S. Patton’s recently activated Third U.S. Army.  While the 1st Division 
pressed across northern France, the 5th Division—with Third Army—pursued the enemy 
through central France as fast as Patton’s divisions could go.  At this time, the division 
received orders to seize Angers, with a prewar population of 80,000, at the confluence of 
the Loire and Maine Rivers.  (See Figure 7.1 below.)
  Tanks were not involved this time but at least the squads understood 
that speed, thoroughness, and decisive action were necessary. 
7  According to the 11th Regiment’s 
history, the city had become the “largest strategically important city to be attacked by the 
Allies after the fall of Cherbourg” because the city’s supply depots was a key rail center 
for the Brittany Peninsula as well as hosting a Gestapo headquarters and a naval 
command station for the Atlantic Fleet at St. Nazaire.8  Further, German soldiers 
retreating from the Brittany Peninsula flooded through Angers, making it critical to   
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Figure 7.1:  Battle for Angers, France 
 
 
 
302 
 
cutting off the Germans in Brittany.  Division intelligence estimated 600 to 1,000 enemy 
soldiers in the city and as intelligence speculated that the city’s strategic importance 
might force a strong German defense of the place, so the Red Diamond staff planned 
accordingly.9
 The 11th Combat Team included the 11th Infantry Regiment, C Company and 
1st Platoon, D/735th Tank Battalion, C/818th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 1st Platoon, 
B/7th Engineer Battalion.  Taking the city required seizing an intact bridge across the 
north-south Maine River or the east-west Loire River.
   
10  As the 11th Combat Team 
approached Angers, Task Force Thackeray (led by the division G-2, Lieutenant Colonel 
Donald Thackeray) scouted south and east of Angers to capture a bridge across the Loire 
River as well as to screen the division as it proceeded toward Angers.11
 In the early morning hours of 8 August, 3/11 marched southward to take the town 
of Brouchemaine as First and Second Battalions tried to force a crossing west of Angers.  
The Americans quickly ran into enemy resistance west of Angers and the Maine.  The 
Germans pinned down I/11 in Brouchemaine but had already blown the bridge in the 
area.  Major William Birdsong shifted the rest of his Third Battalion to Pruniers to 
relieve I Company and by 1700 discovered a prize: the railroad bridge south of Pruniers 
was intact.  A patrol quickly captured it undamaged.  The battalion now had a bridge 
over the Maine River.  The Americans dug up antitank mines and crossed the Maine 
River, sprinting apprehensively past a boxcar laden with high explosives.  
    
 Third Battalion (minus I Company but reinforced by E Company) reached the 
opposite side around 2200 hours and endured heavy fire from 88-mm, 40-mm, and 20-
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mm guns.  During the night of 8-9 August, 3/11 defended against counterattacks trying 
to break its tenuous bridgehead over the Maine.  At several points during that long night, 
Germans nearly broke through the American line, sometimes by tying explosives around 
their own suicidal soldiers and sending them into the inky darkness.  The American 
infantrymen fired at the Germans’ muzzle flashes and sometimes hit the explosives, thus 
virtually disintegrating the unfortunate enemy.  With the Pruniers bridge under fire, few 
reinforcements and little resupply could cross:  a few light tanks managed to creep over 
the narrow span.  Third Battalion absorbed the brunt of the German’s company-size 
attacks and tenaciously held its ground.12  Captured documents indicated that the 
Germans expected the American efforts to come from the west or northwest.  As such, 
Third Battalion’s attack from Pruniers surprised the Germans, effectively and 
inadvertently making it a successful flanking movement.13
 During Third Battalion’s ordeal on the right side of the Maine, Second and First 
Battalions joined the fight further north, where the Germans expected the main attack.  
First and Second Battalions confronted strongpoints and antitank defenses west and 
northwest of Angers.  On 9 August, Second Battalion’s G Company and tanks worked 
together to clear the outskirts of Angers west of the Maine River.  Soldiers fired 
bazookas and Browning Automatic Rifles from buildings’ second-stories onto Germans 
below.
 
14
 On 10 August, the 11th Regiment struck into Angers itself.  The 10th Infantry 
elements that had reinforced 3/11 continued westward to encircle the south of Angers.  
  On the same day, the 10th Infantry Regiment crossed the Pruniers bridge and 
reinforced the struggling 3/11.   
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The 11th’s Third Battalion (plus E Company) attacked northward along the railroad 
while Second Battalion attacked over the Maine River from the west and First Battalion 
from the northwest.  Street fighting came next: light tanks from D/735 Tank Battalion 
accompanied 3/11 northward, firing into buildings and forcing Germans outside while 
bazookas and 57-mm antitank guns blasted into the numerous rock walls, pillboxes, and 
buildings that hid Germans.  By late afternoon, Third Battalion had hooked up with 
Second Battalion.15
 French civilians inside the city enthusiastically greeted the liberating Americans.  
The civilians crowded into the regimental command post, requiring staffers to physically 
eject them.  As Second Battalion approached from the west, G Company had to break 
contact with the Germans because “French, Germans, and Americans were so 
intermingled it was impossible to tell friend from foe.”  Elsewhere, the French helped 
G.I.s.  One enlisted man remembered a Frenchman who gave him something to drink 
during the fight, while another pointed out a sniper.  Others were caught in the crossfire: 
mortar shrapnel took off one Frenchman’s leg as he tried to cross a street.
 
16
 The fighting varied in intensity, in part because the Germans drained much of 
their strength counterattacking 3/11’s bridgehead.  Louis Lauria, a wireman in the 11th’s 
Cannon Company, recorded a sharp engagement.  Because Angers’s buildings limited 
the effectiveness of radio communications, Lauria’s job of maintaining wire 
communications became vital.  He recalled that the Americans fought from house to 
house while the Germans fired from windows and doorways.  The Americans fired their 
rifle grenades and submachine guns to good effect.  Lauria also remembered that the 
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Germans had mined the roads leading into Angers.  As the Americans fought through the 
city, the combat became more intense, seeming “like a hundred Fourth of Julys.”  
German mortars and snipers as well as 20-mm and 40-mm guns prevented American 
movement in the open streets, so G.I.s crawled in and through buildings to maintain 
cover and sustain the attack.  Nevertheless, the American infantrymen, assisted by light 
tanks and a rewired Cannon Company, advanced eastward until the city was theirs by the 
end of 10 August.17
 The presence of tanks throughout the battle against Angers reveals that the 5th 
Infantry Division had learned early that good infantry-tank-artillery cooperation was 
vital to success in the urban environment.
   
18  Additionally, the 11th Infantry Regiment’s 
Cannon Company argued that by acting independent of the combat team’s artillery 
battalion, it could provide better support.  Cannon Company relied on its own fire 
direction control center to monitor the fall of its rounds and knocked out German 20-mm 
and 40-mm guns through observed fire.19
 After Angers, the division participated in Third Army’s aggressive drive across 
central France.  Division and regimental commands employed all organic transportation 
to shuttle the infantrymen forward as rapidly as possible, including trucks, tanks, tank 
destroyers, and even captured vehicles.  These early days helped cement a combined-
arms mindset and a growing awareness for tank-infantry teamwork.  A staff sergeant 
noted that one outcome of the “pig-a-back jaunt across France [was that] we got to know 
the tankers, and the TD [tank destroyer] men and it helped our morale a lot.”  By sharing 
living spaces and rations together, it was no longer “‘I wonder if they’ll send us some 
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tanks’; it was . . . ‘There’s DEPENDABLE II moving up on our right—wait ‘till 
Maguire gets that 75 lowered on those.’”20  Even though the infantrymen could often 
move through unoccupied towns and villages in France, it did not mean that they could 
move recklessly.  An infantryman in the 2nd Infantry remembered that they still 
proceeded with caution: “Soldiers never walked down the middle of a street.  We split 
our outfits in half, and advanced simultaneously up both sides of a street, with the men 
hugging close to the buildings.  The men on the right hand side of the street kept their 
eyes and guns fixed on the left hand side, while the men on the left did the same for the 
men on the right.”21
 During the heady days of August, the division’s units liberated hundreds of 
ecstatic French citizens in towns along the axis of their advance toward the Franco-
German border.  Third Army darted south of Paris to cross the Seine River because a 
quick crossing would help the Allied eastward drive.
 
22  The 5th Infantry Division, on 
Third Army’s left flank in XX Corps, liberated the Seine River towns of Fontaineblueau 
and Montereau on 23 and 24 August.  On 30 August, the division encircled and captured 
Reims.  The division seized these towns from the retreating Germans with relative ease.  
Once the division had taken these places, it forced crossings at the Marne and Meuse 
Rivers, thus entering the Lorraine region of France in early September.  Like the 
Americans further north, Patton’s Third Army slowed to a crawl from a lack of gasoline, 
bad weather, and stiffening enemy resistance.  On 31 August, Third Army received no 
gasoline; its vehicles crossed the Meuse on fumes.  When the G.I.s resumed the advance 
in earnest, the pursuit was over but it took awhile for Allied leadership to understand that 
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the situation had changed.23
 The division’s major urban operation during the Lorraine Campaign was 
capturing the French fortress city of Metz, located on the Moselle River.  (See Figure 7.2 
for the 5th Division’s area of operations from September to November.
  These logistical matters were strategic concerns at army 
and army group levels but the decisions directly affected the conduct of operations in 
Lorraine and prolonged the combat.   
24)  The army that 
had conducted brilliant blitzkrieg strategies against Poland, the Low Countries, and 
France fell back upon fortifications in September, taking positions in the partially 
finished Siegfried Line in northwestern Germany and the Maginot Line in central 
France.  The commanding general of the German Army Group G, Gerneraloberst 
Johannes Blaskowitz, stated that he intended to create a defense along the Maginot 
Line—from Metz in the north to Remiremont in the south—as the way to stop the 
Wehrmacht’s retreat through France.  The Germans were hard-pressed to deploy quickly 
along the Maginot Line but capably and effectively used the fixed fortifications as well 
as the region’s natural terrain against the Americans.  As Army Group G observed the 
American pursuit slowing by September, it spent the time improving the Maginot Line.25
 As the 5th Division rushed toward the Moselle River in early September, the 1st 
Division prepared to assault into the Siegfried Line in an attempt to break through the 
West Wall.  The fixed fortifications that the 5th Division encountered—the Maginot 
Line and forts around Metz—were different than what the 1st Division encountered at   
the West Wall.  The West Wall relied on bands of pillboxes, antitank traps, and obstacles 
to stall an attack until mobile reserves counterattacked.  The Maginot Line consisted of 
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Figure 7.2: XX Corps (Situation, Noon 6 September 1944)  
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self-contained forts of varying sizes and strengths.26
 Metz displayed a veritable museum of European military fortifications.  Before 
the 1940s, fifth-century Huns were the last people to capture Metz by force.  Over time, 
  
Metz rose in political and economic importance.  Beginning in the late 1600s, famed 
French military engineer Sébastien le Pestre de Vauban dramatically improved Metz’s 
forts.  As artillery and firepower improved, these forts were expanded to the hills north 
and west of Metz.  
 After annexing Alsace and Lorraine in 1871, the Germans improved the 
fortifications totrenches, bombproof bunkers, barracks, as well as observation and 
command posts linked by tunnels and telephone lines.  Reinforced concrete turrets 
protected batteries of 100-mm and 150-mm guns.  Larger feste such as the Fort Driant 
that the 5th Division futilely assaulted in October covered 355 acres.  Altogether, 43 
fortified positions ringed Metz, manned by the 14,000 soldaten of the German 462nd 
Volksgrenadier Division. The corps-level operation for Metz necessarily meant 
neutralizing the artillery fire from the many fortified positions that peppered the entire 
region at the cost of manpower and resources.27
 Unfortunately, the Americans had not yet processed one lesson learned from the 
urban combat in Brest: that these older fortifications could still withstand modern 
firepower.  As the 5th Division depended on Michelin road maps to orient themselves 
against Metz on 7 September, it completely failed to understand that it was attacking one 
of the most heavily fortified cities in Europe.
   
28  The Americans were ignorant because, 
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due to the rapid pursuit, intelligence was slow in distributing maps of the region and 
failed to appreciate the strength of the numerous fortresses. 
 The battle for Metz differed from the battle for Aachen in two ways.  First, the 
fortifications around Metz were a much higher caliber than the Siegfried Line 
fortifications.  Germany desperately rebuilt the Siegfried Line but only just managed to 
stop the Allied momentum.  Second, the battle against Metz was an operation for the XX 
Corps—and arguably the entire Third Army—while the battle for Aachen was the 1st 
Division’s battle within the larger First Army operation to pierce the Siegfried Line.  
These fortifications and the presence of well-motivated and well-trained soldiers slowed 
XX Corps operations and revealed an important principle: the fighting outside the target 
city in order to isolate it can sometimes be more costly than the fight within it.29
 Like Aachen, capturing Metz was an operational means toward accomplishing a 
strategic end.  On 6 September, the 5th Division and regimental staffs met to discuss the 
upcoming operation.  General Irwin informed his officers that the goal was to “force a 
crossing of the Moselle [River], capture Metz, proceed to the Siegfried Line, capture 
Saarbrucken, capture Mainz [on the Rhine River], and then proceed to the east of the 
line.”  Later that day, XX Corps ordered the 5th Division to merely “bypass Metz if it 
does not fall like a ripe plum.”
    
30
 In the first several days of September, looking ahead to the Rhine, the 5th 
Division sought to immediately force a crossing of the Moselle River south of Metz.  
The 11th Combat Team failed to get over at Dornot while the 10th Combat Team 
successfully gained a beachhead further south near the town of Arnaville.
     
31  During this 
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time, the 2nd Combat Team, on the division’s northern/left flank, attempted to capture 
the town of Amanvillers, where troops from a German Officer Candidate School, the 
Fahnenjunkerschule Regiment of the 462nd Division, put up fanatical resistance. 
 As the 10th and 11th Regiments marched toward the Moselle River south of 
Metz, the 2nd Regiment directed itself toward Amanvillers on the division’s left, or 
northern, flank.  On 8 September, Germans infiltrators killed or captured two officers 
and 66 men before First Battalion repulsed them.  Second Battalion captured Verneville 
with great difficulty and only after the German OCS cadets had repelled earlier attacks.32  
Accurate enemy artillery, machine guns, and mortars prevented the shaken First 
Battalion from entering Amanvillers.33  On 9 September, Major General Walton Walker, 
commanding general of XX Corps, attached the 2nd Combat Team to the 7th Armored 
Division and the 7th Armored Division’s Combat Command B to the 5th Infantry 
Division.34  Americans made another attempt on the ninth but German artillery and 
antitank fire destroyed several of CCA’s tanks that had supported 1/2’s attacks.  A 
German soldier stated that “the Americans seem determined to take the town at any 
price.  Tanks and infantry are attacking seven times during the day, but . . . are repulsed.  
In the seventh attack three Sherman-tanks are destroyed by [antitank] guns and 
panzerfaust.”35
 That evening, the 2nd Infantry’s colonel, A. Worrel Roffe, protested to the 7th 
Armored Division that it was useless to attack these fortified positions.
 
36  Roffe also 
complained to the 5th Division that the regiment had suffered 346 casualties with little to 
show for it and that any further attacks against these well-built fortifications would be 
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equally fruitless.  Lieutenant Colonel Randolph Dickens, the assistant chief of staff in 
charge of operations (the G-3), spoke with Irwin about Roffe’s predicament and 
confessed that “it would seem to me that a frontal attack is not the way to take Metz.”37
 In Amanvillers, B/2 received 35 infantry-trained replacements.  Captain Tommy 
Gilliam ordered his first sergeant to “put each new man between two old men and pray.”  
Days later, only two replacements remained.  During the fight, Gilliam received another 
65 replacements with no stateside infantry training and “they were asking how to fire an 
M-1 [Garand] because all they had ever had before was a carbine.”  Gilliam called 
eleven batteries of artillery (approximately 60 guns) to fire on the town church and a 
German tank.  After the artillery adjusted and fired five rounds each, the church and the 
tank were no more.  The accompanying tank company commander confessed an 
unwillingness to enter the town because he was convinced that German antitank guns 
and Tiger tanks were behind every corner.  He feared “that once they got into the town, 
his tanks didn’t have a chance.”
   
38  The tanker had a reason to fear: with four assaults in 
five days, the infantry and tanks had gained the town but lost it each time.39  Captain 
Robert Russell, the battalion’s operations officer, remembered a fighter-bomber 
dropping a 500-pound bomb on Amanvillers.  When the battalion assaulted immediately 
afterwards, Russell recalled that “the Germans rose up out of the town thru the smoke 
and attacked us.  All hell broke loose!  Confusion reigned!  Panic set in!  Our troops had 
to pull back to the railroad tracks [west of the town] again.”40
 Late on the tenth, with the support of fighter-bombers, a combined tank-infantry 
attack captured Amanvillers when the tanks hit the town from the south.  Elements of the 
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regiment withstood a vicious counterattack early on the eleventh that slammed into the 
regiment after midnight and threatened to break the Americans’ line.  Instead of 
counterattacking on the eleventh, hidden mortar and small-arms fire from inside 
Amanvillers forced First Battalion to pull back 500 yards west of the town.  After the 
battalion withdrew, an air mission strafed the town but the heaviest German artillery 
barrage yet prevented 1/2 from recapturing the place.41
 On the twelfth, 3/2 relieved the weakened 1/2 and fought on the twelfth and 
thirteenth but made little gain.  As the 7th Armored Division tried to reorganize for 
another assault on 14 September, the 5th Division’s General Irwin called off the attack.  
The 2nd Regiment was simply too beat up to do any good.  The Third Battalion’s journal 
recorded the relief with relief: “Received warning order that were to be relieved (which 
is good news, this is sure a hell hole).”
   
42
 The 2nd Infantry Regiment returned to 5th Division control on the fourteenth and 
the 90th Infantry Division tried to take Amanvillers and the area’s fortifications but were 
equally unsuccessful.  In the end, the Americans bypassed Amanvillers and the Germans 
surrendered after the fall of Metz in November.  The German officer-cadets who had 
done so much to effectively defend Amanvillers escaped before the Americans trapped 
them.   
  By then the town of Amanvillers had been 
ripped apart by both American and German artillery—little was still standing by 14 
September. 
 There are three reasons why the Americans failed to take and hold Amanvillers.  
The first was the lack of intelligence that failed to warn the 2nd Infantry what it was 
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about to attack in terms of terrain, fortifications, and enemy.  The dearth of American 
reconnaissance coupled with Third Army’s lack of intelligence about the enemy to their 
front as well as the nature of these Metz forts, forced the 2nd Infantry to attack “blindly, 
groping in the midst of battle to feel out the contours of the German defense line.”43  
Secondly, First Battalion could not avoid the several hidden festen east of Amanvillers, 
called the Lorraine Forts, that pounded the Americans with near impunity.44
 Third was the nature of the defender:  the officer-cadets were some of the most 
effective and fanatical Nazi soldiers the 5th Infantry Division encountered in World War 
II.  These well-motivated forces trained on the ground they defended and exacted a 
costly toll from the 2nd Infantry.  The assaults on Amanvillers were analogous to a 
foreign invader attacking the U.S. Army’s School of Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, 
where many American officers had intimate knowledge of the fort’s training grounds.  
Aside from knowing the land, they were exceptional soldiers:  the officer-candidates 
sometimes camouflaged their foxholes with steel covers and fired into the backs of 
Americans after they passed by.
  The 
Americans had no weapon against these fortified positions and this enemy artillery 
mercilessly shelled the Americans in ways rarely seen after June 1944.   
45  In another instance, these cadets infiltrated into C 
Company’s lines at night and took two rifle platoons captive.46  They were quite adept at 
nighttime counterattacks, firing into the air, shouting “Fall back, we are surrounded!”47
 Due to their decimated state, the 2nd Infantry Regiment needed an infusion of 
replacements.  Amazingly, many of these men had no stateside infantry training.
  
Because of these reasons, it is little wonder the 2nd Infantry failed to take Amanvillers. 
48  After 
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the 90th Division relieved it, the 2nd Infantry went into division reserve and ramped up 
training these raw replacements, including house-to-house fighting within towns and 
villages.  Such practical training benefitted the 2nd Infantry when the division attacked 
east of the Moselle River.49
 With the 2nd Infantry Regiment relieved from Amanvillers and Verneville and 
preparing for the next advance, the division pushed its Moselle River bridgehead further 
east.  XX Corps, spearheaded by the 7th Armored Division south of Metz, wanted to 
rapidly shift east and encircle Metz.  This risky plan depended on an inadequate road 
network to cooperate and for clear weather to permit air support.
  While the regiment fought on the division’s left flank, the 
10th and 11th Infantry Regiments had fought just as hard, losing as many men as they 
crossed the Moselle River and secured a bridgehead on the eastern side, including 
capturing the towns of Arry and Corny.   
50  Figure 7.3 shows the 
5th Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions’ drive east of the Moselle River.51
 The 5th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division advanced eastward by 16 
September but collided with strong German resistance.  As at Amanvillers, the Germans 
were not content to defend passively but launched strong counterattacks that kept the 
Americans off balance and exasperated an impatient Patton.  On 18 September, the two 
divisions confronted the Seille River, a major obstacle to their encirclement.  As seen on 
Map III, the 5th Division received the task of taking the towns of Pournoy-la-Chétive 
and Coin-sur-Seille.  The 10th Infanty’s Second Battalion had its hands full taking 
Pournoy between the 20 and 23 September.   
 
 On the twentieth, the 10th Infantry’s Second Battalion, assisted by two    
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Figure 7.3:  XX Corps Bridgehead, 13-25 September 1944 
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companies of the 737th Tank Battalion and a platoon of tank destroyers, assaulted from 
the south.   One sergeant reported that Pournoy was a fortified town with flank support, 
zeroed-in machine guns, mortars, artillery, and armor while the Americans attacked over 
1,500 yards of open ground.  The regimental history recorded that when 2/10 attacked at 
1100, the Germans were waiting and, “at that moment, Pournoy seemed a terribly long 
way off.”52
 Encountering a hailstorm of lead, the 10th Infantry executed a marching fire 
wherein the infantrymen kept up a steady volume of fire while advancing toward their 
objective.  Numerous casualties fell along the way and tanks, tank destroyers, and 
artillery helped from the rear.  With great difficulty, the officers, NCOs, and veteran 
soldiers cajoled the shaken, inexperienced replacements to keep going, especially after a 
momentary repulse.  Tank destroyers aided the assault by firing on buildings as well as 
enemy personnel, vehicles, and tanks.
 
53  The different platoons maneuvered to take 
specified sections of the town and cut German access to the railroad east of the town.  
After “five savage, bloody hours” of close-quarters urban fighting, Pournoy-la- Chétive 
was in Second Battalion’s hands.  The dead of both sides littered the streets.54
 After losing the town, the Germans shelled Pournoy ceaselessly from festen to 
the east as well as from Coin-lès-Cuvry a mile to the north.  A tanker quipped that “we 
were shelled only once at Pournoy and that was all the time.”
  F 
Company deployed to the east, G Company to the north, as E Company covered the 
town’s southern approaches. 
55  During the day, German 
artillery targeted the supporting armor and restricted the men to cellars and their 
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foxholes.  The town was already on fire from the American artillery while rain and 
intense vehicle traffic had turned the roads into a sea of mud and made supply difficult.56
 At 0100, the Germans counterattacked with infantry and tanks from the north, 
knifing into the town.  Two platoons of infantry followed tanks that fired into houses.  F 
Company was nearly cut off by this counterattack as poor communications limited the 
artillery support that battalion could provide.  By the morning, 450 men of the original 
800 remained in the battalion.  F Company was virtually wiped out, having only 35 men 
left, and E Company only had 64.  On the twenty-first, a fog permitted the battalion to 
improve its position and get C Company to replace the shattered F Company.  
Throughout the twenty-first, the Germans continued to blast away at Pournoy and 
launched regiment-size counterattacks from Coin-lès-Cuvry.  
       
 On the twenty-second, German assaults came from the southwest rather than the 
north, allowing the 2nd Infantry to assist 2/10 from its position in Coin-sur-Seille.  But 
because German artillery rained on Pournoy accurately and unceasingly, the Americans 
became exhausted because sleep was impossible and their nerves frayed.57  Colonel 
Carroll became concerned as his men neared their breaking point and it was “virtually 
impossible to keep the men awake.”58  A First Battalion soldier that helped relieve 
Second Battalion recalled that the town “‘was blowed to hell’ . . . Dead American 
soldiers and blown-up American jeeps still lay as evidence of the terrific battle that took 
place in Pournoy.”59  First Battalion’s stay was short because the division redeployed 
west of the Moselle River to silence one of the larger feste, Fort Driant, before the final 
drive on Metz.   
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 Although costly, the American success was a result of the combined infantry-
artillery-tank-tank destroyer cooperation.  Despite many supply shortages and 
restrictions placed on artillery ammunition, the 10th Regiment’s attached artillery 
battalion was critical in repulsing the German counterattacks.60  The tanks and tank 
destroyers were so active around Pournoy that every tank destroyer on the line was in 
urgent need of repairs.61
 Strategically, Pournoy had few consequences, especially since this attempted 
envelopment of Metz failed and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) halted the Allied drive for logistical reasons.  The encirclement of Metz, 
therefore, stopped because of concerns at the army-group level and occurred around the 
same time as First Army’s failure to penetrate the Siegfried Line.
  Although the defense of Pournoy was costly, its success was 
not solely because of the infantry.   
62  Beginning in late 
September, the 11th Infantry Regiment attempted to capture Fort Driant but it was a 
disaster.  The lack of intelligence on the strength of these of fortifications doomed these 
attacks.63  Like the 1st Division entangled in the Siegfried Line, the 5th Division was 
likewise ensnared in the Maginot Line.  In September 2 CT paid dearly for its failure to 
take Amanvillers, 11 CT failed to cross the Moselle River at Dornot, 10 CT fought with 
desperation to secure the crossing at Arnaville and its Second Battalion clung to 
Pournoy-la-Chétive by its fingernails.  As a result, the division had absorbed 
approximately 5,000 replacements into its ranks by the end of the month.64
 The October pause allowed XX Corps units to achieve local, limited objectives: 
5th Division turned its attention to Fort Driant west of the Moselle while the 90th 
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Infantry Division to the north continued its northern envelopment of Metz.  With the 
11th Infantry’s failure to take Fort Driant and anticipating a new move, the 5th Division 
trained its thousands of raw replacements and integrated them into the veteran units in 
the latter part of October.  Mostly likely as a result of the costly failures at Amanvillers, 
the 2nd Infantry conducted street fighting training until, its postwar history stated, “it no 
longer seemed a strange game, but rather a sort of second nature.”65
 By 1 November, the 5th Division deployed east of the Moselle River and 
prepared to participate in XX Corps’s next movements against Metz.  The XX Corps’s 
strategy was to envelop Metz from the north and south.  The 90th Infantry and 10th 
Armored Divisions enveloped from the north while the 5th Division moved eastward 
south of Metz.  Figure 7.4 shows the 5th Division’s southern envelopment.
  Rest camps gave 
the men a shower, hot food, rest, and time away from German artillery.  The fall rains 
that swelled the Moselle River and its tributaries beyond their banks complicated river-
crossing preparations.   
66  The 2nd 
Infantry Regiment advanced first and maintained contact with XII Corps to the south.  
The 2nd’s mission was to take the town of Sanry-sur-Nied, bridge the Nied   River, and 
head north to link with the 90th Division to cut off Metz.  The 11th and 10th Regiments 
marched east but then turned north and helped take the city proper.  This plan allowed 
the division to isolate Metz before assaulting it.  Inside Metz were the Germans of the 
462nd Volksgrenadier Division but facing the 5th Division south of the city was the 17th 
SS Panzer Grenadier Division.67 
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Figure 7.4:  Battle for Metz, Envelopment from the South, 8-19 November 1944  
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 XX Corps’s renewed offensive began on 9 November when the 2nd and 10th 
Infantries crossed the swollen Seille River.  Because the French civilians had long since 
left the towns in the region, the Americans “permit[ted] the maximum use of supporting 
fires.”  Previous artillery fires had already destroyed many of these towns.68  The 2nd 
Infantry’s Second Battalion crossed the Seille and immediately assaulted Cheminot 
without tanks  because the bridges could not support them.  In the absence of armor, 1/2 
used marching fire and artillery to quickly take and occupy Louvigny.69
 Units from the 6th Armored Division units seized Sanry-sur-Nied and its bridge 
across the Nied River.  The 2nd Infantry deployed to protect the river town against a 
major counterattack on the thirteenth.  Having defended the bridge over the all-important 
Nied River, the 2nd Infantry turned north and, on 19 November, linked with the 90th 
Infantry Division that was battling southward.  After two months of fighting, Third 
Army had finally cut off and isolated Metz. 
  The 10th and 
11th Combat Teams continued their eastward movement and then turned shifted toward 
Metz.  The 2nd Infantry marched east to the Nied River where it would turn north and 
link up with the 90th Infantry Division. 
 By 14 November, the 11th and 10th Infantry Regiments—the 11th on the left and 
the 10th on the right—engaging in and capturing several towns and villages along the 
way to Metz.  Like further north where the 1st Division was mired in the Hürtgen Forest, 
the weather was cold, wet, and miserable.  Trench foot caused more casualties than 
German bullets.70  The attack on Metz did not require the intense urban fighting required 
of Aachen the month before.  The 10th Infantry utilized marching fire, along with tanks, 
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tank destroyers, and artillery concentrations, to quickly seize towns such as Fleury and 
Marly.71
 On 14 November, the Metz garrison had received a new commander from the 
Eastern Front who had experience in city fighting in Russia.  Hitler remained determined 
to hold the French city but even this veteran commander, Generalleutnant Heinrich 
Kittel, remained doubtful that he could hold for long.  Kittel’s force included the 462nd 
Volksgrenadier Division, a depleted 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the staffs for 
the 22nd and 25th Fortress Regiments as well as three fortress machine gun battalions, 
two SS machine gun battalions, a fortress engineer battalion, five fortress infantry 
battalions, two fortress artillery battalions, and two antiaircraft battalions.
  The marching fire was necessary if only because many of these soldiers in the 
three infantry regiments were replacements new to combat and also because the ground 
over which they assaulted was often open with no cover from the Wehrmacht defenders.  
The 10th Infantry worked its way along Metz’s eastern outskirts and connected with the 
95th Division in a suburb outside the city on 15 November. 
72  The Metz 
defense also included Volkssturm units of boys and old men that often surrendered when 
the opportunity arose.73
 As the 10th Infantry focused on southeast Metz, the 11th Infantry crashed into 
Metz from the south, the 95th Division assaulted from the west and the 90th Division 
entered from the north.  By 18 November, elements of 3/11 joined the assault.  A and 
C/11 searched for snipers in houses along the southern outskirts.  On the nineteenth, 
Third Battalion companies, supported by tanks, fought deeper into Metz but both street 
combat and house-to-house combat was heavy.
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 By the twentieth, most German resistance had ended but the main buildings still 
required searching.  One enlisted man recalled how a squad of twelve men cleared 
houses and buildings along the path of A/10’s advance.  Several men covered a 
building’s rear and sides while a search party entered, clearing each room of each 
building.  It was still wisest to avoid the streets as there remained nominal resistance 
from machine guns and 20-mm cannons.  The Americans still took care in the process of 
clearing southeastern Metz.  In one instance, German machine gun fire pinned down an 
American squad; two sergeants scampered across rooftops to get better vantage points.  
By the end of the twentieth, the 10th Infantry controlled and cleared most of southeast 
Metz to the railroad station, having cleared approximately 40 buildings, and fighting had 
largely ended.75
 Getting into and taking Metz appeared anticlimactic compared to what happened 
in Aachen.  The isolation and envelopment operation, lasting two months.  Priorities 
were also different: Aachen was a division-level operation but Metz involved the entire 
XX Corps.  Despite these differences, both Metz and Aachen called for using all ground 
forces, especially since overcast skies minimized any tactical air support.  The 
envelopment demanded actions by infantry, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers.  The 5th 
Infantry Division necessarily had to move as a combined-arms force because of the 
flooding rivers, worsening weather, and an enemy who purposely defended the outlying 
villages and towns to slow the Americans.
  When Metz formally surrendered on 22 November, the division turned 
its attention to the forts outside the city that were now surrounded.   
76  The infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers 
made the assaults in various combinations while the artillery fired many devastating 
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“time-on-target” concentrations on the enemy that defended the devastated towns and 
villages.77
 After the fall of Metz, the 5th Division confronted the next layer of outlying 
fortifications.  The Americans simply surrounded these fortifications and waited for the 
defenders to surrender, which each eventually did.  The Americans captured Metz in 
order to renew the momentum toward the Rhine River.  General Patton spurred his army 
in that direction.  Soon after Metz fell, the 10th Armored Division and the 90th and 95th 
Infantry Divisions moved northeast toward the Saar River and German territory.  The 
Germans abandoned the Maginot Line and fell back upon the Siegfried Line along the 
Saar River.  With the 10th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions operating on the 
northern/left flank of XX Corps, the 95th Infantry Division struggled as it moved along 
the corps right flank toward Saarlautern.  The corps objective was not the Saar itself but 
Germany east of the Saar River.  The Saar River runs generally north-south but, as 
Figure 7.5 shows, curves and turns around Saarlautern, separating that city from 
Saarlautern-Roden and Fraulautern.
  The battle inside Metz did not match Aachen but the methods were similar 
and they showed a maturing American combined-arms mindset. 
78
 Slowed by well-defended high ground west of the Saar River, the 95th Infantry 
Division drove the Germans eastward.  By 2 December, the division began fighting for 
the portion of Saarlautern south and west of the river’s meandering curve.  The 95th 
Division bled itself white as it pushed against this stiff resistance.  Aerial reconnaissance 
located a bridge across the Saar that connected Saarlautern with Saarlautern-Roden.  In a 
gutsy assault early the next day, two companies from the division seized and held the   
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Figure 7.5:  Saarlautern Bridgehead, 3-19 December 1944  
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bridge across the Saar.  For the next two weeks, the 95th Infantry Division tried to take 
Saarlautern-Roden and Fraulautern but the urban combat overwhelmed a division whose 
combat effectiveness was dropping by the day.79
 A tanker, Captain H. L. West, recounted that “fighting in the ruins of what once 
had been a thriving, large city [was] the most nerve racking type of fighting.”  West 
recollected that “the enemy was in the same block as you or in the house next door.”  “It 
was normal,” he said, “to fight all day with neither side advancing more than a house or 
two.”
  On 15 December, the 5th Division 
received orders to relieve the 95th Division and seize the urban space east of the Saar 
River. 
80  In this sense, Saarlautern was like any other city where the Americans 
challenged the Germans.  But Saarlautern was different than Metz and Aachen in that the 
Saarlautern cities could not be surrounded and that the Germans integrated the Siegfried 
Line fortifications into the cities themselves.  In the cities along the Siegfried Line, West 
observed, many structures “were merely a front for defensive positions consisting of 
heavily reinforced concrete cellars.”  In many other cases, “houses were merely frame 
works, cleverly camouflaging pill boxes with walls seven and eight feet thick.”81  
Another veteran remembered that some pillboxes looked like store fronts and machine-
gun nests resembled coal piles.  Oftentimes, the Americans discovered these concealed 
positions when the Germans opened fire.  Another veteran described Saarlautern as 
“street fighting at its worst.”82  This sometimes forced an adjustment because assault 
teams were not assaulting a home but a cleverly disguised fortified position.83  The 
battles for Saarlautern and its surrounding cities raged for months, but the 5th Division’s 
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fight was brief because the German counteroffensive through the Ardennes forced the 
division to redeploy a few days into its fight on the Saar. 
 Combat Team 10 had bloodied itself securing the 95th Division’s right flank 
after bypassing German resistance in the rush toward the Saar.  On 15 December, the 
entire division prepared to relieve the 95th fighting inside Saarlautern, or more properly, 
Saarlautern-Roden and Fraulautern on the opposite side of the Saar River.  Between 9 
and 15 December, soldiers in the 11th Infantry Regiment also underwent training behind 
the lines, expecting to relieve either the 90th or the 95th Divisions along the river.84  
During this time the 10th Infantry Regiment wanted to assault abandoned houses in 
order to prepare itself for the upcoming urban fight but were denied by higher authorities 
because they feared a public relations fiasco if American soldiers conducted live-fire 
drills in undamaged homes.85  Along with training, intelligence also aided the 
Americans.  Before entering these cities, the division received maps with each house 
numbered and the city gridded.  Like Colonel Derrill Daniel’s “measles sheets,” these 
maps helped the Americans to maintain command and control when assaulting 
Saarlautern.86
 The 95th Division had begun to make progress by the sixteenth.  On 17 
December, the 11th Infantry Regiment took over the fight in Fraulautern while the 2nd 
Infantry relieved 95th Division elements inside Saarlautern-Roden.  By now these two 
cities had endured over ten days of intense urban combat and had become shells of their 
former selves.  The flotsam and jetsam of war littered the entire area.
 
87  On the 
eighteenth and nineteenth, the two combat teams maintained that progress.  Just as the 
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1st Infantry Division slogged its way through the Hürtgen Forest, so the 5th tried to plod 
through these twin cities.   
 On 18 December, the 11th began to attack northward with its supporting armor.  
Tank destroyers’ larger 90-mm guns were especially proficient at blasting the hidden 
pillboxes.  Tank dozers then came along and buried any survivors who refused to 
surrender.  Working methodically with “rockets, artillery, and direct tank fire,” the 
regiment cleared two city blocks and 178 houses.  Not easily outdone, the Germans 
counterattacked with an infantry-tank-artillery force but the Americans drove them off 
after desperate close-quarters fighting that sometimes saw Germans tanks fire at point-
blank range at the Americans.  Unlike Aachen that was isolated, German infantry and 
tanks occasionally infiltrated into the Americans’ rear that night.  German mortar and 
artillery shells fell frequently during this entire period.  The combat team’s organic 
artillery, the 19th Field Artillery Battalion, actively supported the regiment as it slowly 
fought through the city.  On the nineteenth, the regiment took another 40 houses.88
 Accounts of these few days in Saarlautern center on the G.I.s’ “mouseholing,” or 
breaching a building by blowing holes in common walls with explosives or tank rounds.  
One veteran remembered this was necessary because the Germans posted automatic 
weapons at the ends of streets.
     
89  After creating a mousehole, clearing a building 
required at least three infantrymen:  one cleared the upper floors, another cleared the first 
floor, and a third threw a grenade in the cellar.90  Inasmuch as the 5th Division’s 
progress rested firmly on a combined-arms mindset, that approach was becoming the 
normal standard operating procedure for the urban environment.  For all the differences 
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between Saarlautern and Aachen, the practice of mouseholing and the combined-arms 
mindset showed that the American soldiers conducted their urban operations with 
striking similarities. 
 The soldiers routinely assaulted pillboxes but had limited options: either destroy 
them or seal them and move on.  Explosives or tank destroyers could eliminate most 
pillboxes but that was costly in manpower and time.  There were not enough welding 
kits to seal all the pillboxes and tank dozers were not always on hand to bury them.  
Early on the nineteenth, the 2nd Infantry communicated to division command that it 
discovered a new way to seal the pillboxes: placing thermite grenades at the entrances.  
The thermite grenades burned hot enough to melt and seal shut the bunker entrances. 
Later that day, the regiment cried out for more thermite grenades, reporting that “if we 
can get them [then] we can take right off.”  Later that day, the division pressured the 
commander of the 7th Engineer Combat Battalion to find more grenades since the 2nd 
Infantry “is quite enthusiastic about these thermite grenades.  Looking for some more 
tho, they seem to be running out of them [sic].”  By the afternoon of the nineteenth, the 
division rationed 500 thermite grenades between its three regiments.  While the 90th 
Division asserted that the best way to handle these concealed fortified positions was the 
close-range, direct fire of tanks, tank destroyers, or a 155-mm self-propelled gun, the 5th 
Division used thermite grenades to merely seal the defenders in their positions, then 
advancing.91  After leaving Saarlautern, the 2nd Infantry submitted a paper to the 
division’s intelligence officer describing how to use a thermite grenade to seal a pillbox 
shut.92 
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 On 20 December, the German counteroffensive through the Ardennes Forest 
forced Patton’s Third Army to help stop the Wehrmacht.  By then, the 5th Division had 
extricated itself from Saarlautern and turned the battle back to the 95th Division.  In 
preparation for the drive north, XX Corps reclaimed the division’s attached tank and 
tank destroyer battalions.  General Irwin lamented that he would “comply but with a 
bleeding heart,” indicating how vital the two battalions had become to the division since 
their partnership formed in July.93
3rd Infantry Division  
  The 803rd Tank Destroyer and 737th Tank Battalions 
joined the division and remained there for the duration of the war.  By mid-December 
1944, the 5th Infantry Division and its combat teams had clearly learned that 
successfully and effectively fighting in the urban environment—whether offensively or 
defensively—demanded a combined-arms approach. 
 Lastly, the 3rd Division landed with Operation DRAGOON in southern France in 
August 1944.  Fighting alongside French forces in the Seventh Army of the 6th Army 
Group, the division fought its way through southern France, up the Rhone Valley, and 
through the Vosges Mountains.  By the end of this period, the division was in Strasbourg 
on the Rhine River. 
 With the 3rd Division’s participation, the Allies took Rome on 4 June, two days 
before American, British, and Canadian forces launched Operation OVERLORD.  As 
Chapter 4 showed, Major General John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel’s 3rd Division learned to 
combine its infantry-armor-artillery power by the time it broke out of the Anzio 
beachhead and captured the town of Cisterna in May 1944.  The division refined its   
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Figure 7.6:  Breakout from the Blue Line, 17-19 August 1944  
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combined-arms capabilities after Operation DRAGOON put troops ashore southern 
France in August.   
 One objective was to capture the port of Marseilles to aid the Allies’ eastward 
advance in Germany.  As the ports in northwestern France had proven to be 
disappointments, so Marseilles gained strategic value and importance.  The other 
objective of DRAGOON was to coordinate with OVERLORD.  By August, the Allies 
had broken out of the hedgerow country, forcing the Germans to pull units from southern 
France to bolster positions in the North and East.  Figure 7.6 shows the area of 
operations in southern France.94
 After the battle for Rome, the 3rd Division—now under the auspices of the 
Seventh U.S. Army in the 6th Army Group—trained for DRAGOON through June and 
July, including assaulting fortified positions, mastering different weapons, and 
improving tank-infantry coordination.
   
95
 The Germans might have turned the rugged terrain against the Americans like in 
Italy but their collapsing defense only allowed them to stall the American advance 
through roadblocks.  Because of the enemy’s rapid retreat, the Americans relied on any 
available motor transport.  The division’s postwar history described the scene: “it was a  
  Compared to other landings in World War II, 
DRAGOON was smoothly.  With light casualties, the division took its objectives on the 
first day of capturing the towns of St. Tropez and Cavalaire sur Mer.  A few days later, 
the division took Ramatuelle, la Mole, Cogolin, and Collobrieres.  As the Americans 
proceeded westward to isolate Toulon and Marseilles, they swept aside nominal German 
resistance. French forces eventually seized control of the port cities. 
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Figure 7.7:  Brignoles, 18-19 August 1944 
 
 
 
common sight to see a whole rifle battalion moving down a road—doughboys draped 
over the 3-inch guns of tank destroyers, clinging to the slippery-sided tanks of the 756th 
[Tank Battalion], or loaded sixes-and-sevens to trailer-hauling jeeps.”96
 The battle for Brignoles was the division’s first significant fight from 17 to 19 
August, shown in Figure 7.7.
   
97  As the division marched westward, Brignoles sat along 
the 30th Infantry’s axis of advance; capturing it would cut off Marseilles and Toulon.  
By the seventeenth, Germans prevented 2/30 from marching to Brignoles via Highway 
7.That night, the regiment decided to fall upon the town from two different directions: 
1/30 descended from the north while 2/30 attacked from the south and west.  Other units 
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protected the attackers’ flanks.  On the morning of the eighteenth, the two battalions 
began their attack, supported by armor and their heavy weapons companies.  Second 
Battalion’s E Company encountered many snipers in trees and houses.  G Company, on 
the heights south of town protecting the regiment’s left/southern flank, helped direct the 
artillery shelling of Brignoles.  But First Battalion engaged more resistance: even though 
1/30 received the bulk of the armor support, only A Company was close to entering the 
town by day’s end.  The armor was especially crucial since the German positioned 
machine guns in houses on the outskirts.  Of the twelve tank destroyers engaged, five 
were knocked out by German fire.  That night, E Company remained locked in street 
fighting but withdrew to the northeast part of Brignoles for security reasons. 
 On the nineteenth, 3/30 moved around Brignoles to maintain the westward drive, 
effectively cutting off the town.  E Company pushed into the town from the northeast 
part of the town as F Company attacked from the south and west.  A and C Companies 
assaulted from the north with armored support.  Third Battalion’s wide flanking move 
around the town as well as A Company and three tanks entering the town from the north 
helped to break the resistance by 1030.98
 Despite the rugged terrain, the regiment’s plan to assault from multiple directions 
closely resembled how the same regiment took the town of Acerno, Italy, the previous 
September.  Unlike in Italy, the C/601 Tank Destroyer and C/756 Tank Battalions helped 
the 30th Infantry to capture Brignoles.  Similar to the October 1944 edition of the 
infantry battalion manual, the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion also learned that their 
vehicles were vulnerable inside towns and that they were most useful in a small urban 
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battle at the town’s edge firing at the enemy inside the locale.99
 The fighting around Montélimar signified the end of Operation DRAGOON and 
the beginning of the Rhone River campaign as the Americans turned their attention 
north.  VI Corps commanding general, and former 3rd Division commander, Lucian 
Truscott pushed his corps hard toward the Rhone because he knew the retreating German 
Nineteenth Army would attempt to escape the Franco-American drive.  Terrain and 
intelligence confirmed to Truscott that the best place to trap the Germans was at the river 
town of Montélimar, a major road junction.
  The regiment advanced 
as if Brignoles were a momentary distraction.  The division proceeded down Highway 7 
toward Aix-en-Provence, north of Marseilles.  The 30th Infantry’s plan to take Aix was 
similar to Brignoles:  infantry and armor converging from different directions but the 
Germans withdrew before a fight could develop.  With Brignoles and Aix taken, the 
division continued its westward mission toward the Rhone River and cutting off Toulon 
and Marseilles.   
100
 Despite Truscott’s aggressive urgings, VI Corps was not quick enough to capture 
Montélimar and the Germans were able to defend the city and the roads to get their 
forces out of the region.  The Germans’ defense of Montélimar and counterattacks 
combined with American indecision, ammunition shortages, and a tenuous supply line 
prevented VI Corps from completely cutting the German line of retreat between 21 and 
25 August.  The 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions found themselves north and northeast 
of the city and the 3rd Division approached from the south.  American artillery shelled 
convoys along Highway 7 as ammunition became available.  With all the fighting north 
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and northeast of Montélimar, Truscott ordered the 3rd Division northward from Avignon 
on 25 August but supply problems slowed the division.  The Germans were anxious to 
pull their last units out of the region, but as the 3rd Division threatened from the south, 
so enemy resistance stiffened101
 This stiffening defense was evident by the twenty-first at Allan, south of 
Montélimar.  The firefight in Allan was part of a larger operational picture.  Although 
off the path, L/15 advanced through Allan on the twenty-seventh because the company 
commander, Captain James W. Coles, thought it would help him close the trap on the 
Germans.
  Nevertheless, every motorized vehicle was hauling 
G.I.s, whether trucks, tanks, or tank destroyers.   
102  The Germans indicated that they would fight for Allan when they captured 
a patrol sent to reconnoiter Allan.  L Company rapidly deployed with its armored 
support to seize Allan.  The Germans were surprised because they had not expected an 
American attack and had not prepared as thoroughly as they might.  Regardless, 
American tank destroyers fired at buildings’ second-stories that might conceal a German 
soldier with an antitank weapon.  The meeting engagement in Allan included 
infantrymen, tanks, and tank destroyers on both sides at close ranges.  A bazooka team 
from I Company knocked out a Mark VI Tiger tank that had caused trouble for the 
Americans.  The outcome remained in doubt until the afternoon when Cannon 
Company’s self-propelled howitzers fired from the east and I and K Companies 
threatened from the west.  The fighting see-sawed into the evening on the twenty-
seventh, especially when a Mark V Panther tank entered late into the fray.  By 1730, the 
battalion commander reported that L Company was “disorganized” as he committed the 
 
 
338 
 
reserve armor platoon.  At 2245, the battalion reported that L Company captured the 
town but only four tank destroyers and one tank remained operable.103
 The next day, 28 August, the battle began for Montélimar.  The 15th Infantry’s 
First Battalion penetrated the city from the northwest while Second Battalion entered 
from the southeast.  Elements of the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments engaged from the 
east.  The division trapped portions of two German divisions inside Montélimar and they 
became desperate to break out.  At one point, 1/15 battled an entire German regiment 
trying to escape.  House-by-house fighting was common, lasting into the early morning 
hours of the twenty-ninth.  The 3rd and 36th Divisions’ artillery battalions caught 
several large convoys fleeing Montélimar, slaughtering men and horses and annihilating 
trucks, trains, foodstuffs, supplies, and large artillery pieces.  By 1100 on the twenty-
ninth, Montélimar was in American hands but most of the German Nineteenth Army had 
escaped, albeit after suffering horrendous losses.
  The company 
relied as much on individual soldiers’ personal bravery as on its attached tanks and tank 
destroyers to root out the enemy.   
104
 The Americans’ northward pursuit continued.  The veterans of North Africa, 
Sicily, and Italy remember it as the “Champagne Campaign.”
   
105  According to a 15th 
Infantry report, enemy resistance after Montélimar was “practically nil and consisted 
only of scattered fragmentary units whose only action was one of evasion.”106  Figure 
7.8 shows the Seventh Army drive from Lyon to Belfort.107  As the 6th Army Group  
drove north, the terrain became more arduous, especially as they approached the Vosges 
Mountains.  The trap at Montélimar having failed, VI Corps hoped to force the Germans  
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Figure 7.8:  Seventh Army Advance toward Belfort, 4-14 September 1944  
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into the oncoming Third Army before they could enter the menacing High Vosges 
Mountains.108
 Still trying to trap the Germans before they could make a stand, Seventh Army 
drove northeast, with VI Corps in the center advancing toward Belfort.  The German 
defense of Besançon on the Doubs River was more an attempt to protect the Belfort Gap 
and allow units to withdraw and redeploy into position.  The 159th Reserve Division 
received orders to hold Besançon until 15 September to allow withdraw German units to 
man the Belfort Gap.
  The “Champaign Campaign” ended as German resistance increased 
around Besançon and Army Group G fought to keep possession of the Belfort Gap.  
Guarding the Belfort Gap was critical to the Germans because it could allow an invader 
easy passage into Germany between the Swiss border and the Vosges.  
109  As German resistance strengthened, the 3rd Division was 
ordered to take Besançon.  Figure 7.9 below shows a plan of Besançon and its position 
on the Doubs River.110  Like Metz, Besançon sat astride a river, housing 80,000 people.  
Like Saarlautern, the city of Besançon sits along a severe bend in the Doubs River, with 
an imposing Vauban fort, La Citadelle, on the high bluffs along the bend.  It was not 
designed to fall.  The Seventh Army regarded the city as “a fortress built by nature and 
improved by generations of military engineers.”111
 Because of its daunting fortifications, the defenders garrisoned the area forts and 
blew the bridges but did not fortify the city itself.  The 3rd Division fell on Besançon as 
one. On the fifth through 7 September, the division worked its way around Besançon and 
took the various fortresses.  Several times, these forts were able to withstand modern 
artillery so that the assaults required tanks and tank destroyers to offer direct support to  
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Figure 7.9:  Plan of Besançon  
 
 
 
 
the assaulting infantrymen.  Because of the mediocre nature of the defenders, these 
fortifications fell rapidly with low losses.  On the sixth, 3/7 received orders to seize the 
city itself.  Throughout the seventh, elements of the 7th Infantry fought within 
Besançon.112  Much of the reason for the success of the quick capture of Besançon, a city 
that ought to have been as difficult a task as Metz from to the terrain and fortifications, 
was the nature of the defender.  Just as the Americans never took Amanvillers in part 
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because of the well-trained and well-motivated officer-cadet defenders, so Besançon fell 
rapidly because the 3rd Division quickly isolated it and the second-class defenders were 
less devoted to defending it.  The German command intended Besançon to hold out until 
15 September but the city surrendered a week earlier on 8 September.  Both Amanvillers 
and Besançon show how important the quality of defenders were in urban combat. 
 At the same time further north, the 1st Division attempted to fight through the 
Siegfried Line and the 5th Division tried to cross the Moselle River.  The 3rd Division 
drove the Germans north and northeast, the various infantry companies and battalions 
engaging in many minor street fights and enemy resistance notably increasing.  In Rioz 
and Quenoche, First and Second Battalions, 15th Infantry engaged in house-by-house 
fighting.113  Vesoul, the Germans’ last link to Belfort, became the center of a new 
defensive line for the Nineteenth Army.  Like Besançon, a small stream divided the town 
and high bluffs offered the defenders good terrain to repel attackers.  VI Corps 
dispatched the 3rd and 36th Infantry Divisions to take the city of Vesoul on 10 
September.  Intelligence indicated that as German defense efforts covering Belfort in the 
Vosges Mountains increased, so they would likely stubbornly defend Vesoul.114
 Through the eleventh, the 15th Infantry Regiment shoved German delaying units 
onto Vesoul.  By the end of the day, 3/15 had taken the high ground on the southern 
edge of the city.  At 0630 on the twelfth, 3/15 entered Vesoul, incurring stiff antitank fire 
and 2/15 pushed into nearby Navenne.  Elements of the 36th Division attacked from the 
north.  Both battalions made slow progress, building-to-building and house-to-house, 
against strong resistance and counterattacks.  Tanks supported 3/15 but remained outside 
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the city.  At 1415, 3/15 had cleared Vesoul.115  Because the Americans expected a strong 
defense, VI Corps deployed two infantry divisions along with their attached armor and 
artillery.  The Germans were hard-pressed enough elsewhere that while resistance was 
heavy enough for the 15th Infantry’s Second and Third Battalions, most German soldiers 
had fled from Vesoul to other delaying positions.  While the Germans could have made a 
stubborn and costly defense of Besançon and Vesoul, given their strategic locations and 
Army Group G’s need to slow its retreat, the 3rd and 36th Division outmaneuvered the 
defenders and coaxed most of the Germans out of the city.116
 As the 15th Infantry fought for Vesoul, the 7th Infantry took on Noroy-le-Bourg, 
a small crossroads town to the east that controlled the secondary roads leading to Belfort.  
The 7th Infantry’s daily report merely noted that Third Battalion began the assault on 
Noroy at 1645, took it at 2005, and captured 70 Germans prisoner, killing and wounding 
“many more.”
  The Americans relied 
upon their developing combat teams to continue fighting eastward. 
117  Although Noroy-le-Bourg failed to occupy anyone’s attention above 
the regiment, this “run of the mill,” small-unit urban action served as an excellent way to 
show how American infantry battalions maneuvered against the multitude of small 
towns in France as well as how deeply the Americans had embraced a combined-arms 
mentality by September 1944.  Figure 7.10 shows the assault on Noroy-le-Bourg.118
 By late afternoon on 12 September, 3/7 had taken the heights overlooking Noroy-
le-Bourg and expected to assault the town the next day.  As an important crossroads, it  
was as valuable for the Americans as it was for the Germans.  The commander, Major 
Lloyd B. Ramsey, gathered his staff and company commanders as well as the tank and   
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Figure 7.10:  3/7 Assault on Noroy-le-Bourg, 12 September 1944  
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tank destroyer platoon leaders to plan the assault from the southern heights as the sun 
began to set in the west.  Ramsey identified that a battalion of infantry, antiaircraft flak 
wagons, light artillery, and mortars defended the town.  He directed K Company to 
assault the western part of town with a platoon of heavy machine guns while L Company 
and a platoon each of machine guns and tanks would assault the eastern part of the town 
and heights beyond to the north.  I Company was to remain in reserve as the tank 
destroyers, 81-mm mortars, heavy machine guns, and 57-mm antitank guns deployed on 
the southern heights to provide fire support. 
 By beginning its assault in the late afternoon, regimental and division leaders 
hoped to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the battalion defending Noroy.  The 
supporting fire on the heights silenced the antiaircraft flak wagons but enemy mortar and 
artillery threatened to pin down K and L Companies.  In response, Lieutenant John 
Greene, a platoon leader in L Company, rose to his feet and started his own marching-
fire advance.  Greene’s riflemen resumed the attack because of his initiative.  When 
enemy fire again threatened to pin down L Company, Lieutenant Greene kept the attack 
moving by refusing to let the men stop.  Likewise, Staff Sergeant John Stanton made 
long rushes in the open to knock out a German machine-gun position.  From there, 
Stanton ran to a concealed position and knocked out a flak wagon. 
 American antitank guns on the heights destroyed a German convoy that tried to 
escape Noroy.  With that, K Company received permission to swing wide to the left and 
enter the town from the western roads to cut off escape and reinforcement.  Ramsey sent 
a platoon from I Company to cut off the town from the east.  Once the Americans broke 
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into the outskirts, it became a violent struggle, house-by-house.  Sergeant Stanton led the 
way by sprinting down a fire-swept street to throw a grenade into a German-filled barn.  
He took ten prisoners there and then fifteen more from a fortified cellar.  For his actions, 
Stanton received the Distinguished Service Cross.   
 As darkness came over the battlefield, the L Company’s infantry and tanks 
cooperated to take each successive building from the Germans.  According to a postwar 
report, “the excellent coordination between tank and infantry was still the deciding factor 
which permitted L Company to continue advancing through the town” despite the 
darkness.119
 By 2015, L Company was just short of the church on the north end of Noroy.  
Around that time, K Company and I Company converged from the west and east, 
respectively.  K Company blasted a German company attempting to retreat or redeploy.  
I Company severed Noroy-le-Bourg’s eastern road.  By the time I Company joined the 
  Notable individual actions stood out, such as Lieutenant Raymond 
Zussman, the tank platoon leader assigned to Third Battalion.  With tank-to-tank 
communications out, Zussman relied on verbal and hand signals.  Exposed to the enemy, 
he reconnoitered forward positions for the tanks and infantry and he directed tank fire 
onto German positions.  He rushed, cleared, and took several houses by himself and 
returned to his tanks with prisoners in tow.  When approaching an intersection that 
Zussman thought the Germans might have targeted, he investigated and took another 30 
prisoners.  By himself, Zussman accounted for 17 dead Germans and 92 prisoners as 
well as two antitank guns, one 20-mm flak gun, two machine guns, and two trucks 
captured.  For his efforts, Lt. Zussman received the Congressional Medal of Honor.   
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fight, it was completely dark and movement was necessarily slow as it searched all the 
houses and buildings along its path.  Because Vesoul had not yet fallen, K Company 
organized a defense to the west in case of counterattack.  The next day, the battalion 
figured that the Germans had suffered 75 killed and 308 prisoners along with the loss of 
a light artillery battery, mortars, flak wagons, and various vehicles and ammunition 
destroyed.  Third Battalion only suffered one dead and twelve wounded (including 
Lieutenant Greene).  One tank was damaged when, after the fight, it ran over an 
unexploded shell.   
 Similar to 2/10’s fight at Pournoy-la-Chetive, 3/7 had to attack over open ground 
in order to wrestle a town from the Germans.  The company commanders received oral 
direction from Major Ramsey but were free to meet the situation as they saw fit.  The 
company commanders maintained contact with Ramsey as well as with each other.  
During the street fighting, the tanks operated with riflemen, offering critical direct fire 
support.  Even as they fought for Noroy in hours of darkness, cooperation and 
coordination between the infantry and tanks allowed tanks to function inside an urban 
battle at night.120
 Three days later, 3/7 found itself in another urban battle, this time defending the 
village of Vy-les-Lure on 15-16 September.  Vy-les-Lure sits northeast of Noroy-le-
Bourg and southwest of the larger city of Lure.  On the afternoon of the fifteenth, Third 
  Greene, Stanton, and Zussman also demonstrated that successfully and 
effectively taking villages and towns required individuals to lead the fight and put 
themselves in danger.  The Americans’ conception of combined-arms warfare matured 
but it still required soldiers to do the dirty, brutal, violent fighting. 
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Battalion attacked Vy-les-Lure with L Company on the left, I Company on the right, M 
Company heavy weapons interspersed between the two, and K Company in reserve.  As 
the assault companies advanced, they came under strong German artillery and mortar 
fire.  This fire pinned down I Company, killing its company commander and 
communications personnel.  Captain Ralph Yates shifted his L Company to the left to 
escape the plunging shells and maneuver his troops closer to town.  Yates maneuvered 
his company down secondary fields to the outskirts of Vy-les-Lure.  Intense German fire 
pinned down the Americans in a cemetery and momentarily stopped their assault.  As 
German grenades dropped over the cemetery wall, the Americans tossed them back.  
Captain Yates picked up a BAR, stood up, and fired into the nearest house, ordering his 
men to assault that house and find better cover.  The soldiers stormed this residence 
under Yates’s supporting BAR fire, killed one German soldier, and took two others 
captive.  When Yates entered the house, it became the company command post.121
 As men funneled through one door into the command-post, German machine gun 
fire felled many of them.  The private carrying Yates’s radio collapsed after being badly 
riddled.  Sergeant Dean Barnette removed the wounded soldier’s radio and tried to pull 
the man to safety but a German machine gunner put nine rounds through Barnette’s 
body.  Barnette managed to get himself inside the house as someone else dragged the 
radioman into the command post.  With no radio, L Company lost communications with 
Third Battalion and regimental headquarters.  M Company’s mortarmen attached to 
Yates’s company entered the house without their equipment and only their personal 
arms.  The heavy machine gunners managed to get their machine gun in the post but the 
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Germans killed the ammunition carrier, making the machine gun useless.  Before long, 
the only automatic weapons the Americans had were a few Browning Automatic Rifles 
and a limited supply of ammunition.  
 Lieutenant Samuel Selvog and a small party attacked another house down the 
fire-swept streets.  Selvog took a house to the right-rear of Yates’s command post.  
Private Ned Finch and four others braved intense enemy fire to take a house two hundred 
yards in advance of the company position.  Finch’s position accounted for 17 killed 
enemy and two machine gun positions destroyed or silenced.122
 Americans in the upper-story noticed Germans wheeling an 88-mm cannon into 
position less than one hundred yards from their position and opened fire.  Before long, 
this 88-mm gun and another further away shelled Selvog’s position and Yates’s 
command post.  A 170-mm shell dropped into a hayloft connected to the command post, 
landing ten feet from one soldier but failed to explode.  Six other such shells devastated 
a wooden shack outside the command post and shook the entire house.  Between 
bombardments, the Germans assaulted the command post but accurate American fire 
kept them away.  Private James Goldsmith sniped at an enemy machine gun team and 
prevented it from setting up close to the command post.  Goldsmith stood his ground 
until fatally wounded.  
  Ninety minutes into this 
fight, the Germans tried to infiltrate into Yates’s command post but failed.  The Germans 
then relied on their artillery and mortars to kill the Americans.  When Selvog’s house 
began burning, he abandoned it for a nearby house and established an all-around defense 
on both floors and attic.   
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 At 1625, the regiment began to take notice of Third Battalion’s firefight.  I and K 
Companies remained outside the town while L Company was trapped inside.  The lack 
of communications neither allowed information of the precarious state of L Company 
nor the ability to fire artillery because there was no observation.  Major Ramsey’s Third 
Battalion requested an artillery liaison plane to fly over Vy-les-Lure.123  Apparently, this 
plane never got off the ground because, two hours later, Colonel Ben Harrell complained 
to division headquarters that he had lost communications with most of Third Battalion 
and could not fire artillery because he did not know where his men were.124
 At 1930, a strong German attack slammed into Selvog’s and Yates’s positions.  
The rifle company repulsed the German onslaught but was running short of grenades and 
rifle ammunition.  After repelling the Germans, Yates reorganized his position but his 
men only had two or three clips of ammunition per man.  Having been in Vy-les-Lure 
for several hours with no help, Yates sent four men to find Third Battalion to report their 
condition and get reinforcements.  The four riflemen managed to escape unscathed and 
found regimental headquarters. 
     
 As darkness crept over Vy-les-Lure, having received no message from battalion, 
and with no expectation of support, Yates and his soldiers clung tenaciously to their 
small gains but knew they could not hold for long in their depleted state.  At 2100, the 
Germans renewed their artillery and mortar bombardment in preparation for another 
assault on the two houses.  The shellings were powerful enough to make the two German 
captives beg the Americans to surrender before they all died.  Covered by darkness, the 
Germans launched their second attack and captured several American soldiers not with 
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either Selvog or Yates.  The Americans carefully picked their silhouetted targets so as to 
not waste precious ammunition.  American fire was again sufficient to prevent the 
enemy from overrunning their positions but the Germans prepared to charge for a third 
time.  This time, as the Germans crept toward Yates, American artillery miraculously 
fell and virtually wiped out the assaulting force.  Several Germans were killed with 
grenades in their hands and others fell twenty feet from the command post.  This was 
enough to break the attack and save the besieged company.125
 Soon after this final assault failed, a patrol from K Company and the Battle Patrol 
made contact with an exhausted L Company.  During the night, the company regrouped 
and tended its wounded.  But the Americans could not know if the Germans would 
launch another counterattack and had to remain vigilant all night.  Shortly before dawn 
on the sixteenth, Yates sent out a patrol and discovered that the Germans had left the 
town.  On the defense, L Company claimed 18 killed, 2 captured, and approximately 70 
Germans wounded.  The company suffered 7 killed, 16 missing, and 14 wounded out of 
nearly 180 defenders, including men from M Company.    
  
 Neither side employed armor in the brief, savage fight for Vy-les-Lure.  If the 
Germans had tanks available, they might have defeated L Company like they would 
capture the 26th Infantry’s two rifle companies in Merode later in November.  The 
absence of any armor gave a curious parity in Vy-les-Lure.  It was an infantryman’s 
battle that showed the power of the defense in urban combat.  This absence of armor 
indicates how important armor had become in cities:  rather than being an environment 
hostile to tanks, mechanized vehicles could quickly tip the balance.  Vy-les-Lure 
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represents the 3rd Infantry Division’s only significant urban defense during the six 
months in France and signified the beginning of the Vosges Mountain campaign.  By 
mid-September, Seventh Army had decided that it would have to trudge through the 
mountains in order to destroy Nineteenth Army.  This difficult terrain produced much 
tougher combat. 
 By mid-September, the 6th Army Group began its campaign through the Vosges 
by having the French on the army group’s right threaten the Belfort Gap—the easiest the 
easiest and shortest way around the Vosges into Germany—in order to force Army 
Group G to commit many resources to stop them.  With the French providing the 
holding attack by fixing a large portion of German men and material in place, Devers 
sent Seventh Army to make the main attack through the mountains into Germany and 
onto the Rhine River.126  Figure 7.11 shows the Allied frontlines on 15 September.127
 One of the key challenges was the rugged mountainous terrain and the high 
rounded crags of 1,000 to 4,000 feet.  As Figure 7.11 shows, the Vosges are divided into 
two ranges: the Low Vosges in the north and High Vosges in the south.  VI Corps 
moved primarily through the High Vosges, which was the significantly more difficult 
axis of advance.  This situation gave the German defenders excellent high ground 
positions, superior long-range observation, and cover within the forested areas.  The area 
was also as forested as the Hürtgen.  Ernest Hemingway had referred to the Hürtgen  
  At 
that time, the 1st Division was in the Aachen sector, the 5th Division was fighting just 
west of Metz, and the 3rd Division was east of Vesoul.  The 3rd Division drove 
northeast from Vesoul toward Strasbourg.   
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Figure 7.11:  The Allied Front, 15 September 1944  
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Forest as “Passchendaele with treebursts;” the campaign through the Vosges was the 
Hürtgen with mountains.128  One battalion commander recalled battle there was like 
“Indian fighting” in colonial America; another officer described the combat as akin to 
jungle combat.129
 Topographical challenges were complicated by the impending winter.  Like the 
Hürtgen Forest, the Vosges Mountains presented another severe test for the Americans’ 
maturing combined-arms capabilities.  Jeeps, ammunition carriers, armored cars, trucks, 
tanks, and tank destroyers found the going tough through the forested mountains and its 
constricting road network.  Lastly, no military force had ever battled its way through the 
Vosges.  The German defenders, despite their exhausted state, could remain confident 
that history was on their side because the mountains were such a force multiplier against 
their attackers. 
  Just as the 1st Division fought tooth and nail for towns and villages in 
the Hürtgen Forest, so the 3rd Division would fight for the towns and villages in the 
Vosges Mountains. 
 The VI Corps divisions—the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions—certainly 
had experience in similar terrain because each had fought up Italy’s Apennine 
Mountains.  The 3rd and 45th had both fought through Sicily’s mountainous terrain as 
well.  Regardless of this experience, the Vosges campaign was different than Sicily or 
Italy.  In part this was because the Americans were fighting on the Franco-German 
border.  As one veteran remarked, “In Italy, the Germans could afford to trade real estate 
for time, men and materiel. . . [But in the Vosges] their fortifications were deeper and 
more extensive, their firepower heavier and more intense, and their troops grimmer and 
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more determined.”130  The Germans had a tendency through this campaign to 
incorporate towns that sat on road networks into their defensive schemes.  As they 
obstinately defended towns on the Americans’ most likely axis of advance, so the 3rd 
Division was guaranteed to fight in the urban areas.131
 Like the 1st and 5th Divisions, the 3rd Division also had to deal with the problem 
of training and preparing replacements.  By the end of September, after the first two 
weeks into the Vosges campaign, the 15th Infantry Regiment and 756th Tank Battalion 
complained about the low quality of replacements.  By the end of the month, the 15th 
Infantry noted that enemy resistance had strengthened, his artillery accuracy increased 
dramatically, and that they were now using “houses, hedge rows, woods, and high points 
extensively and [that] these positions were well-manned.”  In contrast, the regiment 
complained that “our troops lack the drive they must have to achieve the final defeat of 
the enemy” in part because the replacements were not as “sufficiently trained nor as 
capable leaders as previously received.”  For example, three out of six new lieutenants 
could not handle combat and had to be evacuated and many enlisted replacements did 
not know how to fire rifle grenades or operate bazookas.
 
132
 Just as the infantry regiment had to retrain these new soldiers so the tank 
battalion also complained that nearly half of its men “have to be trained for their jobs 
after being received.”  The 756th Tank Battalion protested that a replacement’s 
classification of “Armored Force” was too general a category because “an armored 
infantryman cannot be made into a tank driver any faster than a general replacement. . . . 
[and] Truck drivers are classified as tank drivers.”  Training these fresh troops to do their 
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jobs and become proficient at combined-arms operations while the unit engaged in 
combat stretched that unit’s capabilities.133
 Through the rest of September, the division pushed northeast through the western 
part of the High Vosges.  The division traversed the Moselle River and cleared towns 
like Maxonchamp and Rupt-sur-Moselle.  On 4 and 5 October, the 7th Infantry 
maneuvered itself in position against Vagney, a crossroads town near the Moselotte 
River.  At 0400 in wet, rainy weather, 3/7 crossed the Moselotte to approach Vagney.  K 
Company crossed the river with little opposition but continuous heavy fire prevented I 
Company from going over until later that afternoon.  When K Company got across, it 
quickly took the outskirts of Vagney by 0700, and fought a bitter house-by-house battle 
throughout the rest of 6 October.  On the battalion’s right/southern flank, L Company 
got across and moved towards the south to seize Zainvillers and its bridge over the 
Moselotte but failed to take it.  
  These replacements that affected their units’ 
overall combat performance no doubt affected how their units engaged in the urban 
environment.   
 Four tanks from A/756th Tank Battalion fired on German soldiers holed up 
inside Vagney’s railroad station that afternoon.134  Supporting artillery and infantry fire 
had destroyed self-propelled guns inside the town as well.  Throughout the day, First and 
Second Battalions along with their tank support, which were north of Vagney, moved 
south to cut off the town from the east.  The Second Battalion then continued south to 
help I Company take Zainvillers.  The wet ground caused several tanks to bog down and 
fail to support the attack. 
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 By the early evening, K Company had captured most of Vagney but was hit by a 
German counterattack of two tanks and nearly 200 infantrymen.135
 On the seventh, the regiment as well as First and Third Battalions located their 
command posts inside Vagney as the 7th Regiment fought toward the east against 
continued heavy resistance.  At 1700, the Germans unleashed an artillery barrage over 
Vagney that, along with rain, fog, and decreasing light, allowed a stronger 
counterattacking force of three tanks and three hundred men to infiltrate into the 
American-held town that had few infantrymen defending it.
  I Company crossed 
the Moselotte River to assist K Company’s defense.  Combat continued into the night 
when 3/7 finally repelled several counterattacks.  Early on the seventh, K and I 
Companies depended upon the emerging combined-arms methods to clear each building 
and house in Vagney and deploy east of the town.   
136  German tanks found and 
blasted the command posts, causing American casualties.  As Lieutenant James Harris of 
the 756th Tank Battalion surveyed the scene, a burst of enemy machine gun fire caught 
him square in the chest and killed the man beside him.  Harris dragged himself thirty 
yards under fire to his tank to redeploy it to a better firing position.  A German tank fired 
and a piece of shrapnel nearly sheared off Harris’ leg at the hip; he died soon after.  U.S. 
infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers rushed into Vagney to blunt the counterattack.  After 
several hours of desperate urban fighting, the Americans expelled the Germans from 
Vagney for a second time.137
 By the end of the month, individual units had formed different opinions of the 
3rd Division’s capabilities.  The 30th Infantry was especially critical of its infantry 
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during October.  The 30th asserted that night movements through forests and towns were 
especially dangerous activities that the regiment should avoid because night disrupted 
unit cohesion especially against stout German defenses.  The regiment also observed that 
tank-infantry cooperation suffered because when accompanying tanks “buttoned up” and 
there became no way for an infantryman to communicate targets to the supporting 
armor.  While the 30th Infantry complained about communication problems, the 756th 
Tank Battalion was confident that tank-infantry cooperation had improved as the 
infantry better understood tanks’ limitations and capabilities and the armored unit 
became more familiar with infantry tactics.  Although never perfected, these two combat 
arms valued the importance of maintaining effective teamwork.138
 After resting and reinforcing in October, the 3rd Division continued its slow push 
through towns in the Vosges.  With their backs to the Meurthe River, the Germans 
stubbornly gave ground.  In the first days of November, the 7th Infantry spent five days 
fighting for Le Haute Jacques, or the “crossroads of hell.”  U.S. artillery bombarded the 
town of LaSalle before 2/15 and its attached armor fought house-by-house from 2 to 3 
November against heavy and ubiquitous German small arms, machine guns, mortars, 
and tanks.  Assault guns from the 756th Tank Battalion offered direct support, firing 
105-mm rounds into enemy-occupied houses.
 
139
 On 20 November, the 3rd Division made an assault across the Meurthe River, 
relying heavily on secrecy and the cover of night, only bringing down American 
firepower after enough men had crossed.  The operation was successful but the 7th 
  A few miles to the east, B/15 defended 
the town of Nompatelize against aggressive regiment-size counterattacks.     
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Infantry Regiment suffered 167 casualties.  The division continued its slow eastward 
drive toward Strasbourg.  At most towns, the Germans delayed the Americans before 
withdrawing.  At Nayemont, on 22 November, the Germans defended the town from the 
oncoming 7th Infantry with a strong complement of artillery, flak wagons, infantry, and 
mines.  A one-company assault escalated into all of 1/7 ejecting German forces from the 
town.  American tanks supported as the infantry eliminated German antitank weapons.  
The G.I.s of A Company, aided by tanks and mortars, worked their way through 
Nayemont, house by house.  Throwing hand grenades, one squad assaulted a house and 
took eleven prisoners.  Germans in a house fifteen yards away opened up on these 
Americans, who doggedly held on to their prize.  First platoon leapfrogged squads from 
building to building, taking fifteen houses this way.  Before long, the balance of 1/7 had 
enveloped Nayemont by 1700.140
 Concurrently, 3/7 moved toward Saales, which became the Germans’ defensive 
obstacle along the route to Strasbourg.  By now, VI Corps observed that German 
resistance was weakening and ordered its divisions to maintain their momentum.
 
141  The 
7th Infantry’s Third Battalion, reinforced by tanks, made a surprise, early morning attack 
on 22 November, entering Saales just as the Germans were waking up, completely 
unaware of the Americans’ presence.  Third Battalion control Saales by mid-day on the 
twenty-second.142  The 7th’s commander, Colonel Ben Harrell, ordered First Battalion 
and its attached armor to proceed east to Bourg-Bruche in order to pre-empt the expected 
counterattack.143   
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 By late afternoon, 1/7 and its armor were outside Bourg-Bruche.  A German 
prisoner stated that there were 150 men in the town and they might surrender; instead the 
garrison stubbornly fought back.  Other intelligence gathered from prisoners indicated 
that they had only arrived that day as an emergency unit.144  B Company entered the 
town but accurate German artillery and automatic fire forced it to seek cover.  An 
American lieutenant directed an M4 Sherman tank to support the stricken infantrymen.  
Combat raged through the night as B and C Companies fought the Germans at close 
quarters for the rooms and buildings of Bourg-Bruche; the Americans and Germans until 
dawn attacked and counterattacked.  On the twenty-fourth, A Company arrived from the 
east.  The infantry and American tanks of A/756 Tank Battalion spent much of the 
second day evicting the enemy infantry and supporting armor.  By 1700, it was finally in 
American hands.  In five days, the 7th Infantry had assaulted across the Meurthe River to 
fight within Nayemont, Saales, and Bourg-Bruche.145
 On the twenty-fourth, a tired 7th Infantry went into division reserve as the 15th 
and 30th Infantry Regiments spearheaded the 3th Division’s drive toward Strasbourg, no 
doubt encouraged by a rumor that the division that took Strasbourg would receive a 72-
hour pass.
   
146
 Upon the division’s arrival to Strasbourg, the 7th Infantry took command of the 
city and the infantrymen, tanks, and tank destroyers patrolled the streets and 
neighborhoods.  The regiment also cleared out the areas between the Rhine River and 
  After Bourg-Bruche, the 3rd Division left the Vosges Mountains and 
debouched onto the plains of Alsace.  In the end, the French 2nd Armored Division, 
fighting northward from Belfort, reached Strasbourg first.   
 
 
361 
 
Strasbourg.  On 30 November, the 7th Infantry seized the Kehl Bridge over the Rhine 
and proceeded into Kehl, Germany.  Until 2 December, the 7th Infantry fought the 
“Battle of the Apartment Houses” against German infantry posted inside homes and 
buildings with various small arms, antitank rockets, automatic weapons, and covered by 
snipers.  The G.I.s of the 7th Infantry advanced systematically, taking Kehl’s buildings 
one by one with the aid of a few tank destroyers that blasted holes into the sides of 
buildings and allowed infantrymen to “mousehole.”  Artillery also gave the troops 
necessary support as they moved through the city.  Second Battalion radioed that the 
Germans were making it difficult for the G.I.s but, late on 2 December, 2/7 controlled 
Kehl, Germany.147
 As a city on the Rhine as well as on the border of France and Germany in Alsace, 
Strasbourg has a unique history of living under French or German control.  In contrast to 
other liberated French towns and cities, the citizens of Strasbourg received their Allied 
occupiers much more coolly than other French towns and cities.  Some civilians were 
not convinced that the Germans would not return and others were friendly toward the 
German cause.  Nevertheless, being there afforded the men of the 3rd Infantry Division a 
chance to rest, refit, and prepare for their next offensive.  Like the 1st Infantry Division 
after its ordeal through the Hürtgen Forest, the 3rd Division rested and retrained until 
forced to return to the war after the German counteroffensive through the Ardennes 
Forest. 
   
 As with the other divisions, the 3rd Division was able to refine how it handled 
the urban environment.  The reports of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion argued that 
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when the enemy held a small town in the open, it was better for the armor to remain 
behind the assaulting infantry and to fire on enemy-held houses.  Often, strong support 
fire from the armor just behind the infantry was enough to keep the enemy lying low.148  
The 30th Infantry observed that attempting to thoroughly clear towns at night was not a 
good idea.  The regiment asserted that its best option was to contain the Germans inside 
the town while the main force simply bypassed it.  By the end of December, the 7th 
Infantry argued that when fighting in buildings on both sides of a street, hand signals 
were an effective means of coordinating fire and movement.149
 Organizational problems persisted, namely because the independent tank 
destroyer and tank battalions were under corps command and corps headquarters could 
transfer these battalions.  For example, in November, VI Corps removed the armor 
attached to the 3rd Division to lend to other divisions.  The 601st Tank Destroyer and 
756th Tank Battalions loudly protested this detachment because it undermined the 
combined-arms teamwork that they worked so hard to maintain.  The 601st Tank 
Destroyer Battalion recommended making itself an integrated part of the 3rd Division so 
that when the division rested and refitted, the armor could do likewise and not have to 
participate in another division’s operations.
 
150  The 756th Tank Battalion complained 
that receiving orders to detach tank platoons and companies rendered supply and 
maintenance “well nigh impossible.”  Worse, the 756th argued that transferring the 
battalion from one unit with established relationships to another with no prior 
association was counterproductive, especially when they had to form that teamwork in 
combat.  The 756th concluded that “there is no substitute for teamwork based on 
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familiarity and mutual confidence.”151
Conclusion  
  Combined-arms warfare had become integral to 
the American Army.   
 American divisions utilized a combined-arms approach to battle as each fought 
through France.  As American infantry doctrine slowly recognized the importance of 
combined-arms fighting, the soldiers in 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions relied 
increasingly on armor-infantry-artillery teamwork.  For example, the 26th Regimental 
Combat Team created battalion-size combat teams with its “Battle Groups.”  The 5th 
Infantry Division referred to the 2nd, 10th, and 11th Regimental Combat Teams 
throughout its wartime records.  The 3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions employed their 
attached tanks and tank destroyers as infantry transports as they pursued the enemy in 
August and September.  The 5th’s commanding general lamented the loss of his tank 
destroyer and tank battalion, and their established relationships, to Third Army control 
during the Battle of the Bulge.  Likewise, officers in the tank and tank destroyer 
battalions in the 3rd Infantry Division loudly protested when VI Corps detached them for 
service elsewhere in November, thus disrupting established armor-infantry relationships.   
 As these units improved their combined-arms capabilities, they applied these 
lessons specifically to urban combat, even down to the company and battalion levels.  L 
Company, 15th Infantry fought alongside tanks and tank destroyers against German 
infantry and armor in an unplanned street fight for Allan in August 1944, knocking the 
Germans out of the town after a bitter close-quarters battle.  The 7th Infantry’s Third 
Battalion, after only a few hours’ planning, assaulted Noroy-le-Bourg.  Armor gave 
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direct fire support from the rear and entered the town after the riflemen secured a 
foothold.  The two battalion commanders leading the attack on Aachen had several days 
to plan, organize, and prepare for the assault.  The tanks and assaulting infantry 
implemented well-designed teamwork and cooperation:  the tanks provided mobile fire 
support, thus allowing the infantry to carry out assignments more effectively, and the 
infantrymen diligently protected the tanks from antitank fire concealed within buildings 
and amidst the rubble.  The Americans in Aachen also labored to improve air-ground 
cooperation between ground forces and fighter-bombers.   
 Heavily forested and mountainous terrain, such as the Hürtgen Forest and Vosges 
Mountains, limited tanks’ and tank destroyers’ firepower.  Despite the terrain 
difficulties, the Americans clung to established combat-team relationship against towns 
like Hamich and Heistern in the Hürtgen as well as Nayemont and Bourg-Bruche in the 
Vosges.  The combined-arms arrangements may have changed with the varying 
circumstances but these attacks involved all the combat arms nonetheless. 
 From a different perspective, the Americans’ experiences when they defended 
towns also demonstrated how important armor and artillery were in this environment.  
Each division had to mount an urban defense at least once: 2/26 at Merode in the 
Hürtgen Forest; 2/10 at Pournoy-la-Chetive during the Metz campaign; and L/7 at Vy-
les-Lure before the Vosges Mountain campaign.  In each example, the presence or 
absence of tanks was crucial.  After the 26th Infantry’s E and F Companies had chased 
the Germans out of Merode on 29 November, the enemy made a quick counterattack.  
Heavy German artillery as well as destroyed tanks that blocked the only usable roads 
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prevented American armor from rescuing the beleaguered rifle companies.  
Communication problems also meant division artillery could not assist.  In the absence 
of American armor, German tanks entered Merode with impunity to kill or capture the 
majority of two rifle companies.  Although they tried to rush bazookas into the town, the 
Americans had no chance at a successful defense without effective armored support.   
 In contrast, when the Germans assaulted the 5th Infantry Division’s 2/10 at 
Pournoy-la-Chetive, American tanks and tank destroyers were instrumental in 
maintaining the American hold on the town, despite strong Germany artillery and 
counterattacks.  The tanks and tank destroyers offered support behind the infantry’s 
attack and once in the town helped expel the German defenders.  Their presence along 
with artillery support was critical to 2/10’s three-day hold on Pournoy.  Indeed, by the 
time the battalion left the town, most of the armor there needed repairs from the days of 
constant fighting.  
 Lastly, L Company, 7th Infantry defended Vy-les-Lure against strong German 
infantry attacks.  There was no armor in this battle, thus creating parity as German 
infantry maneuvered to extricate the Americans and the G.I.s fought desperately to keep 
their hold on Vy-les-Lure.  It is questionable whether the Americans, having no armor or 
antitank support, could have held onto Vy-les-Lure if German tanks rolled into town.  
With neither side enjoying tank support, this battle became a desperate infantryman’s 
fight that the Americans won when a well-placed and well-timed American artillery 
salvo wiped out the Germans’ last major assault.  These cases demonstrate that tanks and 
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artillery could not win a battle alone, but strong, well-coordinated tank-artillery-infantry 
teamwork was a powerful combination. 
 Alongside coordinating the combat arms, the divisions had improved their ability 
to assault an urban area.  Americans understood the importance of maneuver and 
isolation, as seen at the cities of Aachen, Metz, and small towns like Brignoles.  They 
learned that movement inside the towns through “mouseholing”—as at Aachen, 
Saarlautern, and Kehl—was critical to preventing excessive casualties.152
 Focusing solely on the attackers tells only half the tale; the defenders also get a 
vote.  When the Germans assumed positions to renew the fighting by September, the 
Americans quickly learned how the defender affects an urban fight.  For example, in 
August the Germans could have made the 5th Division’s 11th Infantry pay much more 
dearly for Angers, sitting at the confluence of the Main and Loire Rivers.  A stronger 
defense might have held up the Third Army’s drive into central France but these 
Germans were concerned more with withdrawing than stopping Third Army’s pursuit.  
Yet when the 5th Division’s 2nd Infantry tried to capture Amanvillers, the fanatical 
German officer-candidates were supported by enough artillery from a reinforced festung 
that the 2nd failed to seize the town until the defenders finally withdrew.  Even when the 
2nd Infantry cooperated with the combat command of an armored division, the 
  At 
Saarlautern, the 2nd Infantry learned a simple solution to the problem of the city’s many 
pillboxes by using thermite grenades to melt and seal the rear doors shut.  The 16th 
Infantry learned to use surprise and a controlled artillery bombardment to assist the 
attack on Luchem in the Hürtgen. 
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Americans could not control Amanvillers.  Indeed, the Americans never took 
Amanvillers by force and the officer-candidates escaped encirclement.   
 Stolberg, in the Siegfried Line in mid-September, resisted American attempts to 
seize it.  American units hit Stolberg from the west and east, but the attacks were 
uncoordinated.  The staunch German defense, which included German armor and 
employing the town’s tunnels and sewers, prevented the 1st Division from taking the 
city.  The German stand at Stolberg was sufficient enough to keep the Americans at bay 
until November.   
 On the other end of the spectrum, the 3rd Division fought bitter urban battles in 
southern France, but few were on the level as those engaged by the 1st and 5th 
Divisions.  In most places, German soldiers in the south fell back.  The German Army 
Group G did not neglect the urban environment: although it failed, German command 
relied on a stout defense of Besançon to protect the Belfort Gap.  In early October, after 
3/7 took Vagney, the G.I.s had to fight off an enemy tank-infantry force that infiltrated 
into Vagney and nearly destroyed three command posts.  However, by the time the 3rd 
Division disrupted the nascent Winter Line by seizing Saales and Bourg-Bruche in 
November, the Germans were unable to stop the American assaults.  It would only be 
speculation to estimate what would have happened if the Germans had put up a stronger 
urban defense before mid-September but it stands to reason that many of these urban 
battles in France were not as costly as they might have been because of the German 
retreat.  Amanvillers, Stolberg, and Bourg-Brouche revealed that the German soldier 
became a vicious enemy whenever he stood and fought. 
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 Field Manual 31-50 was published before the invasion of Normandy but it is 
difficult to determine to what extent it influenced the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions.  The 
18th Infantry was already training for urban combat and the 3rd Division had accepted a 
view of urban combat that afforded a greater degree of combined-arms fighting.  
Soldiers were already receiving stateside training in village and town combat.  The 
divisions’ records do not indicate whether FM 31-50 had any influenced their combat 
decisions.  Indeed, in many ways, the three divisions were ahead of the field manual and 
were already formulating more sophisticated urban combat techniques, as Lieutenant 
Colonel Derrill Daniel indicated with his planning of the assault on Aachen, as the 5th 
Division showed with its attacks on towns outside Metz, and even in small-unit actions 
like one of the 3rd Division’s battalion’s fight at Noroy-le-Bourg.  This suggests that 
inasmuch as the army was learning institutionally through the war, the combat units 
were also learning experientially and this had a greater influence on their decisions in 
battle.  
 The Americans had improved their urban combat capabilities but casualties—
dealing with the loss of veterans and training and inserting new replacements—hindered 
the process.  As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the army improved draftees’ training.  But, 
as one veteran of Aachen remarked, “all the inf[antry] training you could get would 
never have you ready when it came time go into combat.”153  As such, there was a 
constant need to maintain these combined-arms and urban combat capabilities.  Whether 
infantry-artillery-tank-tank destroyer cooperation, attacking under fire, or fighting in a 
city, veteran units became frustrated that replacements did not have the requisite combat 
 
 
369 
 
knowledge, despite their training, stateside and in Europe.  The constant outflow of 
veteran soldiers and officers as casualties and continual influx of replacements showed 
that learning and relearning these ideas and skills was imperative to American military 
success over the Wehrmacht.  Each experienced, veteran division and its subunits had to 
keep learning these lessons because of the high rate of casualties and replacement.  The 
2nd Infantry trained its men in urban combat before the last major push to take Metz in 
November.  In most cases, a base of veteran corporals, sergeants, and officers helped to 
ensure that the replacements had experienced teachers.   
 In the midst of the fights for Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest, the 1st Infantry 
Division received newly arrived troops.  The 5th Division’s 2nd Infantry accepted new 
soldiers during the battle for Amanvillers.  Each time, they lost a heavy proportion of 
those green soldiers. Replacements filled 2/10 when it attacked across open ground to 
take Pournoy-la-Chetive in late September.  Initially, the inexperienced men wavered 
until forced across by their veteran sergeants and officers, aided by direct fire support 
behind them.  The same month, units in the 3rd Infantry Division also complained about 
the capabilities their inadequate replacements.  As the 26th Infantry attacked Jungersdorf 
and Merode at the end of the Hürtgen Forest campaign, many of those G.I.s were new to 
the regiment since the battle for Aachen.  They were in an urban battle for the first time.  
This meant that as units came off the line, they would have to train on various urban 
combat techniques, such as tank-infantry cooperation, assaulting fortified positions, and 
coordinating artillery fires.  The baseline of veteran corporals, sergeants, and officers 
worked to incorporate replacements into these veteran divisions. 
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 While the issue of personnel turnover continued to plague the American military 
through the rest of World War II, these three divisions’ experiences in towns and cities 
between June and December 1944 show organizational learning.  The American military 
had to master how to integrate its infantry weapons before it could combine its arms but 
by December 1944 the American soldier had embraced combined-arms operations and 
had applied those capabilities to the urban environment.  The Battle of the Bulge as well 
as the invasion of Germany required the Americans to sharpen and refine these 
developing combined-arms, urban operations capabilities.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
“FIGHTING FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE  
AND STREET TO STREET”:   
URBAN COMBAT FROM DECEMBER 1944 TO MAY 1945 
 On 16 December, the Germans launched a massive counteroffensive against 
General Courtney Hodges’s First U.S. Army in the Ardennes Forest.  It was a desperate 
gamble by Hitler to ram through Allied lines and seize the all-important port of Antwerp 
to the northwest.  The attack precipitated the Battle of the Bulge, so named after the 
bulge created within the American positions.   
 Hitler’s gamble failed when the First U.S. Army stopped giving ground on 27 
December.  Two weeks later, in January 1945, the Americans began flattening the Bulge 
as well as reversing the momentum by invading Germany and working to end the war.  
Allied troops pinched off the northern and southern shoulders of the Bulge at Houffalize 
on 16 January.  The Americans declared the battle over on 28 January.1  The 1st and 5th 
Infantry Divisions, a part of First and Third Armies, respectively, fought in bitterly cold 
temperatures amidst bone-chilling winds and through winter storm conditions against a 
frantic German enemy in the Ardennes.  To the south, the Sixth Army Group, including 
the 3rd Infantry Division in Seventh U.S. Army, fought from December to February to 
close the Colmar Pocket in similar conditions.  Given the size, scope, and drama of the 
Ardennes counteroffensive, the Battle of the Bulge has justly received more attention 
than the fighting in the Colmar Pocket.2  But fighting against and reducing the Colmar 
Pocket was just as severe for the 3rd Infantry Division: six of its soldiers received 
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Congressional Medals of Honor during this time for actions well above and beyond the 
call of duty.  The German Wehrmacht had not merely rolled over. 
 By December 1945, the American soldier had clearly understood the value and 
efficacy of combined-arms battle.  The American rifle company and battalion had 
integrated their infantry weapons and the infantry regiment and division had learned how 
to incorporate the other combat arms of artillery, armor, and engineers into an effective 
fighting unit.  Pushing back the German onslaught reinforced this approach.  As General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander-in-chief of Allied Forces in the European 
Theater, looked to the invasion of Germany, it was understood that the Americans would 
maintain these operational combinations.  Combined-arms fighting in the urban setting 
was vital as the 1st, 5th, and 3rd Divisions fought their way into Germany, despite 
geography and weather that sometimes restricted or strained the relationship.  
 This chapter confirms how during the Battle of the Bulge and the invasion of 
Germany combined infantry-armor-artillery teamwork became the standard for the 
Americans, including in the urban environment.  This organization and method of 
warfighting was imperative as the 5th and 3rd Divisions engaged in difficult and costly 
urban combat against the Germans in January 1945.  Because they could capitalize upon 
well-developed tank-infantry coordination, the 1st Division slashed into the city of Bonn 
in early March.  Victory sometimes created overconfidence as the 3rd Division’s 7th 
Infantry experienced in Utweiler in mid-March.  By the time the 3rd and 45th Divisions 
hit the major city of Nuremberg in late April, the American combined-arms team was 
formidable against a seriously weakened German enemy. 
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1st Infantry Division  
 After the 1st Infantry Division fought through the Battle of the Bulge, the 
division joined the Allied advance through the rest of Germany and across the Rhine 
River.  As the war wound down, the Big Red One helped to eliminate enemy holdouts in 
the Harz Mountains. 
 When the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive, the 1st Division 
was resting and refitting after surviving the meat grinders of Aachen and the Hürtgen 
Forest.  As such, much of the 1st Division’s experience was helping to shore up the 
northern shoulder of the Bulge.  By keeping the northern shoulder solid against German 
attacks, the Americans, including the Big Red One, prevented the Germans from 
breaking out as widely as they wanted to press toward Antwerp.  In contrast with the 5th 
Division that attacked into the southern shoulder, the 1st Division fought no urban 
battles until the Americans worked to close the Bulge in mid-January. 
 Despite the 1st Division’s limited urban combat during this time, towns and 
villages of the Ardennes Forest played a significant role in the Battle of the Bulge.  The 
101st Airborne Division’s defense of Bastogne, a critical road junction, is the most 
famous example.  Although pummeled by the German breakthrough, the 106th Division 
delayed the German advance for several days by defending St. Vith.  The 28th Infantry 
Division’s stout defense of Clerf, Vianden, and Wiltz, delayed the German advance 
enough to give the 101st Airborne time to defend Bastogne.  The defense of Stavelot and 
Trois Ponts by rear-echelon and support personnel prevented the Germans from getting 
over the Amblève River and breaking through the American lines.  East of the 1st 
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Division, the 2nd Division aided in the withdrawal of the 99th Division by blunting the 
advance of the Germans at the twin towns of Krinkelt and Rocherath.  Urban combat, 
especially in towns located at road junctions or near bridges over rivers, was critical in 
the Americans stopping the German counteroffensive.3  This pattern continued.  The 1st 
Division’s monthly report observed that when the Americans attacked in mid-January to 
close the Bulge, the Big Red One attacked from town to town “with little emphasis on 
fighting for key terrain features, such as hills.  The chief reason of this may be the lack 
of road facilities by which the Germans could supply isolated key points.”  That is, these 
otherwise insignificant towns and villages became operationally important insofar as 
they helped the Germans to retain their positions or helped the Americans to force a 
German retreat.4
 After stopping the German counteroffensive, the Allies quickly shifted to 
flattening the Bulge and resuming their own offensive.  Figure 8.1 shows the division’s 
area of operations during this time.
 
5  One major challenge was the weather:  frigid 
conditions seared the winter of 1944-1945, one of the coldest on record.  Wounded men 
froze to death and weapons simply would not fire in the bitter temperatures.6  Men in 
C/16 used dynamite to dig foxholes in the frozen ground.7  The division’s history 
likened these urban attacks in the waist-deep snow to wading through waist-deep water.  
A well-conditioned, fully-equipped soldier could go no further than 300 yards before 
taking a break.8
 Nevertheless, the 1st Division seized the initiative on 15 January when Combat 
Team 16 (CT 16), including the 16th Infantry Regiment, A/745th Tank Battalion,
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Figure 8.1:  1st Infantry Division Area of Operations, January 1945  
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C/634th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 7th Field Artillery Battalion, attacked 
Faymonville, Belgium followed by Schoppen.9
 On 15 January, two battalions from CT 16 attacked Faymonville and an 
estimated one thousand German defenders in two battalions.
  Capturing Faymonville and its vicinity 
would help maintain the attack to the southeast.  In the days before the Americans 
attacked, the 7th Field Artillery shelled the town frequently to soften the German 
defense as infantry patrols reconnoitered the area and captured prisoners.     
10  Around 0600, First 
Battalion moved against the town and Third Battalion attacked from the northeast 
through the snow in single-digit temperatures, supported by the 7th Field Artillery and 
the 745th Tank Battalion’s Assault Gun Platoon.11  To preserve surprise, no preparatory 
artillery bombardment signalled the American assault.12  Almost immediately, 1/16 
came under heavy fire from small arms, machine gun, and mortars as they entered the 
town.  By 0730, the rifle companies called for tank support as the resistance stiffened.  
Third Battalion riflemen wormed their way through several houses in the northeast 
corner but First Battalion had difficulty getting inside the town.  By 0900, only the lead 
tank entered the town when a mine stopped the second and held up the other tanks.  
Enemy fire halted A Company on the western edge of Faymonville, where, according to 
one officer, “a man can’t raise his head,” and B Company inched into the edge of the 
town.13  Colonel Frederick Gibb informed General Andrus that the German defense had 
stopped First Battalion but 3/16 could flank the town if it progressed fast enough.  If they 
had attacked three days earlier, Gibb complained, then Faymonville might have fallen 
faster.14  
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 Around noon, 1/16’s reserve, C Company, entered the fight for Faymonville to 
relieve the pressure on A and B Companies.  C Company took losses as it deployed 
slowly in the snowy conditions and in broad daylight.  First and Second Platoons 
instantly became pinned down but progressed as tanks assisted.  By end of the day, the 
three companies and supporting armor had fought their way halfway through the town.15
 Tanks supported riflemen as they assaulted from house to house with their main 
cannon and machine guns.  The tanks accompanying Third Battalion discovered anti-
personnel canister rounds to be very effective.  The 745th Tank Battalion’s A Company 
lost tanks in the fight for Faymonville to mines and the snow but offered significant help 
for the riflemen wrestling the village from German control.
   
16  One reason why the 
infantrymen required armored support was because the homes and buildings in 
Faymonville were not connected to each other.  That is, it was not possible to use 
“mousehole” tactics, or bore their way through buildings’ common walls in order to 
keep off the streets and avoid the Germans’ fields of fire.  Soldiers assaulting each 
individual house in its sector constantly ran a gauntlet of enemy fire.  By noon, both A 
and B Companies had suffered sixteen casualties.17  Frank Hoxie Smith of I/16 wrote 
that he stormed a house in the northeast part with three other squadmates, by tossing a 
grenade into the cellar.  He was proud to capture six or eight German prisoners without 
loss of life.  Nearby, a Lieutenant Jackson allowed a soldier to drop a grenade down a 
vent pipe, exploding in a furnace around which a group of Germans were huddling.  
Several were killed or badly burned and the rest scattered.  Jackson’s command ended up 
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killing all the Germans in the house.  Hoxie did not remember any prisoners in that 
group.  There were many ways to take a house or building in combat.18
 As darkness fell, the town’s southern limits were not quite in American hands.  
The house-by-house fight for Faymonville bled into the sixteenth; the stout German 
defense turned a one-day battle into two.  The regiment planned to complete its control 
of the village and then attack Schoppen with Second Battalion as soon as Faymonville 
fell.  To help the impending assault on Schoppen, four artillery battalions fired time-on-
target bombardments on the waiting town by the afternoon of the fifteenth.
 
19
 At 0700 on the sixteenth, 1/16 infantrymen, tanks, and assault guns, resumed its 
slow push through Faymonville, breaking down strong German resistance.  American 
soldiers checked every house and every cellar to ensure their advance.  An hour later, 
soldiers declared Faymonville cleared and the regiment immediately ordered 2/16 to 
seize Schoppen but German tanks and friendly artillery stopped Second Battalion’s 
advance.
   
20  By this point, soldiers in both armies were using snowsuits and winter 
camouflage, causing one company to report that “Germans and Americans [were] 
unrecognizable to each other, until only a few feet apart.”21  Despite regiment’s desire to 
take Schoppen, it would have to wait.  Those not blessed enough to find shelter in a 
burned-out home, used entrenching tools and dynamite to dig foxholes to fend off the 
extreme cold and knee-deep snow.22
 Raymond Gantter, a soldier in 2/16, remarked that Faymonville had changed 
hands four different times and was impressed that the town still remained after all the 
fighting.  After the battle, Gantter and his comrades occupied a half-demolished house.  
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Dead animals littered the landscape, bullet holes pockmarked the exterior, and German 
and American ammunition littered the area alongside the broken remains of a family’s 
home: children’s toys, pots and pans, muddy linens, broken dishes, and old letters.  
Gantter observed as the civilians trickled back into the area to pick through what the 
armies had not destroyed, mournfully beginning the process of rebuilding in the cold.23
 Division artillery pounded Schoppen again on 17 January as temperatures sank 
and a winter storm hit the area on the eighteenth.  Despite the winter storm, the division 
continued the attack southeastward on the nineteenth.  The 18th Infantry radioed that the 
exhausted, fully-laden men encountered snow drifts four to five feet high and only 
tracked vehicles, such as armor or the M-29 Weasel, could get through the snow.
   
24  
Notwithstanding setbacks, the winter storm helped the American tank-infantry attack by 
preventing the Germans from seeing or hearing the approach until it was too late.  Frank 
Hoxie Smith remembered that his squad and accompanying tank made it inside the town 
with few problems because the wind was in their faces, thus covering their noisy 
advance, and most Germans never expected a fight in weather so terrible and made 
themselves comfortable in Schoppen’s homes.  Before long, the town was in American 
hands and many surprised Germans were taken prisoners.25  In one of his first fights, 
Richard Rivard, an enlisted man from L/16, recalled entering a burning Schoppen 
around 0800, supported by tanks and tank destroyers.  Small-arms fire peppered his 
squad as it cautiously advanced through the burning town, assaulting buildings and 
homes but finding few Germans.  When a comrade was hit by machine-gun rounds, a 
tank destroyer’s 90-mm cannon fired right over Rivard and knocked out the machine 
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gun.  The memoirs during this time focus on the men’s constant struggle to warm 
themselves and find food.26  An E/16 report documented that some platoons were down 
to only five men.27
 In late January, the 18th Infantry Regiment took Moderscheid, Hepscheid, and 
Heppenbach by mounting riflemen atop tanks and tank destroyers, waiting until the 
moon offered just enough light to permit movement, and attacking into the center of the 
towns, hurriedly dismounting, and quickly clearing the homes and buildings.  These 
“brazen” tactics produced sharp firefights as well as large numbers of German prisoners.  
One veteran remembered that the Americans were motivated by a desire to both kill the 
enemy and to quickly wrestle the warm buildings from the Germans so the captors could 
enjoy them.
 
28
 The Americans closed the Bulge and restored their previous lines on 25 January.  
Eisenhower wanted to keep the momentum so he ordered fresh attacks into Germany.  
The Big Red One punched a hole through the Siegfried Line and, by 4 February, 
marched off the frontlines to rest, refit, and prepare for the next major obstacles: 
crossing the Roer and Rhine Rivers. 
   
 By early February, the Big Red One deployed south of Düren opposite the town 
of Kreuzau, Germany, just east of the Hürtgen Forest, and waited for the flooded Roer 
River to recede.  The division used that time to carefully and closely plan the crossing—
one regiment using aerial photographs to construct a sand table of the buildings and 
streets—while the Germans prepared for the inevitable assault with massed artillery of 
their own.  During these days, division artillery thoroughly shelled Kreuzau and its 
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immediate area.  Roving 155-mm self-propelled guns blasted the Germans.  The Battle 
of Aachen had taught them that using a delayed fuse allowed the rounds to explode 
inside buildings.29  The Roer River crossing was an army-level operation involving the 
First Army’s III, V, and VII Corps.  On 25 February, 2/16 and 3/16 both crossed over the 
Roer River by crossing the 8th Infantry Division’s bridges to their immediate left 
(north).  The maneuver turned out to be amazingly bloodless; by the end of the day, the 
1st Division had a strong beachhead on the east bank of the Roer.30  Although a minor 
engagement, 2/16’s attack on Kreuzau is similar to 3/7’s attack on Noroy-le-Bourg the 
previous September and it gives an excellent glimpse into how infantry battalions and 
their rifle companies planned attacks on towns late in the war and shows how integral 
combined-arms thinking had become.  Figure 8.2 indicates Kreuzau and its surrounding 
area.31
 The 8th Division’s capture of Niederau allowed the 16th Infantry to immediately 
turn south.  Lieutenant Colonel Walter Grant’s Second Battalion received orders to seize 
Kreuzau with 4.2-inch mortars, two 155-mm self-propelled guns, and a platoon each of 
tanks, tank destroyers, and regimental antitank guns as well as the support from four 
artillery battalions and First Battalion.  E and F Companies were the assault companies 
and aimed at taking the town and then striking toward the south and southeast.  E 
Company occupied the battalion left and had more tanks attached to protect its left flank 
from any counterattacks from the east.  The fire plan included continuous fire poured 
against the eastern and southeastern outskirts to isolate the town.  The 4.2-inch mortars 
shelled the town’s eastern edge as 81-mm mortars delivered a rolling barrage through the   
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Figure 8.2:  Sketch Map Showing Road Network of Kreuzau and Vicinity 
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town itself.  The two 155-mm self-propelled guns across the Roer targeted any observed 
tanks, antitank weapons, or machine-gun positions.  By firing its automatic weapons and 
mortars from Winden across the Roer, 1/16 hoped to fool the Germans into thinking the 
attack would come from there.32
 E Company planned to rush First Platoon with tanks, tank destroyers, heavy 
machine guns, and a minesweeping team into Kreuzau’s northern edge to gain a foothold 
as quickly as possible and then have Second and Third Platoons attack through First 
Platoon with the armored support.  The two platoons would clear their designated zones 
with the tanks and work in conjunction with F Company.  Second Platoon placed its 
light machine guns and 60-mm mortars behind the tanks.  First Platoon, the heavy 
machine guns, and two tank destroyers would remain at the edge of town and protect 
against expected counterattacks from the east.
   
33
 The Americans planned for the Germans to follow their usual tactics for 
defending towns like Kreuzau: begin by defending outside the town and fall back to 
strongpoints within the place.
  Clearly, the attack on Kreuzau was not 
a haphazard operation.  
34  As Second Battalion attacked from Niderau to the north 
it came under fire from Kreuzau, but heavy counterfire silenced the resistance.  E 
Company’s First platoon quickly took the northeastern side of the town.  Two houses 
and twelve prisoners fell but when a sniper claimed three G.I.s, the company commander 
called for tank support to fire at any possible enemy strongpoint.  The tank eliminated 
the sniper and the attack resumed.  As First Platoon reached its objective and deployed 
to protect the battalion’s left, Second and Third Platoons alongside their armored support 
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advanced through Kreuzau with F Company to the right along the Roer.  Resistance 
remained light until both companies reached the southern edge of town around 1500.  
The river prevented any maneuver to the right and there was no cover to the left, so the 
tanks, tank destroyers, mortars, heavy and light machine guns, and rifle companies laid a 
heavy volume of fire on the last line of defense.  This was sufficient to force the 
defenders to give ground and allow the rifle companies to clear the remainder of the 
town, link up, and prepare the place for all-around defense.  The attack netted 51 
prisoners and 15 enemy killed; the anticipated counterattack also never came.  First 
Battalion’s feint from Winden across the Roer River seemed to have fooled the 
Germans.35
 With Kreuzau in hand, the 16th Infantry sent its G Company and tanks to capture 
Drove to the southeast.  According to one wartime interview, enemy resistance was 
surprisingly “not tenacious,” although the American still lost one tank and one comrade 
to mines.
   
36  The first building that assistant squad leader Raymond Gantter assaulted 
with his men was an apartment house.  Gantter vividly described the all-encompassing 
fear of clearing the large building in the dark, how “shadows crouching in the doorways 
and windows are evil.”  The noise of steps, the building settling and creaking, and 
randomly falling objects added to the tension.  The dark uncertainty made everything 
worse:  “Someone is waiting for you . . . at the head of the stairs, machine gun leveled at 
the landing . . . perhaps around the corner of that half-open door.”  Gantter willed 
himself to keep moving, remembering what he learned in basic training about how to 
clear a room:  shouting “komme sie raus!” to encourage German soldiers to surrender, 
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firing a few rounds through the ceilings, heaving grenades into the cellar, all followed by 
“a moment of pure panic because where the hell has the rest of the squad gone?”37
 Gantter also learned the difficulties of handling inexperienced soldiers paralyzed 
by fear, huddling under a window, bunching together and presenting a fine target for an 
enemy shell or grenade.  Gantter’s squad leader yelled and screamed at them for the 
ignorant mistakes that could cost lives.  As Gantter’s men took the apartment building, 
other squads and platoons leapfrogged around them to clear other buildings.  Gantter and 
his men bounded past squads clearing other buildings, “hugging the buildings and 
stepping over the dead.”  (Due to one feeble counterattack, the Americans and remained 
alert for what could come.)  An 88-mm shell fired from a German Mk VI Tiger tank into 
the house Gantter and his eight men were defending caused more than enough fear and 
alarm.  German resistance might have decreased but the American infantryman could not 
let down his guard.
   
38
 Around 0200 on 27 February, G Company, aided by bombardments from the 7th 
Field Artillery Battalion, wearily captured Soller.  Gantter recalled that taking Soller was 
“Drove all over again—sweating, tensions, and terror; darkened houses and shadows that 
moved.”
   
39  A little later, B/16 captured Frangenheim to the southeast.40
 Kreuzau, Drove, and Soller in the Americans’ hands, they turned their attention 
to Vettweiss in the early morning hours of 27 February.  The commander of 3/16 gave 
the assignment to Captain Karl Wolf’s I Company at 0100, with K and L Companies in 
support.  Map III presents the area around Vettweiss.
 
41  Vettweiss proved to be more  
difficult than anticipated.  I Company received orders to attack Vettweiss supported by
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Figure 8.3:  Vettweis, Germany 
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the battalion’s armor—a platoon each of medium tanks, light tanks, and tank destroyers, 
in part because the enemy strength inside the town was unknown.  If I Company 
encountered few Germans, the company would clear the town and the battalion would 
continue its eastward advance.  If resistance was heavy, then K and L Companies would 
enter the town and help capture it.  Inasmuch as they preferred to wait until dark to take 
the town, H-Hour was set for 1200.42
 The plan of attack—based on aerial photographs and maps—came from Captain 
Wolf and with the armored officers’ suggestions.  From eastern Soller, the officers could 
see where they would approach Vettweiss.  First Platoon mounted the light tanks, 
Second Platoon rode the medium tanks, and Third Platoon got on the tank destroyers.  
Light machine gun squads were attached to each platoon.  Following a twenty-minute 
artillery barrage, each platoon was to cover the distance from Soller to its assigned 
section of Vettweiss as quickly as possible.  One hundred yards from Vettweiss, the 
infantry planned to dismount and attack on foot as the armored motored forward behind 
the infantrymen.
 
43
 At 1200, I Company boarded the tanks and tank destroyers and went “like hell” 
toward Vettweiss, covering the open ground as quickly as possible.
   
44  Early in the attack, 
the medium tanks and tank destroyers began to bog down in the wet soil.  Further, 
German antitank fire destroyed several Sherman tanks and immobilized others.  The 
infantrymen not dead or wounded scrambled off these tanks and sprinted into town.  The 
stuck tanks exhausted their main gun and machine gun ammunition in support of the 
infantry.  The crews then joined the infantry’s assault.  In the chaos, Captain Wolf and 
 
 
401 
 
his executive officer were nearly hit by the tanks behind them as his men reached 
Vettweiss in a disorderly fashion.  Of three platoons of armor, only two light tanks were 
still mobile and undamaged; they quickly moved to assist the riflemen.  Wolf regrouped 
his company; it set out to clear and capture the town.  Around 1300, Third Battalion 
reported that Wolf’s men, reinforced by K Company, were advancing but required more 
antitank weapons.  By 1345, the town was in American hands.  Aside from the German 
antitank fire, one replacement soldier recalled that the Germans did not actively defend 
Vettweiss itself although Cannon Company fired on Germans fleeing to the east.  I 
Company reportedly killed four civilians who were manning antitank guns.  By 1800, 
3/16 had deployed within the town and prepared for its next move toward Gladbach.45  I 
Company’s postwar description of this small-unit action credited the tankers for their 
assistance and “magnificent fighting spirit.”46  With Vettweiss in hand by the late 
afternoon, L Company took Gladbach the next day in a similar fashion:  with soldiers 
mounted atop tanks, jeeps, and half-tracks roaring into the town supported by mortars, 
armor, and artillery.47
 Kreuzau and Vettweiss help support Major Albert Smith, the 16th Infantry’s 
operations officer’s description of the division’s infantry-tank relations.  Because the 1st 
Division assigned the same tank and tank destroyer companies to the same infantry 
regiment and same armored platoons to the same infantry battalions, infantry 
commanders perceived their armor as organic, rather than merely attached, thus 
facilitating in strong infantry-tank ties that added to the already strong infantry-artillery 
teamwork.
   
48  Mounting infantrymen atop armor and halftracks was not limited to just the 
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16th Infantry.  First Battalion, 18th Infantry took Kelz, Germany through similar 
methods and sped inside Kelz, overcame “moderate resistance,” and captured seven 88-
mm guns, two 75-mm guns, anti-aircraft weapons, and twenty prisoners.  Like at Drove, 
tanks were destroyed by well-placed mines—which the Germans were relying more 
heavily on—rather than an active German defense.49
 The Americans began to encounter stiffer, more traditional defenses when 1/26 
attacked the town of Erp, east of Soller, on 1 March.  Without an artillery preparation, B 
and C Companies attacked two fresh training battalions in Erp working with tanks that 
offered immediate assistance after combat engineers cleared the mines.  German 
mortars, tanks, and four 88-mm guns supported the training battalions and heavily 
engaged the Americans into 2 March.  After midnight on 2 March, A Company joined 
the fight and then German aircraft strafed the Americans within Erp.  Late on the second, 
First Battalion finally declared Erp cleared, although the 88-mm guns had pulled out of 
the town.  Indeed to showcase the Americans’ confidence, Colonel Seitz reported to 
General Andrus at 2230 that the battalion faced stiff resistance but had determined that it 
still did not need its supporting armor.  When the armor did arrive in the early hours of 2 
March, a wartime report described the tanks’ assistance as “invaluable” and the entire 
battle just another “typical 26 Inf[antry] tank-infantry attack.”
 
50
 After Erp, the Americans fought more determined German defense but the 
combat teams of the Big Red One steadily continued toward the Rhine, the next major 
obstacle for the Allies.  Any bridge over the Rhine, therefore, had immense value to the 
Americans because capturing such a bridge would help them defeat their German enemy 
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as well as give them an advantage over their British ally.  The Big Red One’s 
maneuvering since jumping the Roer River in late-February had been part of a larger 
army group-level operation to cross the Rhine in early-March called Operation 
LUMBERJACK.  Writing as much from his personal experience as a junior officer as an 
historian, Charles B. MacDonald described the rapid, late-war American infantry 
division in March and April 1945 as “the equivalent of the enemy’s once-powerful 
panzer grenadier divisions.”  By now, MacDonald observed, “riflemen were long 
accustomed to cling to the backs of attached tanks and tank destroyers or to leap aboard 
two-and-one-half ton trucks . . . then to spin forward along highways and side roads in 
wake of the armor or, when resistance developed, to lend their numbers to reopen the 
path.”51
 The 1st Division was bone-tired from its rapid pursuit into Germany.  The 
division had covered much ground in the first week of March, endured heavy spring 
rains, and exhausted itself.  Because the terrain of the Cologne Plain was flat and open, 
the enemy could easily detect attacks.  This geographic reality forced the regimental 
combat teams to advance and attack under the cover of darkness whenever possible and 
to employ smoke in daylight assaults on the numerous towns in the region.  The teams 
also tried to vary their tactics against the Germans in order to retain some element of 
surprise.  The 26th Infantry often kept its tanks behind the infantry but on call so the 
sounds of the tanks’ treads would not betray an oncoming attack.  The regiments also 
leapfrogged over each other to let soldiers get some rest.
 
52  The quality of German 
military effectiveness had noticeably eroded since the Americans had crossed the Roer.  
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An unofficial 18th Infantry history noted that “once the Division tanks and [tank 
destroyers] broke into a town in support the infantry which had infiltrated forward, often 
at night, enemy resistance became individual rather than coordinated.”  As town after 
town fell and the Germans experienced mounting losses, German officers rounded up 
stragglers and shoved them into the line at strongpoints, which, a German prisoner 
commented, might be merely ten riflemen in a ditch.53  As the Americans steamed 
inexorably toward the Rhine, the Wehrmacht desperately tried to defend west of the river 
and to obey the orders of the Fuhrer to not retreat a single inch.  However, thousands of 
frontsoldaten just as desperately tried to flee over the Rhine by any means possible.54
 On the sixth, boundary changes made at First Army and 21st Army Group-level 
assigned Bonn to the 1st Division.
 
55  Late on 7 March, a beleaguered and fatigued 1st 
Division received the order to capture Bonn and seize its bridge over the Rhine intact.  
With only a few hours to plan, Combat Teams 16 and 18 considered the best way to 
capture the bridge in the heart of a major German city.56  As the 16th and 18th Infantry 
Regiments planned their assault on Bonn, the attack showed how experienced they had 
become at combined-arms fighting and how much the Americans could think creatively.  
Figure 8.4 shows the area around Bonn.57
 Meanwhile, German generals were convinced the Americans would target 
Bonn’s bridge over the Rhine.
 
58  According to American intelligence, Bonn’s defense 
included elements of the 62nd Volks Grenadier Division, the 253rd Replacement 
Regiment, the Combat School for Army Group B, a battalion of police, Volkssturm units, 
and stragglers assembled into ad hoc kampfgruppen, or battle groups.  Elements from the
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Figure 8.4:  Bonn, Germany  
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1st SS Division were reportedly nearby as well.  Supporting fire came from anti-aircraft 
battalions as well as seven tanks and three assault guns from the 106th Panzer Brigade.  
An intelligence report estimated 600 effective defenders and 20,000 citizens in the city.  
The commander of Bonn’s defenses planned two rings of defense but failed to complete 
either ring before the American attack.  Nevertheless, 20-mm, 75-mm, and 88-mm guns 
alongside various repurposed anti-aircraft cannon guarded the approaches to Bonn.  The 
Americans did not expect Bonn to go without a fight.59
 To take the bridge intact but not provoke a bloody urban battle, the 16th and 18th 
Infantry Regiments used speed and surprise.  The 16th Infantry’s plan was to quickly roll 
two battalions atop armor and trucks without any artillery preparation in the early 
morning hours.  Third Battalion, 16th Infantry was to take northwestern Bonn and stop 
any German reinforcements that might come from Cologne to the north.  First Battalion 
attacked on Third Battalion’s right.  To the right of 1/16 was the 18th Infantry in Bonn’s 
southern fringes.  The 16th’s battalions also included platoons of medium and light 
tanks, tank destroyers, 57-mm antitank guns, as well as artillery observers and 105-mm 
assault guns.
   
60
 Elsewhere, around noon on the seventh—fourteen hours before the 16th and 18th 
Infantry Regiments attacked Bonn—elements of the 9th Armored Division unexpectedly 
came upon the standing Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine in Remagen and quickly 
seized it.  Despite this strategic find, the 1st Division remained eager to capture Bonn 
and its bridge.  As such, the 16th Infantry’s mounted First and Third Battalions sped 
  The assault forces received orders to avoid firefights in order to get 
inside the city before the enemy could realize what was happening and react.   
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toward Bonn at 0400 from their lines of departure on 8 March.  For the most part, they 
achieved surprise.  First Battalion’s capture of the suburban Dransdorf just west of Bonn 
significantly slowed it.  The rifle companies contended with 200 Germans and various 
supporting weapons for several hours, including some house-to-house fighting.  After 
finally getting through Dransdorf, they entered Bonn itself by 1000.  After they deployed 
in the center of the city, the Germans pinned the companies down with machine gun, 
tank, and artillery fire.  The enemy then got behind parts of C Company in the urban 
mess.  Late in the day, 1/16 reorganized and redeployed with Second Battalion.  Most of 
the fighting in Bonn centered around Third Battalion’s attempts to seize the bridge. 
 Third Battalion relentlessly drove into Bonn despite its unprotected flanks, 
machine-gun fire, and enemy flares that threatened to expose them.  A combat interview 
stated that this “dash was the key factor in taking Bonn.”61  Once inside Bonn, K 
Company took the lead.  Disarmed captured sentries marched alongside their captors.  At 
one point, a soldier in a German patrol asked from what panzer division was K Company 
as the Germans marched along the opposite side of the street.  K Company’s history 
recorded that in the confusion of the German situation, they clearly mistook the 
Americans for Germans.  At 0530, the company thought that the bridge remained 
intact.62  The battalion commander reported just before 0700 that K Company was on the 
Rhine but enduring heavy resistance.63  First Battalion entered the fight in Bonn about 
the same time that resistance increased inside the city.  It became clear that the one 
effective line of defense was a partial ring of enemy armor holding the bridge’s western 
edge.  The American infantrymen and tanks were unable to break those defenses.64  
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According to an intelligence officer, the German defense resembled more “the nature of 
a covering action for a withdrawal” across the bridge rather than a stout defense.65
 In the meantime, 2/16 cleaned up strongpoints bypassed by the other two 
battalions.  Through the morning and afternoon, the Germans and Americans battled 
inside Bonn.  When the battle began in earnest, K Company’s history described “infantry 
crowded into doorways, windows, alleyways, and other places from which they could 
fire into the streets.”  The attached assault guns (105-mm guns on the M-4 Sherman 
chassis) and tanks took on and destroyed German armored vehicles, cars, trucks, and an 
ambulance hauling food and ammunition coming from the north.  K Company contented 
itself with controlling its sector and securing the buildings and streets down to the 
river.
  The 
desperation of keeping the bridge open outweighed the Americans’ attempts to capture 
it. 
66
 By noon, the regiment’s commander, Colonel Frederick Gibb, informed General 
Andrus that his men still could not reach the bridge but more reinforcements might help 
him reduce the defenses.  By 1300, First Battalion’s path was blocked by German 
armor.
 
67  Throughout the day, regimental headquarters continually inquired of the state 
of the bridge and pressured its officers to reach the bridge but the Americans could not.  
In the afternoon, regimental leaders hatched a plan to throw the 26th Infantry into the 
fight to quickly seize the bridge but it does not appear to have been implemented.  At 
1400, division headquarters attached 1/26 to the 16th Infantry in case the situation 
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allowed the regiment to use the extra battalion.68  Around 1800 and again at 2100, 2/16 
attacked into Bonn for the bridge.69
 After midnight of the ninth, the Americans still did not control the bridge.  By 
0435 on the ninth, E/16 reached the waterfront.
   
70  The first report of the bridge’s status 
came at 0534 that the Germans had blown it.71  Later reports confirmed it.  Nothing in 
regimental or division records mentioned a massive explosion.  A combat interview 
asserted that the explosion occurred between 2000 and 2100 on the eighth.72  It is 
possible that the Americans mistakenly reported that the bridge was intact.  At 0645, 
First Battalion commander posited that the Germans destroyed the bridge before the 
Americans got into the city because no one ever heard an explosion.73
 The 18th Infantry, clearing Bonn’s southern half, first had to attack through 
suburban Duisdorf.  The only road that could handle armor was flanked on both sides by 
high ground.  The Germans exploited this situation by posting many self-propelled guns 
and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns on these heights.  B and C Companies fought through the 
western part of Duisdorf.  The defenders numbered 500 to 600 men from two training 
battalions; the high number of 20-mm guns forced the Americans to move carefully.  A 
wartime report recorded the direct fire from the anti-aircraft weapons as “comparable to 
a Hollywood production” but the Americans took few casualties.
  Through the 
ninth, the Americans mopped up western Bonn, took prisoners, and consolidated their 
control over the city. 
74  First Battalion 
slowly deployed and methodically seized all of Duisdorf against an enemy desperate to 
 
 
410 
 
stop them.  Sherman tanks came in to support First Battalion’s attack.75  Duisdorf was in 
the 18th Infantry’s hands by 0900.76
 As 1/18 contended within Duisdorf, the other two battalions successfully drove 
into Bonn.  Third Battalion, at the rear of the column of battalions, reached Bonn late on 
the eighth.
   
77
 Raymond Gantter, in the supporting Second Battalion, remembered that “in the 
darkness we bumped into things, stumbled over each other, and cursed and clattered loud 
enough to wake all [of] Bonn.”  As day broke, the German citizens lined up for their 
daily bread and potato rations regardless of the American presence.
  Once inside Bonn, the resistance decreased notably.  Second and Third 
Battalions deployed within Bonn but their roles in capturing the bridge went unrecorded.   
78  Upon taking 
Bonn, the 16th Infantry felt like “conquerors” in its first major city and many Americans 
satisfied their desires for food, drink, and sex or “liberating” valuables.  The 16th 
Infantry acted with enough “unsoldierly and shameful behavior” that the regiment was 
removed from Bonn soon thereafter.79
 The 1st Division celebrated the attack on the city of Bonn for the way it seized a 
major city without provoking a costly, destructive urban battle.  Late in the war and after 
only four hours of planning, G.I.s mounted atop tanks and tank destroyers boldly 
charged into a major city without any artillery support.  The ability to quickly launch a 
nighttime, combined-arms urban attack with creativity and a degree of “cockiness” was a 
result of the division’s veteran status.
  At this point in the invasion of Germany, 
civilians became more of a challenge as the Americans encountered conquered, not 
liberated, people. 
80  But in its haste, the operation was not flawless.  
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The attacking 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments were not in physical contact and seemed 
not to coordinate their attacks.  First Battalion, 16th Infantry permitted parts of the city’s 
defense to infiltrate behind their positions in Bonn.  That might have been a result of not 
having reconnoitered before attacking.  Lastly, the Americans failed to take the bridge 
intact, which might not have been possible depending on when the Germans destroyed it.  
Postwar accounts justly applauded the daring assault but tend to downplay the failure to 
capture the most important feature within Bonn: the bridge over the Rhine.  The Big Red 
One had become an effective, combined-arms force but it, too, made mistakes late in the 
war. 
 The Allies’ seizure of the Ludendorff Bridge in Remagen, approximately three 
miles from Bonn, offset the failure to capture Bonn’s bridge.  Higher command 
immediately began shifting divisions through Remagen before it collapsed or German 
artillery destroyed it.  The Germans failed to launch counterattacks largely because they 
lacked fuel and manpower.  The 1st Division crossed the Ludendorff Bridge on 15 and 
16 March.   
 As First Army crossed the Rhine at Remagen in strength, Eisenhower continued 
to rely upon British 21 Army Group as the main punch through the Ruhr.  First Army 
would be the southern arm of a massive pincer movement.  The 1st Division’s and VII 
Corps’s breakout from the bridgehead began on 23 March.81  As the Americans 
steamrolled west of the Rhine, Raymond Gantter wrote that war could still be a comedy 
of errors when his G/16 squad assaulted a village on 21 March and were attacked by 
American fighter-bombers, precipitating a chaotic rush to cover and frantic attempts to 
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inform the pilots they were attacking Americans.  As the G.I.s took the village, Germans 
tanks rolled in unaware of the American infantry presence.  Gantter screamed at his 
bazookaman to fire at the tanks but he refused because his assistant was not there to pull 
the rocket’s safety pin.  When the assistant showed up, he explained that he was trying to 
find where he dropped his bag of rockets; the squad now only had the one bazooka 
rocket.  Gantter looked to his grenadier but the rifle-grenadier broke his weapon in the 
bombing attack.  Three tanks gathered in that village but Gantter’s squad could do 
nothing, so it withdrew.  “War,” Gantter wrote, “wasn’t always heroics and cool 
efficiency in our army.”82
 As the Germans amassed men, tanks, and fuel, they fought against the Rhine 
crossing.  On 18 March, Combat Team 18’s First and Second Battalions took 
Quirrenbach after a sharp fight.  In rapid order, the three combat teams took Rostingen, 
Wullscheid, Orscheid, and Stockhausen alongside Quirrenbach on the eighteenth.
 
83
 Combat Team 18 sent 2/18 to capture Uckerath.  VII Corps planned to breakout 
from the Remagen bridgehead once 2/18 had seized the town.  The reinforced battalion 
assaulted at approximately 2000 hours on 23 March.  It attacked over two kilometers of 
open ground and crossed a stream.  The battalion’s operations officer, Major Edward 
McGregor, remembered that the nighttime advance went as well as could be expected 
but some soldiers remained exposed in the open and required smoke from mortars to 
  On 
19 March, 2/18 seized Eudenbach and defended against a strong artillery-supported 
enemy counterattack.  The Americans kept their gains and repulsed the counterattacks.  
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conceal their movement.84
 The Germans stoutly defended Uckerath through the twenty-fourth by using the 
open ground to their advantage.  Second Battalion recorded that the assault companies, E 
and F, encountered “intense” small arms, mortar, artillery, automatic, as well as 
“devastating” armored, self-propelled fire from the dug in Germans.  This enemy fire 
stalled E Company’s attack 800 yards from Uckerath.  Ten tanks and various self-
propelled guns “skillfully protrude[ed] their big guns from buildings in the town.”  By 
1800 on the twenty-fourth, the assault companies’ were stopped.  At 2000, the battalion 
resumed its advance in the dark.  G Company protected the northern/left flank as E and F 
Companies attacked straight into the city.
  The enemy’s defensive strongpoints, supported by eight to 
twelve tanks, covered the approaches into Uckerath.   
85
 The battalion recorded that E and F Companies “had little difficulty in entering 
the town but the problem of remaining there was not so simple.”  Giant German Mark VI 
“Tiger” tanks blocked the approaches into the city as German armor blasted buildings 
suspected of concealing American soldiers at point-blank ranges.  As a reminder of the 
power of armor in the urban fight, the G.I.s found it difficult to organize themselves as 
they had no way of stopping the Tigers.
   
86  B Company, 745th Tank Battalion also 
recorded frustration at combating fierce German armor and antitank rocket fire from 
Uckerath through the early morning hours of the twenty-fifth.87  After midnight on the 
twenty-fifth, the 18th Infantry reported that it cleared most of central Uckerath but was 
slowed in southern Uckerath because the “enemy is putting a terrific fight on and won’t 
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give an inch.”88
 Throughout the period, the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion unleashed several 
bombardments in support of 2/18:  from firing smoke to conceal movement to helping to 
break up counterattacks to firing directly into the city itself.  Indeed, at one point, G 
Company was alone in northern Uckerath by 1500 of the twenty-fourth and defended 
against an overwhelming counterattack until a “box barrage” from the 32nd Field 
Artillery Battalion around the company’s position saved it from near-certain 
destruction.
  At 0430 on the twenty-fifth, the battalion reorganized and renewed its 
efforts at defeating the German defenders. 
89
 As the battalion resumed the attack early on the twenty-fifth, it received orders to 
finish the job so that the 3rd Armored Division could move through Uckerath breaking 
open the Remagen bridgehead.  At 0600, 2/18 declared the town secured.
 
90  In the final 
stages of mopping up, 3rd Armored Division elements passed through the city with no 
problems.  Uckerath was Second Battalion’s “last great battle of World War II.”91
 Allied ground and air forces were pulverizing the German military in late March 
but, like a wounded dragon, the Wehrmacht could still lash out.  Early on 24 March, the 
16th Infantry’s G Company, including Sergeant Raymond Gantter as senior NCO of his 
platoon, assaulted Geisbach on the Sieg River as the regiment attacked elsewhere 
throughout that night.  G Company attacked Geisbach from two different directions with 
little to armored support to battle German infantry and armor within the small river 
town.
 
92  Grantter remembered the Germans firing panzerfausts, their version of the 
bazooka, at his men “and this was a fantastic and outrageous thing, to fire bazookas at 
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men.  It wasn’t according to the rule!”  In the inky darkness, it was difficult to determine 
friend from foe from civilian and Gantter had to will, cajole, and force his platoon of 
experienced and inexperienced men forward.  One replacement failed to search a house 
when ordered to because the doors were locked.  “For Chrissake, smash ‘em, smash ‘em, 
what’ve ya got a rifle butt for?”  His platoon slashed through the village, “fighting, 
smashing, terrorizing women and children.”  One of Gantter’s “trigger-happy infants” 
nearly killed other elements of the company in the confusion of the fighting.   
 The Germans counterattacked with infantry, armor, and artillery and threatened 
to wipe out G Company.  Gantter described the chaos that beset his platoon.  
Replacements refused to stay at their post for fear of being killed.  Two bazookamen 
fired before receiving the command and a third ran away in fear.  Gantter felt shame as 
his command wilted from an all-consuming fear welling up in his men.  His soldiers 
refused to hold a line and many fled.  The company’s commanding officer, Captain Wirt, 
determinedly led a smaller G Company back into Geisbach.  At Wirt’s request, fifty 105-
mm and 1550mm guns forced a dazed enemy into the open, thus helping the company to 
retake the town.  Gantter witnessed sturdy stone houses blown off their foundations by 
the distant guns.  The men assaulted houses and chased German tanks and assault guns 
after the armored support that Wirt had begged for finally entered the fight.  The 
company-level fight for Geisbach is not prominent in the monthly reports or the 
regimental or division histories but Gantter reflected on how fights like these contributed 
to a weary, benumbed, apathetic mindset.93  Although the Americans sensed the end of 
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the war, the fights at Uckerath and Geisbach showed how violent combat remained and 
how treacherous the urban environment continued to be. 
 After Geisbach, the advance resumed.  Gantter wrote that days later G Company 
again became motorized infantry: riding tanks, tank destroyers, and trucks through seven 
towns trying to find German stragglers.94
 The 1st Division’s last combat assignment was into the Harz Mountains, where 
the Allies suspected that Hitler might use the mountains as a final redoubt.
  Into early April the division—along with the 
rest of First Army and in cooperation with Ninth Army to the north—helped to prevent 
large elements of Army Group B from escaping further east.  On 18 April, 317,000 
German soldiers surrendered to the Americans. 
95  VII Corps 
did not encounter the level of combat that it had in 1944 or early 1945.  The division’s 
combined-arms combat teams drove through many roadblocks within the heavily 
forested region.  The mountainous terrain and poor road network gave the region’s many 
towns and villages operational value but taking them was not nearly as difficult as 
Stolberg and Aachen the previous fall or Uckerath and Geisbach.  Gantter recalled 
entering a burning St. Andreasburg, the area’s most important city.96  The division’s 
monthly report stated that the Harz Mountains operations “was not thought by some that 
a great deal of organized opposition would be met but as can be seen from the fighting 
which occurred and the [40,000 prisoners of war] which were taken it proved to be 
definitely a major operation.”97  The Harz was a major operation but more determined 
enemy would have exacted a higher toll from the Americans.  By April 1945, the 
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American advance had become a combined-arms juggernaut attuned to the urban 
environment. 
 The combat teams continued pursuing toward Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia into 
May until ordered by SHAEF to cease fire on 7 May.  The Germans finally surrendered 
on the eighth.  With the cease-fire, World War II for the 1st Infantry Division was over. 
5th Infantry Division  
 The 5th Infantry Division, along with the rest of Third Army, assaulted the 
southern shoulder of Bulge in December 1944 and saw severe urban combat through 
December 1944 and January 1945.  After the Bulge was eliminated, the 5th Division 
fought to and across the Rhine and against collapsing German resistance into 
Czechoslovakia by May 1945. 
 By December 1944, the General Leroy Irwin’s Red Diamond Division had 
proven itself to be every bit the veteran combat organization that the 1st and 3rd 
Divisions had become.  As the 1st Division helped hold the northern shoulder of the 
Bulge in December 1944, so the 5th Division—as part of Third Army—helped charge 
into the southern shoulder.  The 5th Division encountered more urban combat than the 
1st Division and terrain significantly affected combat units’ tactical decisions.  Along the 
Bulge’s southern shoulder, France-Luxembourg-Germany region, land was more 
difficult.  As the historian Russell Weigley describes the terrain in this area, “the 
disadvantages of the Ardennes as a military arena were amply in evidence:  the wooded 
areas were numerous, large, and thick with trees; the ravines were many, steep-sided, 
and deep.”  Further, the road network was not conducive to military maneuvering and 
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the numerous east-west rivers blocked Third Army’s northward advance.98  The 
topography was reminiscent of the 3rd Division’s fight through the Vosges and many 
roads cut through deep, steep draws from the extensive and confusing rivers.  The terrain 
strained the Americans’ combined-arms fighting by minimizing their tanks’ and tank 
destroyers’ effectiveness.99  The weather conditions were as horrid and uncomfortable 
for the Red Diamond Division as they were for the Big Red One.  These combined 
factors spelled trouble.  Figure 8.5 shows the fighting in this area.100
 Third Army’s abrupt right-face northward into the German left/southern flank 
meant withdrawing the 5th Division from its fight in Saarlautern on 18 December to lead 
Third Army’s attack.  The division lamentably lost its attached tank and tank destroyer 
battalions.  The division quickly integrated the armor replacements, the 737th Tank 
Battalion and 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion.  By 22 December, Combat Team 10 had 
relieved elements of the 4th Infantry Division and was helping to push back the German 
onslaught.  On the twenty-third, the 5th Division was all together with the 10th Infantry 
on the left, 2nd Infantry in the middle, and 11th Infantry on the right.  By Christmas Eve, 
the combat teams fought to relieve the 4th Division and secured the area around 
Echternach and the Sauer River, also called the Sure River.  As the division went into a 
new operation, it found incredibly active and accurate German artillery supporting a 
well-motivated German force that effectively used the difficult terrain to its 
advantage.
   
101  But by the twenty-sixth, 10th Infantry patrols were inside Echternach on 
the Sauer but found it empty of all Americans.102
 Fighting on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day was long, confusing, and 
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Figure 8.5: The Seventh Army Attack, 16-19 December 1944 
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complicated by the steep ridges in the area.  By the twenty-sixth, the 2nd Infantry 
Regiment had fought its way to Berdorf.  The regiment’s Second Battalion sent E and G 
Companies to assault from the east and west.  When G Company’s commanding officer 
approached Berdorf and saw one hundred men lined up in the road, he thought it was E 
Company and asked for confirmation.  The response came back: “Yah, Das ist E 
Company.”  The Americans opened fire and killed many but several ducked into houses 
and defended them.  The fighting became house-by-house for E and G Companies 
through Berdorf.  The two companies took southern Berdorf easily but the 
Germans in northern Berdorf offered a stronger defense.  The 737th Tank Battalion’s A 
Company helped with these attacks but the record does not indicate how.   
 By nightfall, most of Berdorf was taken.  The Americans found many houses 
with Christmas trees and food being prepared.  The Germans responded to the American 
attack by plastering the town all day as soldiers fought through the town’s houses.  
Colonel A. Worrel Roffe was impatient to advance First Battalion so he pressed it 
through Berdorf but Germans caused too many casualties; the colonel had to wait until 
Second Battalion controlled the town.  Second Battalion claimed Berdorf cleared around 
0200 on the twenty-seventh.103
 For the first two weeks of 1945, the 5th Division, with the rest of XII Corps, 
defended along the left (west) bank of the Sauer River and patroled along and over the 
river.  In preparation for the inevitable river assault, division elements reconnoitered 
crossing sites.  Snow accompanied the bitter cold.  One Red Diamond veteran, Louis 
  By the twenty-sixth, Third Army was fully engaged in 
countering the Ardennes counteroffensive.   
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Lauria, described the situation as being under “eight degrees and the wind was blowing 
around 25 miles an hour.”  Further, Lauria wrote, “the snow was a foot high” and the 
men sustained themselves by eating cold canned meals.104
 The division had to cross the Sauer River, which constituted its own challenges 
and required its own planning.  In addition to crossing the Sauer, the 2nd Infantry also 
had to seize three towns on the river—Erpeldange to the northwest, Ingeldorf in the 
center, and Diekirch to the east—as well as capture two large heights.  Third Battalion 
planned to cross the Sauer under cover of darkness and take the small town of Ingeldorf 
from the east.  First and Third Battalions would then fan out to the northwest and 
northeast, respectively, and conquer the heights.  There was no preparatory 
bombardment because the Americans hoped to keep the crossing a surprise but that 
surprise was lost.  Third Battalion failed to achieve a beachhead and could not attack 
Ingeldorf.  The battalion’s operations officer reckoned that all the patrolling had tipped 
off where the assault would be coming.
  On 18 January, the division, 
concurrent with the 1st Division along the northern shoulder, attacked out of its foxholes 
to help pinch the Bulge shut.     
105  Second Battalion was supposed to march 
across a footbridge after 3/2 took Ingeldorf but now was tasked with crossing the Sauer 
and capturing Ingeldorf from an awakened enemy.  Second Battalion scrapped any hopes 
of a footbridge and filled assault boats to make an unplanned boat crossing, supported by 
massive amounts of artillery and tank fire from the rear.106  One veteran from G 
Company recalled that “crossing with German fire to our front and American fire from 
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our rear was as frightening as all hell.”  He mused about how anyone survived that 
assault.107
 During this debacle, 1/2 managed to slip over unnoticed.  First Battalion dashed 
over the river on a footbridge, silenced a troublesome machine-gun position, and 
attacked Erpeldange.  Mortars and artillery supported 1/2’s attack on Erpeldange on the 
left flank of the regiment’s operations along the Sauer River.  By 0830, C Company had 
cleared most of the town of its defenders as A and B Companies moved north to other 
targets.  When engineers installed an armor-supporting bridge, tank destroyers crossed 
the Sauer and fired directly into Erpeldange’s buildings that concealed the enemy.  One 
tank destroyer pushed its main gun through a house window and took twenty-seven 
German soldiers prisoner.  River assaults are a notoriously infantry-based affair given 
the tendency of armor to sink.  But once the engineers constructed the Bailey bridge, 
armor supported C Company’s attack into Erpeldange.
 
108
 Given 1/2’s success, Third Battalion’s K Company used the same footbridge to 
attack Ingeldorf from the west rather than the east.  K Company controlled the town by 
1530.  East of Ingeldorf, the taller factory buildings in Diekirch’s northwestern portion, 
gave L and I Companies trouble as they deployed; a preparatory artillery bombardment 
fell on Diekirch at 1550 for ten minutes.  Third Battalion attacked Diekirch from the 
west, aided by five tanks from A/737th Tank Battalion.  Approximately one hundred 
prisoners were claimed and resistance lightened after the artillery bombardment.  The 
main enemies were the mines and booby traps that pestered the Americans.  Sergeant 
Michael Bilder remembered that street fighting went on inside Diekirch most of the 
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day.109  By 0745 on the nineteenth, 3/2 and its supporting tanks resumed the attack and 
claimed Diekirch by noon.110
 By the twentieth, the regimental combat teams dealt with more urban combat 
because, the Eleventh Infantry discovered, the Germans incorporated urban locations on 
high ground into their defensive scheme.  Therefore, “any town could be considered an 
enemy concentration area,” releasing division and corps artillery to mercilessly pound 
and shell these towns.
  Afterwards, Third Battalion gathered itself and continued 
the northward fight. 
111  Tenth Infantry’s Third Battalion took Landscheid.  On the 
twenty-first, 2nd Infantry attacked and took Lipperscheid.  Eleventh Infantry targeted 
Hoscheid by the twenty-second as it relieved the 2nd Infantry.  Figure 8.6 indicates the 
difficult topography in this area.112
 Second Battalion, 11th Infantry attacked Hoscheid on 22 January and suffered 
terrific firepower from Hoscheid as well as Gralingen and Moscheid to its left.  First 
Battalion peeled off to the right to attack Gralingen.  Gralingen proved to be its own 
challenge because, the regiment’s records stated that “the steep grades, nature of the 
ground and deep snow proved to be a great obstacle causing general fatigue among the 
foot elements and prohibiting movement of vehicles.”  First Battalion infantrymen 
endured mortar and artillery fire as well as automatic and rifle fire on the approach 
toward Gralingen.  After five hours of fighting within the town—with only the indirect 
aid of tank destroyer fire from the rear due to the tough terrain—the battalion claimed 
Gralingen.
 
113
 In the meantime, Second Battalion suffered many casualties around Hoscheid  
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Figure 8.6: 10th Infantry Area of Operations, January 1945  
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with little to show for its efforts by the end of the twenty-second.  Armor tried to assist 
but the topography minimized their efforts.  On the twenty-third, 2/11 tried to push into 
the town but German fire slowed their efforts to a near crawl.  E and F Companies 
worked their way to southern Hoscheid but failed to penetrate the town by day’s end.  
Tank destroyers offered limited artillery support against German forces.  Tanks had 
difficulties maneuvering over and along the steep ridgelines; C/737th Tank Battalion lost 
two tanks from attempting to move in support of the infantry.114
 On the twenty-fourth, the regiment finally took the town from the Germans.  
American artillery subjected Hoscheid to a terrible bombardment.  The battalion 
engaged in vicious house-by-house combat as it entered the town and captured it by 
1800.  The battalion found destroyed Mark VI and Mark V tanks inside Hoscheid.  The 
737th Tank Battalion noted that there were three 75-mm self-propelled guns concealed 
there.  The battalion claimed two were destroyed but the damaged third withdrew.
 
115  In 
its morning report for 24 January, G Company, or the “Gruesome Gents from Gallant 
George,” proudly claimed to have captured 51 prisoners along with seven-eighths of 
Hoscheid, had destroyed 16 machine guns, had helped knock out one tank and one self-
propelled antiaircraft gun.  The company credited its combat efficiency to the training of 
its commander, Captain Durst, and the dogged determination of the company’s executive 
officer, Lieutenant Anderson.116
 During these fights, Third Battalion attacked Merscheid.
 
117  After Hoscheid, 
Second Battalion turned its attention to Hoscheiderdickt, the next village defended by 
Germans in the area.  Savage street fighting and town combat broke out as the enemy 
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hampered the Americans fought to flatten the Bulge.  Temperatures dropped and 
snowplows had to clear the roads.118  Division and corps artillery battalions actively 
assisted the Americans in these urban fights.  The 11th Infantry’s history credited 
division and corps artillery battalions for their invaluable support as these combat teams 
attacked the towns and villages in the Bulge’s southern shoulder, especially praising 
artillery battalions’ devastatingly effective “Time on Target” bombardments.119
 On the twenty-fourth, at the very end of the Battle of the Bulge, Combat Team 10 
took on its most difficult challenge of the battle: the town of Putscheid.  After taking 
other preliminary towns, the regiment turned it attention to the northeast toward 
Putscheid.  The regimental history described Putscheid as located “in a hilly and partly 
wooded area on the western side of the Our River.”  The town’s approaches were 
“across exposed ground on three sides” and were covered by the positions of the veteran 
130th Panzer Lehr Division.
  By 
immediately attacking Hoscheiderdickt after capturing Hoscheid, CT 11 was an example 
of the regimental combat teams fighting the Germans without rest or pause.   
120  Vicious enemy fire also came from the high ground and 
towns around Putscheid.121  Similar to the German situation at Besançon, the 130th 
Panzer Lehr Division was trying to slow Allied advances so German forces could 
withdraw from the Bulge.  In contrast to the failed German defense at Besançon, the 
Panzer Lehr Division fought far more desperately and successfully to delay the 
Americans.122
 Early on the twenty-fourth, 1/10 tried to seize Putscheid but failed in the face of 
counterattacking enemy infantry and tanks, withdrawing to allow supporting artillery to 
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pound Putscheid.123  Regimental wartime records vaguely describe what happened but 
more detailed accounts paint a far more brutal fight.  A and B Companies stepped off 
from Nachtmanderscheid for Putscheid at 0330.  Halfway there, they suffered serious 
German small arms and tank fire.  The assault began when the infantry and armor were a 
few hundred yards away from the town but immediately confronted enemy self-
propelled guns and tanks inside and outside the town.  Mortar and artillery fire from 
surrounding towns added to the chaos of the urban battle and greatly complicated the 
Americans’ task.124  Around 0900, Division informed Regiment that it was aware of 
1/10’s difficulty in taking Putscheid and offered the regiment “all the artillery to take 
[the town] apart.”  The 10th Infantry declined the offer because it had men on the 
outskirts but did ask for close air support; cloudy skies prevented fighter-bomber 
support.  By 0930, both Division Artillery and the 46th Field Artillery Battalion were 
preparing to bombard Putscheid.125
 At approximately 1300, the supporting armor shelled Putscheid as advance 
elements waited just outside the town; A Company remained 200 yards away.  When the 
shelling ceased, German machine gun fire again stopped A Company but B Company, 
on A/10’s left, managed to enter the town.  Immediately, the Americans came under a 
hail of enemy automatic, tank, artillery, and small-arms fire.  Tank destroyers usually did 
not enter towns because of their vulnerable open tops but this time they maneuvered to 
engage German tanks inside Putscheid and aid the stricken infantrymen.  As the 
afternoon, A Company infiltrated the streets but both companies suffered accurate 
German shelling from towns and heights north of Putscheid, preparatory to a 
 
 
 
428 
 
counterattack.  The insides of most the Putscheid’s homes and buildings were destroyed 
in the house-to-house fighting.   
 Before long, it was an American combined-arms attack against a German 
combined-arms attack.  The 737th Tank Battalion recorded that its B Company 
destroyed two Mark IV tanks and three trucks.  The 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion 
credited itself with killing a Mark V tank, an armored car, and blowing up a house with 
approximately 15 enemy inside.126  The Americans lost one tank destroyed and three 
damaged.  The increasing German artillery outside Putscheid and the strong resistance 
inside the bloody town forced the Americans to give ground.  To cover the retreat, many 
men rose to the occasion:  Vincent P. Cerrito and PFC Louis Belair each carried out 
wounded men from Putscheid while under fire; Sergeant James Tinsley’s platoon 
withdrew under the accurate covering fire of Tinsley’s machine gun.  All three men 
earned the Silver Star for their actions.  When the G.I.s had left Putscheid, division 
artillery and the 46th Field Artillery Battalion fired “Time on Target” bombardments 
that devastated the town and many Germans within it.127
 Having failed to capture Putscheid on its first attempt, 1/10 spent the next three 
days nursing its wounds and preparing to renew the attack.  Nighttime patrols revealed 
the Germans comfortably ensconced in Putscheid.  When an enemy tank was discovered 
concealing itself in a house, tank destroyer fire and white phosphorus mortar shells 
convinced it to leave the area.  The battalion planned its second assault for the twenty-
eighth.  The battalion plan relied on A and C Companies, supported by Second Battalion.  
A Company would take the heights to the west while C Company attacked from the east, 
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which meant attacking over an exposed hump in the ground.  E Company deployed to 
the northwest to cut off the defenders’ escape.  The advance elements deployed in the 
early morning hours on the twenty-eighth.  At 0600, First Battalion stepped off and came 
under a hail of German lead.  A Company had its position by 0800 but for the first 
several hours, C Company was pinned down in its exposed position east of Putscheid 
and came under fire from German small arms, machine guns, artillery, and tanks.    By 
0930, the Germans attacked these suffering infantrymen and C Company took fearsome 
losses.    By 1000, C Company had retreated and was badly disorganized.  Because of 
poor visibility, artillery could not effectively support the company nor stop the German 
attack. 
 Elements of Second Battalion were now aroused to help the attack and A 
Company prepared to strike from the west.  At 1255, 4.2-inch mortars fired smoke shells 
to help mask the movement of two platoons of tanks as they drove ahead of the infantry.  
The infantry entered and engaged an angry defense.  One veteran recalled the rifle 
platoons “leapfrogging” through the houses and buildings.  The lead platoon seized the 
first house and the second platoon took the next two.  The Germans then counterattacked 
with tanks and infantry in strength.  The fighting was severe enough that the company 
commander adjusted the artillery to fire directly on his house.  Just as the Germans 
approached his building and the American shells were falling, the commander jumped 
out the window.   
 The tanks withdrew but rejoined with tank destroyers.  This combined force of 
artillery, infantry, tanks, and tank destroyers broke a German counterattack as the 
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Americans finally secured Putscheid.  In the process, the Americans destroyed a King 
Tiger tank, two halftracks, and 75-mm howitzer.  A Company fought its way through the 
town; B Company advanced from the south; and a greatly weakened C Company 
reentered from the east.  The Germans proceeded to shell the town but it was now under 
American control.128
 First Battalion’s attack on Putscheid on 28 January, along with a few other Third 
Army actions also along the Our River, signified the end of the Bulge created on 16 
December.  During the Ardennes Offensive, the Americans sustained 41,000 casualties.  
The process of sealing off and flattening the Bulge claimed another 39,000 killed, 
wounded, and captured Americans.
   
129  In the process, these soldiers endured terrible 
weather conditions and fought over very difficult terrain.  The Germans were back in the 
West Wall but Eisenhower had no intention to allow them to remain there for long.  
Despite Eisenhower’s aggressive stance, the division’s history related a fatalist attitude 
among many Red Diamond men by late-January, especially as Germany gave no 
indication of surrender: “to the majority who were killing and being killed, it only meant 
that the Boche was deliberately intent on killing as many Americans as possible before 
he finally gave up.”  Therefore, to most infantrymen on the frontlines, “the situation was 
far from bright.”  As such, the average G.I. “resigned himself to the conclusion that 
unless Germany gave up soon, or he was wounded, he would be very lucky indeed to 
make a return trip home.”130
 The American soldiers reinstated their lines in late-January but there was to be no 
rest or respite from the fighting.  In early February, the 5th Division prepared to cross 
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the Sauer River again and attack into the Siegfried Line to enter Germany and help end 
the war.  In a snow-rain mix, elements of the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments 
attempted to cross the Sauer near where they fought over four weeks previous: to the 
west of Echternach.  The crossing also occurred amidst daunting topography—historian 
Charles MacDonald described it as running through deep draws through “clifflike sides 
sometimes 600 feet high”—with a treacherously rapid current swollen by the previous 
days’ precipitation.131  Figure 8.7 indicates the attack across the Sauer River into the 
Siegfried Line.132
 Veterans at river crossings, 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments sent assault troops 
to the other side of the Sauer on 7 February but the current nearly capsized the entire 
river crossing operation.  Holding superior ground augmented the weakened German 
defenders’ combat power.  For the first several days, the regiments struggled to get men 
across and reinforce them.  Artillery and armor actively offered critical support from the 
opposite bank.
 
133  In the meantime, air and ground forces heavily shelled and bombed 
the principal towns of Ernzen and Ferschweiler in preparation for the eventual American 
advance.  On the ninth, General Irwin ordered eight battalions of artillery, or nearly 200 
guns, to shell the two towns.134  With no restrictions on ammunition, artillery may have 
fired as many as two thousands shells at Ernzen.135
 By the tenth, entire battalions were across the river and moved inland.  The 10th 
Infantry took Bollendorf and discovered that, like at Saarlautern, the Germans were  
  On the twelfth, having enough men 
and machines on the opposite side, the 5th Division began its assault into the Siegfried 
Line and the area towns.   
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Figure 8.7:  Crossing the Sauer into the Siegfried Line  
 
 
 
camouflaging pillboxes to look like buildings.  Thermite and fragmentation grenades 
assisted the dangerous assessment of capturing pillboxes.  Assaulting from the rear of 
these fixed positions was less costly as pillbox garrisons tended to surrender when 
attacked from behind.  It helped that many of the German defenders had only recently 
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deployed there and were not determined to hold out for long.  Bollendorf fell on the 
twelfth and gave convenient bridging sites to the division.136  The tanks and tank 
destroyers that crossed the river augmented the combat teams’ firepower.  On the 
thirteenth a patrol from 3/10 reached the outskirts of Ferschweiler until it drew fire from 
German soldiers and a self-propelled gun.  The next day, Valentine’s Day, L Company 
made a surprise assault on the town at 0630; there was no preparatory artillery but, as 
has been mentioned, artillery had already thoroughly worked over the town the previous 
several days.  First  and Second Platoons attacked from the west and east respectfully but 
resistance was light except for the northwestern part of Ferschweiler.  Capturing the 
town’s northwest corner required rifles, grenades, and bazookas.  As the Americans had 
come to expect, the fighting was house by house.  Light and heavy mortars supported the 
attacks while the company’s machine gun platoon protected the flanks.  By 1100, the 
Germans yielded the town; tanks had entered the fray around 1000.137
 The 11th Infantry’s crossing, on the 10th’s right, was far more trying.  The 
regimental operations officer said succinctly that “nothing in this operation went 
according to plan.”  But the German defenders gave up easily, he noted, and generally 
did not fight.
  Neither 
Diesburgerhof nor Ferschweiler slowed the 10th Infantry’s advance. 
138  Many German soldiers voluntarily surrendered as the 11th Infantry 
secured its beachhead.  Tank shelling from the 737th Tank Battalion began fires within 
Ernzen on the thirteenth.  The next day, all the three rifle battalions advanced and E and 
F Companies entered a bombed-out, burning Ernzen alongside two platoons of A/737th 
Tank Battalion.139   
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 The 5th Division continued northeast to target Bitburg.  The 2nd and 10th 
Infanry Regiments led the division, taking places like Shankweiler, Stockem, Halsdorf, 
and Messerich along the way and crossing the Ernz, Prüm, and Nims Rivers in the 
process.  Once past the Prüm, the land flattened and the division did not have to fight 
through any more deep draws and steep ridgelines.  The floodwaters from the early 
spring thaw receded, thus aiding in the crossings.140  The division’s movements from the 
Siegfried Line toward Bitburg revealed how weak the Germans had become: positions 
that might have been well-defended and exacted a costly toll on the attacking Americans 
now fell easily.141
 On 26 February, a refreshed 11th Infantry left the division reserve and resumed 
the lead into Bitburg.  The XIX Tactical Air Command provided invaluable service 
attacking and destroying enemy columns fleeing out of Bitburg.  American heavy 
bombers had also pulverized Bitburg itself.  By now the Allies’ control of the air was 
complete.  On the twenty-sixth, A and B Companies attacked toward Masholder, a 
suburb just south of Bitburg; C Company reconnoitered and patrolled the city’s western 
defenses.  German armor tried to stop the Americans, forcing the G.I.s to deploy and 
American armor to reinforce them in case the Germans launched an armored 
counterattack that night but none came.  On the twenty-seventh, A and B Companies 
maintained their attack into Masholder, helped by tanks from A/737 Tank Battalion and 
tank destroyers from C/803 Tank Destroyer Battalion.   
   
 By the twenty-eighth, Masholder was in Americans’ hands and 3/11 advanced to 
attack Motsch, just east of Bitburg.  In the late morning and early afternoon, 1/11 
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deployed with tanks and tank destroyers to attacked the cratered city.  A and B 
Companies cautiously entered Bitburg from the south as tanks and tank destroyers lined 
heights over Bitburg and shelled the city in support of 1/11.  Tanks from the 4th 
Armored Division were nearby, the division being on the 5th Division’s left, and they 
also shelled Bitburg.  As First Battalion cleared Bitburg by noon, Third Battalion 
struggled to take an eastern suburb, Motsch.  By the end of the day, the last day of 
February, the 5th Division controlled both Bitburg and Motsch.142
 However, they did not take it fast or aggressively enough for the commanding 
general.  When informed by the division’s operations officer that a roadblock and 
artillery had stopped First Battalion, General Irwin pressured the infantry to disregard 
and bypass centers of resistance if need be to secure a hold on Masholder.  When 
division pressured the 11th’s commanding officer, Colonel Paul Black, Black responded 
that his men were moving forward, even without tanks.
   
143
 As the Americans improved their combined-arms capabilities in urban combat, 
thus becoming more effective as a fighting organization, they also improved their 
technology.  Veteran Michael Bilder, a sergeant in the 2nd Infantry, recalled the 
influence that the new M-26 Pershing tank had on urban combat.  The M-26’s 90-mm 
cannon and thicker armor was superior to the M-4 Sherman.  In urban combat, Bilder 
recollected that the infantry had to work diligently to make sure a street was cleared of 
enemy tanks or antitanks weapons before friendly tanks could proceed.  But Pershing 
  Having endured intense urban 
combat in cities like Angers and Saarlautern, taking Bitburg with far less fighting was 
doubtless a welcome relief to the men of the 5th Division. 
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tanks “turned sharply around corners blind, and simply crushed any anti-tank guns and 
their crews that happened to be in their path.”  Additionally, most Sherman tanks had 
received additional armor and an improved cannon during the war, which helped to 
overcome many of the Sherman’s main limitations.144
  After Bitburg, the division continued its advance through Germany but 
resistance was sporadic.  The 10th Infantry’s Third Battalion took Metterich on 3 March 
after a light struggle.  Massive artillery and close air support destroyed much of the 
counterattack the Germans attempted.  The infantry and supporting armor had few 
problems with the remainders.  Late on 22 March, the 11th Infantry crossed the Rhine at 
Nierstein and Oppenheim.  The crossing brought a curious mix of some enemy and 
others still fighting.  The regiment’s A and B Companies advanced toward Geinsheim 
amidst a terrific Germany artillery barrage.  The officers and NCOs rallied their men to 
continue moving forward.  German forces sallied from Geinsheim but the two 
companies, supported by artillery to the rear, quickly destroyed much of that 
counterattack.  On the twenty-third, B Company fought its way into Geinsheim by using 
the well-worn tactic of “marching fire.”  Once the battalion entered the town, resistance 
stopped.  The two companies claimed over one hundred prisoners, many elderly 
Volkssturm.
 
145
 Enough Germans fought that the Americans could not assume that towns were 
empty of defenders but any defense was becoming noticeably feebler than previous 
campaigns.  The 10th Infantry reportedly encountered “only low-class emergency units . 
. . formed of 50-60 year old men who were not fit to offer any serious resistance.”  In the 
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advance toward Frankfurt, the regiment fought against units with teenage boys.146  Local 
Volkssturm units and police forces tried to defend Gross Gerau from the 11th Infantry in 
late-March.  When B Company and tanks used “marching fire” on these defenses, they 
all but collapsed.  Scattered Germans defended Gross Gerau vigorously with 
panzerfausts, the German shoulder-fired, antitank rocket similar to the American 
bazooka, but simply could not hope to stop a combined infantry-tank assault into the 
town.147
 The 11th Infantry described the Germans’ combat effectiveness at this late stage 
in the war as heavily reliant on tanks, self-propelled assault guns but not artillery.  Due 
to lack of fuel, the Wehrmacht simply abandoned many of these vehicles.  Many German 
officers and NCOs were excellent leaders but the large numbers of elderly and sick 
soldiers severely limited their command options.  Those German soldiers whose homes 
were overwhelmed by Russian forces simply had no reason to fight and they surrendered 
in large numbers.
   
148
 The division’s last action against a major city was the attack on Frankfurt-am-
Main.  Frankfurt had a pre-war population of 500,000 but British and American air 
forces had bombed it mercilessly.  It had perhaps 100,000 civilians still in the city when 
the 5th Division turned its eyes on it.
   
149  With Third Army armored divisions driving at 
high speeds, they encountered the main bridge over the Main River at Frankfurt but 
found it too damaged for vehicles to cross.  Late on the twenty-sixth, 3/11 sprinted 
across the well-defended bridge against strong German artillery and anti-aircraft artillery 
fire to secure a small bridgehead for the Americans.  The Germans tried to destroy the 
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Main bridge by actively shelling it but failed to do so.  By the next day, 3/11 was across 
the Main River inside Frankfurt.   
 The division responded rapidly by sending 3/10 to reinforce them.  Together, the 
battalions snaked their way inside the bombed city.  As the G.I.s attacked the railroad 
station, they endured snipers, 88-mm fire, and civilians helping to direct and adjust 
German artillery.150  When 1/10 entered the operation, it took sniper fire from a church 
steeple that turned out to be a nine year old boy.151  Tanks entered Frankfurt as soon as 
engineers built bridges that could sustain them.152  The initial city blocks witnessed 
intense urban combat but, in the end, Frankfurt fell like Bonn to the Americans.  Before 
long, all three regimental combat teams were inside Frankfurt, and some entered a 
house-by-house fight.  When the German commandant was wounded and his second-in-
command killed by American artillery, the German defense slackened.  By 30 March, 
the city and its suburbs were in American hands.153
 The 5th Division rested, refitted, replenished, and dealt with German civilians for 
a few days in Frankfurt while the war proceeded to engulf the rest of Germany.  The 
division went into Third Army and then SHAEF reserve for a short time.  The 5th 
Division helped to reduce the Ruhr Pocket.  In one instance, a military commander tried 
to make stand against the Americans in a town but, according to a wartime interview, 
that commander “found the civilian population was invariably opposed and displayed 
resentment toward the commander in question.”  In other towns and cities, “white flags 
appeared well in advance of the entry of our infantry.”
 
154  After the Ruhr Pocket, the 
division targeted Czechoslovakia with the rest of Third Army.  The urban combat was 
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sporadic as April turned to May.  The 5th Division and its regimental combat teams were 
inside Czechoslovakia when the men received Eisenhower’s orders to cease fire on 7 
May. 
3rd Infantry Division  
 By early December, the 3rd Infantry Division found itself in Strasbourg and had 
secured the bridge over the Rhine by seizing Kehl.  While American units in the north 
worked to reduce the Bulge, the veteran 3rd Division found itself under French 
command helping to reduce in the strongly-held Colmar Pocket.  After eliminating this 
German stronghold, the division proceeded across the Rhine in March and fought the 
Germans in street-by-street fighting within Nuremberg in mid-April.  By the end of the 
war, the division was moving through southern Germany. 
 During their time in Strasbourg, 3rd Division soldiers busied themselves with 
patrolling the city and enjoying female companionship inside the city.  The division also 
maintained a training regimen.  Among other things, the 30th Infantry’s training 
included small-unit exercises such as mock attacks on fortified positions as well as 
houses and fighting from house to house within villages and towns.155  While the 3rd 
Division rested and trained during the first two weeks of December, the war continued.  
Through November and into December, much of Seventh Army was attacking 
northward and preparing to cross the Rhine.  The German counteroffensive and Third 
U.S. Army’s ninety degrees move north to reinforce the southern flank of the First U.S. 
Army, forced Seventh Army to extend its flanks further north and changing the latter 
army’s plan of attack.156   
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 During this time, a strongly fortified pocket of Germans had crystallized south of 
Strasbourg, near Mulhouse in Alsace, along the eastern edge of the Vosges and the 
western bank of the Rhine, centered around the Alsatian city of Colmar, aptly called the 
Colmar Pocket.157  The German Nineteenth Army filled the Colmar Pocket while the 
French First Army confronted it.  Despite its vulnerability as a bulge, strong interior 
lines allowed the Germans to cross the Rhine to construct a strong defense and reinforce 
strong attacks.  The 7th Infantry’s history described the terrain:  several rivers crisscross 
across the flat land between the Rhine and the Vosges Mountains, all connected by a 
system of canals.  The Germans exploited these waterways and fortified the numerous 
towns to help defend against northern and southern attacks.  The French 2nd Armored 
Division and the exhausted American 36th Infantry Division tried but failed to reduce 
the small bulge.  As a result of these failed Allied attacks, the 7th Infantry’s history 
attested that “the German lines surrounding Colmar became a virtual ring of steel as the 
enemy emplaced himself in the most strategic positions the mountain studded region, 
rivers and canals afforded.”158  Temperatures that remained in the single digits and teens, 
only to dip below zero at night, did nothing to help matters for the infantrymen, 
artillerists, and, tankers.  Figure 8.8 shows the Colmar Pocket; the 3rd Division attacked 
from north of Kaysersberg.159
  Within this context, the rested 3rd Division turned south to help destroy 
the strong German positions in Alsace.  In terms of severity, fighting in the Colmar 
Pocket lies just behind the fighting around Anzio twelve months before, making it the 
division’s “second greatest fight of the entire war.”  The 30th Infantry history described  
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Figure 8.8:  Colmar Pocket, 5 December 1944 
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the fighting as “soul-trying.”160  Former Major General Eugene Salet, then the 
commanding officer of 2/15, blamed the Colmar Pocket on the 36th Infantry Division’s 
failure to break out of the Vosges and push the Germans across the Rhine.  Because of 
that division’s “ineptness,” Salet contended, 2/15 and the rest of the 3rd Division were 
“to suffer an agonizing period” in the Colmar Pocket.161
 The 30th Infantry, backed by the 41st Field Artillery Battalion as well as tanks 
and tank destroyers from the French 5th Armored Division, kicked off the 3rd Division’s 
attack into the Colmar Pocket.  The regiment, temporarily attached to the 36th Infantry 
Division, was ordered to take Kaysersberg and the dominating Kaysersberg hills in order 
to begin pushing in the Germans’ Colmar Pocket.
  Reducing the pocket meant the 
three regimental combat teams scratching and clawing their way over flat, snow-covered 
plains and through many of the well-defended and fortified Alsatian towns within the 
pocket. 
162  The towns within the division’s 
area of operations in the northern part of the pocket can be seen on Figure 8.9.163
 The 30th’s attack began between 0700 and 0800 on 15 December, working with 
French tanks.  The regiment moved slowly against strong resistance, minefields, and 
roadblocks but by the end of the day had taken the small village, Toggenbach, to the 
northwest of Kaysersberg.  Two different reconnaissance patrols managed to worm their 
way into the outskirts of the city.  The next day, 36th Infantry Division artillery fired 
preparatory bombardments as the regimental combat team prepared to assault 
  As the 
topographic lines on Map IX show, Kaysersberg is in a valley surrounded by steep hill 
masses to the north and south. 
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Figure 8.9:  Fighting in the Upper Colmar Pocket, 15-29 December 1944 
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Kaysersberg and the hills to the north and south.164
 First and Second Battalions spent most of the sixteenth attacking the wooded 
heights north and south of the city.  They met with fierce resistance but were able to take 
their objectives.  Enemy prisoners had identified two infantry battalions within 
Kaysersberg reinforced by self-propelled guns.  While First Battalion stormed its heights 
with surprise, Third Battalion assault companies attacked from the southwest and 
became entangled in a vicious urban fight.  One veteran, Staff Sergeant Russell Dunham, 
whose actions in early-December earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor, 
reconnoitered the city.  Dunham remembers the Weiss River that ran through the city 
and a large tower that rose above the buildings in this typical Alsatian town.
  The combat team’s normal tank and 
tank destroyer attachments of C/756th Tank Battalion and C/601 Tank Destroyer 
Battalion rejoined the regiment.  With the assistance of French North African soldiers, or 
Goums, First Battalion was to take Hill 512 south of Kaysersberg and Second Battalion 
would attack the heights north of the city while 3/30 would capture the city itself. 
165
 Sources classified the urban fight in Kaysersberg as a specially bitter one.  The 
battalion fought its way into the heart of the city but a tank-infantry counterattack 
exploded into Kaysersberg.  French tanks found it difficult to support the battalion 
because extensive property damage and street debris inhibited their movement.  I 
Company lost two commanding officers on the sixteenth.  One wounded lieutenant in K 
Company manned a light machine gun and kept the enemy at bay for two hours.  
Elsewhere, another wounded lieutenant used a machine gun to kill or wound thirty-five 
German soldiers, rescue two wounded soldiers, and then return to his position to kill ten 
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more.  Both received the Distinguished Service Cross for helping to maintain I and K 
Companies’ positions.  Sergeant Emil Byke ran a phone through one hundred yards of 
sniper fire to call for mortars on that observation post.  By the end of this second day of 
fighting, the Third Battalion had taken much of Kaysersberg at great cost to itself and 
had repulsed the Germans’ counterattack.166
 According to Sergeant Dunham, the fighting became worse on the seventeenth, 
the third day of fighting.
 
167  The regiment’s history reported that “the street fighting was 
continuing with undiminished fury” alongside furious fighting north and south of the 
city.168  Dunham recalled this battle as one “that kept us one the move as we fought from 
one house to another, from one position to the next.”  Indeed, he confessed, the fighting 
was so intense inside the town that the details have blurred together.  Both sides took 
heavy losses contesting the city and civilians huddled in cold fear for their lives in their 
basements.  By the eighteenth, the battalion had control of the city but at a fearful 
price.169
 While the usual armor attachments rejoined the regiment on the sixteenth, it is 
not clear how they assisted the fight in Kaysersberg since the other two battalions 
engaged in equally bitter fights and also defended against strong counterattacks to the 
south and north.  The only mention of armor assisting the infantry is in the regiment’s 
daily S-3 report that stated simply that tanks, tank destroyers, and flakwagons followed I 
and K Companies.
 
170  Only the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion noted offering any 
assistance to the 30th Infantry in its attack on the city on 18 December.171  The 
division’s artillery states that the 41st Field Artillery Battalion fired thousands of rounds 
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in support of the regiment there.172 Dunham’s only mention of armor was the French 
tanks that entered after the fighting was largely over.173
 The fighting continued when the 30th Infantry rejoined the 3rd Division.   On the 
nineteenth, the 15th Infantry linked up with the 36th Division and French forces to seize 
Sigolsheim, Bennwihr, and Kientzheim but these efforts failed.
  Because the entire regiment 
fought in these four days, it is possible that I and K Companies had a few tanks on hand 
to support their bloodied advance through Kaysersberg. 
174  The 15th Infantry 
pulled back to reassess its position and situation.  A prisoner of war report on 22 
December revealed that Sigolsheim had approximately 200 Germans defending it with a 
hard core of SS soldiers, and were well supplied with antitank weapons and machine 
guns.  Further, the defenders received reinforcements everyday from Colmar and 
planned to counterattack from there once they had enough personnel.175
 As such, the Americans pounded Sigolsheim and Bennwirh with artillery for two 
days.
 
176  Early on 23 December, the 15th Infantry simultaneously attacked the two towns 
with battalion-sized task forces.  First Battalion attacked Sigolsheim from Kientzheim to 
the west with tanks and tank destroyers; 3/15 advanced from the west to assault 
Bennwihr with a platoon of tanks.177  These movements touched off a week of intense 
urban combat against defenders resolved not to lose their towns to the Americans.  The 
Americans wanted these two towns since it would allow them to drive south to Colmar 
and help destroy the Colmar Pocket.178  Sigolsheim and Bennwihr were emblematic of 
the combat in the Colmar Pocket:  brutal, nasty fighting against German soldiers 
resolved to hold their ground.   
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 Third Battalion’s attack against Bennwihr had more immediate success than 1/15 
but at great cost.  I Company and a section of four tanks fought their way from the west 
and encountered a combined-arms defense of the place.  They found approximately 400 
soldiers supported by tanks ensconced in ruined and bombed-out buildings.179  
Tragically, the Americans thought Bennwihr would fall easily.  Division intelligence 
carefully monitored the enemy occupancy of and movements within Sigolsheim but 
Bennwihr does not appear in G-2 reports until the battle.  Further, early on the first day, 
Colonel Hallett Edson ordered battalion commander Major John O’Connell to send K 
Company to capture Hill 216 to the southeast when I Company cleared Bennwihr.180
 But Bennwihr proved to be a tough nut to crack.  I Company attacked southern 
Bennwihr from the west.
 
181  Staff Sergeant John Shirley recalled that his platoon 
followed behind the four medium tanks through vineyards.  Almost immediately, tanks 
ran into trouble as they bogged down in plowed fields and some turrets became 
entangled in the wire, allowing German infantrymen and antitank guns to knock out 
three supporting tanks in short order.  The infantry sprinted to the cover of Bennwihr’s 
buildings and received a heavy fire from enemy small arms, machine guns, and artillery.  
Shirley barely got his men and his wounded platoon leader to a cellar within a crumbling 
house in the town.182
 Having launched their attack at 0730, I Company was halfway through Bennwihr 
by 0845.  The company bypassed a schoolhouse but at 0800 a reinforced SS company 
launched a counterattack and halted the last supporting tank.
   
183  A surprise appearance 
by enemy armor and the counterattack from the schoolhouse threw I Company into 
 
 
448 
 
disarray.  Fighting swirled around the schoolhouse all day but the Germans controlled it 
at day’s end.  K Company was supposed to move attack Hill 216 southeast of town but 
had to send a platoon to aid I Company.184
 The urban fight in the rubble of Bennwihr went back and forth between the two 
opposing forces but the Germans, having more men and armor, gained the upper hand 
and shoved I and K Companies to northern Bennwihr.  After getting most of First 
Platoon and its wounded lieutenant to a cellar but unable to contact his company 
commander, Sergeant John Shirley and his men could do nothing but defend against 
several attacks from German infantry.  With no bazooka, Shirley called for an artillery 
bombardment to knock out a Mark IV tank.  Undamaged, this German tank fired directly 
into Shirley’s building and into his cellar, which convinced the stunned, scared, and 
wounded Americans to surrender.  Shirley escaped a German POW camp by trailing 
behind the column and hitting his guard to make good his escape to American lines.
   
185
 Around the same time, a Mark VI “Tiger” tank and 30 to 40 German infantry 
slammed into the American positions from the south.  The Tiger was impervious to 
American rifle grenades and bazookas; the radio transcripts are filled with concern over 
knocking out this beast.  The reinforcing platoon from K Company also ran into troubles 
trying to link up with I Company.  Second Lieutenant James Morris took his Third 
Platoon through buildings of Bennwihr to contact I Company but had to defend against 
several German attacks.  Morris called in artillery yards away from his men’s positions 
to repulse these counterattacks.  Observing from a house, Morris then tried to bring 
artillery upon a nearby tank but this only served to make the tank fire at Morris’s 
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observation post.  Morris was able to stall this German tank by putting his platoon in a 
static defensive position.186
 By the end of the short wintry day, Third Battalion had brought mortars, artillery, 
tanks, tank destroyers, and infantrymen to bear on Bennwihr.  Bennwihr’s urban 
architecture and rubble complicated this process:  the American tank destroyers could 
knock out neither the Tiger tank nor the self-propelled guns running loose because 
buildings shielded their targets.
 
187  And by the end of this short wintry day, I Company, 
which taken a severe beating, maintained a tenuous finger hold on Bennwihr.188  Most of 
3/15 had withdrawn to the southern edge of Mittelwihr.189
 As First Battalion opened its attack against Sigolsheim at the same time as 3/15, 
it had the support of 2/15 deployed in the saddle between Hill 351 and Mont de 
Sigolsheim.  With B Company in reserve in Kientzheim, A and C Companies and their 
armored supports attacked from the west and immediately endured intense small arms 
and machine-gun fire as well as mortars, antitank rockets, and German tanks.  The tanks 
came under rocket fire or bogged down in the churned mud-snow mix.  Guiding on the 
main east-west road, C Company was on the left and A Company on the right.  C 
Company encountered a convent that stopped its attack with furious fire.  Tank 
   With dark, patrols tried to 
find and destroy that Mark VI tank; there was no indication that they did.  The battalion 
remained confident that the Germans depended on the Tiger to hold Bennwihr.  
Intelligence had discovered, however, that every third German soldier was armed with a 
bazooka.  On 23 December, the Americans had failed in the face of Bennwihr’s stiff 
German defense. 
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destroyers fired on the convent but with little success.  A Company gained the first few 
houses but could not advance any further.  It became clear that these Germans were not 
following the usual habit of defending the outskirts; these were defending from within 
the town.190
 Stalled by the defender’s stand, American artillery, tank destroyers, and P-51 
fighter-bombers tried to help the attack gain momentum but these measures failed.  By 
afternoon, nearly all the American tanks were destroyed or stuck in the mud.  
Counterattacks slammed into the Americans but Captain Elmo Toffanelli’s A Company 
withstood them—in part from his active leadership—despite taking fearful losses 
themselves.
 
191  By evening, neither company had moved past the first houses and their 
armored support was virtually gone.  Just before 2200, 1st Battalion reported that it 
could hold its meager gains if it were “not hit by too large a force.”192
 Despite the concurrent retreat from Sigolsheim by First Battalion, the 15th 
Infantry decided to keep the pressure on the Germans.  Acting division commander 
Brigadier General Robert Young pressured Colonel Edson to send 3/15 into southern 
  As battalion, 
regimental, and division leaders planned the next day’s steps, a strong counterattack 
swept A and C Companies from the town.  Germans attacked down Hill 351 and from 
the city’s center to shove the two companies back to Kientzheim.  The 15th Infantry had 
conceded Sigolsheim and Bennwihr back to the enemy.  The 15th Infantry had not 
endured urban combat this intense since C Company’s lone fight for Roccaromana, Italy 
against German armor and massed artillery.  For the next several days, the Americans 
shelled Sigolsheim. 
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Bennwihr well before daybreak to assure capture of the road intersection just south of 
the town.193
 The division and regiment decided to attack Hill 351 on Christmas Eve before 
renewing the attack on Sigolsheim.  First and Second Battalion attacked the hill as Third 
Battalion’s K and L Companies slugged it out again in Bennwihr.  From 24 to 26 
December, First and Second Battalions bloodied themselves against several hundred SS 
soldiers determined to hold their hill positions at all costs.  As much out of desperation 
as bravery on the twenty-sixth, First Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Keith 
Ware, personally led an eleven-man and one-tank assault against six machine gun 
positions to finally take the hill.  Ware’s actions earned him the Congressional Medal of 
Honor.
  There was to be no letup for Third Battalion.   
194
 The night of 23-24 December, Major John O’Connell intended to have his Third 
Battalion attack from the west again.  Indeed, for the past month, the 36th Division had 
attacked Bennwihr from the west with no success.
 
195  The supporting elements of the 
756th Tank Battalion complained that they had not been part of the planning in the 
earlier attack on Bennwihr but this time, B Company’s Captain David Redle convinced 
O’Connell not to repeat the same plan of attack.  Redle suggested sending tank 
destroyers in a feint west of Bennwihr while the main attack launch from the east.196
 Early on the twenty-fourth, the 15th Infantry wheeled into action: First and 
Second Battalion assaulted Hill 351, division artillery pounded Sigolsheim throughout 
  
Having failed to adequately plan for the initial attack, the second day’s assault brought 
improved tank-infantry coordination and gained more success. 
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the day while P-47 fighter-bombers bombed and strafed Sigolsheim, and Third Battalion 
renewed the attack on Bennwihr.197  K Company plunged in from the east and fought to 
the south while L Company rushed from the northeast and cleared the northern half of 
the town.198  Both companies infiltrated quickly; a K Company squad leader helped by 
compelling a self-propelled German tank destroyer to surrender.  Bazookas incapacitated 
another two tanks.199  Supporting tanks and tank destroyers also each claimed knocking 
out Mark IV tanks during the day.200
 K Company, a platoon from L Company, a tank, and a tank destroyer repulsed 
counterattacks from Sigolsheim and from the basements of southern Bennwihr.  One 
counterattack pushed K Company back but it soon regained the lost ground.
  Soon enough, both companies were fighting 
through the maze of rubble and half-standing houses in their assigned sectors of 
Bennwihr.  Fighting became house-by-house in short order. 
201
 The officers, sergeants, and privates displayed personal bravery and courage, 
contributing to the slow, painful capture of Bennwihr.
  Artillery 
offered key assistance by breaking up a battalion-size attack on nearby Mittelwihr to trap 
3/15 in Bennwihr.  The shelling helped the infantry brushed aside the German attack.  
Both companies made significantly better progress than the day before but faced 
stubborn German resistance in Bennwihr’s ruins, necessitating constant house-to-house 
assaults and attacks, avoiding the streets and avenues swept by concealed German 
machine-gun positions, and enduring heavy German artillery concentrations.   
202  L Company simply bypassed 
the schoolhouse strongpoint and cleared its sector first.  When finished, the company 
directed a tank to pummel the school with round after round.  While under fire, one 
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soldier slowly crawled over 30 yards of open land, concealed himself behind brush near 
the schoolhouse, and opened fire on the snipers within to allow other soldiers to 
approach the strongpoint.  They killed three Germans and took thirteen others prisoner.  
By the end of the day, the combined-arms forces of infantry, tanks, tank destroyers, and 
artillery had wrenched the Germans from all but the very southern tip of Bennwihr from 
the enemy.203
 The regiment continued pressing its attacks on Christmas morning.  First and 
Second Battalions maintained the attack on Hill 351 while  I and L Companies attacked 
Hill 216 in more furious fighting.  In Bennwihr, K Company cleared the snipers and the 
last remaining holdouts out of the town’s southern tip that had been reinforced the night 
before.  Earlier attempts having failed, and after beating back a counterattack, the 
company vented its angry frustration and the battle on Christmas 1944 took a sinister, 
murderous turn.  Antitank grenades exploded window barriers, white phosphorous 
grenades and flamethrowers set fire to the houses, and fragmentation grenades killed 
anyone else.  As flames engulfed each house, the company surrounded the infernos and, 
at approximately forty yards distant, opened up with everything available on the last 
houses, gunning down all who tried to escape.  It took nearly all day.  Employing tanks, 
machine guns, mortars, grenades as well as small arms, K Company wiped out these 
fanatic defenders.  The company took few prisoners.
 
204
 Elsewhere, I and L Companies fought for Hill 216 southeast of Bennwihr but 
could not take all of it.  That night, the regiment’s Antitank Company relieved them.  
Third Battalion then planned for the attack on Sigolsheim from the east, its rear, on 26 
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December.  According to a deserter, the past several days of fighting had depleted 
Sigolsheim’s garrison and it expected the next attack to come from the west again.205  As 
such, the Americans planned to attack from the east.  Over the course of that night, as 
the three battalions situated themselves for another day of attacking strongly defended 
German positions, medium and heavy artillery pounded Sigolsheim all night long.206
 Moving along the road east of Hill 351, Third Battalion attacked into eastern 
Sigolsheim, facing fanatical resistance.  Very early in the advance from Bennwihr to 
Sigolsheim, a German artillery concentration landed right in the battalion’s midst, 
scattering I and L Companies, and delaying them for most of the day.  After ten hours of 
reorganization and redeployment, around 1700, K and L Companies and their tank 
support finally entered Sigolsheim’s maze of rubble and destruction.  Because of the late 
hour and shortened days, Third Battalion only managed to confirm that German troops 
still blocked their way.  By 2300, the battalion came under heavy small arms, rocket, and 
machine-gun fire and also confirmed the presence of enemy armor.
   
207
 After having made the necessary defensive preparations for a long night within 
Sigolsheim, the Americans made ready to attack at light on 27 December.  But at 0325, 
weary Americans were awakened by a screaming \counterattack of 50 to 60 German 
soldiers firing machine guns, small arms, and flamethrowers.  Unlike on the twenty-
third, K and L Companies held firm against sporadic fighting in various houses and 
buildings through the cold night.  American mortars and artillery remained busy for 
hours supporting the infantry.   
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 Second Battalion’s G Company reinforced L and K Companies, now mustering a 
total of 66 riflemen.  The companies divided into five combat teams, each supported by a 
tank, and at 0900 began another day of urban combat.  K Company seized the 
troublesome convent in northwestern Sigolsheim, L/15 cleared out the central part of the 
town, and G Company occupied the southern part.208  The tank-infantry teams attacked 
into what the regimental history considered some of the worst street fighting endured 
during the entire war.209  The stubborn enemy bitterly resisted the American tank-
infantry teams from battered house to destroyed house.  The battalion commander 
observed that few diehard Germans surrendered and they audaciously fired their antitank 
panzerfaust rockets in the open from the middle of streets.210
 The Germans’ organization were admixtures of forces but the SS soldiers 
forming the core of the defense were some of the best in the Nineteenth Army.
 
211  
Dislodging them from Sigolsheim required a superior effort on the part of the exhausted 
15th Infantry.  Early in the day’s fighting, two houses held up one of L Company’s 
platoons, now down to a mere eight men.212  The commanding officer, 1st Lieutenant Eli 
Whiteley, left his men to bring back badly needed bazooka rockets in a pillow case, 
taking a hit in the arm in the process.  Using smoke grenades to cover his movements 
and fragmentation grenades to breach his entries, the wounded Whiteley single-handedly 
assaulted down a street to seize three well-defended houses, crossing streets covered by 
machine guns, mortars, and artillery to kill several and take over twenty enemy 
prisoners.  At the last house, a soldier fired a bazooka into the wall, giving the platoon 
leader enough room to rush inside, kill five, and take twelve prisoner.  Afterwards, 
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Whiteley and his men continued fighting, despite their wounds.  By the end, Whiteley 
was severely wounded in his head, shoulder, arm, and leg.  According to one of his 
soldiers, the lieutenant consented to be evacuated after L Company’s CO “knock[ed] 
him out cold.”213
 Stiff fighting continued through the rest of the twenty-seventh.  The Germans 
converted another schoolhouse into a deadly strongpoint and continued to use the 
convent in the northwestern corner to their advantage.  The tank-infantry teams worked 
together to take them from the Germans.  The main danger for tanks in cities is antitank 
weapons and the Germans heavily relied on their version of the bazooka, the panzerfaust 
rocket, to knock out the accompanying Sherman tanks.  The tanks, then, adjusted their 
tactics.  One tanker recalled finding a concealed position that allowed him to expose his 
tank long enough to fire and then back into the concealment when the Germans fired 
their panzerfausts at him.  By the end of these battles, the Americans found over two 
hundred spent panzerfaust tubes.
  Whiteley earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for his efforts. 
214
 By day’s end, I Company and the 15th Infantry’s Battle Patrol had joined the 
fight but G, K, L Companies and tanks had cleared most of Sigolsheim.  The night of 27-
28 December, the Germans tried to infiltrate forces into the convent but were discovered 
and destroyed.  The fighting continued through the night as the three companies 
maintained a steady advance.  On the twenty-eighth, German artillery unleashed 
bombardments over the advancing Americans but it was little help.  By 1000 on the 
twenty-eighth, the regiment claimed to have cleared Sigolsheim and K Company troops 
occupied the convent in the northwestern corner.
 
215  The weeklong nightmare was over. 
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 With the end of the draining fights for Kaysersberg, Bennwihr, Sigolsheim, and 
Hill 351, the division could content itself with having dented the Colmar Pocket’s 
formidable forward positions.  As Hitler’s Ardennes Offensive lost momentum around 
this time, he launched Operation NORDWIND north of the 3rd Division and its sector 
fell quiet.  For the first three weeks of January, the division licked its wounds, 
incorporated new replacements, clashed with enemy patrols along the Weiss River, and 
temporarily absorbed the 254th Infantry Regiment to give it combat experience.  The 3rd 
Division’s leaders prepared for the inevitable eradication of the Colmar Pocket; few had 
any illusions that it was going to be easy. 
 These Germans were some of the most fanatical that the 3rd Division had 
encountered.  They received orders not retreat an inch, which they took to heart.  The 
urban environment augments the combat power of the defender.  To American officers 
and enlisted men who had forgotten that lesson, Kaysersberg, Bennwihr, and Sigolsheim 
were powerful reminders.  Fanatical Germans, who were often SS soldiers, made a 
vigorous defense from prepared positions, battered mounds rubble, and buildings left 
standing after  the shelling and bombing.  Selling their lives dearly, defenders showed 
how well-motivated troops made capturing a town or city a very costly proposition.  An 
officer observed that few German soldiers surrendered and that these fanatical defenders 
armed with a generous supply of panzerfausts.216  In these preliminary fights along the 
Colmar Pocket, the 3rd Division fought a different enemy than it had yet encountered 
since landing in southern France five months prior.  Instead of a joyous time, such 
enemies turned Christmas 1944 into a nightmare for the men of the 3rd Division.  The 
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601st Tank Destroyer Battalion summed it up best:  “morale was ‘excellent’ on the 
morning reports but nowhere else!”217
 In late-January, the 1st French Army, along with the American 3rd Infantry 
Division in its II Corps, began to bludgeon the Colmar Pocket by attacking the salient 
from north and south.  The 3rd Division led the northern wing and targeted Neuf 
Brisach, the city controlling the main bridge over the Rhine and, therefore, Colmar.  The 
Allies planned to assault Colmar after sealing it off entirely.  Supporting from the south, 
the French I Corps began their offensive a few days early.  Both logistical problems and 
terrain features plagued the French forces.  The northern attack had to cross several 
rivers.  Further, the German forces appeared to be depleted with significantly less armor 
than the Allies but the Germans could count on difficult terrain to favor them as well as 
adequate stores of ammunition, good interior lines, and the network of fortified Alsatian 
towns and villages to canalize and bleed the Allied attack.
   
218  Turning these villages and 
towns into hedgehogs against the Allied offensive was something they had learned along 
the Eastern Front as well further north along the Siegfried Line.219  Figure 8.10 shows 
the division’s area of operations within the Colmar Pocket.220
 Of the three combat teams, the Combat Team 7 experienced some of the more 
intense urban combat.  On 22 January, the 7th Infantry led the division’s attack, by 
crossing the Fecht River at Guemar.  In the intervening weeks, the men had become 
accustomed to having some warmth and reluctantly left those warm comforts for the 
cold reality of combat in bone-chilling temperatures.
 
221  The soldiers covered themselves 
in a variety of white capes, sheets, and mattress covers, otherwise known as “spook  
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Figure 8.10:  3rd Division’s Reduction of the Colmar Pocket, 22 January-6 
February 1945 
 
 
 
suits,” to camouflage themselves.222  After crossing the Fecht, the 30th Infantry moved 
to cross the Ill River to the southeast and fought heavy counterattacks there while the 7th 
Infantry quickly marched south. 
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   The 7th Infantry made its crossing without attracting the attention of too much 
enemy artillery.  First Battalion’s objective was Ostheim, so it turned south, marched 
through the Foret Communale de Colmar and upwards of 18 inches of snow to attack 
from the north and east.223  Proceeding without armor—it had not yet crossed—A 
Company deployed two assault platoons abreast followed by light machine guns and the 
reserve platoon; 60-mm mortars brought up the rear. The company struggled through a 
minefield and eliminated various enemy machine-gun positions.  After the attack began, 
it took nearly all day to clear the stubbornly held southern portion of its German 
inhabitants.  Two German tanks, a Mark IV and a Mark VI, assisted the defenders but 
when a bazooka destroyed the Mark IV, the Mark VI withdrew.  Indicating the value of 
friendly armor in a built-up area, one veteran recalled the attack stalled by a sniper that 
was most likely in the church steeple.  But only armor, which had not yet joined the 
fight, had the power to shoot down a steeple.  Finally, around 1700, Ostheim fell and the 
battalion moved to its next objective.224
 On 25 January, the 7th Infantry’s Second and Third Battalions jumped off 
towards Houssen just before 0600.  Second Battalion sent F and G Companies as the 
assault companies, following behind an artillery barrage and tanks behind the assault 
companies.  Between the Americans’ line of departure in the woods north of Houssen 
and the town itself was one thousand yards of open, snow-covered land sited German 
riflemen and machine guns in trenches, bunkers, and foxholes.  They had also posted 
machine guns in the houses and an antitank gun in a street.  The tanks and tank 
destroyers offered support where possible in the dark chaos.  After an hour, G Company 
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and a tank destroyer finally wiggled its way into town, where they began the slow 
process of clearing out the Germans.  The Americans encountered snipers, machine 
guns, and more antitank positions as the fighting became street to street and at close 
quarters.  The two companies claimed over 30 prisoners.  Since they had bypassed 
positions north of Houssen, those Germans swung their attention to the Americans 
within Houssen until blasted by American riflemen, tanks, and tank destroyers. 
 Third Battalion attacked from the northeast and did not have the same problems 
as 2/7 in penetrating Houssen.  Instead, a fog and smoke screen served to break up and 
disorganize the the battalion as men, according to combat interviews, “wandered about 
aimlessly.”  Taking advantage of the Americans’ disorganization, Germans infiltrated 
their positions and inflicted losses.  In this confusion, Third Battalion lost two tanks to 
enemy fire.  With the morning light, the Americans responded by eliminating the 
bypassed  positions from the earlier attack or took the defenders prisoner.  After this 
success, First and Second Battalions secured nearby Rosenkranz and prepared to defend 
the towns.  Other regimental elements stomped out other German positions.  Showing 
the Americans’ poor defensive measures, a German patrol infiltrated Houssen on the 
morning of 26 January, seized a house, and knocked out a tank destroyer.  A Sherman 
tank ended the minor threat by firing its main gun into the house.   
 January 26 concluded Phase I of the 3rd Division’s operation in the Colmar 
Pocket.  By attacking down the corridor caused by the Fecht and Ill Rivers, the 7th 
Infantry had sealed off Colmar from the north by taking Houssen and Rosenkranz.  At 
the same time, the 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments fought vicious battles to hold a 
 
 
462 
 
bridgehead over the Ill River and secure positions north of the important Colmar 
Canal.225  In these few days, the 7th Infantry had taken nearly 400 prisoners while 
suffering over 300 casualties itself, including approximately 90 evacuated due to the 
cold.  Chilled to the bone, veterans recalled that “rifles and machine guns were chilled 
into uselessness [and] Bazooka rounds, upon contact, refused to explode.”  Having 
isolated Colmar from the north and been relieved by elements of the 28th Infantry 
Division, the 3rd could begin Phase II, isolating Colmar from the east.226
 Phase II sent the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments over the east-west Colmar 
Canal, driving south, and cutting off Colmar from the east by slashing southward.  The 
Colmar Canal presented its own crossing challenges: it was fifty feet wide, five feet 
deep, and slow moving.  The banks were steep and soldiers planned to use rubber boats 
under the cover of darkness and supporting weapons.  Artillery bombardments fell 
throughout the twenty-eighth; the 7th Infantry crossed at 2100 on 29 January at 
Wickerschwihr.  First and Third Battalions advanced rapidly and took a burning 
Bischwihr from the north and south.  Thinking the town empty of any enemy, men from 
1/7 carelessly exposed themselves in the town’s streets until fired upon by the Germans.  
By midnight, the town was in Americans’ hands.  When the Americans discovered 
uniformed women in the garrison, they became extra thorough in frisking them.  With no 
armor across, they established defenses and prayed the Germans would not 
counterattack.
 
227
 Second Battalion marched to the southwest toward Wihr-en-Plaine and Horbourg 
to cut off Colmar from the east.  By moving fast, the battalion hoped that speed and 
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surprise would compensate for the lack of accompanying armor.  Once engineers had 
constructed a bridge, armor was to cross and support their usual attachments, especially 
the exposed Second Battalion.  As 2/7 approached Wihr-en-Plaine in the nighttime cold 
from the northeast, battalion commander Major Jack Duncan recalled that “it was too 
easy and too quiet.  I felt like we were walking into something.”  Duncan was proved 
right when two German Panzerjägers (tank destroyers) at 0130 sprang their trap by 
slamming into the unassisted infantry’s right flank and heavy weapons opened up on the 
Americans.228
 The German guns encircled the isolated Americans and raked them with cannon 
and machine-gun fire.  Bazookamen maneuvered to destroy the threat.  On the last 
bazooka, one panzerjäger was set afire and the other withdrew.  Duncan’s command 
group, reinforced by the E Company, joined F and G Companies’ slow fight for the 
town.  After gaining entry into the town, the battalion had another savage house-to-house 
fight.  After Duncan radioed about the Panzerjägers, L Company came to reinforce 2/7.  
In the early morning hours, two Mark VI “Tiger” tanks and German infantry 
counterattacked in Wihr-en-Plaine from the east and west against the Americans who 
were desperately short of adequate weapons.  American soldiers, German soldiers, and 
German tanks fought savagely in Wihr-en-Plaine.  Lacking adequate antitank support, 
  The assault companies, F and G, reached Wihr-en-Plaine’s northern edge 
but the German armor threatened to obliterate the battalion headquarters and E 
Company.  One F Company private, Earl Reitan, remembered sprinting toward Wihr-en-
Plaine as fast as he could with his heavy load in the deep snow and through the 
entanglements of a vineyard to the cover of outlying buildings.   
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the Americans faced the threat of total destruction.  Reitan recalled diving into a house 
but one of the Tigers saw him.  The soldiers cowered against a wall, expecting the tank’s 
88-mm main cannon to annihilate them.  The tank fired at point-blank range and put a 
hole in the home as it shook violently but no one was killed or injured.  Reitan praised 
the Alsatians for building sturdy stone houses that could absorb such damage.229
 Second Battalion fought with desperation, killing many of the counterattacking 
German soldiers and holding off the enemy tanks with the few bazookas remaining.  
They used them well:  one American fired a rocket into a tank’s engine and turned it into 
an inferno.  In the fighting elsewhere, a new replacement, in his first battle, knocked out 
two machine-gun positions and captured ten Germans soldiers.  This helped finally break 
the counterattack.  In the morning light, Major Duncan put his men inside buildings and 
called for an artillery barrage on the town itself.  Pozit-fuse shells, which reliably 
detonated above ground, helped to empty the streetes of enemy.  Heavy artillery fell 
outside the town to prevent German reinforcements from infiltrating. 
 
 With daylight on 30 January, American armor entered the fight and helped the 
battalion to hold Wihr-en-Plaine.  Enemy artillery rained upon the Americans.  By 1000, 
the Americans were in defensible positions in the northern half of the town and able to 
stop a morning counterattack.  In the afternoon, Second Battalion, L Company, and the 
regimental Battle Patrol attacked and cleared out buildings to the south.  Second 
Battalion’s fight in Wihr-en-Plaine served as a violent reminder to the 7th Infantry and 
3rd Division that urban combat is not solely an infantryman’s affair.230 
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 Second Battalion’s objective, however, was nearby Horbourg, which held the 
bridge to eastern Colmar over the Fecht River.  As the battalion consolidated its control 
over Wirh-en-Plaine, the division’s commanding general, Major General John O’Daniel, 
ordered 2/7 to take Horbourg with the “greatest possible speed” in cooperation with 
French armor.231  The battalion readied itself but the French refused to coordinate.  The 
attack went in with only two American M-4 tanks.232
 At 2100 on the thirtieth, a weakened Second Battaion’s fight for Horbourg was 
difficult and painful.  The Germans were determined to keep their escape route to Neuf 
Brisach and the Americans were just as determined to seal it shut.  And, again, the 
soldiers fought house-to-house and street-to-street.  As with many of these towns in 
Colmar Pocket, indeed through World War II:  Horbourg only had operational value 
insofar as it helped the Allies to destroy the German forces and bring about their 
unconditional surrender.  American and German artillery pounded the town.  Late on the 
thirty-first, the Americans controlled Horbourg and the Germans had destroyed the 
bridge that connected Colmar and Horbourg over the Ill River.  The fighting had taken a 
fearsome toll.  By 31 January, Private Earl Reitan’s E Company was down to 18 men.
   
233
 With Horbourg and Andolsheim in American hands, the division moved into the 
third and final phase of eliminating the Colmar Pocket:  seizing Neuf Brisach.  As with 
the previous phases, in order to take Neuf Brisach, the 7th Infantry would have to plow 
its way through other towns.  The 7th Infantry led the attack southward down the narrow 
corridor created by the north-south Rhine-Rhone Canal and the Rhine River.  The 
  
By 2300 on the thirty-first, units from the 75th Infantry Division relieved 2/7.   
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regiment stepped off at 0500 on 2 February from Artzenheim and quickly seized 
Baltzenheim and Kunheim in quick succession from defenders eager to surrender.  But 
as Second and Third Battalions approached Biesheim, the last town before the all-
important Neuf Brisach, they found enemy foxholes, zig-zag trenches, and bunkers 
designed to prevent the Americans from advancing.   
 I Company managed to penetrate this outer defense and get into Biesheim, where 
a German defense and Mark V Panther tank awaited them.  It seemed as though every 
house had to be assaulted.  Tanks and tank destroyers helped assault teams of eight to ten 
men to storm houses with grenades, submachine guns, and rifles.  One platoon would 
attack a house or building in Biesheim under the suppressing and covering fire of 
another platoon. 
 Second Battalion’s attack against northeast Biesheim included four tanks and two 
tank destroyers.  The tanks opened fire on six-foot outer wall; the cannon fire gave the 
infantry access into the town.  The infantry cleared buildings and tore down roadblocks 
to give armor the ability to maneuver.  The combined-arms fighting continued when 2/7 
cleared a defended row of houses:  tank and bazooka fire allowed the infantry to close 
with the enemy inside the houses and take nearly fifty prisoners.  By the end of 2 
February, Biesheim was in the Americans’ hands at the cost of twenty-six killed and 
seventy-seven wounded.234
 Having taken Beisheim, the end was in sight as the regiment prepared the 
isolation of Neuf Brisach.  As with Colmar, the division had neither intention nor need to 
attack Vauban-style, fortified Neuf Brisach.  Shortly after midnight on 5 February, the 
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regiment moved behind a heavy artillery barrage to seal off Neuf Brisach’s eastern side.  
The regiment fought its way south from Biesheim as the 30th Infantry took Neuf 
Brisach’s eastern suburbs.  The German garrison began fleeing the city southward into 
the waiting arms of the French forces coming from that direction.  Early on 6 February, 
Neuf Brisach surrendered to the Americans and without any fighting within it.  During 
this last drive, American and French forces entered Colmar and took it relatively 
bloodlessly.  The 3rd Division returned to VI Corps control in the Seventh U.S. Army 
while the French finished the last of the resistance within the Colmar Pocket; the city 
was in Allied control on 9 February.235
 The division’s history bragged that the division had “fought from house to house 
and street to street in the fortress towns of the Alsatian Plain” against an enemy that 
grudgingly gave ground and at a steep price.
  The focused now became crossing the Rhine.   
236  Whenever possible, the division 
problem cut off and isolated towns, such as Colmar and Neuf Brisach, rather than assault 
them.  However, the division had made mistakes during this time.  The 15th Infantry 
failed to understand the nature of Bennwihr’s defenses before the attack on 23 
December.  The fighting in Wihr-en-Plaine and Horbourg confirmed to the 7th Infantry 
confirmed that urban combat required every weapon available.  That is, the regiment’s 
February report asserted, if one battalion was enough to take a town, then two should 
take it.  This should help to accomplish the objective faster, the first battalion can hold 
the town, and the second battalion can be use against another objective.237
 By mid-February, the division transferred to Lorraine and SHAEF reserve.  The 
division took in new replacements, maintained and repaired equipment, got new 
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uniforms, enjoyed time away from the chaos of war, and trained for upcoming 
operations.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, it was here that the 7th Infantry converted the 
town of Pournoy-la-Chetive, which the 5th Division’s 10th Infantry Regiment had 
assaulted and then defended the previous September, into a street-fighting course.  
Because the course included armor, it was designed to facilitate and improve tank-
infantry cooperation in urban combat.  Aside from combined-arms urban combat 
training, the regiment also initiated a tank-infantry training for other types of fighting.238
 After nearly a month off the front lines, the division, now part of XV Corps in 
the Seventh U.S. Army, prepared for the invasion of Germany.  The veterans no doubt 
tried to push the memories of the harsh fighting during the hard winter as spring came.  
But new troops had no memory of the previous harsh winter and the inhuman fighting 
for the Colmar Pocket because they, the inexperienced replacements, had just entered the 
war.  The previous weeks of training were designed to integrate the many new men and 
prepare for yet another attack into a highly fortified area. 
 
 The 3rd Division’s attack on 15 March was part of a combined Third and 
Seventh Army offensive through the Saar-Palatinate that would proceed through some of 
Germany’s most valuable industrial areas.  American planners expected the offensive to 
include assaulting through the Siegfried Line, and crossing the Rhine.  Seventh Army 
planners decided to rely upon the 3rd and 45th Divisions to cross the Rhine because of 
their previous experience in amphibious operations.  This offensive added added the 
firepower of various tactical air units to hit destroy valuable targets behind the front lines 
and the Eighth Air Force to bomb cities such as Zweibrucken, Kaiserslautern, Homburg, 
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and Neunkirchen further behind the lines.  The overall German commander, German 
Paul Hausser, in command of Army Group G, preferred staged withdrawals back to the 
Rhine but received orders to hold the region and not retreat.239
 From 3rd Division, the 7th Infantry’s First and Second Battalions as well as the 
30th Infantry’s First and Third Battalions led the attack into Germany.  In the weeks of 
stalemate along this sector, the Germans had time to mine, fortify, bunker, and prepare 
for the eventual American attack.  In their preparations, the 7th Infantry sent officers to 
ask for advice on how to defeat these fortifications.  In early March, 1st Lieutenant 
Nicholas Pellicciari interviewed officers from the 9th Division’s 47th Infantry Regiment 
on how to best grapple with the Siegfried Line and submitted his observations to 3rd 
Division headquarters for divisional dissemination.
  Because of this inter-
army offensive, the 5th Division in Third Army and the 3rd Division in Seventh Army 
both crossed the Rhine within days of each other.   
240
 The four battalions stepped off in a steady rain behind an artillery barrage at 
0100 on 15 March.  However, decisions made in these first hours nearly led to the 
destruction of 2/7.  A setback at Utweiler was minor but it showed just how much new 
replacements could affect a veteran division’s operations as well as how careless even a 
veteran division could become, First Battalion appeared to handle its resistance with 
little problem.  When Second Battalion marched into a minefield, the attack stalled.  
Engineers from the 44th Division were supposed to mark a path through the minefield 
with engineer’s tape, which the lead company, F Company, followed.  When the 
engineer tape ended, Captain Earl Swanson thought the minefield had also ended and 
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ordered his F Company to move.  This fateful decision cost him his life, along with his 
radio operator and several other soldiers.  In the dark, rainy confusion, company 
organization rapidly disintegrated as enemy automatic-weapons fire and mines exploded.   
 E Company worked its way around the minefield and into Utweiler.  The 
defenders were well-motivated Germans from the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division.  
Armor was not accompanying these infantrymen because mines and Germany artillery 
had destroyed several tanks, thus convincing the other tanks and tank destroyers to stay 
put until engineers had cleared the road of mines.  
 Nevertheless, by 0600, the battalion controlled Utweiler and awaited the tanks’ 
arrival before advancing.  As it waited, the battalion let down its guard entirely.  A 
veteran Lieutenant Colonel Jack Duncan had posted his battalion headquarters inside 
Utweiler’s warm, dry buildings where radio contact to regimental headquarters and 
artillery support was spotty, rather than dig in outside in the rain.  As Colonel Duncan 
relaxed, so did his officers, sergeants, and privates.  Some sergeants found temporary 
companionship with the town’s women and failed to look after their men’s protection 
and defense.  But why establish outposts?  Sherman tanks were due to arrive any minute 
and an enemy counterattack this far from the Siegfried Line was not considered 
probable.  One lieutenant later confessed that these decisions “would not have been 
made earlier in the war when the Germans were more feared.” 
 At approximately 0800, a German tank-infantry counterattack caught Duncan’s 
battalion completely by surprise.  Having no armored support, 2/7 unwisely fired its 
bazookas at the German tanks outside the rockets’ effective range.  Sensing the 
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Americans’ lack of antitank weapons, the Germans surged into Utweiler and quickly 
retook the town.  The tanks blasted buildings containing American soldiers and so 
captured many prisoners.  Lieutenant Wes McKane recalled G Company surrendering 
without putting up a fight. 
 Colonel John Heintges did not know anything because radio contact was lost.  
Before 1000, a sergeant who had escaped Utweiler reported the counterattack and that 
the battalion was in serious danger.  Through the morning, Heintges, under pressure 
from General O’Daniel, patched together a force to attempt to save 2/7.  Finally, at 1400, 
Third Battalion took the initiative, supported by fifteen tanks and tank destroyers as well 
as the regiment’s Antitank Company, to counterattack Utweiler.  Artillery shelled 
beyond the town to prevent the Germans from reinforcing.  By 1515, 3/7 reported good 
progress in knocking out the enemy armor and regaining the town.  By 1600, the 
Americans had regained control.   
 Second Battalion was nearly shattered by these mistakes.  It had begun the attack 
with 640 men but could muster only half of them by day’s end.  The action at Utweiler 
did not stop the division’s drive toward the Siegfried Line and the Rhine as O’Daniel 
aggressively ordered his units to renew the offensive.  The errors at Utweiler showed 
that even veteran units were susceptible to lapses in judgment.  Earl Reitan has studied 
this battle and has argued that 2/7’s mistakes and errors was symbolic of how tired and 
“worn out” the division had become from over two years of combat, especially as the 
men anticipated the end of the war soon and were becoming more hesitant to see action 
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against the Germans.  Replacements, however, refilled Second Battalion and it continued 
to fight until the end of the war.241
 After the attacks into Germany on 15 March, the division quickly made ground 
and fought through the Siegfried Line in only a few days.  After having been at the 
banks of the Rhine when they took Strasbourg and after reducing the Colmar Pocket, the 
division finally crossed it on 26 March between Worms and Sandhofen.  The Germans 
defended the crossing but could not stop the division. 
 
 Between 26 March and 17 April, the division drove east from the Rhine across 
the Main River and then southeast to Nuremberg.  In the process, the division took 
scores of towns.  At various towns and villages, the combat teams confronted stiff 
resistance against their invasion or none at all.  The 7th Infantry faced strong urban 
combat within Sandhofen and the 15th Infantry’s First Battalion endured heavy urban 
combat taking Miltonberg on the Main River on 30-31 March.  Each time, employing 
tactics developed since 1944, towns fell to the Americans.  By early April, the 15th 
Infantry’s history recounted “the allied offensive had assumed the proportions of a 
victory march through Germany.”242
 One important element had become the civilian population as organized German 
military effort disintegrated.  The Americans realized they were no longer liberating 
French civilians; now they were conquering the Germans.  The 15th Infantry’s history 
stated that where a German town offered resistance, American artillery, armor, and 
infantry leveled it.  American forces fired upon buildings not showing a white flag of 
surrender.  It did not take long to convince Germans in these towns that resistance was 
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not only futile but foolish; these towns typically “lost all heart to fight on.”  Towns that 
did not resist these tank-infantry punches bore no resemblance to the other countries 
welcoming the Americans as liberators.  The American ground forces passed through 
“town after town and city after city [that] had completely lost its identity, smashed by 
our air corps and ripped and torn by our artillery and infantry.”  The 15th Infantry’s 
history remarked with a sense of self-righteousness that this reality was in “drab contrast 
to the proud people who set out to conquer the world.”243
 By mid-April, the 3rd, 42nd, and 45th Divisions, perhaps 35,000 soldiers, looked 
toward Nuremberg, a major city split by the Regnitz River.  Nuremberg’s cultural 
importance rivaled Aachen. It was the location for important German churches, 
museums, artisans, and artists.  Because of this, the Nazis had selected the city to be the 
shrine of their party.  The city was the site of mass Nazi rallies, such as one in 1934 that 
swept 250,000 Germans into a cult of Hitler-worship.  In 1935, Hitler introduced his first 
anti-semitic statutes in Nuremberg, the so-called “Nuremberg laws,” wherein Germany 
would be protected from the perceived menace of European Jews.
 
244  Although the city 
had not asked for this special fascist attention, it would reap the whirlwind as the 
American XV Corps approached it.  Beyond the city’s psychological value, capturing its 
road network would undermine Germany’s First Army and help the Allies on the way to 
Munich.245  The 42nd Division fought for the western suburb of Fuerth while the 3rd 
Division attacked from the north and the 45th Division attacked from the south and east.  
The difficulty would come when the 3rd and 45th Divisions hit the thick, centuries-old 
wall around the old city.  Northern Nuremberg is mapped out in Figure 8.11. 
 
 
474 
 
 The core of the city’s defenses was a ring of antiaircraft positions.  The 9th Volks 
Grenadier Division had command of the city’s defense and were aided by the 2nd 
Mountain Division and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadiers.  Outside the city was Gruppe 
Grafenwoehr, consisting of two infantry battalions and thirty-five tanks.  Within the city 
were many Luftwaffe personnel and Volkssturm units.  Many civilians, including the 
dedicated Nazi gauleiter, were also militarized.  To German generals, the city had no 
special significance and they preferred not to have to defend the city itself.  Indeed, by 
16 April, there were practically no prepared defenses against a ground attack.246  But to 
the soldiers defending Nuremberg, it took on a special significance.  One German officer 
described these auxiliary units as “absolutely inadequate.” The Volkssturm units were 
too old to fight and the civilian population “seemed to be useless.”247  Extrapolating 
from the number of prisoners taken, there may have been between eighteen to twenty-
five thousand German defenders in the area.248
 As the 42nd and 45th Divisions deployed west and east, respectively, the 3rd 
Division advanced from the north.  On 15, 16, and 17 April, the division captured the 
suburbs thoroughly.  The preliminary clearing operations were violent, nasty little urban 
actions that foreshadowed what Nuremberg had in store for the Americans.  At this time, 
the 14th Armored Division eliminated the German tank-infantry unit Gruppe 
Grafenwoehr as a viable armored threat to the attack on the city.
 
249
 As the division approached Nuremberg, the plan became to send the 7th and 15th 
Infantry Regiments directly south into the city.  Initially, the 30th Infantry was in reserve 
but deployed to the division left to attack westward into the city.
   
250  As it fought its way 
 
 
475 
 
Figure 8.11:  Town Plan of Nuremberg 
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toward Nuremberg and anticipated a strong fight, a German prisoner of war informed the 
15th Infantry that there forty or fifty German tanks and assault guns were aiding in the 
city’s defense.  This information was either an inaccurate statement or a blatant lie 
because the Germans had few tanks inside the city.251  At 1700, 3/15 complained about 
the suburbs’ “stubborn,” stiff defense.252
 On the eighteenth, the city of Nuremberg became encircled.  Through 18 and 19 
April, the 3rd and 45th Divisions aggressively pressed into and fought through the city.  
All accounts consistently dwell on the extremely stubborn resistance from the defenders.  
Units fought from room to room as they advanced house-by-house.
  By the end of the day, patrols were reaching 
Nuremberg itself. 
253  This sort of 
defense necessitated a combined-arms approach.  The Germans fought so hard that it 
would have been impossible for infantry alone to capture the city.  Infantry, armor, and 
artillery were sufficient to capture the city.  The process remained violent and brutal.  
O’Daniel ordered the 30th Infantry to use tanks and tank destroyers on these stubborn 
houses.254
 The street fighting through these three days was as intense as anything the 1st 
Division encountered in Aachen and the 5th Division faced in Saarlautern.  Unlike those 
two places, civilians played a major part.  Civilians fought alongside German soldiers, 
fortifying every floor and room in houses.  The Germans established strongpoints, 
making extensive use of antitank and sniper fire against the Americans.  The 7th 
Infantry’s Second Battalion assaulted a factory under cover of smoke, clearing each 
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room in turn.  First Battalion took fifty prisoners when it seized an apartment 
building.255
 The commander of L/15, Captain John Toole, remembered the isolation of 
having no flank protection and hearing nothing but the houses on fire in his street.  He 
sent out patrols in the evening to find I and K Companies but his men did not feel at ease 
with being on their own like that.  Germans feigned surrender and killed his men.  Toole 
recalled the anger he felt in getting his men bunched up in a street to be gunned down by 
German soldiers.  When he returned to battalion headquarters, he heard of a German 
woman firing a panzerfaust and knocking out tank.  The battalion commander was 
determined to issue incendiary grenades to the men and burn the city down.  Toole 
remembered thinking, “Why, the whole city’s already on fire!”
   
256
 By the end of the nineteenth, the Americans had slowly wound their way to the 
walled Old City.  A 155-mm self-propelled gun fired twenty rounds at the wall at point-
blank range but caused little damage.  In the early morning hours on the twentieth, the 
division breached the Old City walls and poured inside.  Heavy urban combat resumed 
through the twentieth: booby-trapped bodies, abundant panzerfausts, and civilians 
joining the military.  However, by the afternoon of the twentieth, the 3rd Division 
declared the city to be cleared of German combatants.  After the division breached that 
wall, the German soldiers began to surrender once they saw that American victory was 
inevitable. 
   
 In comparing the urban combat in Aachen with what happened in Nuremberg, it 
appears that combat there was not managed as well as in Aachen.  That is, the American 
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advance through Nuremberg was not as methodical as through Aachen.  The 15th 
Infantry’s history commented on the “painstaking, slow, deliberate way of fighting” 
from having to check every room in every house.  What is more, German soldiers 
sometimes infiltrated behind the Americans in Nuremberg, something that the 
Americans in Aachen worked hard to minimize.  While the 3rd Division maintained 
close tank-infantry ties, the 3rd Division did not adhere to other American lessons of 
urban combat, such as thoroughly ensuring that their rear had nobody in it, civilian and 
soldier.  Just as the division dispatched a lieutenant to observe how the 9th Division 
assaulted the Siegfried Lines, there was no such observer from the 3rd Division to 
inquire how the Big Red One took Aachen nor how the 2nd Division breached the city 
walls of Brest.  Nuremberg constitute the 3rd Division’s largest and one of its most 
intense urban battle in World War II.257
 Of course, the 3rd Division continued its advance.  In the last days of the war, the 
division seized the cities of Augsburg and Munich but without bloodshed.  The division 
found itself in Austria when the Germans agreed to a cease-fire on 7 May and 
surrendered on 8 May. 
  Although the city was shell of its former glory, 
Nuremberg later hosted the trials of Germany’s most notorious and infamous leaders. 
Conclusion   
 Combat after December 1944 showed that the U.S. military had adopted 
combined-arms fighting.  In many ways, the 1st Division at Bonn and the 3rd Division at 
Nuremberg showed how tank-infantry-artillery teams were an essential part of victory in 
modern war.  As the Americans fought for those villages, towns, and cities, they did so 
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in a combined-arms manner that usually brought infantry into greater degrees of 
cooperation with artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers.  This cooperation was now a part 
of the American way of war.  After the 5th Division’s tanks and tank destroyers were 
taken from them by corps headquarters before joing the Battle of the Bulge in December, 
the division received two new attached battalions.  The Red Diamond Division quickly 
established solid working relationships with those not attached battalions.  They 
understood that their lives and their division’s success depended on it.   
 However, as the conduct of the several 3rd Division attacks show, not all the 
divisions thoroughly learned the lessons of urban combat.  The 15th Infantry failed to 
appreciate the defense at Bennwihr and let its Third Battalion become entangled in a 
vicious fight against a bitter enemy.  In late January, 2/15 gambled that speed and 
surprise might help them to seize Wihr-en-Plaine and lost that gamble.  The battalion 
relearned the lessons on the importance of armor support in an urban battle as it fought 
against difficult resistance in late January.  At Utweiler, 2/7 failed to provide its own 
security and defense after it seized it on 15 March 1945 and was nearly overrun by a 
German counterattack.  At Nuremberg, the 3rd Division seems to have failed to maintain 
adequate rear security and did not always thoroughly clear buildings of their enemy 
presence.  The 3rd Division fought in many difficult battles through World War II and is 
not defined by these mistakes.  Lessons sometimes had to be relearned throughout the 
war.  The three divisions developed mature ways to handle the urban environment, 
despite occasional mistakes. 
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 In terms of urban combat, villages, towns, and cities continued to be tactical and 
operational targets as the Americans pursued the broad-front strategy of destroying the 
Wehrmacht.  The towns of the Colmar Pocket had no significance except they helped the 
Allies to reduce that pocket west of the Rhine River.  When the Americans were forced 
to engage in urban combat, some battles, such as against Putscheid, Uckerath, and 
Nuremberg, showed the power of the defender in this environment.  As the Americans 
fought the Germans, they learned the efficacy of combined-arms fighting.  As they 
applied these lessons to ensure the Allies’ eventual victory, they had to re-learn how 
difficult fighting in towns and cities was.  Nevertheless, the Americans learned well 
enough, and maintained strong enough organizations to defeat the German fascist threat.  
Throughout the course of this conflict, the Americans had overcome its prewar 
unpreparedness, and drew upon resources of modern arms and firepower that the 
German Wehrmacht could not defend against or resist, regardless of how often they 
counterattacked.  The American Army that stood victorious in 1945 reflected four years 
of improved training, effective logistics, and remarkable soldierly qualities than their 
enemies could have imagined in 1941. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
CONCLUSION:  “I COULD SEE NO SCARS OF BATTLE”  
 And so it was that World War II in Europe ended when German officers signed 
the terms of unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945.  At this point, Allied statesmen, 
diplomats, and politicians began implementing a new direction for Europe.  Although 
East vied against West as a “cold war” developed, the western European powers 
reconciled far more with western Germany than they had in 1918.  Indeed, the emerging 
western European community rivaled what happened in European diplomacy after the 
fall of Napoleon in 1815. 
 Having experienced such a long war, the Allies could not simply rest on their 
success and not plan for future conflicts, especially in the face of the emerging Cold War 
between East and West.  This planning factored in urban combat.  Before 1941, United 
States Army officers gave little consideration the possibility of urban combat but, after 
1945, they could not afford to ignore its likelihood.  Towns and cities composed one 
environment among several possible combat environments that received attention in the 
professional military journals of the postwar United States military.  Postwar articles 
written about the subject reveal how the military perceived the state of urban combat 
after its experience in World War II.  The theme of combined-arms thinking threads 
through these articles. 
 In one notable report, Brigadier General George Taylor, chief of staff of the 1st 
Infantry Division, commander of the 26th Infantry in North Africa, and commander of 
the 16th Infantry in Sicily, reflected on how best to engage in urban combat.1  He began 
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by noting the most common elements that should affect an officer’s plan of attack into a 
built-up area:  its population density; the size, location, and the terrain of the area; and 
the extent of defensive preparations.  Once the commander had evaluated how these 
elements would affect his plan of attack, Taylor argued that the principles of war applied 
to the attacker only insofar as he was able to seize the commanding ground in the town’s 
outskirts.   
 Having gotten a foothold within the outskirts, officers needed to be flexible 
because the usual rules of battle did not always apply.  This was because, he noted, “the 
large towns and cities of Germany present a maze of buildings, alleys, fortifications, 
cellars, subways, and sewers that offer countless places of shelter and concealment to 
defending troops.”  The possibilities of tripping enemy ambushes or defending against 
enemy infiltration were much higher.  Taylor showed that the attacker must maintain 
tight command and control within the maze of a battered, broken city where many 
homes and buildings were crumbling and half-standing, thus giving the enemy many 
opportunities to inflict injury and the attacker many circumstances to lose direction and 
control.  Therefore, Taylor advocated an approach to combat in built-up areas that was 
thorough, methodical, and combined.2   
 The commander maintained command and control by establishing clear 
boundaries, phase lines, and control points.  This kept the line units together and 
prevented gaps from opening between them.  Numbering important positions, 
intersections, and buildings, such as on the veteran divisions’ “measles sheets,” aided in 
communication and quickly getting artillery support.  Part of that thorough command 
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and control meant clearing every room and every hiding place in every house and 
building to kill the enemy and evacuate all civilians so they could not help any enemy 
that might infiltrate.3 
 Soldiers’ movement, Taylor maintained, must not be through the open streets, 
where they would be exposed to enemy fire but through buildings instead.  The streets 
must be clear so that assault guns, tanks, and tank destroyers could assist the infantry’s 
attack.  Medium and heavy artillery might have a reduced role but high-angle weapons 
such as mortars became more important in the city.  In the attack, Taylor advocated 
using all weapons on hand but especially praised the tank-infantry team. Artillery 
offered preliminary bombardments as well as harassing and interdiction fire.  Mutually 
supporting armor-infantry teamwork was a requirement for success.  Armor fired on 
machine-gun nests and strongpoints to help infantrymen advance as other soldiers also 
searched for and eliminated antitank positions to protect the armor.4  
 Villages were different only in that they were smaller.  Taylor broke combat in 
villages into different categories.  If commanding ground was beyond the village, then 
the assault companies should bypass the village and seize the high ground, allowing 
reserve units to mop up the defenders in the cut off village.  If the village rested on the 
high ground, then taking it was similar to assaulting a fortified position.  And if attackers 
had to cross open ground, then it was best to attack that village at night.  Neutralizing a 
village also required tank-infantry-artillery cooperation and coordination.5 
 Taylor’s essay on urban combat closely followed the lessons learned from the 
26th Infantry’s September 1944 fight in Aachen, which he acknowledged.6  Thus it 
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indicates how wartime experiences likely shaped postwar reflection and thinking about 
combat. 
 General Taylor was not alone in considering and reflecting how the U.S. Army 
should fight urban combat after its World War II experiences.  Whereas there were no 
prewar articles and no prewar doctrine on urban combat, World War II created a 
different postwar outlook.  American professional military journals no longer ignored 
fighting in built-up areas and the military took steps to revise FM 31-50 in 1952.  
Postwar writing, and especially the revised version of FM 31-50, reflects the culmination 
of what the army learned about urban combat and how it had processed those lessons. 
 Between 1945 and 1952, there were three types of articles on urban combat.  
Reprints of Soviet articles on urban combat were the first type of postwar articles.  These 
essays typically appeared in Military Review’s “Foreign Military Digests” section.  
Whereas reprinted Soviet articles during the war discussed the lessons of Stalingrad, the 
postwar articles drew insights from the Battle for Berlin.  A February 1946 essay arguing 
that self-propelled artillery had a role in urban combat used examples from the fighting 
in Berlin.  Along these lines, the Soviets seemed to have gleaned many of the same 
lessons as the Americans had from their experiences:  understanding the special 
conditions inherent in fighting in built-up areas and the need for close coordination 
among the combat arms.7 
 This is not to say that American urban combat doctrine was the same as the 
Soviets.  Influenced by the fighting with in Aachen, General Taylor endorsed a 
methodical, thorough push through a town or city.  Lieutenant Colonel V. Iakovlev 
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concurred with some elements of the American urban combat experience: namely, in 
having a well-organized combined-arms approach, but Iakovlev envisioned a different 
role for Soviet assault groups.  These assault groups merely gained entry into buildings 
in order to maintain the Russians’ momentum.  But these teams should not be 
responsible for clearing a building’s upper stories.  Instead, he asserted, assault teams 
should simply seal off the first floor from the upper floors and let units behind them deal 
with room clearing.  Using the street fighting in Berlin for examples, Iakovlev indicated 
that it was more important to maintain the speed and momentum of the attack than to 
methodically eliminate all threats within a particular building.8 
 The second type of postwar article was one that merely narrated an urban action 
somewhere, usually pertaining to American forces.  Typically, these narratives did not 
feature much analysis but left that to the readers themselves.  With the war against Japan 
all but over, Nelson Randall’s August 1945 piece highlighted how artillery batteries’ 
massed direct fire helped the infantry to capture the city of Manila from fanatical 
Japanese defenders.9  Brigadier General R. W. Grow detailed how armored units took 
Mulhausen in April 1945 but did not explicitly derive lessons from that action.10  
Similarly, a Soviet reprint also described how an antitank unit successfully captured 
Skvir from the Germans in 1943.11 
 This third type of publication attempted to closely investigate the nature of urban 
combat, how to fight within built-up areas, or how the environment affected a specific 
branch.  Several articles appeared in Fort Benning’s Infantry School Quarterly.  This 
periodical typically dealt with small-unit tactics.  Articles written after the war assumed 
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that small infantry units, such as rifle platoons, would have to cooperate units armed 
with other weapons.12  Infantry School Quarterly did not neglect battle in built-up areas.  
In 1948, “Tactics and Techniques of Small-Unit Fighting in Built-Up Areas,” instructed 
a combined-arms approach to urban combat at the squad, platoon, and company levels.  
This piece covered some of the elementary aspects of urban combat:  the increased 
strength of the defense, reasons why an officer might need to attack a village, town, or 
city, and how to launch a controlled, methodical attack.  This article, written between the 
original 1944 publication of FM 31-50 and its 1952 revisions, closely followed the 1944 
FM 31-50 but more explicitly supported the utility of tanks and crew-served recoilless 
rifles within urban combat.13  Many of these sentiments were echoed in a 1950 article.  
That article assumed a combined-arms approach and emphasized planning, junior 
officers’ command and control, and the value of flexibility and creative thinking within 
the chaos of such fighting.14  A 1952 article continued many of the same themes within 
the context of the Korean War and fighting within Korean towns and villages.15 
 Other Infantry School Quarterly essays dissected small-unit urban engagements, 
whether a company or a battalion.  These articles closely described the planning of these 
actions as well as the fighting that occurred and made a conscientious effort to cull 
lessons from these actions.  One such battle analysis was the Third Battalion, 7th 
Infantry’s quickly-planned, late-afternoon attack on Noroy-le-Bourg during the 3rd 
Division’s campaign in southern France in the fall of 1944.  The lessons described 
included the importance of diligent junior officers that kept the attack moving in the face 
of strong enemy fire; that veteran, well-trained officers can adapt to new circumstances 
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and change a battle plan accordingly; and the importance of coordination between the 
infantry and tanks in capturing towns such as Noroy, especially in darkness.16  Another 
article studied F/23rd Infantry, of the 2nd Infantry Division, and its experiences within 
the port city of Brest, France in September 1944.  The Germans forced the Americans to 
fight block by block and street by street for Brest’s port.  Among other things, the article 
admonished junior officers to be mindful of communication difficulties in urban terrain, 
the importance of command and control amidst a city’s ruins, and to make use of armor 
to help reduce enemy strong points.17 
 Also noteworthy were the student monographs at Fort Benning’s and Fort 
Knox’s advanced officers’ courses.  After the war, many junior officers who attended 
those courses had also fought in World War II.  Part of their curriculum included 
describing a small-unit action, typically one that they had experienced, and dissecting 
the mistakes made and successes achieved in the engagements.  These student 
monographs covered a wide range of topics: from jungle warfare to airborne operations 
to river crossings to urban combat.  These student officers analyzed their own 
experiences and attempted to learn from them.  By keeping them on file at Fort Benning 
and Fort Knox, they became potential historical lessons for future officers.  This 
dissertation drew upon several student monographs as they related to urban combat.18 
 In sharp contrast to the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Army reflected upon, 
processed, and learned about urban combat between 1945 and 1952.  All the above 
examples, whether one general’s unpublished ruminations, or student monographs, or 
published articles in professional journals, constitute lower forms of institutional 
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learning.  That is, they did not have the power to change military doctrine.  Such 
discussions built upon what had happened in the recent past but did not have the power 
to officially change the doctrine of the U. S. Army.  In 1952, however, taking these 
views into consideration, and in light of a war in Korea, the U.S. military revised its 
urban combat field manual.  The 1952 edition of FM 31-50:  Combat in Fortified Areas 
and Towns represents the highest form of institutional learning.  It processed some 
lessons of the recent past and adapted military doctrine to fit its understanding of the 
military reality.  And it is clear that the 1952 edition shows institutional learning. 
 It is worth repeating that pursuant to the army’s practice of not denoting 
authorship, it is not possible to determine who helped to write this revised edition.  It is 
also not possible to determine how these authors wrote that manual: that is, what access 
they had to what documents to aid their writing.  While one cannot link specific 
historical lessons that influenced the revised manual, the revised edition is worth 
contrasting with its earlier 1944 cousin. 
 The 1952 edition of FM 31-50 is a more defined manual than its 1944 
predecessor.  Its definitions and assertions are more precise, but also more descriptive, 
fuller, and more nuanced.  The first major section gives the general, tactical, and 
intelligence characteristics of urban combat.  In contrast, the 1944 FM 31-50 reads more 
vaguely as a result of the American army not having experienced as much urban combat.  
That is, in elaborating upon the 1944 version’s more general and more vague 
characteristics of urban combat, the revised edition clearly bore proof of extensive 
experience with combat in that environment, and offered a more complete picture of 
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what to expect.  The 1952 edition assumed from the beginning that urban combat would 
include mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and tanks fighting alongside 
infantrymen with artillery support.19 
 The 1952 edition of FM 31-50 greatly modified the 1944 version.  It offered a 
more complete picture and gave fuller instructions that took into account what had 
happened in World War II.  In the defense of a town, both manuals explain that many of 
the principles of defending a fixed position apply to a built-up area.  That is, an adequate 
defense must include the front and flanks, is mutually supported by the weapons at hand, 
offers all-around protection, and is a defense-in-depth.  Both acknowledge that a 
defender should not select any location that the enemy can bypass but the 1952 edition 
explained that a defender chooses a position that therefore requires the enemy to attack.  
It also warned that defending a town or city is different than an organized defense 
elsewhere in that observation is limited, fields of fire are reduced, there is increased 
cover and concealment for a variety of weapons, mobility for infantry and tanks is 
limited, communication is impeded, and command and control is decentralized.20 
 In planning the defense, the deployment of regiment, battalion, company, 
platoon, and squad-sized units do not differ.  The discussion of support changed.  The 
1944 version focused on the different supporting units that might assist the infantry 
regiment, including artillery, the antitank mine platoon, engineers, communication, the 
intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, chemical units that fired a larger 4.2-inch 
mortar, and, lastly, tanks.  By January 1944, it was assumed that artillery would be the 
main weapon of support for an infantry unit defending a town or city.  Artillery was to 
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prevent an enemy from penetrating into the town or city, be capable of shelling likely 
avenues of assault, and be able to prevent an enemy’s envelopment maneuver.  Tank 
units, on the other hand, were good as a mobile reserve and for counterattack.  It is worth 
emphasizing that the 1944 edition, written through 1943 and published in January 1944, 
acknowledged a combined-arms stance but did not stress combined-arms battle in the 
ways that field units were being employed by then nor as subsequent wartime field 
manuals instituted.21 
 By 1952, a change in language occurred in the wake of a change in mindset.  
Rather than organizing different supporting units, a commander was now expected to 
integrate different supporting weapons.  The revised edition discussed how machine 
guns, recoilless rifles, mortars, tanks, and, artillery helped support a prepared urban 
defense.  Artillery did not have the primacy in 1952 that it did in 1944; tanks, on the 
other hand, received much more attention in 1952.  Rather than describe tanks’ use in a 
single sentence, the new manual discussed in depth how tank platoons, attached to front-
line units, could stop enemy tanks, aid in the overall defense, or cover important avenues 
of assault.  In general, tanks would remain generally static because of their limited 
maneuverability within towns.  It is also noteworthy that the manual included a 
photograph of an M-4 Sherman moving through rubble in a town street to remind the 
reader that tanks would experience far less maneuverability.  The later edition did not 
neglect how supporting units such as engineers as well as the antitank mine platoon, and 
intelligence and reconnaissance platoon aided in the defense as well.22 
514 
 
 Furthermore, the 1952 version described how to conduct the defense.  An urban 
defense consisted of three elements: security forces, main line forces, and reserve forces.  
Security forces, positioned at the outskirts of the defense to observe as well as direct air 
and artillery support, should “delay, deceive, and disorganize the enemy.”  Through pre-
planning, security forces ought to channel the enemy through obstacle and mine-strewn 
avenues of approach to eliminate as many as possible.  The main line forces engaged the 
enemy “by increased fires and by close combat in the streets and within buildings.”  The 
manual encouraged main-line forces to use every weapon available to keep the enemy at 
bay and defend “at all costs” or until ordered to withdraw.  Regimental and battalion 
reserves were to be used to prevent encirclement and for counterattack.  Reserve units 
needed to prepare plans for counterattack before the battle if the enemy breached the 
main line of resistance, especially at areas critical for the regimental or battalion defense.  
Ideally, plans for counterattack were to be arranged with higher headquarters in 
cooperation with artillery and tanks in order to maximize the effect of a counterattack.  
These plans for counterattack might include premade passages through buildings before 
the battle where a counterattack was likely to occur.23  Not only had the mindset become 
more thoroughly combined-arms oriented but the instructions for how to defend and how 
to counterattack suggest a more mature doctrine that was the fruit of urban combat 
experience in World War II. 
 Like the defense, there were key differences in the new edition explaining the 
urban attack.  The revised FM 31-50 asserted that the objective in fighting for a city or 
town was “the seizure of the entire built-up area.”  Further, limited objectives within a 
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city or town included “installations such as railroad stations, telephone exchanges, and 
public utility works” but contended these were also locations were the enemy was likely 
to make a strong defense.  Lastly, it advocated a methodical, thorough approach to urban 
combat wherein “all enemy are cleared from each zone before resuming the attack to the 
next phase line.”24 
 The 1944 manual had described the attack in two phases.  Phase I was the assault 
on the outskirts and gaining a foothold on the town or city and Phase II included the 
fight within the location for control of it.  The 1952 manual parsed an urban attack into 
three parts. Phase I is where the attacker isolated the city and cut it off from 
reinforcement and resupply; Phase II, then, was the assault on the city’s outskirts to gain 
entry into the place; Phase III was the “systematic house-by-house, block-by-block 
advance through the built-up area.”25 
 Focusing on the infantry aspect of urban combat, the 1944 manual organized 
instruction on the attack by the responsibilities at the rifle regimental, battalion, 
company, platoon, and squad levels.  Supporting units are discussed at their appropriate 
levels of command.  For example, the regimental level of command briefly considered 
the role of armor, artillery, engineers, and chemical combat troops.  The battalion level 
instructed the use of its antitank platoon, ammunition and pioneer platoon, and its heavy 
weapons company.  The squad level explained how squads support each other in the 
assault on houses and buildings.26   
 World War II taught Americans that taking a town required many weapons 
working in coordination and combination.  As such, the 1952 manual explained how 
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artillery, tanks, antiaircraft artillery, engineers, mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, 
and bazookas assisted in capturing a built-up area.  Not surprisingly, the revised manual 
significantly elevated the role played by tanks in the attack, especially in concert with 
the infantry.  The manual emphasized and closely defined how an infantry-tank team 
should operate inside a built-up area.   
 The 1952 manual then explained how to conduct the attack through Phases II and 
III.  Unlike the 1944 manual, there was no need to differentiate between levels of 
command.  It discussed control measures: the decentralization of the fighting and 
command as well as the assigning objectives and boundaries that it mattered little if it 
was a division or a battalion attacking a city, these characteristics and principles would 
hold true.  The tactics, techniques, and procedures for house-to-house fighting as well as 
assaulting and breaching entry into houses and buildings were largely the same.  The 
revised manual was briefer in this regard but both manuals advocated supporting fires 
between squads, the application of firepower, and quick movement.  Both also 
encouraged a thorough, methodical approach of clearing every room in order to 
minimize the possibility of the enemy infiltrating into rear areas.27 
 The U.S. Army was mired in the Korean War by 1952 and had encountered 
urban combat within the towns, villages, and major cities on the Korean Peninsula.  
Those experiences likely influenced the 1952 rewriting of FM 31-50.  However, the 
revised manual also strongly reflected the U.S. Army’s World War II experience as well.  
The emphasis on the necessity of the combined-arms approach is a fundamental 
outgrowth of what the army assimilated in World War II.  Allowing for a few 
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technological and organizational changes, this dissertation has shown how the 1st, 3rd, 
and 5th Infantry Divisions were fighting more in line with the 1952 urban combat 
manual than the 1944 manual by the end of World War II.  In many ways, the 1952 
revision accurately reflected the lessons that the field armies had learned about urban 
combat in World War II and how it was fighting within that environment by the end of 
that conflict. 
Conclusion  
 In December 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded to 
National Guard complaints of shortages and old equipment in the Iraqi insurgency.  The 
secretary said “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or 
wish to have at a later time.”28  His comment was controversial and was judged by many 
to be impolitic but it is not entirely wrong.  The United States has always gone to war 
with the army it had and not the army it wanted or needed.  The challenge has been to 
quickly improve, adapt, and become more effective as that army identifies weaknesses in 
various areas.   
 World War II was no different.  In November 1942, the 1st and 3rd Divisions 
participated in the landings in North Africa.  Both divisions encountered limited urban 
combat but both responded similarly.  Elements of the 7th Infantry Regiment 
encountered enemy resistance within the coastal city of Fedala but there was no 
coordination with its tanks as it captured the city.  Likewise, the 18th Infantry relied 
solely on its infantrymen to take the town of St. Cloud, which it accomplished only when 
Oran fell and ordered the St. Cloud garrison to surrender.  By the end of war, these 
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organizations, along with their sister regiments and parent divisions, had learned how to 
capture towns and cities from the Germans.  Awareness of the urban environment 
sharpened and combined-arms coordination and techniques had improved.  As a result, 
two battalions from the 26th Infantry, one of the 18th Infantry’s sister regiments, 
captured Aachen after the division had isolated it.  The 3rd and 45th Divisions seized 
Nuremberg in 1945.  And the 5th Division fought with the rest of XX Corps to seal off 
and seize Metz.  In many ways during World War II, the U.S. Army became the army it 
wanted to be but it was a process that took many months, trial and error, and many 
thousands killed and wounded.   
 Because the enemy always gets a vote, the Germans helped with this 
transformation.  In order to defeat an enemy as sophisticated as the Wehrmacht, the 
American infantryman, artillerist, and tanker had to make organizational changes at the 
tactical level and bring about greater combined-arms coordination.  In contrast to the 
operational unpreparedness in 1942 and 1943, the American soldier had become more 
proficient in urban combat in 1944 because his experience against such an experienced 
enemy demanded it.   
 Examining the American response to urban combat in its war against Germany 
shows elements of that learning process.  As such, this dissertation argues that learning 
occurred from two different directions:  by the infantry divisions themselves as they 
fought in various combat environments, including the urban environment, and by the 
Army during the war and afterwards as it processed and analyzed the various battlefields 
to adjust doctrine or create it anew. 
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 Very early in the war, American soldiers were thrust into an environment for 
which they did not have adequate training.  It is no surprise that they struggled in their 
first urban battles at Fedala and St. Cloud.  After the North African Campaign, the field 
army became aware that it needed to adjust and so it created the Fifth Army Invasion 
Training Center in North Africa for those units going to Sicily.  Part of the training 
center included training in movement down a street and house-to-house fighting.  But 
because this training only involved the infantry, and most likely just the riflemen, it 
showed that the field forces were moving in the right direction but were not fully 
prepared yet.   
 The Sicily Campaign revealed the field units slowly learning.  At places like 
Barrafranca, the 1st Division began to see the importance of effective tank-infantry 
teamwork as its infantry regiments advanced and captured towns and villages.  Fighting 
in Troina taught the difficulty of urban combat, as it took the Americans several days to 
pummel and finally subdue the town’s defenders.  The 3rd Division landed without 
armored support and moved through much of Sicily with little assistance from tanks or 
tank destroyers.  As the division proceeded along the island’s northern coastal highway, 
racing the British toward Messina, the Germans tended to fortify and defend from the 
mountainous terrain rather than the area towns.  While the divisions had begun to grasp 
the nature of urban combat with the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center, they still had 
yet to learn that effective fighting within towns and cities required a combined-arms 
approach and not one that relied almost exclusively on the infantry. 
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 The 3rd Division brought this infantry-centered attitude to Italy.  Through much 
of the division’s fighting up the Italian peninsula, the infantry bore the brunt of the 
fighting as organic artillery offered support along the way.  During one of the division’s 
more vicious urban fights in Italy, C/15’s battle of Roccaromana in October 1943, tanks 
and tank destroyers offered no help at all but fulfilled missions elsewhere.  The 
treacherous, mountainous terrain limited armor’s help, but no one attempted to use 
armor even in a modified form in the attack on Roccaromana.  The fight at Roccaromana 
remained an American infantry-artillery attack against German infantry, artillery, and 
armor. 
 It was not until February and March of 1944, when the 3rd Division was locked 
in the beach at Anzio, that the attached armor battalions advocated improved tank-
infantry teamwork and coordination.  Preparing for the breakout from Anzio involved 
both street fighting training at Nettuno and training in tank-infantry cooperation, 
including tank-infantry assaults on fortified houses.  When the division broke out of the 
Anzio beachhead toward Rome, it had prepared itself for fighting for towns and cities, 
such as Cisterna di Littoria, and the infantry and tanks had developed far better 
teamwork. 
 During this time in England, the 1st Division also improved its urban combat 
effectiveness.  As the division prepared for the invasion of Europe, the 18th Infantry 
used a bombed out British community to train its rifle companies in urban combat to 
prevent another fiasco like St. Cloud.  Although it only involved its rifle companies and 
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it did not include any armor, the regiment was still processing and learning from its past 
battles. 
 It was in northwest Europe, then, that American divisions came to better 
understand and conduct combined-arms warfare and to apply it against the German 
Wehrmacht in towns and cities.  After breaking out of the hedgerows, both the 1st and 
5th Divisions relied heavily on their attached tank and tank destroyer battalions.  
Progress for both divisions required that infantry-armor-artillery teamwork as they 
helped push the German military toward the Siegfried Line.  Both divisions came to 
depend upon that cooperation through the latter part of 1944: the 5th Division in 
Lorraine helping to capture Metz and the 1st Division entangled within the Siegfried 
Line.  As these divisions understood and mastered combined-arms fighting in general, so 
they applied it specifically to urban combat. 
 By the time the 3rd Division landed in southern France, urban combat had ceased 
being solely an infantry affair and had become a cooperative effort with artillery, tanks, 
tank destroyers, and infantry.  The Germans expertly used the forests, mountains, rivers, 
and broken terrain to stymie American advances against Metz, the Siegfried Line, and 
southern Germany through late 1944.  But the 1st and 5th Divisions captured Aachen 
and Metz regardless of German efforts to defend them.  The Hürtgen Forest and the 
Vosges Mountains dramatically challenged the Americans’ combined-arms 
arrangements but those combinations produced advances nonetheless. 
 After recovering from the shock of the Ardennes Counteroffensive in December 
1944, the Americans made strong artillery-tank-infantry attacks to flatten the Bulge and 
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begin the main invasion of Germany.  The 5th Division saw vicious urban combat at 
Putscheid and the 3rd Division fought savagely at Sigolsheim, Bennwihr, and Biesheim, 
places where Germen defenders tenaciously resisted American attacks, though the war 
appeared to be going against them.  These costly engagements were powerful reminders 
of the strength of the defender in urban combat.   
 As enemy resistance collapsed in March and April 1945, the Americans sped 
rapidly through Germany’s cities and towns to facilitate the destruction of the 
Wehrmacht.  Still, the 1st Division’s failure to capture the bridge at Bonn and the 3rd 
Division’s near-fiasco at Utweiler showed that, even late in the war, the Americans 
committed costly errors.  Anticipating the end of the war, the 7th Infantry captured 
Berchtesgaden in a very different way than it seized Fedala in 1943. 
 The three infantry divisions learned as they fought the Germans.  In this sense, 
there is a degree of individualism in the American infantry division in World War II, 
fighting its own war and not communicating with other units.  Records for the 1st, 3rd, 
and 5th Divisions indicate very few examples of inter-division or intra-corps learning or 
communication.  This is not to say there are no examples.  Significantly, the 12th Army 
Group disseminated combat units’ battle lessons by publishing Battle Experiences.  In its 
pages the 1st and 5th Divisions discussed the best methods to capture towns and cities 
and how to maximize a regiment’s organic weapons.29  In terms of intra-corps discussion 
were the December 1944 exercises of XIX Corps on how to capture villages and towns 
with tanks and infantry.30  And one rare example of inter-division communication was 
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the 7th Infantry Regiment’s observations of how the 9th Division attacked into the 
Siegfried Line in order to emulate their successes in March 1945.31   
 It is also noteworthy that as Lieutenant Colonel Derrill Daniel’s 2/26 planned its 
movements within Aachen in October 1944, he did not draw any lessons from the battle 
within Brest, France, which had occurred one month earlier in September.  Instead, 
foremost in his mind was preventing the mistakes and the stalemate of Cassino, Italy, 
which occurred the previous January and February as the 1st Division prepared for the 
invasion of Europe.32  Yet as both the 2nd Division in Brest and the 1st Division in 
Aachen employed “mouseholing” tactics, it is possible that more communication 
occurred but went unrecorded.33 
 These constitute informal but noteworthy forms of institutional learning.  
However, it is clear that the U.S. Army, at various levels, processed its battle 
experiences and tried to improve upon them.  One product of lesson processing, and an 
example of top-down learning, was the U.S. Army’s first field manual on urban combat, 
FM 31-50 in 1944.  FM 31-50 had pulled from the army’s experiences in terms of urban 
combat but by the time that it was published in January 1944, many of the field divisions 
had already progressed beyond it.  These units had already found ways to employ armor 
to augment the striking power of an urban assault, like the 16th Infantry at Kreuzau and 
Vettweiss in March 1945, for example.  However, later field manuals, such as FM 7-20: 
Infantry Battalion, published in October 1944, reflected the combined-arms tendencies 
in urban combat more than FM 31-50.   
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 It is worth considering the interaction between combat units and official doctrine 
such as the army’s urban combat manual in FM 31-50.  While the 1944 manual called 
for only a small degree of combined-arms fighting in a built-up area, American soldiers 
through the latter half of 1944 modified the official doctrine by conducting much more 
combined-arms fighting in the urban environment.  The divisions’ records are silent on 
the degree to which Battle Experiences and field manuals influenced units in the field.  
Short of an officer or NCO explicitly claiming that these publications guided a specific 
battle or operation, it is very difficult to determine how, or even if, they influenced the 
battlefield.  Colonel Derrill Daniel acknowledged the influence of the difficulties at 
Cassino in Italy, and he wished to avoid them in Aachen.  Nothing in the 5th Division 
records illuminates how the 2nd Infantry discovered that thermite grenades could 
effectively neutralize pillboxes in Saarlautern, although it strongly indicates that it might 
have been trial and error or was serendipitous.  Whereas it is unclear if FM 31-50 
affected the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions, their actions in northern France, Lorraine, and 
southern France showed that they were ahead of the army’s institutional learning curve.  
The October 1944 field manual on the rifle battalion, FM 7-20, is evidence that the army 
was trying to catch up. 
 In the question of influence, FM 7-20, and its increased emphasis on combined-
arms fighting in towns and cities, suggests that battlefield experiences had a greater 
bearing on doctrine than doctrine had on combat leaders’ decisions.  Field units were 
more attuned to doctrinal strengths and deficiencies as they endured battle than military 
planners or the writers of doctrine.  These combat leaders were therefore more likely be 
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ahead of the institutional state of learning in wartime.  In this sense, it is logical for these 
combat units to have more sophisticated and mature warfighting practices, such as in the 
urban environment, than codified current doctrine suggested.  What is notable is that 
military planners stateside observed these patterns and changes and endorsed them as 
they could.  It is significant that, for example, the role of armor changed from a vague, 
limited role in FM 31-50 to a more prominent function in the later FM 7-20, very 
possibly as a result of the successes and battlefield lessons learned by combat units such 
as the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions.  The army’s institutional learning may have lagged 
behind combat units’ battlefield experiences but it sought to catch up nonetheless. 
 The process of “catching up” was uneven.  The 1942 manual for tanks, FM 17-
10, saw no place for tanks within towns and cities and that manual was never updated.  
Some of this unevenness is because the World War II U.S. Army lacked a central 
organization to cull, process, and analyze lessons that the army should be learning in 
wartime.  Without such an organization, doctrinal improvements were imbalanced:  the 
1942 FM 17-10 warned against tanks’ involvement in urban combat, FM 31-50 (early 
1944) recognized that tanks might contribute to street fighting, and the late-1944 FM 7-
20 more strongly emphasized tanks’ participation in urban combat.  Although sometimes 
irregular, army field units and military planners eventually came to agree that the best 
way to assault a town or city was within a combined-arms mindset.  The 1952 revisions 
to FM 31-50 reflected the wartime lessons learned in blood of the combined-arms nature 
of urban combat in the attack and the defense. 
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 One major hindrance to the divisions’ learning process was the constant turnover 
from casualties and replacements.  Experienced veterans became casualties and unable 
to train new replacements.  Especially when integrated into a combat unit during a battle, 
new replacements died at fearful rates.  By the time the 26th Infantry’s Second and Third 
Battalions, the conquerors of Aachen, attacked Merode and Jungersdorf in the Hürtgen 
Forest, a large number of those units were making their first urban assault because they 
were the replacements from the battle in Aachen.  The divisions’ records are replete with 
complaints about the inadequate stateside training of replacements.  This called for 
constant in-theater training and, during rest periods, most of these divisions did just that.  
After the Colmar Pocket drained many veterans from the 3rd Division, it absorbed new 
replacements.  Part of rebuilding those units meant hard training in Lorraine for the 
upcoming invasion of Germany.  In February 1945, this training included a street 
fighting course in Pournoy-la-Chetive.  It was up to the replacements to learn these skills 
and enough seem to have learned these skills and contribute toward the Allies’ victory 
over Germany.34 
 When all the fighting and destruction was over, Europe slowly picked itself up 
and rebuilt.  The Germans rebuilt their cities as they labored to move away from the 
Nazi nightmare.  In 1957, Colonel John Corley, who led one of the battalions into 
Aachen, brought his two sons to see the old battlefields that he and the rest of the 1st 
Division had fought over in the fall and winter of 1944.  In Aachen, father and sons 
stayed in the same Quellenhof Hotel at Farwick Park that Corley’s men had assaulted 
during the battle.  The hotel had been rebuilt since the battle gutted it.  The three enjoyed 
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first-class service in the same place that had once housed German mortars and a 20-mm 
gun.  Corley reported that “I could see no scars of battle” when he visited Farwick Park’s 
tennis courts, gardens, mineral bath pool, and walking paths.  As Corley wandered 
around rebuild Aachen, he marveled at what his men had accomplished and how the city 
had transformed itself; he even got lost during his walk.  After thirteen years, he had to 
exert effort to find a few buildings that still had battle damage.35  Whereas military 
thinkers estimate that urban warfare will increase as global urbanization trends rise and 
whereas modern urban warfare means even more death, misery, and destruction than in 
the 1940s, it is a small reassurance that those who survive will still rebuild their lives and 
begin anew. 
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